Singh v The Queen - [1983] FCA 374

Re: WILLIAM SINGH
And: THE QUEEN
No. NTG 12 of 1982
Criminal Law - Criminal Law and Procedure Act

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Forster J.
Woodward J.
Neaves J.

CATCHWORDS

CRIMINAL LAW - Appeal against declaration under s.24 Criminal Law & Procedure Act - "Habitual Criminal" - whether proper sentencing discretion exercised.

Criminal Law & Procedure Act 1978-1981 N.T. s.24 Habitual Criminals Amendment Act 1907 S.A. N.T. Acceptance Act 1910 Habitual Criminals Amendment Act Criminal Code Act 1983 s.397 Parole of Prisoners Act 1971 R v Fahey (1954) V.L.R. 460 R v Tait (1979) 24 A.L.R. 473 R v Roberts (1961) S.R. (N.S.W.) 681 Baldry v R - High Court of Australia 24/6/83 unreported

HEARING

DARWIN

#DATE 18:11:1983

JUDGE1

The appellant was convicted after trial by jury on one count of robbery with violence and one count of assault with intent to rape. He was sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for 5 years on the first count and for 4 years on the second count and the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The learned trial judge said, "Having regard to the nature of the offences with which you have been convicted, to your antecedents and to the declaration which I propose to make, I do not think it appropriate that I should fix a non parole period. In pursuance of s.24 of the Criminal Law and Procedure Act I declare that you are an habitual criminal and direct that on the expiration of the sentences I have just imposed you be detained in prison during the pleasure of the Administrator."

The appellant appeals against sentence on the following ground:

"That the declaration that the appellant is an habitual criminal is in all the circumstances unreasonable and amounts to a manifestly excessive sentence."

Section 24 of the Criminal Law and Procedure Act 1978-1981 is as follows:

"24. Where a person convicted of an indictable offence has been previously convicted on at least 2 occasions of indictable offences, the court before which he is convicted may declare that he is an habitual criminal and may direct, as part of his sentence, that, on the expiration of the term of imprisonment then imposed upon him, he be detained in prison during the pleasure of the Administrator."

The appellant, who was aged 27 at the time he was convicted and sentenced, had been previously convicted of indictable offences as follows:

3. 6.66 Larceny (2 counts); Break, enter and steal.
9. 6.66 Break, enter and steal; Attempt break, enter and steal.

12.10.67 Larceny.

10.12.68 Larceny.

27.2.70 Larceny.

6.11.70 Assault with intent to rape.

2.4.73 Break, enter and steal.

24.10.73 Buggery.

6.2.80 Indecent assault.

The convictions on and prior to 6 November 1970 were dealt with in the Children's Court but are nonetheless indictable offences. It is apparent that the appellant more than meets the criteria of being convicted on at least two previous occasions of an indictable offence, indeed so much was very…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Singh v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Singh v The Queen [1983] FCA 374
Case: [1983] FCA 374
Decision Date: 18 NOVEMBER 1983

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Singh, appealed against a declaration made by the Supreme Court of Victoria under section 24 of the Criminal Law and Procedure Act, which declared him a "habitual criminal." The appellant's argument was that the trial judge did not properly exercise their sentencing discretion when imposing a sentence on him. The appeal was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the trial judge exercised their discretion correctly in imposing a sentence and whether the Supreme Court was justified in declaring the appellant a "habitual criminal." The court considered the meaning of "habitual criminal" under the Act and the extent of the sentencing discretion available to the trial judge.

The court found that the trial judge had exercised their discretion correctly and that the Supreme Court was justified in declaring the appellant a "habitual criminal." The court held that the declaration was not an exercise of sentencing discretion but rather a statutory requirement that followed from the trial judge's sentence. The court also found that the appellant's previous convictions were relevant to the sentence imposed and that the trial judge had taken them into account appropriately. The appeal was dismissed.

The High Court's decision upheld the declaration made by the Supreme Court of Victoria and affirmed the trial judge's sentencing discretion. The court emphasised the importance of considering an offender's criminal history when imposing a sentence and the role of the Supreme Court in declaring an offender a "habitual criminal" under the Act.

Orders