Sherwan and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship)

[2021] AATA 1702

Sherwan and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 1702 (11 June 2021)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:2020/1037          

Re:Riad Elyas Mohammed Ali Sherwan

APPLICANT

AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member

Date:11 June 2021

Place:Melbourne

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant is of good character under s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth). 

..................[sgd]......................................................

Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member

Catchwords

CITIZENSHIP – application for Australian citizenship refused – good character requirement allegedly not satisfied – Alleged lie by Applicant about being stateless – decision under review set aside.

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)

Cases

BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574

Goldie v Minister for Immigration

and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1277
[1998] FCA 1660

Irving v Minister of State for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs

REASONS FOR DECISION

Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member

11 June  2021

BACKGROUND

1. A decision made on behalf of the Respondent, dated 11 December 2019, refused the application of Mr Ali Sherwan (“Applicant”) to become an Australian citizen. The refusal was on the ground that he failed to meet all the requirements set out in s 21(2) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (“Act”) in that he failed to satisfy the good character requirement.

2. The Applicant has applied to the Tribunal to have such decision set aside.

   LEGISLATION

3. Section 21(2) of the Act provides that a person is eligible to become an Australian citizen if the Minister is satisfied of a number of matters in regards to that person, including that the person:

   (h) is of good character at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application.

4. The issue is whether the decision of the Respondent to refuse the Applicant’s application on the ground in s 21(2)(h) of the Act, is the correct or preferable decision in light of the evidence presented to the Tribunal at the hearing.

   HEARING

5. The hearing took place over several days on 10 November 2020, 10 December 2020 and 14 January 2021. The Applicant was represented on each occasion by Mr Krohn of Counsel instructed by Vrachnas Lawyers and the Respondent by Mr Morris of Clayton Utz.

6. At the hearing by videoconference, affirmed evidence was given by the Applicant (through an interpreter) and by his wife Ms Hanna Falak Habeeb (also through an interpreter) by telephone in Iraq. Evidence was also given in support of the Applicant by

   
   

   Mr George Arapantzis, the Applicant’s employer. Each witness was cross examined. No witnesses were called by the Respondent.

7. T Documents and Supplementary T Documents were received into evidence.

8. At the conclusion of the hearing, a Direction was issued for the parties to provide written closing submissions. They were informed that the Tribunal would consider their submissions and reach a decision in due course.

9. For the reasons below, the Tribunal has decided to set aside the decision under review.

   EVIDENCE

10. The Applicant gave detailed evidence in which he confirmed the contents of his Witness Statement made in support of his application dated 5 November 2020. He said that its contents are true and correct.

11. I have read and considered the contents of that Statement. The Applicant refers to a number of other documents including two Statutory Declarations made by him on 24 August 2016 and 22 October 2019. The earlier relates to other prior proceedings concerning a visa cancellation.

12. In his Statement, the Applicant acknowledges “that I falsely stated in 2010, after I arrived in Australia, that I was stateless”. He says he has “expressed my remorse for that false information”. He also acknowledges that “I …wrongly stated in my application to sponsor my wife, that my wife was stateless”. Again, he says, “I am remorseful for this false statement”.

13. The Applicant explains, in his Statement, the circumstances in which he made such false assertions, and goes on to explain other matters including how it is that the box marked “No” was, as he says, erroneously ticked by an interpreter in response to a question about the citizenship of his children. The Applicant stated in oral evidence, “I am unable to read or write English at all”.

14. In oral evidence, the Applicant stated he was born in Baghdad in November 1968, and he has Iraqi citizenship. The Applicant stated that he married in 1994 and is the father of four children. The Applicant’s wife and children continue to reside in Baghdad. He indicated that he saw them in Turkey in 2019. The Applicant returned to Iraq in 2012 when his wife was ill, and he travelled on an Iranian visa.

15. The Applicant said he works in a freezer which is “very, very cold” where he assists in packing goods for restaurant orders. The Applicant has been doing this job for approximately five years. He sends money over to Iraq from his salary. The Applicant gave evidence that he has never been charged with a criminal offence either in Australia or Iraq even. 

16. The Applicant said that he left Iraq because “the situation [there] is very bad, especially for us as parents”. He said in Iraq “we suffered a lot”. In the Statutory Declaration made in 2016, he agreed he said, “I never intended to lie about my identity [but] we were persecuted in Iraq and I was threatened and I came to Australia, fearing for my life”.

17. The Applicant said he had “made a mistake in the beginning” by saying he was stateless, but said he was advised to say this by the person with whom he was sharing accommodation. However, a number of Iraqi documents disclosed that the Applicant, his wife and children all had Iraqi passports at the time, as well as Iraqi identity cards.

18. There was an earlier hearing in the Tribunal as I have noted concerning cancellation of the Applicant’s visa and there was reference in his evidence to the evidence he gave in that proceeding. He said he agreed “I lied” on that occasion to the Tribunal when he gave evidence that he was stateless.

19. In his application for citizenship under the Act, the Applicant agreed the box was ticked “no”, indicating thereby that his children did not have any citizenship at all. He said he was assisted in understanding the form by an interpreter named Hazim, but it was a “lawyer actually” who ticked the boxes on the form. He said he handed over to the lawyer all relevant documents including “the passport, the ID card, the immigration card and also the marriage certificate” and the lawyer “completed the form”.

20. The Applicant agreed “there was a time in 2010 and then in 2013 when [he] said [he was] stateless and that was not true”. But he agreed also that in 2013, he corrected that and told Australian authorities that he was an Iraqi citizen. He said “I am feeling very depressed because I lied to the authorities” but he said that since 2015 when he told his lawyer the truth, he has “[n]ever” lied to authorities again.

21. In lengthy cross- examination, the Applicant explained he has “lots of relatives” in Australia, including a brother who is an Australian citizen and who left Iraq 10 years before him because of the war between Iran and Iraq.

22. The Applicant agreed he came to Australia in January 2010 having left Iraq in late 2009. He had been on Christmas Island. He told authorities on Christmas Island that he had “no nationality”. It was then that he decided to say he was “stateless” after speaking to other detainees. He agreed he knew this was “wrong”. As to leaving Iraq, he said “I was threatened and my brother was kidnapped so I have to leave the country”. He repeated;  “I left country because of the threat on my life”.

23. The Applicant agreed that shortly after arriving in Australia, he engaged the services of a migration agent who helped him put together his visa documents. He admitted he told the agent a lie—that at the time (in 2010) he was a stateless person—but said he corrected this in 2017. He acknowledged that he, his wife and his children are still all Iraqi citizens.

24. As regards a written statement made by him in 2010 that his family “had no right to identity documents necessary to function within the society in Iraq”, the Applicant admitted that he was lying when he said that.

25. The Applicant said he was “really ashamed” that he had lied to the lawyer but he was at the same time fearful of telling the truth—“I was scared that they would return me back to Iraq…”. He stated that his lawyer was the one “who got me out of Christmas Island”. 

26. As regards his statement made on 20 February 2013, the Applicant said that the interpreter filled out the form for him and it was the interpreter who said “I will write the same as the previous statement and when you bring the citizenship [document] you can hand it over”. But the Applicant said, “I was actually in a depression at that time” and he said, “I told him that I need your help”. He said, “I didn’t know at that time what’s happening”– “That’s why I needed a lawyer and someone to help me”.

27. The Applicant alleged that his Witness Statement dated 5 November 2020 was written for him and he signed it, but he had not spoken to his lawyers and he managed to translate it for himself by using a Google App, but he said it was explained to him by an interpreter speaking Kurdish and Arabic. However, he said his translating was “very weak” so he got a friend to translate it for him.

28. As regards the Statutory Declaration of August 2016, the Applicant believed that was also written for him by the interpreter. The same was true of his Statutory Declaration of October 2019. He stated that this one also was written by the interpreter.

29. In re-examination, once again the Applicant said that he knew he had done “wrong” in lying and was “embarrassed” out of having done so. He said that on Christmas Island, he was “very, very stressed” and “not stable”.

30. The Applicant said his decision to flee Iraq was a “sudden” one.

31. The Applicant said that if he was to be granted with Australian citizenship, it is his intention to bring his wife and children to Australia. He said he speaks to them every day on the telephone using Facetime.

    George Arapantzis

32. Mr Arapantzis agreed in evidence he had given a reference for the Applicant. He said that the Applicant had worked at Metro Mill for the previous five years as warehouse and cooler general–hand. He said he has been punctual, willing to learn and pleasant to staff and others.   

33. In his evidence, Mr Arapantzis stated that he regarded the Applicant as a “gentle giant” who needs guidance “because he doesn’t understand the language that well”. He said that the Applicant’s character is one “to help out as much as he can and he’s always pleasant with [people]”.

34. Mr Arapantzis said it did not affect him that the Applicant wrongly lied to authorities saying he was stateless. He said the Applicant, in saying that, may not have taken in the right information to the questions he was asked.

35. He said if he could have more people like the Applicant in the workforce at his business “life would be so much easier”. In cross examination about the false answers the Applicant gave authorities, Mr Arapantzis said Mr Ali Sherwan “cannot understand people when they talk to him”. He said that “I don’t think he lied because I don’t think he understood”.

    Hanna Falak Habeeb

36. Mrs Falak Habeeb gave evidence by telephone from Iraq and said she was born  in 1978 . She said she has been married to the Applicant for 21 years. She said she is the mother of four children.

37. She said her husband came to Australia “out of fear” after his brother had been kidnapped.

38. She said she keeps in touch with her husband – “He ringing me all the time”. They speak “on a daily basis”.

39. Mrs Falak Habeeb said also that her husband sends her money every week or two – “I have no one else to support us”. She said her husband is “a very hardworking person”.

40. She said she did not know why her husband had said he was stateless when he came to Australia. She said she did not know he had claimed this.

41. In cross- examination, Mrs Falak Habeeb said her husband did not know he had a brother in Australia before fleeing Iraq. She said she did not travel to Australia with him because of financial reasons and because he was concerned about the safety of his family at sea — “just the fear of what the family may encounter”.

42. Mrs Falak Habeeb said her husband is “very honest”.

    CONTENTIONS AND SUBMISSIONS

43. The Applicant contends that the decision under review should be set aside.

44. The Applicant submits that he meets the requirements of “good character” in s 21(2)(h) of the Act. Reference is made to a number of considerations and to a number of authorities. Those authorities include BOY 19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574 (“BOY19”).

45. It is submitted that I should have regard to all the factors in the case relating to the Applicant’s character as a matter of enduring qualities. It is submitted that it is not a standard of heroic virtue which should be my guide, but one whether the Applicant is of good character to a level appropriate for him to be a permanent member of the Australian community as a citizen. In that regard, reference is made to sections of the Minister’s policy in these matters.

46. The statelessness wrongly claimed by the Applicant is contended to have taken place a long time ago in distressing circumstances and has since been corrected. There is no other ground for it to be properly said that he is not of “good character” and therefore the decision under review cannot be supported. Reference is made to his work history and family considerations such as the financial support he provides.

47. The Respondent, however, contends that the decision under review should be affirmed.

48. On the question of the meaning of “good character”, I am referred to authority in Irving v Minister of State for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs [1998] FCA 1660 (“Irving”).

49. It is submitted that the migration system depends upon the integrity of the information provided by individuals just like the Applicant. The system, as is indicated, should not be exploited to engineer a migration outcome to which an Applicant is not entitled. Although an instance of dishonesty may be outweighed by other considerations, a sustained pattern of dishonesty ought reasonably to be regarded as more difficult to displace.

50. The Respondent in that regard contends there have been a number of occasions on which the Applicant has provided false information or has answered falsely. In all, it is contended that there are six lies which should be highlighted, which  the Respondent submitted indicates a pattern of behaviour of lying.

51. It is submitted that the evidence on character provided to the Tribunal on the Applicant’s behalf does not substitute for a proper character assessment. There are moreover issues to be raised with respect to the character evidence. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that there are several good things to be said about the Applicant and thus, about his character.  

    CONSIDERATION

52. The Full Court decision in Irving is referred to by O’Bryan J in his review of the authorities in BOY19. At [46] of the latter, his Honour says “the term ‘good character’ is not defined in the Act, which indicates that Parliament intended the term to be used in a broad way and allows the decision-maker to consider a range of events and conduct connected with [an] applicant”.

53. I take it from his Honour’s remarks that I am not obliged under s 21(2)(h) of the Act to confine myself to consideration only of the Applicant’s admitted lying—be it one occasion or others. Nor that I should find that the Applicant fails merely by having lied. A broader range of considerations is involved. From this it follows, I consider, I am entitled to have regard to the Applicant’s character more generally as well. This, I consider, is the “broad way” to proceed as his Honour says.

54. My attention is also drawn to the Full Court decision in Goldie v Minister for Immigrationand Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1277 (“Goldie”) where at [8], the Court observed that the concept of “good character” in s 501 of the Act “is not concerned with whether an applicant for entry meets the highest standards of integrity but with a less exacting standard than that”. The Court went on to say—“It is concerned with whether the applicant for entry’s character in the sense of his or her enduring moral qualities is so deficient as to show it is for the public good to refuse entry”. That, of course, is a different section of the Act, but the principles involved are the same.

55. The “public good” is not specifically referred to in s 21(2)(h) of the Act but it may well come in as an element to be considered if, as the Respondent contends, the integrity of the migration system is in issue.

56. I should observe in that regard that the integrity of the system is a fundamental consideration. As the Respondent submits, the integrity of the system depends on the integrity of the information provided by individuals “just like the Applicant” it was said.. Thus, it is critical to the very functioning of the system that applicants deal with it responsibly and, importantly, honestly.

57. To quote O’Bryan J again in BOY19, Parliament, however, intended the term “good character” to be used in a broad way. For that reason, I cannot think, as I have said, that Parliament intended that in the Applicant’s case I should confine my attention only to his false claims of statelessness made early on. The inquiry I make, I consider, must take account also of a wider range of factors as is suggested by their Honours’ remarks in Irving-as indeed I have indicated above.

58. The question the Tribunal has to decide is, in a sense, a narrow one. Is it or is it not the case that the Applicant is of “good character” under s 21(2)(h) of the Act? If the Applicant is of good character, he is eligible for citizenship – there being no other ground advanced which would make him ineligible. If the Applicant, however, is not of good character then he is ineligible.

59. The approach I adopt to this question is that set out (in accordance with the authorities cited) by O’Bryan J in BOY19, above, at [54]. His Honour says that the word “satisfied” in s 21(2)(h) of the Act “is not amenable to the application of the evidentiary burden of proof, such as balance of probabilities”. I consider that I must be satisfied about the Applicant’s good character, not as a fact to be proved but as an opinion requiring evaluative judgment. As O’Bryan J goes on further to observe (at [55]), I am required to “reach an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character”. It is not necessary for me to have “a high degree of confidence” that this is so, but at the same time, it is not sufficient for me simply to believe there is “a chance” this is so. I think it is clear, as well, that I must exercise my powers of decision reasonably.

60. Following out these precepts, I am satisfied that the Applicant is of good character under

    
    

    s 21(2)(h) of the Act. I have a high degree of confidence that this is so. I am satisfied that there is not merely a chance that this is so. I am confident of my view analysing the evidence, I consider, reasonably. It is important to state that I have seen and heard the Applicant for myself and I observed him carefully. I am quite satisfied the Applicant is of good character at the present day.

61. As regards the Applicant’s false assertions of statelessness, I am inclined to distinguish between a person who has lied and one who is a liar-an habitual liar. It is clear to me that the Applicant did lie about his status on a number of occasions. It is alleged there were six or more such occasions of lying. Be that as it may, having seen and heard the Applicant, I have not formed the view that the Applicant is a liar as such. I do not regard him as given to lying. Nor do I regard him therefore as a habitual liar. I shall say more about this aspect further on.

1. Cross-examination did not, in my view, greatly or at all damage the Applicant’s credibility. It was directed almost solely to his lying on the forms but that was already an admitted fact. Cross-examination did not satisfy me that Mr Ali Sherwan was lying about anything else. Indeed, important aspects of his evidence were corroborated by his wife in Iraq. His employer even spoke well of him in this regard and he spoke of him very positively as a good employee.

2. I have not mentioned language difficulties experienced by the Applicant, but I think they are real and significant. Mr Arapantzis in evidence drew attention to this. At times it was clear to me the Applicant did not seem to understand the question being put to him by the interpreter but that could be an issue of interpretation by the interpreter. But I did not as a result place weight on alleged occasions of lying other than those admitted. Also, perhaps in the translation, there seemed to be some confusion in the Applicant’s evidence over dates or years.

3. I include, in particular, in this regard, the occasion where he agreed in evidence he had lied to the Tribunal on a previous occasion.

4. Lying to the Tribunal is of course a very serious matter. If he did lie then it may be said-- in his favour at least-- that he was very honest on this occasion in admitting to it. The question asked of him on this occasion was not objected to on the grounds of self-incrimination-- as it should have been. And his answer did expose him to the risk of criminal penalty. Indeed, I also consider the Respondent should have alerted me to the question being asked--before it was asked.

5. In any event, in light of the difficulties I have mentioned in paragraph 63 above, I am not able to be satisfied and reasonably make the finding that the Applicant realised he was answering a question related to previous Tribunal proceedings, as opposed to something else. He, for instance, had readily acknowledged he lied to authorities about statelessness and I am not satisfied, in light of the difficulties I have mentioned, that he realised that the question on this occasion was directed to the previous Tribunal proceedings. In such circumstances, I consider it unsafe to make a finding that the Applicant did lie to the Tribunal on the previous occasion, despite what he admitted to in cross-examination. As Mr Arapantzis said, the Applicant may not have taken in the right information to the question he was asked. My discounting of a purported admission, I must indicate, can only rarely—if ever—happen again. The facts in this case ,however, are special and out of the ordinary.

6. The initial occasion or occasions of lying that took place occurred as much as a decade or so ago. I did not see the occasion or any of the occasions as extending beyond the issue of statelessness—of the Applicant himself, his wife or his children. It is very easy at this stage to criticise the Applicant for having lied at all but the circumstances in which he found himself were desperate –on Christmas Island he said, he was “very, very stressed” and was not “stable” and I believe him when he says these things. No one can doubt that conditions there would have been very difficult –uncertain and unsettling.

7. In such circumstances, I consider he foolishly listened to others for advice. Given the circumstances, I am not however inclined to be over-critical. He was in a desperate situation. He explained at one point, he was scared authorities would send him back to Iraq—the very country he had fled by sea. After his initial act of lying on Christmas Island, I consider it reasonable to say the situation compounded and so as not to be caught out—and possibly, fearing return to Iraq—he continued with the lie about statelessness. As the Applicant himself said , he made a mistake “at the beginning” of it all..

8. That being the sole content of his lying as I see it, there is no evidence before me–which I with confidence can make findings about–of his lying about anything else. He has frankly confessed to his lying and says that he is “ashamed” and “embarrassed” and “depressed” that he did lie. I regard his contrition as significant and genuine.

9. Had the Applicant continued lying to authorities after acknowledging his lying about statelessness, I might feel differently. While I cannot say his lying about statelessness is isolated to one occasion, I believe I can say that he has not been lying about anything else which I can be satisfied about. This includes, as I say, the previous Tribunal proceedings.  In a sense, then, his lying is of a singular character and about one subject-matter only. It does not in my view extend into other matters.

10. I do not happen to regard the Applicant himself as lying in the answer “no” being given in the citizenship application form indicating thereby that his children had no citizenship status at all. I accept and find that the form was filled in for him by someone else who wrote the wrong thing.

11. There are always difficulties in cases of this kind where language problems of one kind or another occur-where because of language problems, for instance, documents are filled out and forms signed by others. Or in the course of translation, something gets misinterpreted or someone admits to something thinking it is something else they are admitting to. Legal practitioners especially, but others as well, need to be very careful in this regard. Taking instructions is one thing but preparing detailed witness statements and other documents on behalf of persons who do not speak or write English is quite another. Sometimes people are expected to sign statements that they cannot read or that have not even been read over to them. This practice must stop. An applicant making a witness statement, which the applicant may be required to affirm in the witness box, should be very clear about what is being stated. Before signing it, the statement should be read by the witness in a language they understand. Or the lawyer or agent may be asked to explain their actions should it turn out that evidence being given by a witness does not conform to statements taken or should it appear that the witness has no or little idea what their witness statement contains.

12. None of this is to downplay the significance of lying to authorities within the migration system, but it does put the Applicant’s conduct in context and I am bound by authority to judge whether he is of good character in a “broad” way. If I was to concentrate solely on his lying –even on as many as six or more occasions—I consider I would be failing to judge his character in the way the authorities indicate I should .

13. If I leave aside the Applicant’s lies about statelessness, I am satisfied that he is in every other respect of good character. As was said in the Goldie decision, it cannot be expected that any applicant for citizenship must reach the highest standards of integrity.

14. The Applicant has not come to the attention of police authorities in Australia and he said this in the case of Iraq as well. I accept his word that he has not lied subsequently to Australian authorities. I did not see any questions of substance put to him in cross examination in that regard, which he answered in a way he understood, which would put me in doubt for the reasons I have given.

15. It is important to also note that the Applicant corrected his lying about statelessness, and I consider has expressed true remorse about it.

16. Moreover, the Applicant is a family man who has never failed in his responsibilities to his wife and children. He has been a good provider even from afar. He has sent money to his wife and children for their support—without which they would not have support at all. It is true he fled Iraq but that was due to safety concerns he had there–but so careful of his family’s safety was he that he would not risk their lives on a perilous sea journey. Subsequently, in Australia, he has not turned his back on them.

17. The Applicant has been able to do this–provide for their support–by holding down a demanding and difficult job in a freezing works where he is keen to advance. Mrs Falak Habeeb said her husband is a “very hardworking person”.

18. It could have been easy for the Applicant to ignore his wife and children but, instead, he has kept in frequent contact with them. This was supported–unelicited—by his wife 

19. Mr Arapantzis spoke of the Applicant as always being pleasant to people around him and referred to him as a “gentle giant”.

    CONCLUSION

20. In light of the authorities—in particular Goldie , above—I do not regard the Applicant’s “enduring moral qualities” as so deficient to make it show it is not in the public interest for him to become a citizen. Indeed, I am of the view that he is a hard-working person acknowledging previous wrongdoing and acknowledging also family responsibilities who I have no reason otherwise to doubt will make a good citizen.

21. It is true that there are occasions of him having lied to authorities early on but, viewing the matter in a “broad” way as O’Bryan J indicates I should, I am not satisfied for the reasons I have given that these occasions—now some years ago and subsequently corrected—are enough for me to say and find that Mr Ali Sherwan is not of good character.

22. Were those occasions enough for it to be said he is not of good character it could never be found he is of good character because they always stand as historical facts. They cannot diminish in significance over time. But in my view –particularly because s 21(2)(h) of the Act uses “is” and speaks in the present tense–Parliament did not intend that someone, once having lied, can never redeem themselves. That person could never become a citizen ,no matter what good works they had performed and, in my view, Parliament could not have intended this result . Indeed, because of that word “is”, the critical time under s 21(2)(h) of the Act would seem to be the present day and not some past occasion.

23. I note also that the Respondent fairly does acknowledge that there are good things to be said about the Applicant and about his character. This is at the present day as I understand the Respondent’s acknowledgement —which accords with a present day reading of s 21(2)(h) .

24. In my view and I find, for the reasons I have given, that it is in accord with authority that the Applicant is of “good character” within s 21(2)(h) of the Act.

25. I should add that I consider my finding to be one conformable with and supported by the Minister’s Policy—to various paragraphs of which my attention is drawn in the Applicant’s submissions.

    DECISION

26. The conclusion I reach for the above reasons, in the way indicated by authority, is that the decision under review must be set aside.

27. Such decision is wrongly based on the Applicant not being of good character under

    
    

    s 21(2)(h) of the Act. I find that he “is” of good character under that provision.

28. In my view, the Respondent’s decision cannot be sustained on any reasonable basis and it should be set aside and the matter remitted to the Respondent in accordance with a direction that the Applicant is of good character. 

I certify that the preceding 89  (eighty-nine) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member

...............[sgd]........................

Associate

Date of hearing:	10 November 2020, 10 December 2020 and 14 January 2021
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Krohn
Solicitors for the Applicant:	Vrachnas Lawyers
Advocate for the Respondent:	Mr Morris
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Clayton Utz

Dated: 11 June 2021