FVVM and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) - [2022] AATA 2595

FVVM and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2022] AATA 2595 (2 August 2022)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2021/1669
Re:FVVM
APPLICANT

AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member C. J. Furnell
Date:2 August 2022
Place:Melbourne

The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
...........[SGD].............................................................
Senior Member C. J. Furnell
Catchwords
CITIZENSHIP – application for citizenship by conferral – refusal of citizenship – Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal can be satisfied that applicant is of good character – application of Citizenship Procedural Instruction 15 – provision of false personal information regarding family composition – Tribunal not satisfied Applicant is of good character – decision affirmed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Act 1975 (Cth)
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)
Cases
Al Salim and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 65
BOY19 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 574
Chalou and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 1514
Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 123 FCR 499
Fang and Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] AATA 3686
Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2019) 266 CLR 250
Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 128
Hasan and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 2457
Hassanzada and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2022] AATA 603
Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422
Jalil and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2022] AATA 675
Kasirye and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2022] AATA 790
KLJG and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 2447
Lachmaiya v Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] AATA 27
Leong and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) [2019] AATA 3641
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Makasa [2021] HCA 1
Mohamad v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] AATA 687
Nguyen and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 1082
Plaintiff M64/2015 v The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50
Rafaat and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1743
Ramazani and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 1801
Sakhi Zada and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 1729
Shah and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 2121
Sherwan and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 1702
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286
Taradel and Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] AATA 1255
VFWQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 23
Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 304
Secondary Materials
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report: Afghanistan (27 June 2019)
Department of Home Affairs, Citizenship Procedural Instruction 15 – Assessing Character under the Citizenship Act
Department of Home Affairs, Revised Citizenship Procedural Instruction 16 – Assessing Identity Under the Citizenship Act
Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Australian Citizenship [Policy Statement] (27 November 2020)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member C. J. Furnell
2 August 2022

The applicant applied for Australian citizenship by conferral in January 2015.[1]
[1] T4, pp.185-194, with “T” being a reference to documents provided by the Respondent under s 37 of the Tribunal’s constituent legislation (Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975).
Under the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (the Act) (s 24(1)), when a person makes such an application, the respondent becomes obliged to approve or to refuse to approve the application. In certain circumstances, however, that decision must be to refuse to approve. For instance, this will be the case if:
(a)the respondent is not satisfied of the identity of the applicant (s 24(3)); or
(b)the applicant is not eligible to become an Australian citizen under certain provisions of the Act (s 24(1A)). Of those provisions, the only one of potential relevance in this case[2] renders eligibility for citizenship conditional on the respondent being satisfied that the applicant is of good character at the time of the decision (s 21(2)(h)).
[2] Seven eligibility provisions are identified in s 24(1A) of the Act. Most require the respondent’s satisfaction as to the good character of the relevant applicant. The others might apply where the applicant is aged under 18, born in Papua or was born in Australia. One applies where the applicant has a permanent or enduring physical or mental incapacity: s 21(3).
On 9 March 2021, a delegate of the respondent decided to refuse to approve the applicant becoming an Australian citizen. The delegate was not satisfied of the applicant’s identity or that the applicant was then of good character.[3]
[3] T2, pp.13-26.
On 22 March 2021, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision.[4]
[4] T1, pp.7-12.
In conducting that review, the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the respondent, in order to “do over again” that which was done by the respondent’s delegate.[5]
[5] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Makasa [2021] HCA 1 at [50], quoting with evident approval two earlier decisions, Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2019) 266 CLR 250 at 271 [51] and Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286 at 315 [40]-[100].
Accordingly, in this proceeding, the Tribunal needs to decide whether or not to approve the applicant becoming an Australian citizen, noting that it cannot do so unless it is satisfied of the applicant’s identity and that he is now of good character.
I am not satisfied that the applicant is of good character. As such, I have decided to refuse to approve him becoming an Australian citizen and to affirm the decision the subject of review.
Given the conclusion I arrived at in relation to the applicant’s character, it is not necessary that I reach a conclusion on the issue of identity.
MATERIAL BEFORE ME
In arriving at my decision in this matter, I have had regard to the submissions made at and before, and evidence adduced at, the hearing,[6] and to certain documentary material lodged with the Tribunal prior to the hearing.
[6] In terms of submissions made before the hearing, reference is made to the respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions of 7 February 2022 (R SFIC) and to the applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions of 14 January 2022 (A SFIC).
In terms of evidence at the hearing, the Tribunal had the benefit of hearing from the applicant.
As for documentary material lodged with the Tribunal, it included copies of:
(a)a volume of documents provided by the respondent under s 37 of the Tribunal’s constituent legislation (being the “T” documents);
(b)a supplementary volume of such documents (being the “ST” documents);
(c)a National Police certificate issued on 9 April 2021 by Australian Federal Police;
(d)a certified translation of a statement of the Mullah Imam of the village in which the applicant claims to have been born.[7]
(e)an application of 3 August 2021 for a duplicate taskera[8] in the name of the applicant, together with a certified translation thereof (lodged with the Tribunal on the day of the hearing of this proceeding).
(f)a taskera (including an English translation thereof) issued in February 2022 for each of the applicant’s wife and two children (lodged with the Tribunal one business day before the day of the hearing of this proceeding).
[7] ST1, p.18. Consistent with a confidentiality order made in this proceeding, information tending to reveal the identity of the applicant has been omitted from this decision.
[8] The primary form of identification for Afghan citizens is and was the taskera (sometimes spelled taskira or tazkera), a document required for employment and admission to schools and universities, to obtain approval to run a business and to buy, rent and sell property: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report: Afghanistan (27 June 2019) [5.46].
ASPECTS OF FACTUAL CONTEXT
The applicant submits that he was born on or around 31 December 1994[9] in a particular village in the Ghazni province of Afghanistan and lived there all his life until forced to flee in 2010.[10]
[9] T4, p.185; T6, p.219; ST1, p.154; ST1, p.174. The applicant submits that his exact date of birth is unknown: A SFIC [2] and ST1, p.139.
[10] ST1, p.139; ST1, p.211-213.
In March 2010, he arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival, aged 15 or 16.[11]
[11] T12, p.561; ST1, p.156.
As an unauthorised arrival, the applicant was interviewed in April 2010. In response to questions posed of him in that interview, the applicant indicated that:
(a)he had no taskera.[12]
(b)he had five brothers and three sisters.[13]
[12] ST1, p.207.
[13] ST1, p.209.
In May 2010, the applicant requested a refugee status assessment.[14]
[14] ST1, pp.127-173.
In material lodged by, or on behalf of, the applicant in connection with that request, statements were made repetitive of those made by the applicant in his April interview to the effect that:
(a)he did not have (and, indeed, had never held) a taskera.[15] It was apparently thought that he would not have held a taskera as the applicant was then aged less than 20.[16]
(b)he had five brothers and three sisters.[17]
[15] ST1, p.157; ST1, p.175. In the latter document, when asked about identity documents he used or had used in the past, the applicant’s response was “n/a”.
[16] ST1, p.72.
[17] ST1, pp.160 and 171; ST1, p.182.
That material included the following statement made by the applicant concerning the fate of his brother-in-law.
“My sister was married but she and her little daughter is living with us after her husband disappeared... My brother in law was an engineer and working with a foreign company in Kabul. The last time he returned he disappeared on the way. My sister and my parents are still waiting for him to come back. We don't know what happened to him but we believe he was taken by Taliban when he crossed the desert of Qarabagh.”[18]
[18] ST1, p.139.
The applicant declared the material so lodged to be either “complete, correct and up to date in every detail”[19] or correct so far as he knew or could reasonably find out.[20]
[19] ST1, p.169.
[20] ST1, p.180.
In September 2010, the applicant’s initial request to be recognised as a refugee was refused.[21] He then requested an independent merits review of the refusal decision.[22] Information provided on or with the request form was declared by the applicant to be “complete and correct in every detail”.[23]
[21] ST1, pp.19, 22 and 90.
[22] ST1, p.9.
[23] ST1, pp.25-26.
Information in support of that request included:
(a)Statements concerning the applicant’s family composition. For instance, it was said that the “… claimant’s father, mother, five brothers and three sisters remain in their village in Jaghori.”[24]
(b)Statements concerning the disappearance of his brother in law, such as:
(i)“…owing to the disappearance of his brother-in-law the claimant's sister and niece are dependent upon the family and live with them”;
(ii)“…In early 2009 his brother-in-law, an engineer working for an American company in Kabul disappeared”;[25]
(iii)“His brother-in-law was travelling from Jaghori to Kabul in the area of Qarabagh when he disappeared. This occurred around May 2009. From that time the family has not heard from him.”[26]
[24] ST1, p.6 (submission to the independent reviewer of 27 October 2010).
[25] ST1, p.6.
[26] ST1, p.33: this is a reviewer’s statement as to what she or he was told by or on behalf of the applicant.
In a statutory declaration accompanying the information he provided in the context of the merits review process, the applicant referred to his “five younger brothers.”[27]
[27] ST1, p.11.
Five brothers were identified in a document apparently outlining information provided by the applicant in an interview conducted in connection with the merits review process.[28]
[28] ST1, pp.76 and 78.
Consequent upon a favourable decision on independent merits review,[29] the applicant was recognised as a refugee and, in January 2011, was granted a protection visa.[30]
[29] ST1, p.32; ST1, p.51.
[30] T13, p.562; ST1, p.47.
In around 2014 or 2015, the applicant married. He and his wife now have two young children.
In January 2015, as already mentioned, the applicant applied for Australian citizenship by conferral.[31]
[31] T4, pp.185-194.
In November 2015, the applicant applied for and was granted a resident return visa.[32]
[32] T13, p.562.
In October 2017, in connection with his citizenship application, the applicant lodged with the respondent:
(a)what was said to be a certified copy of the applicant’s taskera, together with an English translation thereof;
(b)what was said to be a copy of the applicant’s father’s taskera, together with an English translation thereof; and
(c)a Form 80 (personal particulars for assessment including character assessment).[33]
[33] T6, p.218.
In the October 2017 Form 80, the applicant stated that:
(a)he held a taskera issued in Afghanistan, numbered XXXX50.[34]
(b)he had five brothers, three of which were said to be deceased, and three sisters.[35]
[34] T6, p.221. For confidentiality reasons, the Tribunal does not propose to refer to taskera, or purported taskera, numbers in full.
[35] T6, pp.232 and 241.
The applicant declared that the information provided in the Form 80 was complete, correct and up-to-date.[36]
[36] T6, p.235.
The taskera submitted by the applicant was said to have been issued on 2 June 2009, roughly six months prior to his departure from Afghanistan. It described his occupation as “student”.[37]
[37] T6, p.237.
In December 2020, the respondent provided the applicant with an opportunity to comment on two types of what was characterised by the respondent as adverse information.[38]
[38] T10, p.537.
First, the applicant was said to have provided bogus documentation. The taskera provided in October 2017, which the applicant claimed in his Form 80 to hold, and of which the applicant purported to provide a certified copy, was described as not genuine. This reflected advice provided in April 2018 by the Afghanistan Central Civil Registration Authority. The information in the taskera was said by the Authority to not correspond with records of the Afghan Population Registration Department. According to the Authority, the taskera had not been issued by the authority responsible for issuing taskeras.[39]
[39] ST2, p.224; T10, p.539.
Second, the applicant was said to have excluded information or provided incorrect information about himself or family members. The applicant had been sending money to the brother-in-law who the applicant had, in 2010, claimed to be missing.[40] Similarly, the applicant had, since 2014, been sending money to a brother claimed by the applicant to be deceased (who, in these reasons, I shall refer to as Brother 1).[41]
[40] T10, p.540.
[41] T10, pp.539-540.
I turn now to address the applicant’s various responses to this “adverse” information. Before doing so, however, mention should be made of some aspects of the regulatory and policy context.
Aspects of regulatory and policy context
As noted earlier, the applicant is not eligible to become an Australian citizen unless the Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the respondent, is satisfied the applicant is now of good character.
In considering whether I am so satisfied, while not bound to do so and in the absence of cogent reasons to the contrary,[42] I have taken into account government policy, where it is relevant.[43] Doing so is particularly appropriate when, as here, the Tribunal is required to arrive at an opinion[44] based on an evaluative judgment.[45]
[42] Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 123 FCR 499 at 506–7 per Hely J. See also Leong and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) [2019] AATA 3641 at [34]-[42].
[43] Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at [645] per Brennan J; Al Salim and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 65 at [25].
[44] Plaintiff M64/2015 v The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50 at [54], where it is said: “Policy guidelines like the priorities policy promote values of consistency and rationality in decision-making, and the principle that administrative decision-makers should treat like cases alike. In particular, policies or guidelines may help to promote consistency in ‘high volume decision-making’, such as the determination of applications for Subclass 202 visas. Thus in Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) , Brennan J, as President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, said that ‘[n]ot only is it lawful for the Minister to form a guiding policy; its promulgation is desirable’ because the adoption of a guiding policy serves, among other things, to assure the integrity of administrative decision-making by ‘diminishing the importance of individual predilection’ and ‘the inconsistencies which might otherwise appear in a series of decisions’. The subjectivity of the evaluation by a decision-maker in a case such as the present highlights the importance of guidelines.”
[45] BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574 at [54] “…the matter of which the Minister must be satisfied, the applicant’s good character, is not a fact to be proved but an opinion requiring an evaluative judgment.”
In this regard, reference is made to the Australian Citizenship [Policy Statement] (policy statement) reissued on 27 November 2020. The policy statement provides the context for use of citizenship procedural instructions in making decisions under the Act, being instructions outlined in what are characterised in the statement as related framework documents.[46]
[46] Policy statement [2.1].
Instructions to be so used when assessing a citizenship applicant’s character are provided for in Citizenship Procedural Instruction 15 – Assessing Character under the Citizenship Act (CPI 15). Citizenship Procedural Instruction 16 – Assessing Identity under the Citizenship Act (CPI 16) outlines instructions for use in assessing matters to do with identity.
Consistently with CPI 15, in assessing character, various aspects of a person’s life are of potential relevance,[47] such as the person’s family life, employment, payment of taxes and community contributions.[48] Consideration may be given to “…a range of events and conduct connected with the applicant.”[49]
[47] CPI 15 [3.3].
[48] CPI 15 [4].
[49] VFWQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 230 at [32], citing Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 128 at [60].

Consistently with case law[50] and in accordance with CPI 15,[51] a person’s character is not determined by the person’s reputation but, rather, is something to be assessed by reference to the person’s enduring moral qualities.
[50] Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422 at pp.431-432; BOY19 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 574 at [51].
[51] CPI 15 [3.1], [3.3].
A person’s enduring moral qualities are more likely to be considered to be such as to support a finding of good character if the person has behaved in an ethical manner[52] and been legally observant.[53]
[52] CPI 15 [3.3]; Hasan and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 2457 at [17].
[53] As cited in CPI 15, Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 304: “In the context of the Act, loyalty to Australia, a belief in a democratic form of government, a respect for the rights and liberties of all Australians and obedience to and observance of the law are values that are regarded as significant.” See also KLJG and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 2447 at [16].
On the other hand, a person’s unethical behaviour in lying to governmental authorities in the context of visa or citizenship applications will generally be taken to reflect adversely on the person’s character. As said in CPI 15,[54] as a general proposition, a person of good character would not:
“…practise deception or fraud in dealings with the Australian Government, or other organisations, [by] for example: intentionally providing false personal information (such as fraudulent work experience or qualification documents) or other material deception during visa and citizenship applications…”.[55]
[54] CPI 15 [4].
[55] Adopted in Hasan and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 2457 at [18].
Bogus documentation
In terms of the information put to the applicant suggesting that the taskera he provided in October 2017 was not genuine, the applicant’s response in February 2021 was that he had “…obtained my absentee Taskera through a friend of mine in Afghanistan…My friend assured me that the Taskera is genuine and authentic.”[56]
[56] T11, p.559.
At the hearing of this proceeding, the applicant did not contend that the taskera was genuine, but nor did he accept that it was not genuine.[57]
[57] Hearing Transcript, p.6.
Given the advice provided in April 2018 by the Afghanistan Central Civil Registration Authority (mentioned earlier), however, I find that the “taskera” so provided is not genuine.
A conclusion that it is not genuine is supported by an examination of the particulars specified in it, noting that:
(a)In terms of particulars such as volume and registration number, as well as date of issue, they differ from the particulars of the taskera apparently issued in July 2009, a duplicate of which was applied for by the applicant in August 2021 (although I note the applicant’s evidence at the hearing of this proceeding to the effect that he had been told by officials of the Afghan embassy that he had two taskeras[58]).
(b)In terms of particulars of the page and registration number of the applicant’s father’s taskera, they differ from the corresponding particulars of that latter taskera, as lodged with the Tribunal.
[58] Hearing Transcript pp.20-21.
The provision of a bogus document to the respondent does not of itself, however, reflect adversely on the character of the person providing the document.
The Tribunal was taken to the decision of Senior Member Millar in KLJG[59] where, at [55], it was said that “In the absence of information to show that the Applicant could readily obtain a legitimate document but chose not to do so, or that the provision of a fraudulent document was a deliberate attempt to mislead or deceive the Department, I am not satisfied that this reflects adversely on her character.”
[59] KLJG and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 2447.
I note that the KLJG decision was one made in a statutory context different to that currently before the Tribunal; one where the Tribunal had to be satisfied that the person concerned was “not of good character”, as opposed to being satisfied that the person is of good character.[60]
[60] Ibid at [11].
As I see it, a person’s failure to provide a document readily obtainable would not generally reflect on character (albeit it may be of relevance in deciding whether to be satisfied of the person’s identity). Hence, while it might be that there was no particular difficulty in expatriate Afghans obtaining genuine taskeras in or around 2017,[61] the applicant’s failure to have then provided a genuine taskera is not relevant to an assessment of his character. On the other hand, however, the provision of a bogus document would reflect adversely on character not only in the context of a deliberate attempt to deceive. An adverse reflection on character would also arise where the person providing the document knew or suspected that it was not genuine, unless it is apparent from the circumstances that the person had made no express or implied representation as to the document’s authenticity.
[61] According to the applicant, there was in 2017 an official process in place which entailed taskera applications being made in absentia through the Afghan Embassy in Canberra: A SFIC [64].
With some hesitation, I adopt the approach taken in the decision the subject of review where, in relation to his provision of the bogus document, the applicant was given “the benefit of the doubt”, with its being given no weight in assessing his character.[62] I am not satisfied that the applicant either knew or would have suspected that the document was not genuine.
[62] T2, p.20
The “taskera” was provided by the applicant in October 2017. His evidence before the Tribunal was, in effect, that he thought he had procured its issue about the time he was sent the Form 80,[63] being the form which the applicant completed and sent to the respondent in October 2017.[64] The issue of the document at that time is not, however, consistent with:
(a)The document being expressed to have been issued in June 2009.
(b)Details of the document having been included in the applicant’s marriage certificate issued in June 2015[65] (noting that the certificate included details of the volume number, page number and registration number of the “taskera”).[66]
[63] Hearing Transcript, p.21.
[64] Indeed, in his evidence before the Tribunal, the applicant stated that he thought he had asked for the taskera in around 2018: Transcript, p.37.
[65] An English translation of which is found at T4, p.209.
[66] T4, p.209.
When asked at the hearing of this proceeding to explain these inconsistencies, the applicant was unable to do so.[67] What he did say, however, was that he did not look at the document’s details before sending it on to the respondent.[68] I do not reject that evidence albeit that the date of issue of the document would, I suspect, have been apparent from a glance. I also do not reject a proposition implicit in the applicant’s evidence to the effect that he also did not look at or notice details of the purported taskera included in the marriage certificate issued in 2015.
[67] Hearing Transcript, p.38.
[68] Hearing Transcript, p.25.
I note that the issue of the document in June 2009 (roughly seven months before the applicant’s arrival in Australia) is also difficult to reconcile with:
(a)the applicant’s statement in or around May 2010 to the effect that he did not have, and had never held, a taskera, a statement echoed in the applicant’s evidence at the hearing of this proceeding that he did not have any identity documents prior to coming to Australia.[69] The difficulty with this evidence, however, is apparent from other evidence given by the applicant to the effect that, after hearing that the document was not genuine, he had called “home” and told that he had been issued a taskera when he was “quite young.”[70] This is reflected in submissions made on his behalf in relation to the 2021 application for a duplicate taskera. There it was said that the applicant had been told that his father had arranged for a taskera but it had subsequently been lost.[71]
(b)the applicant’s characterisation of the document as an “absentee” taskera (noting he was said to have applied for an “absentee” taskera through a friend[72]). At the time of its purported issue, however, the applicant was not absent from Afghanistan. I note, however, that there is some indication in the document that it is (or at least purports to be) a duplicate taskera,[73] rather than an absentee taskera. In closing submissions, it was suggested that the taskera being a duplicate of an existing taskera (rather than a new taskera issued to the applicant when absent from Afghanistan) might explain how the marriage certificate in 2015 appeared to contain details of a document thought to have been obtained in 2017. Put simply, the suggestion was that the marriage certificate referenced an original taskera rather than the 2017 document which itself was simply a duplicate of that original taskera.[74]
(c)the applicant’s evidence to the effect that in June 2009 he would have been managing his father’s shop,[75] noting that the document describes his occupation as “student.” When asked about this matter at the hearing of this proceeding, the applicant proffered no explanation other than to suggest that how the document was completed was a matter for the person who issued it.[76]
[69] Hearing Transcript, p.37.
[70] Hearing Transcript, p.21.
[71] A SFIC [69].
[72] T11, p.552.
[73] In the English translation, the words “duplicate copy” appear at the top right hand side of the document: T6, p.237.
[74] Hearing Transcript, p.47.
[75] At T6, p.242, the applicant states that he was a self-employed shop keeper in the period December 2007 to February 2010. See too ST1, p.183 and Hearing Transcript, p.16.
[76] Hearing Transcript, p.25.
As noted earlier, in a statutory declaration made by the applicant in February 2021, the document was said by the applicant to have been procured through a friend. Before the Tribunal, however, the applicant’s evidence was that, acting on his father’s advice, he arranged for his uncle to procure the document.[77] When asked to explain this, the applicant suggested that, in his language, the same word can be used to describe family and friends.[78] The respondent was, understandably, not in a position to contest or accept that suggestion at the hearing of this proceeding. I note, however, that in 2022 before the Tribunal, the applicant was clearly able to designate the person who procured the document as his uncle but in 2021 (when the previously mentioned statutory declaration was made) was apparently unable to do so.
[77] Hearing Transcript, p.20.
[78] Hearing Transcript, p.25.
As my comments make clear, difficulties with the “taskera” provided by the applicant in 2017 abound. Nevertheless, they are not such as to satisfy me that the applicant knew or suspected that the document was not genuine.
Brother-in-law and Brother 1
The applicant’s response to the proposition that he had been sending money to a brother-in-law who, in 2010, he had claimed to be missing was, in essence, to admit that the brother-in-law had never been missing.
On the applicant’s behalf, it is said that he had been “…advised by other detainees in detention centre to declare his brother-in-law … as missing so that he could sponsor his sister and her family to Australia.”[79] The applicant is said to have “…explained that he had informed immigration officials his brother-in-law was missing for the sake of including his sister, …, in his immediate family composition as a widow. The applicant explained that he had received advice from the people smugglers and others in the detention centre that he would not be able to sponsor married family members and that his best chance to assist his sister and her young daughter… in reaching safety in Australia was to declare [his brother-in-law] was missing.”[80]
[79] T11, p.552.
[80] A SFIC [56].
In his statutory declaration of February 2021, the applicant stated that “…while in detention centre other detainees told me that I should put my brother-in-law … missing and that it would be easy to help my sister by sponsoring her to come to Australia…My brother-in-law is in fact in Indonesia.”[81]
[81] T11, p.560.
It is apparent from what has just been said that not only did the applicant lie about the status of his brother-in-law but he did so in anticipation of his involvement in a fraud on the Australian authorities, one which would have entailed his sister being brought to Australia in reliance, at least in part, on a falsehood (being that she was, in effect, a widow).[82]
[82] Hearing Transcript at p.15: “…if you declared the husband being alive then you won’t be able to rescue your sister or her kids because they would not - they would say that, you know, there is someone already to look after the family.”
As for Brother 1, the applicant’s response to the proposition that he had been sending money to a brother who he had claimed to be deceased was to admit that Brother 1 was not only not dead but also that he was not, in fact, the applicant’s brother. Instead, Brother 1 is said by the applicant to be his cousin.[83]
[83] A SFIC [47].
According to the applicant, he “…was given incorrect advice by other detainees in Immigration detention centre. I was told that if I added my cousin as my immediate family member, I would be able to sponsor him and bring him to Australia”[84] but then, some seven years later (in 2017), he said Brother 1 was dead because he “…did not know how to deal with that initial lie I had told the Department when I was 16 years old. I wanted to tell the Department that he was no longer part of my immediate family member. That is why I incorrectly declared that he had died.”[85]
[84] T11, p.559 [9].
[85] T11, p.559 [11].
On the applicant’s behalf it is said that he was “…incorrectly advised by other detainees when he came to Australia to include his cousin as a member of his immediate family. He was told that he would then be able to sponsor his cousin to Australia and bring him to safety.”[86] When he lied about his relationship with Brother 1 (his cousin), he then understood it may enable him to sponsor his cousin to come to Australia.[87]
[86] T11, p.552.
[87] T11, p.552.
Again, not only did the applicant lie about his relationship with Brother 1, but he did so in anticipation of his involvement in a fraud on the Australian authorities, one which would have entailed Brother 1 being brought to Australia in reliance, at least in part, on a falsehood (being that he was the applicant’s brother).
It is said that, rather than respond to the respondent’s “adverse information” letter in the way that he did, the applicant could have chosen to respond by simply saying that Brother 1 was alive and that his earlier statement that Brother 1 was dead was in error. That he did not do so is said to be a “testament to his true character”.[88]
[88] A SFIC [54].
Insofar as the “testament” said to be afforded by the applicant’s election not to say simply that the Brother 1 was alive is of the applicant’s good character, I do not agree. While the admission that Brother 1 is not the applicant’s brother was not a necessary response to the “adverse information” raised by the respondent (which only raised the issue of whether Brother 1 was alive), the making of that admission needs to be seen in the context of a presumably deliberate decision of the applicant not to make similar admissions with respect to other aspects of the applicant’s family composition (as addressed later). An admission made in the context of a decision not to make similar admissions is not proof or evidence of good character.
On the applicant’s behalf, it is said that a consideration of the context in which these lies were told “is absolutely key”.[89] It is said, in effect, that the applicant ought to be allowed some leeway given that he was only 15 or 16 when he initially lied about his brother-in-law and Brother 1 and, as the oldest son of the family, he assumed a “moral obligation” to assist his family members.[90]
[89] Hearing Transcript, p.5.
[90] A SFIC [48].
I accept that conduct of a person engaged in when a minor is less indicative of character than conduct engaged in by the person when an adult. Here, the conduct of concern was initially engaged in while the applicant was young (15 or 16) when he no doubt had recently experienced some difficult and traumatic circumstances. Moreover, as submitted, it would appear that his lies were, at least initially, primarily told in an endeavour to assist others escape from difficult circumstances. The moral obloquy occasioned by a lie in such circumstances is clearly less than a lie told, say, “for the purposes of personal enrichment”.[91] Nevertheless, the applicant elected to persist with that conduct when he was an adult, at least in relation to Brother 1 (and, as will soon be seen, in relation certain others). In this regard, when an opportunity arose in 2017 in the context of his citizenship application to reveal the truth about his relationship with Brother 1, the applicant (then aged 23) instead elected to try and cover up his initial lie by indulging in another falsehood, being that Brother 1 had died.
[91] BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574 at [72]. See too KLJG and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 2447 at [20].
In explanation of that lie in 2017, on the applicant’s behalf it is said that:
“…he felt bound by his initial decision. The Applicant was unsure as to how to come clean and was terrified his visa would be cancelled and he would be deported to Afghanistan where he would face persecution. Ultimately, the Applicant’s continued safety in Australia was at the forefront of his mind at all relevant times.”[92]
[92] A SFIC [50]. In his oral evidence, the applicant indicated that he persisted with lies in 2017 out of naivety and fear (Hearing Transcript, p.35), the fear being that he would be returned to Afghanistan (Hearing Transcript, p.40).
This exemplifies the fact that the applicant’s conduct was not, as he would have it, solely motivated by an understandable desire to assist his sister and cousin[93] or in implementation of some moral imperative as the eldest son “to care for his family and assist them in reaching safety in Australia”.[94] Indeed, the applicant’s evidence was that he has not sought to facilitate or sponsor a move by Brother 1 to Australia,[95] apparently because “they were not my real family members and I just didn’t want to cause any future trouble for me”.[96] Similarly, there is no material before me suggestive of him having done so in relation to his sister. Moreover, at least in relation to the lie told by the applicant concerning his brother-in-law, it is clear that it was, at least in part, self-serving, designed to enhance the applicant’s 2010 claim to refugee status.[97]
[93] At T11, p.560 the applicant states that “My only motivation was to help them bring to safety where they do not have to constantly live under threat of being killed by the Taliban and other sunni extremists.” It was part of “a desperate attempt to try to help his cousin and sister to come to Australia.”: T11, p.553.
[94] A SFIC [48].
[95] See also A SFIC [49].
[96] Hearing Transcript, p.14.
[97] It was an element of his claims for protection: ST1, p.6. It was considered by the independent merits reviewer to have been put forward by the applicant as a reason for the applicant’s departure from Afghanistan in February 2010: see ST1, p.63.

On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that his failure to act on his initial intention to be involved in migration fraud was a testament to his character.[98] I do not agree. A decision not to be involved in fraud because it might risk a person’s residency rights is not evidence or proof of good character.
[98] Hearing Transcript, p.50.
The applicant is said to deeply regret providing incorrect information in relation to his brother-in-law and Brother 1.[99] In his February 2021 statutory declaration, the applicant stated that he felt “… extremely remorseful for my conduct of making incorrect statements to the Department about my family composition.”[100]
[99] T11, p.553.
[100] T11, p.560.
As soon will be seen, however, that regret and remorse was not at a level sufficient to ensure the applicant’s full and truthful disclosure prior to the hearing of this proceeding.
Other brothers
As outlined earlier, on multiple occasions in 2010 (including by way of statutory declaration), and again in 2017, it was stated by or on behalf of the applicant that he had five brothers.
As admitted by the applicant in 2021, these statements were clearly incorrect given that Brother 1 is not, in fact, the applicant’s brother.
Given that admission in 2021, however, one would have been left with the impression that the applicant had four brothers, rather than the five he had consistently claimed to have had up until then. Indeed, that was what was put on behalf of the applicant in submissions lodged with the Tribunal in January 2022. In those submissions, the applicant’s “correct family composition” was described so as to include four brothers, two of whom were deceased, as well as three sisters.[101]
[101] A SFIC [4].
In those same submissions, the applicant was said to have learnt his lesson and to be genuinely remorseful for his actions, actions which were said to amount to a mere “blemish”.[102]
[102] A SFIC [53].
At the hearing of this proceeding in April 2022, however, it became clear that the applicant had not “learnt his lesson”[103] in 2021. At the hearing, the applicant admitted that the description in the January 2022 submissions of his family composition was inaccurate. Two of the four persons identified as his brothers are not his brothers, one being his second cousin and the other his nephew.[104] Moreover, none of them is dead.[105]
[103] A SFIC [53].
[104] Hearing Transcript, p.12.
[105] Hearing Transcript, p.14.
While the applicant asserted in his evidence that his lies about his supposed siblings were neither deliberate nor intentional, it is clear that this is not the case. Instead, as with his other lies concerning his family composition, they were told initially in anticipation of his involvement in a fraud on the Australian authorities, one which would have entailed the persons he had identified as his brothers being brought to Australia in reliance, at least in part, on a falsehood.[106]
[106] Hearing Transcript, p.29-30.
The applicant gave evidence to the effect that he came to realise the importance of telling the truth when the respondent raised issues concerning information provided in relation to Brother 1.[107] That occurred in December 2020. It was not until the hearing of this proceeding in April 2022, however, that admissions were made concerning the falsity other family composition information provided by the applicant.
[107] Hearing Transcript, p.35.
While the applicant’s admissions at the hearing of this proceeding are to his credit, the expressions of regret and remorse accompanying them ring hollow given, in particular, the absence of full disclosure when expressing, in 2021, regret and remorse for having lied about Brother 1 and his brother-in-law.
CONSIDERATION OF CHARACTER
The admissions made by the applicant at the hearing of this proceeding serve to emphasise his engagement in a pattern of dishonesty, one which, while initiated when young and in difficult circumstances, was maintained by him for a lengthy period after he had become an adult. Indeed, despite having earlier opportunities to do so, it took the applicant more than 10 years to start on the path to full disclosure and this was only after the respondent had, in December 2020, questioned the veracity of certain information provided by the applicant. Even then, the applicant made only partial disclosure.
While this conduct of the applicant does not speak well of his character, other aspects of his conduct evident from the material before me do so.
The applicant has not been convicted of any serious criminal offence in his 12 years in Australia.[108]
[108] A SFIC, Annexure 1.
As submitted on his behalf,[109] the applicant has contributed positively to Australia and its economy by maintaining consistent employment while in Australia.[110]
[109] A SFIC [76.2].
[110] T6, pp.241-242.
His various employers speak highly of him. In a letter of August 2015, a human resources manager of a large supermarket chain said the applicant had “consistently met the high standards within our operation...”.[111] In a letter of January 2021, an employer stated that the applicant had been working as contractor in the employer’s tiling company for three years and that he could confirm that the applicant “…is a hard worker, honest person and a man of good character.”[112] In an undated letter provided to the respondent in February 2021, another employer stated that the applicant was an employee in a tiling business in Melbourne and that in the time he had known the applicant (three years) the applicant “…has always had a good character and has been a punctual, committed and hardworking employee and colleague. He is an honest and reliable person…”.[113]
[111] T5, p.217.
[112] T11, p.558.
[113] T11, p.557.
I attribute some weight to these references, albeit weight diminished by the fact that none of them indicate any awareness on the part of the person providing the reference of the applicant‘s conduct of concern in this proceeding.
The favourable impression of the applicant’s character conveyed by these references is consistent with that which I formed after hearing from the applicant. It is of a person who has, somewhat admirably, struggled to overcome circumstances outside of his control which have conspired to make life very difficult for him and his family.
On the applicant’s behalf the decision of Member Burke in Rafaat[114] was cited in support of a proposition that a conclusion that a person is of good character remains open to the Tribunal even where the person “provides false or misleading information naively, misinformed, or without malicious or particular intent of attempting migration fraud.”[115]
[114] Rafaat and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1743.
[115] A SFIC [42].
Unlike the circumstances addressed by Member Burke, in this matter the applicant’s lies were told, at least initially, with the intent of facilitating a future migration fraud. Nevertheless, as Rafaat makes clear, telling lies to the respondent is not determinative of character.
In Shah,[116] the Tribunal was satisfied as to the good character of a citizenship applicant despite having found that she had lied to the authorities twice about the marital status of her son. The assessment was “marginally tipped” in the applicant’s favour[117] in a context where it was said to have been important that there was no evidence of the person concerned having made other false or misleading statements.[118]
[116] Shah and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 2121.
[117] Ibid at [37].
[118] Ibid at [36].
In this case, unlike the situation addressed in Shah, we are confronted by a series of untruthful statements in relation to several aspects of the applicant’s family. Moreover, it is of importance that the applicant’s admissions about their untruthfulness were only made after concerns as to the accuracy of information the applicant had provided were raised by the respondent and, even then, the admissions were, initially, only partial.
In Sherwan,[119] Senior Member Cremean was satisfied of a person’s good character despite his having falsely asserted statelessness. As subsequently noted by the Senior Member, however, there (unlike here) he was not addressing “repeated, frequent, lying which took place over a decade.”[120]
[119] Sherwan and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 1702.
[120] Hassanzada and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2022] AATA 603 at [60].
While lying to the authorities in the context of visa and citizenship applications is not determinative, I consider it to be significant. That significance is reflected in both policy and various Tribunal and judicial decisions.
As for policy, as mentioned earlier, in CPI 15 it is said that, as a general proposition, a person of good character would not intentionally provide false personal information in the context of a visa or citizenship application. That is what the applicant did, consistently, over a lengthy period.
As for Tribunal and judicial decisions, a lack of honesty when dealing with the respondent has been considered a “very serious matter”.[121] In a context where, as here, a person applies for citizenship, there has been said to be a “…reasonable expectation of the Australian people that a non-citizen will obey Australia’s laws and tell the truth to immigration officials.”[122] To do as the applicant has done and lie to the respondent consistently over a number of years has been said to “…demonstrate that …[the person concerned] is not a person of good repute or good character. Australia can have no confidence that he would not again transgress in matters where truth and good faith could be deceptively withheld.”[123] It showed disrespect for the government, thereby reflecting adversely on the applicant’s character “in the statutory sense.”[124]
[121] Taradel and Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] AATA 1255 at [23]; Sakhi Zada and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 1729 at [73].
[122] Mohamad v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] AATA 687 at [39] cited in Sakhi Zada and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 1729 at [74].
[123] Lachmaiya v Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] AATA 27 at [35].
[124] BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 165 ALD 39 at [88].
In comments frequently approved of,[125] in Nguyen it was said that:
“Citizenship of Australia is regarded as a special privilege when extended to those not automatically qualified. Earning it requires adherence not only to statutory requirements but also to the set of moral values and qualities related to honesty in dealings with the Government. These values and qualities are themselves a hallmark of good citizenship. Citizenship cannot be awarded on the basis of false statements. There are no excuses for making false statements in this regard.”[126]
[125] Sakhi Zada and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2020] AATA 1729 at [41]; Chalou and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 1514 at [43]; Ramazani and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2021] AATA 1801 at [25]; Kasirye and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2022] AATA 790 at [35]-[37].
[126] Nguyen and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 1082 at [82]-[83].
In a similar vein, in Fang,[127] it was said that citizenship applicants:
“… must be absolutely truthful as to who they are and absolutely truthful about their identity. Truthfulness in the completion of government documents, such as passenger arrival cards, applications for visas or citizenship, licences or identity documents is an absolute requirement…”.
[127] Fang and Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] AATA 3686 at [97].
The suggestions in these decisions that there can be no excuse for making false statements and that truthfulness is an absolute requirement simply convey the significance with which the making of false statements and a lack of truthfulness ought to be regarded in evaluating character.
I find myself in a position similar to that which I recently encountered in coming to a decision in Jalil.[128] Here, as in that case, in evaluating the applicant’s character, the favourable impression I had formed of him was not such as to outweigh the significant impact of his having lied to the Australian authorities on a number of occasions over a number of years.
[128] Jalil and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2022] AATA 675.
As in Jalil, while the applicant’s conduct in lying to the Australian authorities might be understandable in the circumstances he confronted, it reflected a long-term, repetitive, failure to behave in an ethical manner. It is not conduct consistent with a state of satisfaction as to good character. Nor is it conduct which inspires confidence that the applicant would not again engage in deceit were he to perceive it to be in his or his family’s interests to do so.
I note that a decision-maker might well come to a state of satisfaction as to the applicant’s good character with time. Of significance in this matter, however, is the fact that the applicant waited until the hearing of this matter before he came to admit the truth about his family’s composition.
I also note that it might well be that the applicant is a person of good character. In making the evaluative judgement required in the circumstances, however, I need to “reach an affirmative belief that he is a person of good character.”[129] I have not reached that belief in relation to the applicant.
[129] BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574 at [55].
Hence, I am not satisfied that the applicant is now of good character.
Given this conclusion, I do not need to address the issue concerning the applicant’s identity.
The decision under review to refuse to approve the applicant’s application for citizenship is affirmed.

I certify that the preceding 106 (one hundred and six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member C. J. Furnell

...........[SGD].........................................................
Associate
Dated: 2 August 2022

Date of hearing: 4 April 2022

Advocate for the Applicant: Stephanie Margush

Solicitors for the Applicant: Beena Rezaee Legal and Migration

Advocate for the Respondent: Kyu-Won Kim

Solicitors for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

Date of hearing:	4 April 2022
Advocate for the Applicant:	Stephanie Margush
Solicitors for the Applicant:	Beena Rezaee Legal and Migration
Advocate for the Respondent:	Kyu-Won Kim
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Clayton Utz