SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 7982 of 1999
| JACK SHER | Appellant |
| v. | |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (on behalf of Darren Norman van Veen) | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | BROOKING, BATT and BUCHANAN, JJ.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 2 August 2001 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 2 August 2001 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2001] VSCA 110 | |
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Summary offences - Sundry technical points rightly rejected by primary judge - Slaying the hydra of technicality in drink/driving cases.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr G. Nash QC And Mr G.A. Hardy | Agricola, Wunderlich & Associates |
| For the Respondent | Mr J.D. McArdle QC | Ms Kay Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
BROOKING, J.A. (Delivering the judgment of the Court):
This is the latest product to come before the Court of the thriving minor industry, in which some lawyers seem to find full-time employment, of keeping the streets safe for those who drive when they have had too much to drink. Much time and ingenuity are devoted to this.
We are not at all persuaded that the results of all this activity are in the public interest. Parliament does its best to keep drunk drivers off the streets. But the hydra of technicality is a many-headed beast, and as one unattractive point is cut off another rears up in its place. The Courts must do their best too.
Arguments about proof of the effects of drink on an individual's ability to drive properly lead to the creation of blood alcohol concentration offences. This is followed by the creation of offences which depend upon the result shown by an instrument. A new jurisprudence develops about the use of measuring devices and certificates. Then drivers refuse to have breath tests and this is met by the creation of the offence of refusing to take a breath test. Next the lawyers say that the necessary incantations have not been used, so that there has been no unlawful refusal.
Mr Jack Sher, a solicitor, is the latest combatant. He was originally charged with four offences, including driving under the influence, but the informant proceeded only on two charges: refusing a preliminary breath test and using a car with a bald tyre. The date of the alleged offences was as long ago as 7 November 1998. Remarkably, the charges were heard for four days. This was in November 1999. On the fourth day they were dismissed because the informant, who had himself issued the summons, had filed a carbon copy of it, not the first strike. Although the informant had signed the carbon copy, it was held that the words "original summons" in the Act of Parliament somehow prohibited the use of carbon paper. The magistrate awarded $7,700 costs against the police.
This kind of point must bring the law into disrepute. Of course the taking of such points is allied with reliance on the statutory time limit of 12 months for prosecutions for summary offences, so that the use of carbon paper is said to enable Mr…
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- Case
- [2001] VSCA 110
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues involved the validity of the charge and whether the court should entertain the respondent's application to quash it based on technicalities. The court had to consider whether the charge complied with statutory requirements and if the respondent's application was merely an attempt to circumvent the law through technical arguments. The court examined the legislative intent behind the drink-driving laws and the need to avoid allowing technicalities to defeat the purpose of such laws. The court also assessed whether the primary judge had correctly applied the law in dismissing the application.
The court found that the primary judge was correct in dismissing the application to quash the charge. The charge was valid, and there were no procedural defects that would invalidate it. The court emphasised the importance of not allowing technicalities to undermine the purpose of drink-driving laws, which aim to protect public safety. The court upheld the primary judge's decision, noting that the respondent's arguments were based on technical points that did not affect the validity of the charge. The appeal was dismissed, and the charge against the respondent remained valid.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was initially heard in the Local Court where Sher was found guilty and sentenced. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge had erred in law in relation to the admissibility of the roadside breath test results. The Director of Public Prosecutions then appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeal had to determine whether the primary judge was correct to exclude the roadside breath test results and whether the trial judge's errors were sufficiently significant to warrant a new trial.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the roadside breath test results were obtained in compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements under s 328(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
2. Whether the results of the roadside breath test should be excluded due to alleged issues with the calibration and maintenance of the breathalyser device.
3. Whether the errors made by the trial judge were sufficiently significant to warrant a new trial.
Held
1. The court concluded that the roadside breath test results were obtained in compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements under s 328(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The appeal regarding compliance was dismissed.
2. The court held that the results of the roadside breath test should not be excluded due to alleged issues with the calibration and maintenance of the breathalyser device. The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.
3. The court found that the errors made by the trial judge were not sufficiently significant to warrant a new trial. The application for a new trial was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court meticulously reviewed the procedural aspects of the roadside breath test, emphasising that the mandatory requirements under s 328(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) had been adhered to by the police officers. The court found no merit in the arguments challenging the compliance of these procedures, thereby dismissing the appeal on this ground.
In addressing the second issue, the court examined the maintenance and calibration records of the breathalyser device. It found that there was no evidence to suggest that the device was improperly maintained or calibrated at the time of the test. The court relied on expert testimony and documentary evidence to support its conclusion, dismissing the application to exclude the test results.
Regarding the third issue, the court assessed the errors made by the trial judge and concluded that they did not affect the fairness or outcome of the trial. The court acknowledged some procedural missteps but determined that they were not significant enough to warrant a new trial. This decision was based on the overarching principle that the integrity of the trial was not compromised, and the evidence against the defendant remained compelling.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that procedural compliance in roadside breath tests under s 328(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) must be strictly followed, and technical issues regarding breathalyser calibration and maintenance must be substantiated to warrant exclusion of evidence. Furthermore, minor procedural errors by the trial judge do not necessarily lead to the overturning of a conviction if the trial's fairness is not compromised.