DPP v Croaker - [2001] VSC 342

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 5029 of 2001

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS	Appellant
v
SCOTT CROAKER	Respondent

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JUDGE:	Bongiorno J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	21 and 24 August 2001
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	24 August 2001
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v. Croaker
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2001] VSC 342

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Road traffic - prescribed concentration of alcohol - traffic infringement notice - meaning of "conviction" – ss 50(1AB), 89A Road Safety Act 1986.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Appellant	Mr D.A. Trapnell	Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Respondent	Mr W. Walsh-Buckley	Kenna Croxford

HIS HONOUR:

On 20 December 1996 the respondent, Scott Croaker, was apprehended by police and given a breath test, as a result of which he was found to have been driving a motor vehicle whilst the percentage of alcohol in his blood exceeded the statutory limit, contrary to s 49(1)(b) Road Safety Act 1986. His reading on that occasion was .07%. He was issued with a traffic infringement notice by a police officer which had the effect, 28 days after it was issued, of taking effect as a conviction for the offence specified in the notice. This result is achieved by the effect given to a traffic infringement notice by s 89A Road Safety Act 1986.

On 19 June 2000 Mr Croaker was again apprehended and breath tested by police, and on this occasion was found to have a blood alcohol reading of .077%. As a result of that event, on 21 February 2001 he appeared in the Melbourne Magistrates' Court charged with another breach of s 49(1)(b) Road Safety Act 1986, the same offence with which he had been charged in 1996. Before he was asked to plead to the charge, an exchange took place between his counsel and the magistrate in which his counsel said:

"I appear for Mr Croaker. This is a drink drive matter, section [the section is quoted]. The matter hasn't resolved, in so far as the police aren't willing to withdraw the charges. However, if you're willing to give a sentence indication that you wouldn't interfere with the defendant's licence, he'd be willing to plead guilty today. There is a problem with that because this defendant, the police will allege, has a prior for a drink driving offence in 1996."

Counsel then went on to put an argument to the magistrate to the effect that although, if this was the first occasion on which Mr Croaker had been found guilty of this offence the magistrate would have had a discretion not to interfere with his licence, the fact that he, in fact, had a prior conviction did not mean that that discretion had been lost. At the end of the argument which included reference to what judges in the County Court had done on two other occasions, the prosecutor was invited to reply. He said:
"And in relation to the legal argument put forward to you, I've…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading DPP v Croaker

Details

AGLC: Director of Public Prosecutions v Croaker [2001] VSC 342
Case: [2001] VSC 342
Decision Date: 24 August 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and Croaker, who was issued a traffic infringement notice for exceeding the prescribed concentration of alcohol while driving. The dispute centred around the interpretation of the term "conviction" as it appears in sections 50(1AB) and 89A of the Road Safety Act 1986. The central issue for the court was whether a conviction for an alcohol-related traffic offence could be established through a traffic infringement notice and, if so, whether such a conviction would trigger specific legislative consequences. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the issuance of a traffic infringement notice constituted a conviction under the statutory framework and whether it would lead to the automatic disqualification of the driver’s licence under section 50(1AB) of the Act.

The court began by examining the legislative language and statutory context of sections 50(1AB) and 89A of the Road Safety Act 1986. It considered the ordinary meaning of the term "conviction" and how it applied within the framework of traffic infringement notices. The court found that, while the term "conviction" generally implied a formal judicial determination, the statutory context suggested that a traffic infringement notice could be treated as a conviction for certain purposes. The court reasoned that the legislative intent was to impose significant consequences for alcohol-related driving offences, and treating a traffic infringement notice as a conviction aligned with this intent. Consequently, the court held that a traffic infringement notice did indeed constitute a conviction for the purposes of section 50(1AB) of the Act, leading to the automatic disqualification of the driver’s licence.

The decision of the court was that a traffic infringement notice for an alcohol-related driving offence should be considered a conviction under the Road Safety Act 1986. This interpretation meant that the issuance of such a notice would trigger the automatic disqualification of the driver’s licence as per section 50(1AB) of the Act. The court’s ruling was based on a careful analysis of the statutory language and the broader legislative objectives of the Act. The decision provided clarity on the interpretation of "conviction" in the context of traffic infringement notices and reinforced the stringent penalties for alcohol-related driving offences.

Orders