SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 6144 of 2001
| COSIMO IMPAGNATIELLO | |
| Appellant | |
| v. | |
| IAN COLIN CAMPBELL | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | CALLAWAY, BUCHANAN and EAMES, JJ.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 1 September 2003 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 26 September 2003 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2003] VSCA 154 | |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Road safety – Driving offence – Breath testing – Failure to lead evidence that instrument met definition of “breath analysing instrument” – Whether fact that instrument complied with the definition could be inferred – Presumption of regularity.
COSTS – Magistrates’ Court – Failure of notice under s.58(2) to specify precisely the “fact or matter” with which issue was taken.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr G.A. Hardy | Michael Rickards |
| For the Respondent | Ms K. Judd | K. Robertson, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
CALLAWAY, J.A.:
I agree that this appeal should be allowed and orders made as proposed by Eames, J.A. I do so substantially for the reasons his Honour has given, which I have read in draft form. So far as the presumption of regularity is concerned, I am content to say that it did not apply here, for the reason given by the Privy Council in Dillon v. R.[1], and that, without its support, the charge under s.49(1)(f) of the Road Safety Act 1986 was not proved to the requisite standard.
BUCHANAN, J.A.:
[1][1982] A.C. 484 at 487E. See also Selby v. Pennings (1998) 19 W.A.R. 520.
I would allow the appeal for the reasons stated by Eames, J.A. I would also make the orders for costs proposed by his Honour.
EAMES, J.A.:
The respondent, a senior constable of police, conducted a breath analysis on the appellant at Oakleigh police station on 7 September 2000. Upon completion of the test a reading of .095 grams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood was obtained. On 18 October 2000 the respondent laid two charges against the appellant arising out of his driving at Oakleigh on 7 September 2000. The first charge, under s.49(1)(b) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (“the Act”) charged that he drove whilst more than the prescribed concentration of alcohol, being .05 grams per 100 millilitres of blood, was present in his blood. The second charge was brought under s.49(1)(f) being an offence of furnishing a sample of breath for analysis by a breath analysing instrument pursuant to s.55(1) of the Act within three hours after driving a motor vehicle, the result of such analysis indicating that he had more than the prescribed concentration of alcohol in his blood. The two charges were fixed for hearing at the Magistrates’ Court at Dandenong on 7 May 2001. On 14 February 2001 the appellant, by his solicitors, gave notice under s.58(2) of the Act that the appellant required the
operator of the breath analysis machine to be called as a witness.
The notice pursuant to s.58(2) was signed by the solicitor for the appellant and was addressed to the informant. It read as follows:
“TAKE…
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- Impagnatiello v Campbell [2003] VSCA 154
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- [2003] VSCA 154
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central issue before the court was whether the appellant's failure to lead evidence that the AMI complied with the statutory definition of a "breath analysing instrument" could be remedied by an inference that the instrument did indeed comply with the definition, or whether the prosecution was required to lead evidence to that effect. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the failure to specify the precise "fact or matter" in the notice of appeal under section 58(2) of the Magistrates' Court Act meant that the appeal could be dismissed.
The court held that the appellant's contention was untenable, as the appellant was required to prove that the instrument did not meet the statutory definition. The court noted that the appellant failed to call any evidence or cross-examine the witnesses to suggest that the instrument did not comply with the definition. The court applied the presumption of regularity, which held that the instrument was properly used unless proved otherwise. Regarding the notice of appeal, the court held that the failure to specify the precise "fact or matter" with which the issue was taken meant that the appeal was invalid. The court noted that the notice of appeal was insufficiently specific and did not comply with the statutory requirements.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The court held that the failure to specify the precise "fact or matter" with which the issue was taken meant that the appeal could not proceed. The court also held that the appellant's argument that the instrument did not meet the statutory definition was without merit, and that the presumption of regularity applied. The court noted that the appellant had failed to call any evidence or cross-examine the witnesses to suggest that the instrument did not comply with the definition.
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Background
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Decision
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