Shelley v Board of Professional Engineers Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Shelley v Board of Professional Engineers Queensland & Anor [2020] QSC 38

PARTIES:

JONATHAN PAUL SHELLEY

(applicant)

v
BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS QUEENSLAND

(first respondent)
and
AMANDA ALLEN as the REGISTRAR OF THE BOARD OF ENGINEERS QUEENSLAND
(second respondent)

FILE NO:

12683 of 2019

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

10 March 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

5 December 2019

JUDGE:

Applegarth J

ORDERS:

1.    The first respondent is restrained until further order from engaging in further consideration of the applicant’s application for registration dated 26 August 2019.

2.    Direct the parties to confer within seven days as to the terms of any undertakings or orders, including orders as to costs.

3.    The matter be listed for the making of final orders on a date to be fixed.

4.    Liberty to apply.

CATCHWORDS:

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES – EXERCISE – GENERALLY – where the Board has power to grant applications for registration as a professional engineer – where approved assessment scheme sets out qualifications and competencies required for professional engineers in a specific area - where the Board must have regard to assessment of applicants’ qualifications and competencies by expert assessment entity - where applicant applied for and was granted registration as a professional engineer by the Board – where the Board purports to re-exercise its power to grant or refuse applicant’s registration – whether the Board is empowered to re-exercise its power to grant or refuse registration  – whether the Board’s discretion to grant or refuse registration extends to substituting its own assessment for the expert entity’s assessment of the applicant’s qualifications and competencies - whether the Board can require an applicant for registration to demonstrate academic qualifications beyond those required by the approved assessment scheme

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 4, s 24AA
Professional Engineers Act
2002 (Qld), s 8(2), s 9(1), s 10(1), s 12(2), s 13(4), s 28, s 112B

Carr v Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138; [2007] HCA 47, cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193, cited
Victorian Building Authority v Andriotis (2019) 93 ALJR 869; [2019] HCA 22, cited

COUNSEL:

B Codd for the applicant
M H Hindman QC, with L Clark, for the first respondent
The second respondent was not required to appear

SOLICITORS:

iContract Management Consultants Pty Ltd for the applicant
Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland for the first respondent

  1. The applicant is a highly-qualified and experienced fire engineer.  His qualifications include a Masters of Engineering in Fire Engineering degree from the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.  He completed that degree in 2004 with Distinction, winning a University Prize for academic excellence in the process.  By then he had worked full-time with the New Zealand Fire Service since mid-1996 and in May 2001 became a member of its Fire Engineering Team.  In around 1999…

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Shelley v Board of Professional Engineers Queensland involved an applicant seeking registration as a professional engineer. The Board of Professional Engineers Queensland had previously granted the applicant’s application but later sought to reconsider and potentially revoke the registration. The applicant challenged the Board's authority to re-exercise its power to grant or refuse registration and whether the Board could substitute its own assessment for that of the expert assessment entity. The central legal issue was whether the Board was empowered to revisit its decision to grant registration and, if so, whether it could impose additional requirements beyond those stipulated by the approved assessment scheme.

The court examined the statutory framework governing the Board's powers, specifically section 24AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), which allows for the amendment or repeal of decisions if an Act authorises or requires such action. The applicant argued that the Act intended to preclude the Board from revisiting its decision to grant registration, highlighting the substantive rights and consequences associated with registration. The Board, however, contended that the purpose of the Act to protect the public by maintaining professional standards justified its ability to re-exercise its power. The court found that the discretionary power reposed by statute in the Board could be spent by the initial substantive exercise of power, rendering any subsequent re-exercise ultra vires unless specifically authorised by the Act.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the Board was not empowered to re-exercise its power to make a decision to grant or refuse the applicant’s registration, given the substantive rights and consequences of such a decision. The court restrained the Board from further consideration of the applicant’s registration application until further order and directed the parties to confer on the terms of any undertakings or orders, including costs. The matter was listed for the making of final orders at a later date, with liberty to apply.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent is restrained until further order from engaging in further consideration of the applicant’s application for registration dated 26 August 2019.

2. Direct the parties to confer within seven days as to the terms of any undertakings or orders, including orders as to costs.

3. The matter be listed for the making of final orders on a date to be fixed.

4. Liberty to apply.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Board relies upon s 24AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (“AIA”) which provides:“24AA Power to make instrument or decision includes power toamend or repealIf an Act authorises or requires the making of an instrument or decision – (a)the power includes the power to amend or repeal the instrument or decision; and(b)the power to amend or repeal the instrument or decision is exercisable in the same way, and subject to the same conditions, as the power to make the instrument or decision.”The application of s 24AA (like the application of other provisions of the AIA) is “displaced, wholly or partly, by a contrary intention appearing in any Act”.[22] [22]AIA, s 4. Whether or not an intention to displace the application of a provision such as s 24AA appears is a matter of statutory interpretation of the power in issue.[23] As Gummow J observed in a similar context:“… in any given case, a discretionary power reposed by statute in the decision maker may, upon a proper construction, be of such a character that it is not exercisable from time to time and it will be spent by the taking of the steps or the making of the statements or representations in question, treating them as a substantive exercise of the power. The result is that when the decision maker attempts to resile from his earlier position, he is prevented from doing so not from any doctrine of estoppel, but because his power to do so is spent and the proposed second decision would be ultra vires.”[24][23]Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193 at 211.[24]Ibid. In submitting that the Act appears to show an intention to displace a power to repeal a decision to approve an application for registration, the applicant places particular reliance on the subject matter of the power and the existence of an express power to cancel registration in certain circumstances. The granting of registration confers upon a successful applicant substantive rights to carry on practice as a professional engineer. To deprive such an individual of his or her registration is a matter of great consequence. Depriving a person such as the applicant in this case of his registration deprives him of his livelihood, interrupts his recently established business and is apt to adversely affect his reputation. It would have the same practical effect as the cancellation of his registration, but without having to establish one or more of the grounds contained in s 28 under which the Board may cancel a registered professional engineer’s registration. It also would not require the Board to follow the process contained in s 29 to cancel a person’s registration. These include giving at least 21 days’ notice (which includes notice of the facts and circumstances which are the grounds for cancellation), giving the engineer an opportunity to make written representations as to why the registration should not be cancelled and considering those representations. In reply to these submissions the Board emphasises the subject matter and purpose of the Act, being to protect the public by upholding the standards of professional engineers. It submits that if occasion arises for the Board to re-exercise its power for that protective purpose, then the purpose of the Act is best achieved by construing the Act to permit that to occur.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Absent a suitably worded undertaking from the Board, I will hear the parties as to the terms of a continuing restraint upon the Board engaging in further consideration of the applicant’s application for registration dated 26 August 2019.Is the Board empowered to re-exercise its power to make a decision to grant or refuse to grant an application for registration? My conclusion about the nature and content of any discretion which the Board may possess in the present circumstances makes it unnecessary to determine this question. However, since the parties addressed arguments on this question, I will address them. The applicant submits that the Act defines the powers of the Board and that the Act provides no power to revisit a decision to grant an application. The Board relies upon s 24AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (“AIA”) which provides:“24AA Power to make instrument or decision includes power toamend or repealIf an Act authorises or requires the making of an instrument or decision – (a)the power includes the power to amend or repeal the instrument or decision; and(b)the power to amend or repeal the instrument or decision is exercisable in the same way, and subject to the same conditions, as the power to make the instrument or decision.”The application of s 24AA (like the application of other provisions of the AIA) is “displaced, wholly or partly, by a contrary intention appearing in any Act”.[22] [22]AIA, s 4. Whether or not an intention to displace the application of a provision such as s 24AA appears is a matter of statutory interpretation of the power in issue.[23] As Gummow J observed in a similar context:“… in any given case, a discretionary power reposed by statute in the decision maker may, upon a proper construction, be of such a character that it is not exercisable from time to time and it will be spent by the taking of the steps or the making of the statements or representations in question, treating them as a substantive exercise of the power. The result is that when the decision maker attempts to resile from his earlier position, he is prevented from doing so not from any doctrine of estoppel, but because his power to do so is spent and the proposed second decision would be ultra vires.”[24][23]Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193 at 211.[24]Ibid. In submitting that the Act appears to show an intention to displace a power to repeal a decision to approve an application for registration, the applicant places particular reliance on the subject matter of the power and the existence of an express power to cancel registration in certain circumstances. The granting of registration confers upon a successful applicant substantive rights to carry on practice as a professional engineer. To deprive such an individual of his or her registration is a matter of great consequence. Depriving a person such as the applicant in this case of his registration deprives him of his livelihood, interrupts his recently established business and is apt to adversely affect his reputation.