SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Independent Assessor v Councillor Conduct Tribunal & Anor [2020] QSC 316
PARTIES:
INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR
(Applicant)
v
COUNCILLOR CONDUCT TRIBUNAL
(First Respondent)
and
NIGEL WAISTELL(Second Respondent)
FILE NO/S:
5124/20
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
16 October 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
18 August 2020
JUDGE:
Flanagan J
ORDER:
1. The application for a statutory order of review and for review filed 13 May 2020 is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS – where the applicant applied to the first respondent pursuant to the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) to make a determination in respect of alleged misconduct by the second respondent – where the applicant then purported to revoke and rescind its application – where the first respondent advised that it would proceed to determine the application – whether the first respondent had jurisdiction to hear and determine the application
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – INTERPRETATION ACTS AND PROVISIONS – EXERCISE OF POWERS AND DUTIES – GENERALLY – where the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) allowed the applicant to apply to the first respondent to make a determination in respect of alleged misconduct by councillors – where s 24AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) provided that the power to make an instrument or decision includes a power to amend or repeal the decision – where the application of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) could be displaced by a contrary intention appearing in any act – whether the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) displaced s 24AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 4, s 24AA
Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 150WAurukun Shire Council v CEO Office of Liquor Gaming and Racing in the Department of Treasury [2008] QSC 305
Firearm Distributors Pty Ltd v Carson & Ors [2001] 2 Qd R 26
Pfeiffer v Stevens (2001) 209 CLR 57
Ping v Medical Board of Queensland [2004] 1 Qd R 282
Schipp v Herfords Pty Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 412
Shelley v Board of Professional Engineers Queensland & Anor [2020] QSC 38COUNSEL:
SJ Keim SC for the applicant
SA McLeod QC, with MR Wilkinson for the first respondent
Nigel Waistell, self-represented, for the second respondentSOLICITORS:
Office of the Independent Assessor for the applicant
Councillor Conduct Tribunal for the first respondent
The applicant (“Independent Assessor”) is a statutory officer established under s 150CT of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) (“LG Act”) to perform a variety of investigative and advisory functions in relation to the conduct of councillors in Queensland local government areas.[1] The first respondent (“Tribunal”) is also established by the LG Act to investigate and make determinations in relation to the conduct of councillors, including upon application by the Independent Assessor.[2] In January 2020, the Independent Assessor made an application to the Tribunal…
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- Case
- [2020] QSC 316
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the relevant provisions of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) and the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), concluding that the Act did not evince a contrary intention that would displace s 24AA of the AIA. The court noted that the Independent Assessor's discretion to withdraw or amend an application was consistent with the general approach to statutory interpretation, as illustrated in cases such as Pfeiffer v Stevens. The court found that the Independent Assessor's attempt to revoke and rescind the application did not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter.
In light of the court's findings, the application for a statutory order of review and for review was dismissed. There was no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for a statutory order of review and for review filed 13 May 2020 is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court following an application by the Applicant seeking a statutory order of review and for review of the decision of the Tribunal. The Applicant contested the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to proceed with the determination of the application for misconduct against the Second Respondent. The Applicant had initially filed the application with the Tribunal, which was later purportedly revoked and rescinded by the Applicant. However, the Tribunal proceeded to determine the application, leading to the Applicant's challenge of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The court was tasked with deciding whether the Tribunal had the authority to hear and determine the application despite the Applicant's purported revocation and rescission.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Regarding the possible application of s 150DLA of the LG Act, the Independent Assessor submits that this section applies in circumstances where the Tribunal refers a matter of possible misconduct directly to the Independent Assessor for investigation. In the present case, the Tribunal referred the matter to the SRRC with the recommendation that the SRRC refer the matter back to the Independent Assessor for reassessment. Accordingly, the Independent Assessor submits, correctly in my view, that s 150DLA and the related provisions of s 150W(2) are not applicable.[64] Even in the event that s 150W(2) was applicable to the decision, the Independent Assessor does not accept that this constrains the Independent Assessor’s discretion such as to displace s 24AA of the AIA.[65][64]Submissions in Reply of the Applicant, paras 24-26.[65]Submissions in Reply of the Applicant, para 34.Consideration The issue of whether s 24AA is displaced by a contrary intention appearing in the LG Act is resolved upon a proper construction of that Act. A consideration of the operation of s 4 of the AIA in the context of cases dealing with different legislation is of limited assistance. Such a consideration does, however, assist in identifying the general approach to be adopted in determining whether the relevant Act evinces a contrary intention. In Pfeiffer v Stevens,[66] the section of the AIA considered by the High Court was s 23(1) rather than s 24AA. Section 23(1) provides:“If an Act confers a function or power on a person or body, the function may be performed, or the power may be exercised, as occasion requires.”[66](2001) 209 CLR 57. Section 860(2) of the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld) provided that a local law proposed pursuant to s 860(1) must include a sunset provision stating that the law would expire six months after its commencement, or at the end of a longer period gazetted by the Minister. An interim local law of a city council contained a sunset provision in those terms. The Minister purported to extend the law twice. The issue was whether the words “a longer period” in s 860(2) evinced a contrary intention so that s 23(1) of the AIA was displaced. Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Hayne JJ concluded that no such contrary intention arose. Gummow and Kirby JJ dissented. In deciding that s 860(2) did not evince a contrary intention, McHugh J observed:[67]“An intention contrary to the Acts Interpretation Act may appear not only from the express terms or necessary implication of a legislative provision but from the general character of the legislation itself. It was so held in Blue Metal Industries Ltd v Dilley, a case involving the takeover provisions in the Companies Act 1961 (NSW). The issue in Dilley was whether a section dealing with the transfer of shares in ‘a company’ to ‘another company’ attracted the presumption in the Interpretation Act 1899 (NSW) that a reference to the singular includes the plural. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the Companies Act showed an intention to apply to a transfer to only one company. Consequently, the Interpretation Act was inapplicable.” (Footnotes omitted)[67](2001) 209 CLR 57 at 73-74, [56].