TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Shane Miles to registration of trade mark application number 2135020 (class 12) – POWER SLIDE – in the name of Clearview Towing Mirrors Pty Ltd
Delegate: | Jonathon Galloway |
Representation: | Opponent: Ian Tannahill of Ahearn Fox Applicant: Sam Hallahan of counsel instructed by Foundry Intellectual Property Pty Ltd |
Decision: | 2025 ATMO 18 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – opposition under s 52 – ss 41, 43 and 62(b) pressed – s 41 established – registration refused |
Background
This decision concerns an opposition under s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)[1] by Shane Miles (‘Opponent’) to registration of the following trade mark:
Trade mark number: 2135020
Trade mark: POWER SLIDE (‘Trade Mark’)
Applicant: Clearview Towing Mirrors Pty Ltd (‘Applicant’)
Filing date: 11 November 2020
[1] Unless otherwise stated, each reference to a section or regulation is a reference to the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) or Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’) respectively.
Specification:
Class 12: Storage systems for motor vehicles for storing refrigerators (‘Claimed Goods’)
The Trade Mark was examined as required by s 33 and advertised as accepted for possible registration on 14 September 2022.
On 31 October 2022, the Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose registration of the Trade Mark. On 29 November 2022, the Opponent filed his Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’).
The Opponent filed the following Evidence in Support (‘EIS’) on 22 May 2023:
- Declaration by Ian Robert Tannahill, registered patent and trade mark attorney at Ahearn Fox, dated 22 May 2023 with exhibits IRT-1 to IRT-37 (‘Tannahill 1’).
The Applicant filed the following Evidence in Answer (‘EIA’) on 25 August 2023:
- Declaration by Andrew Richard Jones, Principal of Foundry Intellectual Property Pty Ltd, dated 25 August 2023 with exhibits AJ-1 to AJ-24 (‘Jones’).
- Exhibit AJ-16 contains a declaration by Michael Cowan, CEO and co-founder of the Applicant, dated 24 April 2023 with exhibits MC-1 to MC-9 (‘Cowan’).
The Opponent filed the following Evidence in Reply (‘EIR’) on 27 October 2023:
- Declaration by Ian Robert Tannahill dated 27 October 2023, with exhibits IRT-38 to IRT-47 (‘Tannahill 2’).
Once the period for filing evidence had ended, both parties requested an oral hearing.
As a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, I heard the matter on 24 October 2024. The Opponent filed written submissions and was represented by Ian Tannahill of Ahearn Fox. The Applicant filed written submissions and was represented by Sam Hallahan of counsel, instructed by Andrew Jones of Foundry Intellectual Property Pty Ltd.
The following constitutes my decision on this matter as required by s 55 based on the evidence set out above, the SGP and the parties’ submissions.
Grounds and Onus
The SGP nominates grounds of opposition under ss 41, 43 and 62(b).
The Opponent carries…
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- Case
- [2025] ATMO 18
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the delegate were whether the trade mark application should be rejected on the grounds of being not capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods from those of other persons under section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), or on the grounds of being deceptive or misleading under section 43, or on the grounds of being used contrary to law under section 62(b). The opponent bore the burden of establishing these grounds on the balance of probabilities.
The delegate found that the ordinary signification of "POWER SLIDE" in relation to the claimed goods was a reference to an electronically controlled sliding function for accessing vehicle refrigerators. The delegate considered that other traders would likely desire to use this term or a similar one to describe their own goods, due to the common understanding of "power" indicating an electronic enhancement and "slide" referring to a sliding motion. While the mark was found to be to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the goods, the delegate concluded that the applicant's use of the mark, often in conjunction with a lightning bolt device or the "CLEAR VIEW POWER SLIDE" mark, did not necessarily demonstrate use of the trade mark as applied for, as these additions could substantially affect its identity.
Ultimately, the delegate determined that the ground of opposition under section 41 was established. Consequently, the delegate refused the registration of the trade mark application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Shane Miles filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose the registration of trade mark application number 2135020, titled "POWER SLIDE", submitted by Clearview Towing Mirrors Pty Ltd on 31 October 2022. The Statement of Grounds and Particulars followed on 29 November 2022, nominating grounds of opposition under sections 41, 43 and 62(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). Both parties filed evidence in support of their positions, with Shane Miles submitting evidence on 22 May 2023 and Clearview Towing Mirrors Pty Ltd responding on 25 August 2023. Shane Miles further submitted evidence in reply on 27 October 2023. Both parties requested an oral hearing, which was conducted by Jonathon Galloway, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, on 24 October 2024. The decision of Jonathon Galloway, rendered on 23 January 2025, was that the trade mark "POWER SLIDE" did not distinguish the Applicant's goods or services from those of other persons, thereby establishing a ground of opposition under section 41 of the Act. Consequently, the registration of the trade mark was refused.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' have an ordinary signification in relation to the claimed goods and, if so, what is that signification?
2. Is the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods from those of other traders?
3. Does the combined effect of the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods, the use or intended use of the trade mark by the applicant, and any other circumstances, establish that the trade mark will distinguish the applicant's goods?
4. Is the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services from those of other persons under s 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)?
5. Are there any other grounds of opposition under ss 43 and 62(b) that have been sufficiently established to warrant refusal of registration?
Held
1. Does the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' have an ordinary signification in relation to the claimed goods and, if so, what is that signification?
The court concluded that the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' has an ordinary signification in relation to the claimed goods as a reference to the electronically controlled sliding function that provides access to vehicle refrigerators.
2. Is the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods from those of other traders?
The court concluded that the trade mark is to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the claimed goods.
3. Does the combined effect of the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods, the use or intended use of the trade mark by the applicant, and any other circumstances, establish that the trade mark will distinguish the applicant's goods?
The court concluded that the combined effect is not sufficient to satisfy that the trade mark does or will distinguish the claimed goods.
4. Is the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services from those of other persons under s 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)?
The court concluded that the opponent has established a ground of opposition under s 41, and the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods from those of other persons.
5. Are there any other grounds of opposition under ss 43 and 62(b) that have been sufficiently established to warrant refusal of registration?
The court concluded that consideration of the remaining grounds is not necessary as a ground of opposition under s 41 has been established.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's reasoning begins with an assessment of whether the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' has an ordinary signification in relation to the claimed goods. The delegate considered the definitions of the words 'power' and'slide' from the Macquarie Dictionary and the likelihood that consumers would understand the trade mark as a reference to the electronically controlled sliding function that provides access to vehicle refrigerators. The court held that the ordinary signification of 'POWER SLIDE' was a reference to the electronically controlled sliding function that provides access to vehicle refrigerators. This finding aligns with the evidence provided by the opponent, which demonstrated the common use of 'power' to denote an electronic enhancement to a product and 'slide' to indicate an electronic sliding function or aspect.
Next, the court assessed whether the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' is inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods from those of other traders. The test for inherent adaptability to distinguish involves considering the likelihood that other traders would desire to use the trade mark for the ordinary signification of the claimed goods. The court found that the trade mark was to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the claimed goods. This conclusion was based on the evidence that other traders would desire to use the trade mark to describe their goods which possess the same function, emphasizing the electronic advantage of their fridge actuation units. However, the trade mark was not merely laudatory and was not comprised of words that were the only or natural words to indicate this particular aspect of the goods.
The court then considered the combined effect of the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods, the use or intended use of the trade mark by the applicant, and any other circumstances. The evidence of use provided by the applicant, which included the incorporation of a stylised lightning bolt or as part of a trade mark including the words 'CLEAR VIEW POWER SLIDE', did not sufficiently demonstrate that consumers would view the trade mark as a badge of origin. The court found that the evidence of use was insufficient to satisfy that the trade mark does or will distinguish the claimed goods. The court concluded that the trade mark was not capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods from the goods or services of other persons under section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).
Finally, the court considered whether there were any other grounds of opposition under sections 43 and 62(b) that had been sufficiently established to warrant refusal of registration. Since the opponent had successfully established a ground of opposition under section 41, the court found it unnecessary to consider the remaining grounds of opposition. The court refused to register the trade mark number 2135020.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the trade mark 'POWER SLIDE' is not capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods from the goods or services of other persons under section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), as it is to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the goods, and the combined effect of the extent of the inherent adaptation to distinguish, the use or intended use of the trade mark, and any other circumstances, is not sufficient to establish that the trade mark will distinguish the applicant's goods. The court followed the established principles of assessing the inherent adaptability to distinguish and the test for distinctiveness set out in Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks and Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Modena Trading Pty Ltd. The court departed from prior authority to the extent that it found the trade mark to be insufficiently inherently adapted to distinguish the goods, despite the ordinary signification of the trade mark.