FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Shah v Hagemrad [2018] FCAFC 148
Appeal from: Shah v Hagemrad [2018] FCA 91 File number: NSD 252 of 2018 Judges: RARES, MARKOVIC, BANKS-SMITH JJ Date of judgment: 13 August 2018 Catchwords: APPEAL – rehearing – review of judge’s findings of fact – whether findings inconsistent with incontrovertibly established facts – power of appellate court to set aside findings – whether judge erred in calculation of damages Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 36.75
Cases cited: Australian Iron and Steel Limited v Greenwood (1962) 107 CLR 308
Enzed Holdings Limited v Wynthea Pty Limited (1984) 57 ALR 167
Mills v Stanway Coaches Limited [1940] 2 KB 334
Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v Thiers Contracts Pty Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 257
Date of hearing: 13 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 33 Counsel for the Appellant: Dr AJ Greinke Solicitor for the Appellant: Lodhia Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr CD Wood Solicitor for the First Respondent: Paramonte Legal ORDERS
NSD 252 of 2018 BETWEEN: JIMITKUMAR BHUPESHKUMAR SHAH
Appellant
AND: MAZEN HAGEMRAD
First Respondent
MICHAEL ALLOUCHE
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, MARKOVIC, BANKS-SMITH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 36.75 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the hearing of the appeal proceed generally as against the second respondent.
2.The appeal be allowed.
3.Order 1 of the orders made by the primary judge on 23 February 2018 be varied by deleting “$337,696” and substituting “$476,170.62”.
4.The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)THE COURT:
This appeal is limited to a short point that, in essence, turned on whether the primary judge erred in using the average weekly earnings, excluding GST, instead of including GST when assessing the value of the business that generated those earnings. It arises in the following context.
Background
The appellant, Jimitkumar Bhupeshkumar Shah, was the sole director of the second applicant below, Riversub Pty Limited as trustee of the Tandon family Trust. Mr Shah purchased the right to operate a Subway franchise business operated under a licence from a well-known retail fast food chain, in Haymarket, on George Street, Sydney, from the respondents and vendors, Mazen Hagemrad and Michael Allouche. The third respondent below was a company associated with the vendors, The Retail Group (Darlinghurst) Pty Limited that is now in liquidation. Mr Allouche and The Retail Group did not appear at the trial. Mr Shah joined only the two vendors as respondents to the appeal. Mr Allouche was served with the notice of appeal personally on 20 July 2018 together with the primary judge’s reasons, final orders…
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- Shah v Hagemrad [2018] FCAFC 148
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- [2018] FCAFC 148
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the primary judge erred in his calculation of damages by excluding GST from the average weekly earnings when assessing the value of the business. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the primary judge's findings of fact were inconsistent with the incontrovertibly established facts and whether the judge had sufficiently explained his reasoning for the damages awarded. The respondents contended that the primary judge had discretion in assessing the value of the business and was entitled to arrive at his finding without elaborating on the reasons. However, the appellant argued that the primary judge's failure to explain his assessment of damages was problematic and required the court to undertake a rehearing to establish the proper inference from the undisputed facts.
The Full Court found that the primary judge's failure to explain how he arrived at his finding of the business's actual net weekly takings, exclusive of GST, was a significant omission. The Court held that a judge must provide reasons for assessing damages in a particular way, especially when the task is not as complex as suggested by some precedents. The Court also noted that the primary judge's findings that the business had been in a dire financial state and that the banking records provided a more reliable record of takings made his assessment of $12,000 per week exclusive of GST appear either mistaken or without basis in the evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that it was in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from the established facts. The appeal was allowed, and the damages awarded were increased accordingly.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 36.75 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the hearing of the appeal proceed generally as against the second respondent.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. Order 1 of the orders made by the primary judge on 23 February 2018 be varied by deleting “$337,696” and substituting “$476,170.62”.
4. The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Hagemrad accepted that the primary judge had not elaborated or explained how he had arrived at his finding that the actual net weekly takings (i.e. exclusive of GST) were $12,000 per week. Mr Hagemrad contended that, in a case such as the present, his Honour was entitled to make that finding because it was open to him to do so in exercising a discretionary judgment as to the value of the business.Consideration Mr Hagemrad’s argument must be rejected. A judge must give reasons as to why he or she has assessed damages in a particular way. There will be cases where it is difficult to be precise, as the Full Court in Enzed 57 ALR at 183 suggested. Indeed, in Australian Iron and Steel Limited v Greenwood (1962) 107 CLR 308 at 326, Windeyer J compared the task of a jury in assessing general damages for personal injury with what Lord Goddard CJ had said, as Goddard LJ, in Mills v Stanway Coaches Limited [1940] 2 KB 334 at 349, namely:Of course, different minds have diferent ideas as to what is moderate in seeking for a mean, a normal or an average. Where there is really no guide it is very like Lord Bowen’s illustration of a blind man looking for a black hat in a dark room. However, this is not such a case: cf Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 257 at 267 [41] per Hayne J, with whom Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Kirby JJ agreed. His Honour did not explain how, in the context of his other findings, he had arrived at a takings figure of $12,000 per week exclusive of GST or $13,200 inclusive of GST. That context consisted of the primary judge’s findings that, first, the banking records for the period June 2014 to October 2015 provided a much more reliable record of the takings of the business than the monthly combo reports, secondly, the business had been in a dire financial state over that period, and thirdly, the banking records of the business for the 12 months ended 30 June 2015 showed average weekly takings, inclusive of GST, of $12,442 per week. Given his Honour’s findings that the business continued to decline after 30 June 2015, with respect, in our opinion, his Honour did not explain how he arrived at his finding that, in fact, the actual sales figures, excluding GST, for the preceding 12 months were $12,000, which equalised to $13,200 per week inclusive of GST. In those circumstances, his Honour’s finding that the average sales were about $12,000 per week, exclusive of GST, appears to have been either a mistake or to have no basis in the evidence. Accordingly, the Court must undertake on a rehearing, pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act (1976) (Cth), the task that Gibbs ACJ, Jacobs and Murphy JJ identified in Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 551, namely:… in general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge. In deciding what is the proper inference to be drawn, the appellate court will give respect and weight to the conclusion of the trial judge, but, once having reached its own conclusion, will not shrink from giving effect to it. These principles, we venture to think, are not only sound in law, but beneficial in their operation.