FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SENIOR & ANDERSON | [2011] FamCAFC 129 |
| FAMILY LAW - APPEAL – (Per May J) – Property – Binding Financial Agreement – Where the subjective and common intention of the parties regarding the division of their property was properly expressed in the agreement – Where the mistakes in the agreement were of a technical nature – Where the incorrect reference to s 90C can be rectified to s 90D to reflect the parties’ true position – Where the incorrect reference to the parties’ names cannot be rectified by s 90KA but where it is appropriate to correct the solicitor’s error by reading the certificates as if they referred to the parties correctly – Where the remedial provisions in this case inevitably lead to a conclusion that it would be unjust and inequitable if the parties’ agreement is found not to be binding – Given the circumstances it is not necessary to remit the matter to the trial judge – Where this case is a good demonstration of Parliament’s intentions to not allow technical faults to be the basis for setting aside an agreement – The appeal should be dismissed. FAMILY LAW - APPEAL – (Per Strickland J) – Property – Binding Financial Agreement – Where there were errors in the Agreement and the annexed Solicitor’s Certificates – Where the Agreement is described as being a s 90C Financial Agreement instead of a s 90D Financial Agreement and where the names of the parties were incorrect in the Solicitor’s Certificates – Whether the trial judge erred in rectifying the Agreement to accord with the provisions of s 90C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and in rectifying the Solicitor’s Certificates – Whether the trial judge erred in declaring that after rectification the Agreement was a Financial Agreement pursuant to s 90D of the Act and was binding on the parties pursuant to s 90G(1) of the Act – No merit found in the grounds of appeal relating to the rectification of the mis-description of the section pursuant to which the Agreement was made and the finding that the Agreement was a Financial Agreement, although the trial judge erred in finding that the power to rectify was derived in part from the recent amendments to the Act – Merit found in the grounds of appeal relating to the rectification of the Solicitor’s Certificates and the finding that the Financial Agreement was binding on the parties pursuant to s 90G(1) of the Act – Appeal allowed and remitted to the trial judge to determine whether the financial agreement can be declared binding pursuant to s 90G(1A) and (1B) of the Act. FAMILY LAW - APPEAL – (Per Murphy J) – Property – Binding Financial Agreement – Effect of the transitional provisions of the Federal Justice System Amendment (Efficiency Measures) Act (No 1) 2009 (Cth) (“the Amending Act”) – Where the effect of Item 8A of Schedule 5 of the Amending Act on the Binding Financial Agreement was not considered… |
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- AGLC
- Senior & Anderson [2011] FamCAFC 129
- Case
- [2011] FamCAFC 129
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether the trial judge erred in rectifying the mis-description of the section pursuant to which the Agreement was made and the finding that the Agreement was a Financial Agreement. The court found no merit in the grounds of appeal relating to the rectification of the mis-description of the section and the finding that the Agreement was a Financial Agreement. However, the trial judge erred in finding that the power to rectify was derived in part from recent amendments to the Act. The court also found merit in the grounds of appeal relating to the rectification of the solicitor's certificates and the finding that the Financial Agreement was binding on the parties. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the trial judge.
The appeal's outcome highlighted the importance of rectifying technical errors in legal documents without undermining the intention of the parties. The court emphasised that Parliament intended for technical faults not to be the basis for setting aside an agreement. The court further noted that it was not necessary to remit the matter to the trial judge for a full re-hearing, as the circumstances led to the conclusion that it would be unjust and inequitable if the parties' agreement was not found to be binding. Additionally, the court considered the effect of the transitional provisions of the Federal Justice System Amendment (Efficiency Measures) Act (No 1) 2009 (Cth) on the BFA, allowing the appeal on this ground as well.
The final orders included setting aside the previous order, allowing the appeal, and remitting the matter to the trial judge for a determination on whether the agreement should be declared binding. Both parties were granted costs certificates for the appeal and the re-hearing, reflecting the complexity and importance of the issues involved.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The time for filing a Notice of Appeal be extended to 24 August 2010.
2.
The Appeal be allowed.
3.
Order 2 made by Young J on 30 June 2010 be set aside.
4.
The matter be remitted to Young J for determination of whether the agreement should be declared binding pursuant to s 90G(1A) and (1B) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
5.
There be no order for costs in relation to the costs of the appeal.
6.
The Court grants to the wife a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of section 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the wife in respect of the costs incurred by the wife in relation to the appeal.
7.
The Court grants to the husband a costs certificate pursuant to the provision of section 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the husband in respect of the costs incurred by the husband in relation to the appeal.
8.
The Court grants to each party a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of section 8 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to each party in respect of such part as the Attorney-General considers appropriate of any costs incurred by each party in relation to the rehearing to determine whether the agreement should be declared binding pursuant to s 90G(1A) and (1B) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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