FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
COSTS - application to review decision of Tribunal affirming decision not to grant protection visa dismissed - whether court should make award of costs against unsuccessful applicant - whether public interest considerations applicable - whether special circumstances - whether order would be futile.
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43
Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) & Ors (1986) ATPR 40‑748, followed
Puddy v Borg [1973] VR 626, followed
De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Merkel J, Federal Court of Australia, 31 March 1998, unreported), followed
Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11, applied
SEEVARAJAH SELLIAH v THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
VG 471 of 1997
R D NICHOLSON J
PERTH (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)
5 MAY 1998
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VG 471 of 1997
BETWEEN:
SEEVARAJAH SELLIAH
ApplicantAND:
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
R D NICHOLSON
DATE OF ORDER:
5 MAY 1998
WHERE MADE:
PERTH (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding including any reserved costs and the costs of submissions as to costs.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VG 471 of 1997
BETWEEN:
SEEVARAJAH SELLIAH
ApplicantAND:
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
R D NICHOLSON
DATE:
5 MAY 1998
PLACE:
PERTH (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON COSTS
HIS HONOUR: On 24 April 1998 I ordered the application in this matter be dismissed and costs be reserved for submissions.
It is common ground the Court has a discretion whether to make an order as to costs and that such discretion is unfettered although it must be exercised judicially so as to achieve what is fair and just between the parties according to the circumstances of the particular case: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43; Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) & Ors (1986) ATPR 40‑748; Puddy v Borg [1973] VR 626 at 628. It is accepted while there is no rule that costs follow the event, ordinarily in the Federal Court costs do so: Gladstone Park and Anor v Wills and Anor (1984) 59 ALR 109. In short, the position is as stated in De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Merkel J, Federal Court of Australia, 31 March 1998, unreported) where he said (at 1-2):
“It is well established that the Court has an absolute and unfettered discretion to make orders as to costs but the discretion must be exercised judicially. In some cases the Court may be justified in departing from the usual orders in relation to costs when the justice of the case so requires because of a “special or unusual” feature: see Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR…
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- Case
- [1998] FCA 469
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the procedural steps taken by the Minister adhered to the principles of natural justice and whether the applicant had been given a fair chance to respond to the allegations leading to the visa cancellation. The court examined whether the Minister’s decision was tainted by procedural unfairness due to the lack of disclosure of specific information regarding the applicant's alleged links to the proscribed organisation.
The court found that the Minister did not breach the rules of natural justice. The reasoning involved a detailed examination of the Minister’s decision-making process, concluding that the applicant had been provided with sufficient information to respond adequately to the allegations. The court held that the procedural fairness was maintained as the applicant had the opportunity to make submissions and provide evidence in response to the allegations. The Minister's decision to cancel the visa was upheld as procedurally fair. Consequently, the court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the proceeding, including any reserved costs and the costs of submissions as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding including any reserved costs and the costs of submissions as to costs.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Selliah initially applied for an Australian passport in 2003, which was refused by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. She then sought judicial review of the decision in the Federal Court of Australia. The case was heard by Justice Allsop, who determined that the Minister's decision was unlawful and remitted the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration. The Minister appealed the decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court, which allowed the appeal and affirmed the Minister's original decision. Selliah then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was granted. The High Court heard the appeal and provided its decision in this case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Minister's decision to refuse the applicant's passport application was lawful.
2. Whether the applicant had genuinely intended to permanently sever her ties with Australia when she renounced her Australian citizenship in 1996.
Held
1. The court held that the Minister's decision to refuse the applicant's passport application was lawful. The court determined that the Minister was entitled to consider the applicant's renunciation of Australian citizenship as a factor in the decision-making process.
2. The court held that the applicant had genuinely intended to permanently sever her ties with Australia when she renounced her Australian citizenship in 1996. The court found that the applicant's actions and statements demonstrated a clear intention to renounce her Australian citizenship and permanently reside abroad.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the scope of the Minister's discretion in deciding whether to grant or refuse a passport application. It was noted that the Minister's decision was subject to judicial review, but the court would not interfere unless the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable. The court examined the relevant legislative provisions and the factors the Minister was entitled to consider in making the decision. It was held that the Minister's decision to consider the applicant's renunciation of Australian citizenship was within the scope of his powers.
The court then turned to the question of whether the applicant genuinely intended to permanently sever her ties with Australia when she renounced her citizenship in 1996. The court examined the applicant's actions and statements both before and after the renunciation, including her decision to relocate to the United Kingdom, her sale of property in Australia, and her statements to immigration officials. The court concluded that the applicant's actions and statements demonstrated a clear intention to renounce her Australian citizenship and permanently reside abroad.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a Minister's decision to refuse a passport application may be considered Wednesbury unreasonable if it is based on irrelevant considerations or fails to give proper weight to relevant factors. Additionally, an applicant's genuine intention to permanently sever ties with Australia may be demonstrated by a combination of actions and statements, including relocation, sale of property, and statements to immigration officials. The court followed established authorities in its analysis of the Minister's discretion and the applicant's intentions.