MZARS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZARS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 177

Appeal from: MZARS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2419
File number: VID 1072 of 2016
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 1 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for protection (Class XA) visa – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia holding no jurisdictional error in decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether conclusion of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was in error – no error established
Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

Plaintiff S157/202 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476

Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security (No 2) [2000] FCA 1450

Selliah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [1998] FCA 469

SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129

SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; 233 FCR 451

Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1212

Date of hearing: 20 February 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 38
The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: S Koya

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

DLA Piper Australia

The Second Respondent submitted to any order, save as to costs.

ORDERS

VID 1072 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MZARS

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KENNY J:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), to affirm the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (protection visa).

  2. The appellant was self-represented in this Court, as she had been in the FCCA. She appeared at the hearing of the appeal with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter. The Minister was represented by his lawyer in this Court as at first instance.

  3. The applicant in the FCCA and the Tribunal (referred to in this Court and generally in these reasons as the appellant) claimed to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 177
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of MZARS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an Indian citizen who had applied for a protection visa. The appellant entered Australia in 2009 and was granted a second visa in 2011 to study. She subsequently applied for a waiver of a "no further stay" condition, which was denied. After remarrying an Australian permanent resident, she again applied for a waiver, which was also refused. The appellant then applied for a protection visa, which was subsequently refused. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) upheld the delegate's decision, and the appellant appealed to the court. The appeal centred on whether the FCCA had erred in its decision that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error.

The court examined whether the appellant had identified any alleged jurisdictional error that the FCCA should have discerned. The appellant's notice of appeal did not identify any such error, and the court found that the appellant's failure to provide further documentation was not critical to the outcome of the Tribunal's decision. The court found that the decision turned on the evidence and other material before the Tribunal, as well as the findings that the Tribunal made on the basis of this evidence and material.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. The court found no error in the FCCA's decision and upheld the Tribunal's findings that the appellant's claims were "vague and generalised" and lacked credibility. The court held that the appellant had not established any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, I would dismiss the appeal, with costs. SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND FACTS The background facts are not in dispute. The following summary is drawn primarily from the Tribunal’s statement of reasons. The appellant is an Indian citizen, who entered Australian in 2009 with a valid Indian passport and as a dependent of her then husband, who held a student visa. The appellant and her husband divorced in Australia in 2011; and the appellant was granted a second visa in her own right later the same year, to study an “English as a Second Language” course and a “Community Welfare” course. She received the necessary financial support from her family in India. This second visa was issued subject to condition 8534, which is a “no further stay” condition. The appellant applied for a waiver of that condition in June 2012. This waiver request was unsuccessful, although the appellant had been granted a bridging visa when she made the waiver request. The appellant re-married in July 2013. Her second husband was an Australian permanent resident. In November 2013, the appellant made a second request for waiver of the “no further stay” condition, this time in order that she could apply for a partner visa sponsored by her new husband. This waiver request was also refused. The appellant applied for the protection visa in March 2014. This application was refused by a delegate of the Minister in May 2014. Amongst other things, the delegate described the appellant’s claims as “vague and lacking in detail”. The delegate also stated that her failure to contact the department, as invited, to discuss her claims led the delegate to “to doubt the genuineness of her claimed fear”. Rejecting the corroborative value of certain text messages on which the appellant relied, the delegate also found that her delay in making her application for a protection visa raised “serious concerns about the immediacy, gravity and credibility of her claims of fearing persecution in India”. On 2 June 2014 the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The appellant gave oral evidence before the Tribunal on 27 January 2015. In January 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Like the delegate, the Tribunal found that the appellant’s evidence in support of her claims was “vague and generalised”. The Tribunal also expressed “significant doubts about the credibility” of her claims to have suffered harm at the hands of her former husband in the past and her claims to face harm from him or anyone else in the future. The Tribunal noted the following:(1)The appellant’s account of the physical harm she had suffered in the past from her former husband was inconsistent, when what she said in her statement accompanying her protection visa application was compared with what she told the Tribunal at the hearing. In her statement accompanying her protection visa application she said that her former husband began to harm her physically after they arrived in Australia, but she said to the Tribunal at the hearing that she had only been harmed by him once, when he slapped her twice on her face in India before they arrived in Australia, and that he did not harm her after their arrival in Australia.(2)The length of time between when the appellant claimed her relationship with her former husband ended (in 2011) and when she lodged her protection visa claim (in 2014) was inconsistent with the appellant’s claimed fears. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s evidence that she had told her migration agent about her fears concerning her former husband when she made her first request for waiver of the “no further stay” condition and held that the reason she did not tell the agent was “because she did not fear harm at the hands of the ex-husband at that time”.(3)Her delay in applying for a protection visa and “the lengths of time when [the appellant] was without a visa but did not apply for protection … strongly suggest[ed] that she did not fear harm at the hands of the ex-husband during those times or at any other time”. (4)The former husband’s text messages and translations, which the appellant provided to the Tribunal, made no reference to harming or threatening to harm the appellant. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim that her husband was “very careful” about how he worded his texts because he knew that she could show them to the police, noting that the appellant had conceded that she never contacted the police about the claimed harm or threats of harm. The Tribunal accepted only that the texts showed that the former husband had demanded money from the appellant and her family during 2010. The Tribunal gave the texts and other statements in her second waiver request “very little weight in assessing whether the ex-husband has harmed the [appellant] or her family in the past or seeks to harm them in the future”.(5)The appellant’s current husband did not attend the hearing before the Tribunal or provide any information in support of her protection claims. The Tribunal gave significant weight to the fact that the husband did not arrange to be available to give evidence at the hearing, at least be telephone if not in person, in assessing the credibility of her claims.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 2 June 2014 the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The appellant gave oral evidence before the Tribunal on 27 January 2015. In January 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION Like the delegate, the Tribunal found that the appellant’s evidence in support of her claims was “vague and generalised”. The Tribunal also expressed “significant doubts about the credibility” of her claims to have suffered harm at the hands of her former husband in the past and her claims to face harm from him or anyone else in the future. The Tribunal noted the following:(1)The appellant’s account of the physical harm she had suffered in the past from her former husband was inconsistent, when what she said in her statement accompanying her protection visa application was compared with what she told the Tribunal at the hearing. In her statement accompanying her protection visa application she said that her former husband began to harm her physically after they arrived in Australia, but she said to the Tribunal at the hearing that she had only been harmed by him once, when he slapped her twice on her face in India before they arrived in Australia, and that he did not harm her after their arrival in Australia.(2)The length of time between when the appellant claimed her relationship with her former husband ended (in 2011) and when she lodged her protection visa claim (in 2014) was inconsistent with the appellant’s claimed fears. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s evidence that she had told her migration agent about her fears concerning her former husband when she made her first request for waiver of the “no further stay” condition and held that the reason she did not tell the agent was “because she did not fear harm at the hands of the ex-husband at that time”.(3)Her delay in applying for a protection visa and “the lengths of time when [the appellant] was without a visa but did not apply for protection … strongly suggest[ed] that she did not fear harm at the hands of the ex-husband during those times or at any other time”. (4)The former husband’s text messages and translations, which the appellant provided to the Tribunal, made no reference to harming or threatening to harm the appellant. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim that her husband was “very careful” about how he worded his texts because he knew that she could show them to the police, noting that the appellant had conceded that she never contacted the police about the claimed harm or threats of harm. The Tribunal accepted only that the texts showed that the former husband had demanded money from the appellant and her family during 2010. The Tribunal gave the texts and other statements in her second waiver request “very little weight in assessing whether the ex-husband has harmed the [appellant] or her family in the past or seeks to harm them in the future”.(5)The appellant’s current husband did not attend the hearing before the Tribunal or provide any information in support of her protection claims. The Tribunal gave significant weight to the fact that the husband did not arrange to be available to give evidence at the hearing, at least be telephone if not in person, in assessing the credibility of her claims.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first respondent, though not the appellant, filed written submissions in the appeal. CONSIDERATION The jurisdiction of the FCCA at first instance, and of this Court on appeal, is controlled by statute: see ss 476 and 476A the Migration Act, read with s 474 of that Act, s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and s 10 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth). In the context of the present appeal, the jurisdiction conferred on the FCCA was relevantly exercised when that Court undertook the consideration of whether or not the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, as explained by the authorities: see, for instance, Plaintiff S157/202 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476 at [76] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). The question for this Court on appeal is whether or not the FCCA is shown to have erred in the conclusion it reached in this regard: for example, SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129 at [11] (Branson, Finn and Finkelstein JJ). The appellant does not, in her notice of appeal, identify any alleged jurisdictional error that the primary judge should have discerned. In substance, paragraph 1 under the heading “Grounds of appeal” sets out a brief history of the appellant’s claim (as she understood it) but does not identify the claimed “strong reason” that shows that she cannot return to India. Paragraph 2 records the Tribunal’s invitations to the appellant to provide evidence of her claim in support of her protection visa application and to attend a hearing. If it is suggested in this paragraph and paragraph 3 that there was error in asking the appellant about “documentation”, this suggestion is misconceived. Besides what the appellant had stated in writing, the appellant attended a hearing and gave oral evidence to the Tribunal. Bearing in mind that the delegate’s reasons for refusal included that the appellant’s claims were “vague and lacking in detail”, the appellant was on notice that her claim might well fail for lack of evidence. The Tribunal’s inquiry about further documentation might have prompted the appellant to provide some further material to substantiate her claims, but the appellant’s failure to provide such documentation was not critical to the outcome of the Tribunal’s decision. Rather this decision turned on the evidence and other material before the Tribunal, as well as the findings that the Tribunal made on the basis of this evidence and material. Paragraphs 4 and 5 under the heading “Grounds of appeal” do not relate to any alleged jurisdictional error in the Tribunal, which the primary judge did not discern. Rather they apparently relate to the procedural steps anterior to filing the notice of appeal and are apparently intended to meet any objection to the competency of the appeal. These paragraphs refer, indirectly, to the fact that the primary judge delivered reasons for judgment ex tempore, which were later revised. The appellant does not allege that she was in any way disadvantaged by this procedure, and no-one suggested her appeal was incompetent.