Schultz v Bank of Queensland Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Schultz v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] QCA 208

PARTIES:

KYM ELEANOR SCHULTZ

(appellant)v
BANK OF QUEENSLAND LTD
ACN 009 656 740
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 616 of 2015
SC No 6255 of 2012

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2014] QSC 305

DELIVERED ON:

27 October 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

1 May 2015

JUDGES:

Holmes CJ and Philippides JA and Boddice J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   The appeal be dismissed.

2.   The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed on a standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

EQUITY – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – UNCONSCIONABILITY, UNCONSCIONABLE DEALINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF EQUITABLE FRAUD – where the appellant purchased properties in Highgate Hill and Cotton Tree, both funded by bank loans and secured by registered mortgages – where the appellant was familiar with bank guarantees – where the appellant’s then husband inherited vacant land at Mudjimba Beach – where the appellant funded the building of the family home on that land by selling the Highgate Hill property, and was registered, with her husband, as a co-owner of the Mudjimba Beach property – where the appellant and her husband established a family trust – where the appellant entered into two guarantees, secured by the Cotton Tree and Mudjimba Beach properties, in return for the respondent loaning funds to the trust – where, in respect of those guarantees, the appellant did not receive independent legal advice and signed a waiver of the opportunity to seek and obtain that advice – where each waiver acknowledged the appellant understood the practical legal effect of the documentation and transaction, and the appellant confirmed she understood that if the borrower defaulted, the respondent would be entitled to sue the appellant, as guarantor, to recover the monies due to the respondent – where the appellant claimed she was a volunteer who did not understand the nature and effect of the transaction she entered into with the respondent – whether the trial Judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s claim for relief from her legal obligation to pay the respondent

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12CA

Agripay Pty Ltd v Byrne [2011] 2 Qd R 501; [2011] QCA 85, applied
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; [1983] HCA 14, cited
Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395; [1998] HCA 48, applied
State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Chia (2000) 50 NSWLR 587; [2000] NSWSC 552, cited
Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649; [1939] HCA 3, applied

COUNSEL:

K Wilson QC, with R Cameron, for the appellant
P A Looney QC, with P K O’Higgins, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Hillhouse Burrough McKeown for the appellant
Thomson Geer Lawyers for the respondent

  1. HOLMES CJ:  I…

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Details
Case
[2015] QCA 208
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Schultz v Bank of Queensland Ltd involved the appellant, Schultz, who was appealing against the dismissal of her claim for relief from her legal obligations under two guarantees she signed for loans made to a family trust by the respondent, Bank of Queensland. Schultz contended she was a volunteer who did not understand the nature and effect of the transaction and had entered into the guarantees without receiving independent legal advice. The primary judge dismissed Schultz's claim, finding she understood the nature and effect of the transaction and had signed the guarantees knowingly.

The court was required to determine if the primary judge erred in dismissing Schultz’s claim for relief from her legal obligations. A key issue was whether Schultz had a material misunderstanding of the nature and effect of the transaction, and whether any such misunderstanding would have been material in all the circumstances. The court also had to consider if Schultz was at a special disadvantage.

The court found that Schultz was not a volunteer for the purposes of the Yerkey v Jones equity and had a significant interest in the family trust's investments. The primary judge determined that Schultz understood the risks associated with the guarantees and the potential consequences of default, including the possibility of losing the secured properties. The court upheld the primary judge's findings that Schultz had no material misunderstanding of the transaction and that the bank had no obligation to inform her of the full extent of her liability. The court held that Schultz's lack of independent legal advice did not vitiate the guarantees, as she was aware of the risks and had the opportunity to seek advice.

The appeal was dismissed, and Schultz was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed on a standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant appeals against that dismissal. At issue is whether the primary Judge erred in refusing to draw an inference that the appellant had a material misunderstanding as to the nature and effect of the transaction, and in applying the onus of proof. A separate issue in dispute, raised by notice of contention, is whether the primary Judge erred in finding that any such misunderstanding would have been material in all the circumstances. The appellant also contends the primary Judge erred in failing to find she was at a special disadvantage.Background The appellant was born in 1959. She was educated to Year 12. After some years in the workforce, the appellant purchased a unit at Highgate Hill. The purchase price was largely funded by a bank loan, secured by registered mortgage. Eight years later, the appellant purchased another unit at Cotton Tree on the Sunshine Coast. This purchase was also funded by a bank loan, secured by a registered mortgage. The appellant married her former husband in 1999. At the time, the appellant was working as a sales representative for a major corporation and retained ownership, in her own name, of the Highgate Hill and Cotton Tree properties. The appellant’s husband had multiple businesses and owned a property at Mudjimba Beach which he had inherited as vacant land. The appellant funded the building of the family home on that property. In early 2000, the appellant and her husband were registered as co-owners of the property at Mudjimba Beach. Some years after their marriage, the appellant and her husband decided to establish a family trust. The class of primary beneficiaries comprised the appellant’s husband and the appellant, as his spouse. The class of secondary beneficiaries included their children. Camelon Pty Ltd was established in 2005 as trustee for that family trust. The appellant’s husband and the appellant were the directors and shareholders of Camelon Pty Ltd. Subsequent to the establishment of the family trust, the appellant sold her unit in Highgate Hill. The appellant loaned the proceeds of sale to Camelon Pty Ltd. It invested those funds in a portfolio of securities. At about the same time, the property at Mudjimba Beach was transferred to the appellant’s name only. That transaction was to protect the property from the separate creditors of the appellant’s husband. In 2006 and 2007, the appellant and her husband undertook a number of transactions with the respondent. The first transaction was a loan to the appellant’s husband. Two subsequent transactions related to Camelon Pty Ltd. There was also a separate transaction pertaining to the appellant alone. The transactions in respect of the appellant’s husband and Camelon Pty Ltd were all guaranteed by the appellant. The appellant also granted a mortgage over the family’s property at Mudjimba Beach and, later, the appellant’s unit at Cotton Tree.Guarantee The appellant executed the relevant guarantee on 11 April 2007 in respect of an advance made by the respondent to Camelon Pty Ltd as trustee for the K & D Schultz Family Trust. The amount guaranteed was $773,000. The guarantee was secured by mortgages over the appellant’s Mudjimba Beach and Cotton Tree properties.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

At trial, the appellant contended the waiver she signed in respect of the relevant guarantee did not truly state her position. The appellant did not understand the transaction of guarantee. The appellant’s understanding of the transaction, as explained by the respondent’s representative, was that the worst case scenario was that if Camelon Pty Ltd defaulted, the respondent would sell the secured property to recoup the sum and she would have to repay the loan. The appellant did not understand she could be made bankrupt in the event she could not or would not repay the loan. The appellant also understood the mortgage over her Cotton Tree unit was limited to $150,000.Primary decision The primary Judge assumed, without deciding, that the appellant was a volunteer for the purpose of the Yerkey v Jones equity[5]. In doing so, the primary Judge observed that whilst the appellant was only a beneficiary of the trust, and therefore did not have an immediate or direct interest in the purchase made with the loan supported by her guarantee, the trust’s investments were made in order to build assets for the benefit of the appellant and her family in circumstances where the appellant was already a significant creditor of the trustee and the loan was for the acquisition of land to be used as a backyard for the family home. Further, all of the investments made by Camelon Pty Ltd were undertaken with the appellant’s approval.[5]AB 865. The primary Judge found the appellant was aware: the guarantee was for a loan of $773,000; a consequence of default of the loan was that the mortgages given by her could be enforced; she was at risk of losing the secured property; the worst case scenario was that the secured property might have to be sold to pay the respondent. Further, at the time she signed the guarantee, the appellant understood: it was recommended she obtain independent legal advice; there were financial risks; she could refuse to enter into the guarantee; she could ask for more financial information. The primary Judge found the appellant did not have any material misunderstanding that:(a)she would limit her liability under the guarantee;(b)she would be liable for interest and costs as well as the loan amount;(c)she might be made bankrupt if the amount payable was not paid; and(d)the mortgage over the Cotton Tree unit secured more than $150,000. The primary Judge found that although the respondent’s representative did not advise the appellant that she might be made bankrupt if the amount payable under the guarantee was not paid, he had advised the appellant that the worst case scenario was she could be asked to sell the secured property and repay the loan. The appellant was also aware both the Mudjimba Beach and the Cotton Tree properties were being mortgaged and were “on the line”.[6] The primary Judge found that the respondent did not tell the appellant the mortgage over her Cotton Tree unit was not limited to $150,000, but held it had no reason to do so. The appellant knew the guarantee was for $773,000.[6]AB 874 at [96].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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