Edwards v Pepper Finance Corporation Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Edwards v Pepper Finance Corporation Limited [2019] QCA 152

PARTIES:

WANDA MARGARET EDWARDS
(appellant)
v
PEPPER FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED
ACN 094 317 647
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8348 of 2018
SC No 12261 of 2009

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2018] QSC 152 (Mullins J)

DELIVERED ON:

2 August 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 November 2018

JUDGES:

Gotterson and Philippides JJA and Boddice J

ORDER:

The appeal be dismissed with costs on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – DEFAULT JUDGMENT – SETTING ASIDE – PROCEDURAL AND OTHER MATTERS – where the appellant and her husband entered into a loan agreement under which the respondent would advance $937,000 to them, secured by a registered mortgage against a residential property – where the appellant defaulted under that mortgage and the respondent commenced proceedings against the appellant and her husband seeking recovery of possession of the mortgaged property – where default judgment was entered against the appellant on the basis that she and her husband were served personally with a claim and statement of claim but failed to file a notice of intention to defend – where the appellant contended that the default judgment should be set aside as irregularly entered on the basis that the claim and statement of claim had in fact not been personally served on her and that the primary judge erred in not finding so – where the issue of service turned on the evidence of the appellant, her husband and the process server at trial – where the appellant, her husband and the process server were cross examined – where the primary judge made findings as to that evidence – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant and her husband were personally served with the claim and statement of claim and that therefore default judgment was regularly entered

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – DEFAULT JUDGMENT – SETTING ASIDE – DISCRETION – where the appellant contended that the primary judge erred in exercising the discretion in r 290 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to dismiss her application to set aside the default judgment – where the appellant advanced voluminous grounds of appeal seeking to impugn the mortgage – where, inter alia, the appellant contended she entered into the mortgage as a consequence of actual undue influence on the part of her husband or that the equity in Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649 was available to her – where the primary judge found that the appellant did not have a prima facie defence – where the appellant contended that the primary judge either wrongly rejected her arguments or failed to consider them – whether the primary judge erred in exercising the discretion to dismiss the appellant’s application to set aside default judgment

PROCEDURE…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Edwards v Pepper Finance Corporation Limited involved Mrs Edwards contesting the decision of the primary judge to deny her application to set aside a default judgment against her. The primary judge had ruled that default judgment was properly entered as the claim and statement of claim had been personally served on Mrs Edwards and her husband, and she had not filed a notice of intention to defend. The appeal focused on whether the primary judge erred in finding that the claim and statement of claim had been served, and whether the primary judge correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment and in granting leave to commence enforcement proceedings.

The court found no error in the primary judge’s approach to the evidence. The primary judge had observed the witnesses and was entitled to find that personal service had been effected. The primary judge correctly considered the relevant legal principles in exercising the discretion to set aside the default judgment, including whether there was an explanation for the delay in defending the claim and whether Mrs Edwards had a prima facie defence on the merits. The primary judge concluded that while there was an explanation for the delay, Mrs Edwards did not have a prima facie defence. The voluminous grounds of appeal raised by Mrs Edwards, which sought to impugn the mortgage, were not substantiated as the primary judge correctly rejected the defences advanced.

The court further found that the primary judge correctly exercised its discretion to grant leave to commence enforcement proceedings. The primary judge correctly found that leave to commence enforcement was not required under the relevant rules, and that the respondent’s conduct in accepting further loan repayments after the default judgment was granted did not amount to a waiver or estoppel.

The appeal was dismissed with costs on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed with costs on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

The crux of the complaint raised by Mrs Edwards was that, in deciding her application, the primary judge either wrongly rejected her arguments or failed to consider her arguments.Factual background and findings It is necessary to set out in some detail the factual background outlined by her Honour and the inferences and findings of fact made before considering whether there was error in concluding that the proposed defences lacked viability. Those facts and findings are as follows. The Fig Tree Pocket property was purchased by Mr and Mrs Edwards in 1998 from Mr and Mrs Finney. By transfer registered number 702864522, Mr and Mrs Finney transferred the fee simple to Mr and Mrs Edwards as joint tenants and Mr and Mrs Edwards as trustees as tenants in common in the shares of 51 per cent and 49 per cent respectively. Her Honour stated:[7]“It is apparent the intention was that Mr and Mrs Edwards in their own capacity as joint tenants would be the registered owners of a share of 51/100 of the estate in fee simple in the subject property and they as trustees would hold a 49/100 share in the property. The transfer document itself did not identify the trust on which Mr and Mrs Edwards held the 49/100 share in the property, but in accordance with Titles Office requirements at the time, reflecting the terms of s 110(3) of the Land Title Act 1994, a document specifying details of the trust, or the document creating the trust, would have been deposited with the instrument of transfer. Section 110(5) then provided for the registrar to keep a certified copy of the document and return the original to the person who deposited it.”[7]Reasons at [10]. Her Honour stated[8] that by 26 June 1998, according to Mr Edwards’ affidavit, Mr and Mrs Edwards were the trustees of The Edwards Investment Unit Trust (EIUT). Mr Edwards asserted implicitly that their intention was to hold the 49 per cent share in the property as the trustees of the EIUT. The EIUT was established by trust deed dated 1 November 1995 between Mr Edwards as the trustee and Mr and Mrs Edwards as the unit holders. Mrs Edwards subscribed to one unit as the trustee for The Edwards Superannuation Fund. Mr Edwards subscribed to one special unit. Clause 10.3 of the deed applied restrictions to the special units. The holders of special units would be entitled to receive an amount equivalent to 0.001 per cent of the trust fund in proportion to their holdings. The provisions of the deed relating to the equality of rights of unit holders and proportionate entitlement to the trust fund were expressly excluded in respect of special units or the holders of special units. Her Honour found that effectively gave Mrs Edwards, as trustee for The Edwards Superannuation Fund, the entitlement to the trust fund, apart from 0.001 per cent of the trust fund.[8]Reasons at [11]-[12]. A copy of the mortgage (number 702864536) given by Mr and Mrs Edwards to the National Australia Bank Limited at the time they purchased the Fig Tree Pocket property was exhibited to Mr Edwards’ affidavit. In his affidavit, he asserted that the mortgage was given by him and Mrs Edwards for and on behalf of the registered owners, including themselves as trustees of the EIUT. Her Honour made the following observations:[9]“The mortgage instrument does not identify on its face, as part of the description of the trustees, the trust of which [Mr and Mrs Edwards] were the trustees. Similarly, [Mr and Mrs Edwards] granted a mortgage over the Fig Tree Pocket property to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in 2000 and although Mr Edwards asserts it was given by [Mr and Mrs Edwards] for themselves personally and as trustees of the EIUT, the mortgage merely recites that the mortgagors were Mr and Mrs Edwards and Mr and Mrs Edwards ‘as trustees under instrument 702864522’ which refers to the trust that was notified to the Titles Office, when the transfer under dealing number 702864522 was lodged. Although Mr Edwards asserts that mortgage number 709124971 in favour of Heritage Building Society Limited was also given by [Mr and Mrs Edwards] for themselves personally and as trustees of the EIUT, the identification of the mortgagor in the mortgage does not extend to identifying the relevant trust, other than by reference to instrument 702864522.”[9]Reasons at [13].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There was no error in her Honour’s approach to the evidence. Her Honour had the advantage of observing the witnesses during the course of giving evidence and was entitled to find that personal service had been effected so that the default judgment was regularly entered. Arguments as to the failure to serve Mrs Edwards in her representative capacity are meritless.Exercise of the discretion in refusing to set aside default judgment There can be no doubt that her Honour addressed the application to set aside the default judgment by reference to the correct legal principles. In considering the exercise of her discretion to set aside a default judgment that was regularly entered, the primary judge, referring to National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited v Oasis Developments Pty Ltd,[5] identified the relevant matters to be taken into account as including whether there is an explanation for the delay in defending the claim and whether Mrs Edwards had an arguable or prima facie defence on the merits.[6][5][1983] 2 Qd R 441 at 449-450.[6]Reasons at [5]. The primary judge concluded that, while there was an explanation for Mrs Edwards’ delay in bringing the application to set aside the default judgment, she was not satisfied that there was a prima facie defence. The crux of the complaint raised by Mrs Edwards was that, in deciding her application, the primary judge either wrongly rejected her arguments or failed to consider her arguments.Factual background and findings It is necessary to set out in some detail the factual background outlined by her Honour and the inferences and findings of fact made before considering whether there was error in concluding that the proposed defences lacked viability. Those facts and findings are as follows. The Fig Tree Pocket property was purchased by Mr and Mrs Edwards in 1998 from Mr and Mrs Finney. By transfer registered number 702864522, Mr and Mrs Finney transferred the fee simple to Mr and Mrs Edwards as joint tenants and Mr and Mrs Edwards as trustees as tenants in common in the shares of 51 per cent and 49 per cent respectively. Her Honour stated:[7]“It is apparent the intention was that Mr and Mrs Edwards in their own capacity as joint tenants would be the registered owners of a share of 51/100 of the estate in fee simple in the subject property and they as trustees would hold a 49/100 share in the property. The transfer document itself did not identify the trust on which Mr and Mrs Edwards held the 49/100 share in the property, but in accordance with Titles Office requirements at the time, reflecting the terms of s 110(3) of the Land Title Act 1994, a document specifying details of the trust, or the document creating the trust, would have been deposited with the instrument of transfer. Section 110(5) then provided for the registrar to keep a certified copy of the document and return the original to the person who deposited it.”[7]Reasons at [10]. Her Honour stated[8] that by 26 June 1998, according to Mr Edwards’ affidavit, Mr and Mrs Edwards were the trustees of The Edwards Investment Unit Trust (EIUT). Mr Edwards asserted implicitly that their intention was to hold the 49 per cent share in the property as the trustees of the EIUT. The EIUT was established by trust deed dated 1 November 1995 between Mr Edwards as the trustee and Mr and Mrs Edwards as the unit holders. Mrs Edwards subscribed to one unit as the trustee for The Edwards Superannuation Fund. Mr Edwards subscribed to one special unit. Clause 10.3 of the deed applied restrictions to the special units. The holders of special units would be entitled to receive an amount equivalent to 0.001 per cent of the trust fund in proportion to their holdings. The provisions of the deed relating to the equality of rights of unit holders and proportionate entitlement to the trust fund were expressly excluded in respect of special units or the holders of special units. Her Honour found that effectively gave Mrs Edwards, as trustee for The Edwards Superannuation Fund, the entitlement to the trust fund, apart from 0.001 per cent of the trust fund.[8]Reasons at [11]-[12].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Voluminous grounds of appeal were raised in the notice of appeal, much of which reformulated the arguments raised before the primary judge. Those grounds were premised on the contentions that the primary judge erred in rejecting the defences advanced, or that her Honour failed to consider them. As mentioned, there is no substance in those contentions and Mrs Edwards has not established that the primary judge made an error in rejecting submissions as to the existence of a prima facie defence. In that regard, it is useful to keep in mind the following findings of the primary judge:(a)it was always the intention of Pepper Finance that, to the extent that it was dealing with Mrs Edwards and her husband as trustees, it was dealing with them as the trustees of The Edwards Family Trust;[49] and(b)the transfer which Mrs Edwards sought to impugn was prepared by her husband[50] and was explained in a statutory declaration signed by both Mr and Mrs Edwards suggested that it was always their intention to register themselves as owners of a 49 per cent interest in the property as trustees of The Edwards Family Trust.[51][49]Reasons at [16].[50]Reasons at [22].[51]Reasons at [27]-[28].Inadequate consideration of merits It was argued[52] that the primary judge did not individually address each one of the numerous proposed defences raised in the outline of submissions filed at the hearing of the applications.[53] That the primary judge did not reject individually each proposed defence raised in that lengthy written outline, but rather took the course of making finding in general terms, is not cause for criticism. Her Honour expressly identified the material she had considered, which included the written submissions filed at the hearing of the applications[54] before considering whether any of the proposed grounds of defence raised in those submissions amounted to a prima facie defence. Her Honour’s identification[55] of the gravamen of Mrs Edwards’ complaints in general terms does not warrant the conclusion that all of the proposed defences were not considered in deciding whether a prima facie defence had been demonstrated. Her Honour was simply pinpointing the crux of the complaints raised.[52]Ground 3 and also grounds 15 and 16.[53]AB2 at 91.[54]Reasons at [38].[55]Reasons at [49].Proposed defences relating to amendments to the transfer and the mortgage Mrs Edwards advanced a number of proposed defences[56] premised on the contention that the borrower under the loan agreement (Mrs Edwards and her husband as trustees of the Edwards Family Trust) and the mortgagor of the property (Mrs Edwards and her husband as trustees of the EIUT) were different. It was contended in ground 7 that the primary judge should have found that the mortgage was ineffective since it was not executed in Mr and Mrs Edwards’ capacities as trustees of the Edwards Family Trust. However, as the primary judge correctly identified,[57] the argument overlooks that the original form of the mortgage incorrectly included a reference to the transfer instrument by which Mrs Edwards and her husband became registered as owners as trustees of the EIUT, which was corrected by an amendment to the mortgage by Pepper Finance solicitors, who were authorised to make the amendment, so that it was binding on Mrs Edwards. The amendment was in conformity with the express intention of Mr and Mrs Edwards as set out in the statutory declaration. After that amendment, the trustee capacity in which Mrs Edwards borrowed the monies under the loan agreement and mortgaged a 49 per cent interest in the property in favour of Pepper Finance was the same.[56]See grounds 7, 10-12, 17-21, 26-27 and 29.[57]Reasons at [47]-[48].