SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Edwards v Pepper Finance Corporation Limited [2019] QCA 152
PARTIES:
WANDA MARGARET EDWARDS
(appellant)
v
PEPPER FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED
ACN 094 317 647
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 8348 of 2018
SC No 12261 of 2009DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2018] QSC 152 (Mullins J)DELIVERED ON:
2 August 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
12 November 2018
JUDGES:
Gotterson and Philippides JJA and Boddice J
ORDER:
The appeal be dismissed with costs on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – DEFAULT JUDGMENT – SETTING ASIDE – PROCEDURAL AND OTHER MATTERS – where the appellant and her husband entered into a loan agreement under which the respondent would advance $937,000 to them, secured by a registered mortgage against a residential property – where the appellant defaulted under that mortgage and the respondent commenced proceedings against the appellant and her husband seeking recovery of possession of the mortgaged property – where default judgment was entered against the appellant on the basis that she and her husband were served personally with a claim and statement of claim but failed to file a notice of intention to defend – where the appellant contended that the default judgment should be set aside as irregularly entered on the basis that the claim and statement of claim had in fact not been personally served on her and that the primary judge erred in not finding so – where the issue of service turned on the evidence of the appellant, her husband and the process server at trial – where the appellant, her husband and the process server were cross examined – where the primary judge made findings as to that evidence – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant and her husband were personally served with the claim and statement of claim and that therefore default judgment was regularly entered
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – DEFAULT JUDGMENT – SETTING ASIDE – DISCRETION – where the appellant contended that the primary judge erred in exercising the discretion in r 290 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to dismiss her application to set aside the default judgment – where the appellant advanced voluminous grounds of appeal seeking to impugn the mortgage – where, inter alia, the appellant contended she entered into the mortgage as a consequence of actual undue influence on the part of her husband or that the equity in Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649 was available to her – where the primary judge found that the appellant did not have a prima facie defence – where the appellant contended that the primary judge either wrongly rejected her arguments or failed to consider them – whether the primary judge erred in exercising the discretion to dismiss the appellant’s application to set aside default judgment
PROCEDURE…
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- Case
- [2019] QCA 152
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found no error in the primary judge’s approach to the evidence. The primary judge had observed the witnesses and was entitled to find that personal service had been effected. The primary judge correctly considered the relevant legal principles in exercising the discretion to set aside the default judgment, including whether there was an explanation for the delay in defending the claim and whether Mrs Edwards had a prima facie defence on the merits. The primary judge concluded that while there was an explanation for the delay, Mrs Edwards did not have a prima facie defence. The voluminous grounds of appeal raised by Mrs Edwards, which sought to impugn the mortgage, were not substantiated as the primary judge correctly rejected the defences advanced.
The court further found that the primary judge correctly exercised its discretion to grant leave to commence enforcement proceedings. The primary judge correctly found that leave to commence enforcement was not required under the relevant rules, and that the respondent’s conduct in accepting further loan repayments after the default judgment was granted did not amount to a waiver or estoppel.
The appeal was dismissed with costs on the standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal be dismissed with costs on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Voluminous grounds of appeal were raised in the notice of appeal, much of which reformulated the arguments raised before the primary judge. Those grounds were premised on the contentions that the primary judge erred in rejecting the defences advanced, or that her Honour failed to consider them. As mentioned, there is no substance in those contentions and Mrs Edwards has not established that the primary judge made an error in rejecting submissions as to the existence of a prima facie defence. In that regard, it is useful to keep in mind the following findings of the primary judge:(a)it was always the intention of Pepper Finance that, to the extent that it was dealing with Mrs Edwards and her husband as trustees, it was dealing with them as the trustees of The Edwards Family Trust;[49] and(b)the transfer which Mrs Edwards sought to impugn was prepared by her husband[50] and was explained in a statutory declaration signed by both Mr and Mrs Edwards suggested that it was always their intention to register themselves as owners of a 49 per cent interest in the property as trustees of The Edwards Family Trust.[51][49]Reasons at [16].[50]Reasons at [22].[51]Reasons at [27]-[28].Inadequate consideration of merits It was argued[52] that the primary judge did not individually address each one of the numerous proposed defences raised in the outline of submissions filed at the hearing of the applications.[53] That the primary judge did not reject individually each proposed defence raised in that lengthy written outline, but rather took the course of making finding in general terms, is not cause for criticism. Her Honour expressly identified the material she had considered, which included the written submissions filed at the hearing of the applications[54] before considering whether any of the proposed grounds of defence raised in those submissions amounted to a prima facie defence. Her Honour’s identification[55] of the gravamen of Mrs Edwards’ complaints in general terms does not warrant the conclusion that all of the proposed defences were not considered in deciding whether a prima facie defence had been demonstrated. Her Honour was simply pinpointing the crux of the complaints raised.[52]Ground 3 and also grounds 15 and 16.[53]AB2 at 91.[54]Reasons at [38].[55]Reasons at [49].Proposed defences relating to amendments to the transfer and the mortgage Mrs Edwards advanced a number of proposed defences[56] premised on the contention that the borrower under the loan agreement (Mrs Edwards and her husband as trustees of the Edwards Family Trust) and the mortgagor of the property (Mrs Edwards and her husband as trustees of the EIUT) were different. It was contended in ground 7 that the primary judge should have found that the mortgage was ineffective since it was not executed in Mr and Mrs Edwards’ capacities as trustees of the Edwards Family Trust. However, as the primary judge correctly identified,[57] the argument overlooks that the original form of the mortgage incorrectly included a reference to the transfer instrument by which Mrs Edwards and her husband became registered as owners as trustees of the EIUT, which was corrected by an amendment to the mortgage by Pepper Finance solicitors, who were authorised to make the amendment, so that it was binding on Mrs Edwards. The amendment was in conformity with the express intention of Mr and Mrs Edwards as set out in the statutory declaration. After that amendment, the trustee capacity in which Mrs Edwards borrowed the monies under the loan agreement and mortgaged a 49 per cent interest in the property in favour of Pepper Finance was the same.[56]See grounds 7, 10-12, 17-21, 26-27 and 29.[57]Reasons at [47]-[48].