Pepper Finance Corporation Limited v Edwards

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Pepper Finance Corporation Limited v Edwards & Anor [2018] QSC 152

PARTIES:

PEPPER FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED
ACN 094 317 647

(plaintiff)

v
DAVID ROGER EDWARDS and WANDA MARGARET EDWARDS in their own capacity and as Trustee under Instrument 710233115

(defendants)

FILE NO:

BS12261 of 2009

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application to set aside default judgment

DELIVERED ON:

6 July 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

24 May 2018

JUDGE:

Mullins J

ORDER:

1.   The application filed on 15 December 2017 is dismissed.

2. Leave granted to the plaintiff pursuant to r 894(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 to start enforcement proceedings to enforce the default judgment against the defendants.

3.   The question of costs is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – DEFAULT JUDGMENT – SETTING ASIDE – GENERALLY – where mortgagee obtained default judgment for recovery of possession of the mortgaged property against the defendants – where seven years later the female defendant applied to set aside the default judgment – where the female defendant alleged that she relied on her husband in relation to borrowing from the plaintiff and using part of the funds for a development project – whether the plaintiff disclosed facts that gave rise to a defence of unconscionability against the mortgagee – where the mortgagee’s solicitors amended documents lodged for registration with the male defendant’s concurrence asserted to be on behalf of both defendants – whether the defendant has an arguable or prima facie defence on the merits          

Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 11A, s 76, s 78, s 110
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 72, r 290, r 894

National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited v Oasis Developments Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 441, considered
Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649; [1939] HCA 3, considered

COUNSEL:

S Cooper for the plaintiff

A M West for the defendant David Roger Edwards
L G Smits (Sol) for the defendant Wanda Margaret Edwards

SOLICITORS:

Kemp Strang Lawyers for the plaintiff

Bradley Munt & Co for the defendant David Roger Edwards
Leonardus Smits Lawyer for the defendant Wanda Margaret Edwards

  1. The defendant Mrs Edwards applies pursuant to r 290 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to set aside the default judgment that was regularly entered against her by a Deputy Registrar on 21 October 2010. The plaintiff opposes the application and applies for leave to commence enforcement proceedings to enforce the judgment. The default judgment was entered against both defendants for recovery of possession of specified real property situated at Fig Tree Pocket which is the home of the defendants and remains occupied by them. If necessary, the plaintiff also applies for leave to proceed against Mr Edwards pursuant to r 72 of the UCPR.

    Nature of the claim

  2. By an agreement dated in November 2006, the plaintiff agreed to advance a loan of…

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Details
Case
[2018] QSC 152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pepper Finance Corporation Limited v Edwards, the dispute arose after the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendants for the recovery of possession of the mortgaged property. Seven years later, Mrs Edwards applied to set aside the default judgment, alleging reliance on her husband for borrowing from the plaintiff and using part of the funds for a development project. The court was required to determine whether the plaintiff disclosed facts that gave rise to a defence of unconscionability against the mortgagee and whether the defendant has an arguable or prima facie defence on the merits.

The court found that the female defendant had an explanation for her delay in defending the claim, as she was unaware of the proceedings due to her husband's concealment of their difficulties because of her health problems. However, the court concluded that the defendant did not have an arguable or prima facie defence on the merits. The court found that the female defendant's proposed defence was misconceived and premature, as it was necessary to first set aside the default judgment before seeking to amend her defence to claim additional forms of relief.

The court dismissed the application filed on 15 December 2017, granted leave to the plaintiff to start enforcement proceedings to enforce the default judgment against the defendants, and adjourned the question of costs to a later date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application filed on 15 December 2017 is dismissed.

2. Leave granted to the plaintiff pursuant to r 894(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 to start enforcement proceedings to enforce the default judgment against the defendants.

3. The question of costs is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The first application to set aside the default judgment that was filed on 16 March 2017 was made on behalf of both defendants. That application was withdrawn by the defendants with the consent of the plaintiff when Mr Edwards’ trustees in bankruptcy refused to continue with the application. On 19 September 2017 a further application was filed on behalf of Mrs Edwards to set aside the judgment and to seek a declaration that the mortgage granted by the defendants did not support repayments of any loans made by the plaintiff to the defendants. That application was amended on 15 December 2017 by which Mrs Edwards sought additional orders for the conduct of a mediation or case appraisal and for relief on a variety of bases, including unconscionable dealing or misleading and deceptive conduct or on the basis of the authority of Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649. These claims for additional relief in the application are misconceived. First, Mrs Edwards has to overcome the hurdle of setting aside the default judgment and, if she does, she can then seek to amend her defence to claim these additional forms of relief. It was premature to include final relief in the same application that seeks the setting aside of the default judgment. What has to be shown to set aside the default judgment? The factors that are usually addressed on an application to set aside a default judgment that was regularly entered include whether there is an explanation for the defendant’s delay in defending the claim and whether the defendant has an arguable or prima facie defence on the merits, but it is the latter factor that is described as the most “cogent”: National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited v Oasis Developments Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 441, 449-450. Explanation for the delay During the hearing of the application, I made a finding that Mrs Edwards had been served personally with the claim and statement of claim on 14 November 2009, despite her denial that she had received those documents from the process server. I accept her evidence, however, that she was in the habit of passing any legal documents she received onto her husband for his advice. Mrs Edwards said she first became aware of this proceeding early in 2017 when she said she was informed by Mr Edwards that:“We have a dispute with Pepper because of the irregularity of our Mortgage repayments. I believe the interest rate being charged by Pepper is excessive. The dispute is a legal one. I will deal with it.” It appears from Mr Edwards’ affidavit that he was aware that the plaintiff had obtained an order for possession against him and his wife, but he chose to conceal their difficulties from his wife because of her health problems. It is common ground that even after the judgment was obtained against the defendants, ad hoc repayments in respect of the debt were made on their behalf which forestalled the enforcement proceedings. The making of the loan by the plaintiff Before analysing the proposed defence of Mrs Edwards, it is necessary to summarise the transactions that took place affecting the subject property at the time the plaintiff’s loan was advanced.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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