Sarah Morgan (a pseudonym) v Public Trustee and Guardian (Appeal) - [2022] ACAT 105

ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

SARAH MORGAN (A PSEUDONYM) v PUBLIC TRUSTEE AND GUARDIAN (Appeal) [2022] ACAT 105

AA 61/2021 (XD 590/2021)

Catchwords: APPEAL – civil dispute – negligent disposal of goods – principles for assessing loss – loss assessed as value of goods at time of disposal – value of goods as used goods – Tribunal may rely on own knowledge – Original Tribunal misapplied principles – Appeal Tribunal must conduct real review applying correct principles and own knowledge

Legislation cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 s 79
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180

Cases cited:Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185
Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR
433
Excel Intelligent Pty Ltd v Thomson [2018] ACAT 4
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499
Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351
Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25
Mansour v Dangar [2017] ACAT 49
Morgan v Public Trustee and Guardian [2021] ACAT 102
The Clyde (1856) Swab 23
Zheng v Crane & Anor [2022] ACAT 70

Tribunal:Presidential Member MT Daniel
Senior Member J Lennard

Date of Orders:  15 December 2022
Date of Reasons for Decision:      15 December 2022
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY          )
CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL     )          AA 61/2021
BETWEEN:
SARAH MORGAN (A PSEUDONYM)
Appellant

AND:

PUBLIC TRUSTEE AND GUARDIAN
Respondent

APPEAL TRIBUNAL: Presidential Member MT Daniel
Senior Member J Lennard

DATE:15 December 2022

ORDER

The Tribunal orders that:

The pseudonyms used for the applicant and her sister in the decision appealed from continue to apply, and there is to be no publication of the name of the applicant or her sister in relation to this proceeding.
Order 1 of the Orders of 25 October 2021 is set aside and replaced with the following order:
(a)The respondent is to pay to the applicant the sum of $2,095 within 28 days.

………………………………..

Presidential Member MT Daniel
For and on behalf of the Tribunal

REASONS FOR DECISION

On 25 October 2021 the tribunal (Original Tribunal) ordered the Public Trustee and Guardian (PTG) to pay to the applicant the sum of $545.[1],[2] It made those orders because it was satisfied that the PTG had breached the duty that it owed to the applicant by allowing the disposal of goods that the applicant was entitled to.
[1] Morgan v Public Trustee and Guardian [2021] ACAT 102
[2] The names of the applicant and the applicant’s sister appear as pseudonyms in the reasons of the Original Tribunal, we have maintained that approach in these reasons for decision.
The applicant appealed from that decision on the basis that the amount of compensation awarded was inadequate. She argued that the goods disposed of had a purchase price of around $3,535 and that the Original Tribunal had erred in the way it quantified her loss. Before the Original Tribunal she had sought an order for compensation in the amount of 90% of $3,535 (i.e. $3,181.50) and she asked that the Appeal Tribunal amend the orders to provide for compensation in this amount.
The PTG in response to the appeal conceded that the Original Tribunal’s decision was affected by error but submitted that despite those errors the amount awarded was within the reasonable range of an exercise of discretion and should not be interfered with on appeal.
The appeal hearing was conducted on 9 February 2022 and proceeded as a review of the decision of the Original Tribunal. The principles for such an appeal conducted under section 79 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Act 2008 (ACAT Act) are well known and have been summarised in previous cases of the Tribunal.[3] Suffice it to say that the appeal is directed to the correction of error, rather than being an opportunity for the Appeal Tribunal to simply substitute its own decision. If an error is identified the appellant must satisfy the Appeal Tribunal that the error was material to the outcome before the decision of the Original Tribunal may be disturbed. Where the decision appealed from involves an exercise of discretion, the principles established House v R[4] will apply to regulate the extent to which the Appeal Tribunal may set aside the decision, and re-exercise the discretion:
The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be exercised is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance.[5]
[3] Mansour v Dangar [2017] ACAT 49 at [22]-[23]; Excel Intelligent Pty Ltd v Thomson [2018] ACAT 4 at [46] to [54]; Zheng v Crane & Anor [2022] ACAT 70 at [25] – [30].
[4] (1936) 55 CLR 499
[5] (1936) 55 CLR 499 page 504ff per Dixon, Evatt & McTiernan JJ
With these principles in mind, we turn to review the decision of the Original Tribunal.
The decision of the Original Tribunal
The Original Tribunal heard the application on 24 September 2021 and gave its decision with written reasons around four weeks later.[6]
[6] Morgan v Public Trustee and Guardian [2021] ACAT 102
The Original Tribunal found, and it was not disputed before us, that the PTG was at the relevant time appointed as guardian for the applicant’s sister Nadine. In performance of this statutory role the PTG surrendered a lease over premises that Nadine had been renting from the Commissioner for Social Housing (Housing ACT). Located within the premises was personal property which had been jointly purchased by the applicant and Nadine, to which Nadine had relinquished any claim. After returning the keys, the PTG authorised Housing ACT to dispose of any personal property remaining in the premises, despite being on notice that the applicant sought the return of the personal property. It transpired that Housing ACT disposed of the personal property.

The question of liability

The Original Tribunal concluded that the PTG had not afforded the applicant a reasonable opportunity to retrieve the personal property and that in failing to do so it had breached the duty it owed to the applicant. In reaching this conclusion the Original Tribunal referred, among other things, to the general duty of care and diligence required to be exercised by a director of a corporation pursuant to section 180 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and concluded at paragraph 37:
37 Given this, I find the respondent owed the applicant a duty to consider her interests on 9 October 2020 when it authorised Housing ACT to dispose of the items of furniture in the premises. I find it did not give those interests adequate attention. I find in doing so the PTG breached its corporate obligation to the applicant in that it failed to exercise the requisite care and diligence. …
There was no cross-appeal by the PTG on the question of liability. However, before the Appeal Tribunal the PTG submitted that the Original Tribunal had been incorrect to rely upon section 180 of the Corporations Act as a source of the duty the PTG owed the applicant, because the word ‘corporation’ in that legislation does not include a corporation sole. We accept that submission.
The damages application lodged by the applicant indicated that the claim was brought as a claim for compensation for negligence or another tort, and this was the claim that the PTG had responded to. The PTG on appeal did not dispute that the Original Tribunal was correct to find that the PTG owed a general duty of care to the applicant, which in the circumstances had been breached.
The question of compensation
It is clear from the transcript and the written reasons that the greater part of the hearing before the Original Tribunal on 24 September 2021 was focussed on the facts in issue around the disposal of the goods, and the question of the PTG’s legal liability.
The Original Tribunal listed the goods which had been disposed of, and their value according to the applicant, at paragraph 17 of the reasons for decision as follows:
17. The applicant claims the replacement values of items of furniture and effects are:
(a)Westinghouse upside down fridge $1,749
(b)Bunnings dining setting approximately $349
(c)Single bed/bed coverings/linen/doona $500
(d)Towels $80
(e)Cutlery/saucepans/crockery/linen/kitchen items $50
(f)Microwave $49
(g)Toiletries approximately $50
(h)Curtains and tracks $118 x 6
These total $2,945.[7]
[7] Applicant’s witness statement dated 27 August 2021 at [60]
The applicant pointed out on appeal that this list contained an arithmetical error, as the aggregated value of curtains/tracks was $708 thus making the total $3,535 not $2,945.
In relation to the amount of compensation payable for the loss of the listed items, the decision of the Original Tribunal is confined to one line, and one paragraph.
Within paragraph 31 the Original Tribunal wrote:
31. The evidence supports my conclusion that the respondent certainly become aware that the applicant wanted to recover the items of furniture from mid-July. The photographs taken by its Property Unit on 20 July 2020 show the fridge, the bed ensemble and the outdoor table and chairs in situ. I find these are the only items of any real value. I also find it was reasonable in the circumstances for the respondent to refrain from communicating with the applicant in the period from mid-July to mid-September 2020 when her application for guardianship was afoot. [emphasis added]
At paragraph 38 the Original Tribunal concluded:
38. Any award that the Tribunal may make in the applicant’s favour has to consider the issue of quantum of damages. As indicated, I find that only the fridge, the bed ensemble and the outdoor table and chairs are of compensable value. The applicant gives estimate values of these (the fridge $1749, the bed/bed coverings/linen/doona $500, the dining setting $349) totalling $2,598. However, this estimate bears no clear relation to any loss she has suffered. She says the items were purchased jointly by her and Nadine, and her 70% contribution to their cost is therefore $1,818.60. Given she has had no contact with her sister since at least May 2019 the items were purchased at least three years ago, if not more. Their value has declined significantly. I find her loss is at most 30% of her contribution, namely $545.58. Rounding this, I order the respondent to pay to her the sum of $545 within 28 days of the date of the order.
The correct principles for assessment of amount payable for compensation
When the appeal came on for hearing before us on 17 March 2022, we raised with the parties our concern as to the principles applied by the Original Tribunal, and in particular:
(a)whether a duty of care arose only in relation to property of ‘real value’;[8] and
(b)whether damages were payable only in relation to items of ‘real value’.
[8] The Original Tribunal’s focus on only the larger items of furniture when considering the existence and breach of the duty – at paragraphs 32 and 37 of the reasons for decision – implies the application of such a principle.
We directed the parties to lodge written submissions on these points, and to set out the principles they considered the Original Tribunal should have applied in making its decision to order damages for loss.
The applicant did not take advantage of the opportunity to lodge written submissions. In her oral submissions at the hearing before us she argued that the Original Tribunal erred in its finding that only some of the items were of value, and that it had failed to give any or adequate weight to the evidence she had provided on this point. Further, she submitted that the Original Tribunal was incorrect to reduce her loss by a factor of 0.7 on account of her contribution to the purchase price, and incorrect in applying a reduction by a further factor of 0.3 due to the items being purchased some 3 years before the hearing. She argued that her loss should have been assessed as the whole value of the items as at the time they were disposed of, and that the best estimate of that value was 90% of the new cost, of which she had provided uncontradicted evidence.
In its written submissions lodged 1 April 2022 the PTG submitted that the fundamental principle for the assessment of damages is that the injured party should receive compensation in a sum which, so far as money can do so, will put them in the same position as they would have been in if the tort had not been committed.[9] Further, where goods have been destroyed or lost the normal pecuniary loss is the market value of the goods.[10]
[9] Butler v Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185 (referring to Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39)
[10] The Clyde (1856) Swab 23 at [24]
As for the date at which loss is to be assessed, the PTG submitted that the general rule is that damages for torts are assessed at the date of the breach or when the cause of action arises.[11]
[11] Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351 per Mason CJ at 355
We accept these are the principles which should have been applied to the assessment of the applicant’s loss, with the qualification that assessment of value as at the date of breach of the duty is not always rigidly applied. A Court or Tribunal may consider all of the circumstances of the case, including factors such as the use to which the item would be put and changes in value over time, to conclude that in a particular case a different date of assessment of value provides the best measure of the loss suffered.[12]
[12] See for example Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433
The PTG also conceded that in view of the finding that ownership was not in contention, the Original Tribunal’s decision to take into account the applicants 70% contribution to purchase price in assessing the applicant’s loss was not consistent with legal principle. The appellant was the sole owner of the items at the time of their disposal and thus the loss that she sustained must be determined by reference to the entire value of the items.
In relation to the concept of ‘compensable’ or ‘real’ value, the PTG submitted that the duty of care applied to all items irrespective of value, but that for items of no value no loss would result from a breach of duty in relation to that item. The PTG submitted that the Original Tribunal had implicitly adopted this reasoning in limiting its award of damages to items ‘of value’, and that it was not in error in doing so.[13]
[13] The applicant having sought only compensatory damages, and not punitive or nominal damages.
Further, insofar as the Original Tribunal found that only the fridge, bed ensemble and outdoor furniture was of ‘real value’ the PTG submitted that this factual finding was open to it and not in error.
The PTG submitted that despite the misapplication of some principles the Original Tribunal’s decision should not be interfered with, because it was within the range of a reasonable exercise of discretion. We do not accept this submission. It is clear that the misapplied principles had a significant impact on the amount of compensation awarded in relation to those items found to be value and were thus ‘material’. Further, the decision is submitted to be predicated on incorrect factual findings that certain items were of no value.
Where factual errors are asserted, and the application of incorrect principles which are material to the decision is conceded, a full review of the decision must be conducted. Indeed, it is not possible to know what is within the reasonable exercise of discretion without first considering whether the contested factual findings were available on the evidence, and then applying the correct principles to those findings. We have proceeded to undertake that task below.
What loss has the applicant suffered, on the evidence available to the Original Tribunal?
The applicant asserted – and it was not disputed – that the goods were purchased around the time that Nadine moved into the property in around early April 2019. The applicant asserted that Nadine moved out of the premises around 7 May 2019 (the Original Tribunal did not make a clear finding on this point) and the Original Tribunal found that the property was disposed of around 20 October 2020.
There being no submission from either party[14] that the value of the items should be assessed at anything other than the date of breach, the date of disposal of the items – somewhere between 13 and 20 October 2020 – would ordinarily be relied upon as the relevant date for valuation purposes. The Original Tribunal did not at the hearing or in its reasons note any circumstances which justified a departure from the norm, nor were we able to identify any such factors which would lead to a different date of assessment of loss. The date of disposal should be used as the date at which the value of the items is assessed.
[14] Either before the Original Tribunal or on the appeal
The evidence before the Original Tribunal relevant to assessment of the value of the goods at the time of their disposal consisted of:
(a)the applicant’s investigations of purchase price (new) for like goods dated early – mid 2021;
(b)evidence of the applicant as to the condition of the goods, and extent to which they had been used, at the time of disposal in October 2020;
(c)submissions/evidence by the applicant that in her view overall the value of the disposed goods was around 90% of the ‘as new’ purchase price;
(d)photographs of the goods in situ in the vacated premises, some still in their original packaging or shopping bag.
The transcript discloses that at the conclusion of the hearing the Original Tribunal raised the question of the use of new values with the applicant as follows:
SENIOR MEMBER: …if it turned out to be the case, that these items could be returned to you, that they hadn’t been disposed of, if they came back to you they wouldn’t be brand spanking new replacement value items, would they?
APPLICANT: I agree with you but it would only be a small percentage of them being in use because she only stayed in the property for three weeks. So everything was brand new.
…
SENIOR MEMBER: Yes, just because they were bought 18 months plus ago doesn’t mean they’re brand new, does it, I mean if they haven’t been used?
APPLICANT: Okay. Sure. So I don’t say – so you might, you know, you might lost 20 per cent but you wouldn’t lose 80 per cent. I mean, you know, everything was brand new, like it was brand spanking new. Everything. The whole lot and she only used it – she was only in there under four weeks….[15]
[15] Transcript of proceedings 24 September 2021, page 112
At the hearing before the Original Tribunal the PTG provided no direct evidence of the value of the goods. Significantly, there was no direct evidence that any of the goods had no value. We note however that the Original Tribunal found at paragraph 26 of the reasons for decision that “…The [PTG Property] Unit then confirmed that it was not financially feasible to sell the furniture items.” The Original Tribunal referred to paragraph 15 of Ms Duggan’s witness statement as providing evidence for this finding.
Ms Duggan’s witness statement did not contain an assertion that the PTG property unit had found that it was not financially feasible to sell the items left in the premises.[16] There was no evidence to that effect in any of the other documents before the Original Tribunal, nor was such evidence provided orally at the hearing.
[16] Paragraph 15 of Ms Duggan’s witness statement, with an awkward mix of tenses, set out the usual process that would be followed but did not include an assertion that the usual process had been followed in this case.

Overall, the evidence of value of the goods at the time of their disposal was imperfect and required supplementation and inferences to be drawn. That is not unusual in a tribunal proceeding where parties are frequently self-represented and the cost of obtaining ‘perfect’ evidence is not warranted by the value of the claim. A tribunal may inform itself as it wishes and this may include reference to its own knowledge of matters such as the depreciation and resale value of used goods, or increases/decreases over time in the new price. It cannot be assumed that used goods will always depreciate in value simply due to the effluxion of time, or that goods purchased new will always become cheaper over time due to efficiencies or more expensive due to inflation.[17] Even where parties agree an item loses value over time, it can be very difficult to arrive at a rate of reduction which is accepted by the parties or grounded in objective evidence. Sometimes reference is made to the depreciation schedules provided by the Australian Tax Office, however these schedules are prepared for a specified purpose under tax laws and may not be an appropriate reference point for other purposes.
[17] As supply chain issues over the COVID-19 pandemic have demonstrated.
Where a tribunal intends to rely upon its own knowledge to supplement deficiencies in the evidence before it or to draw inferences, it must tell the parties it intends to do so and allow them an opportunity to comment and if appropriate bring further evidence on that point. The Original Tribunal did this with the applicant at the conclusion of the hearing, but there was no similar opportunity afforded the PTG.
In her opening before the Original Tribunal, the solicitor for the PTG had clarified that the claim had been approached as a claim in negligence, and that if the claim was made out the quantum of damages would be at issue.[18] However the PTG did not provide oral submissions to the Original Tribunal on the principles to be applied to the assessment of compensation in a negligence claim involving the loss or destruction of personal property. Nor as we have noted did the PTG provide any specific evidence as to the value of the personal property disposed of.
[18] Transcript of proceedings 24 September 2021, page 6, line 18ff
The Appeal Tribunal is thus well aware the difficulties of the task with which the Original Tribunal was presented. It was required to make factual findings of the value of used items at a point in time, and those findings required it to draw inferences from the material available to it and apply its own knowledge. Having found material error in the original decision – being the date at which the value of the items was assessed – it is the Appeal Tribunal’s role and responsibility to make our own findings of value at the correct date in place of those that were affected by error. This means relying upon our own knowledge and experience to fill gaps and draw inferences where the Original Tribunal relied upon its own.
We consider that the Original Tribunal was correct to attribute no value (and thus no loss suffered) to the toiletries. These items are highly personal, and even accepting that one may sometimes be willing to reuse items of a family member there was no evidence that they were of a particular kind able or intended to be used by the applicant.
In relation to the towels, cutlery and microwave[19] these are everyday household items which common sense[20] indicates could have been sold as second-hand goods, or immediately used by the applicant, or kept by her against the eventual need to purchase similar replacement items in the future. Photographs taken by ACT Housing show some of the crockery still apparently in the bag of purchase, located in a cupboard and unused. We consider the Original Tribunal was incorrect to conclude that those items were of no value, and thus no loss had been suffered by the applicant.
[19] There was no corroborative evidence of the existence of a microwave – none of the photographs of the kitchen and its open cupboards discloses a microwave – however the applicant asserted it existed and that evidence was unchallenged and accepted.
[20] And familiarity with online sites or weekend markets enabling the sale of second-hand goods
What was the value of the items when disposed of? The items in October 2020 were around 18 months old and had been used for around a month of that period. We consider there is no reliable basis on which it can be concluded that the new price in April 2019 (time of purchase) or October 2020 (time of disposal) was markedly different to the purchase price of like goods in mid-2021. But what reduction should be applied in recognition of the items being aged, and used? The Original Tribunal applied a factor of 0.3 (i.e. reduction of 70% of value) to the goods it considered had value, on the mistaken basis that the goods were almost three years old. We consider that an appropriate reduction from new value for 18 months of age and one month of use, taking into account the possible uses to which the applicant could have put these goods, would be in the range of 10-50%. We have therefore applied a reduction of 30% to the new price, the mid-point of that range. The applicant’s loss for these goods is therefore 70% of the new price.
In relation to the six sets of curtains and curtain tracks, the Original Tribunal concluded that these were of no value. Photographs taken by ACT Housing prior to disposal show these items had not been installed but were still in their original packaging. The applicant attested that the purchase price of similar items in mid‑2021 was $118 (x 6). Before the Appeal Tribunal the applicant asserted she could have returned these items to the store of purchase for a refund. That evidence or submission does not appear to have been put to the Original Tribunal, it is not an inference that is readily available to be drawn from the established facts, and we do not rely upon it. These items were clearly unused, but 18 months old, and there was no evidence that the items could have been used by the applicant. Common sense indicates they would have had some value as second‑hand goods. Again, there is no basis to conclude the new price in April 2019 or October 2020 was different to the new price in mid-2021. Some reduction from the new price must be applied to account for the items being technically second-hand, although apparently unused, and being sold in the market for unused but old curtains and tracks, the precise parameters of which are unknown to us. We consider that a 10‑50% reduction could apply, depending upon the speed with which the applicant wished to effect a sale. We have chosen to apply the mid-point of that range – a 30% reduction from the new price. This means the applicant’s loss for these items is 70% of the new price.
In relation to the refrigerator, bed and bed linen, and outdoor setting, the Original Tribunal first applied a reduction to the new values on account of the applicant’s contribution to purchase price. This was incorrect and we do not apply such a reduction. The Original Tribunal then reduced the loss suffered to 30% of that figure because the items had been purchased: “at least three years ago, if not more. Their value has declined significantly. I find her loss is at most 30% of her contribution, …” This approach is affected by error in the date of assessment of value and cannot be adopted.
In assessing the applicant’s loss in relation to these larger household items we note that they are not easily stored, or moved, and there was no evidence before the Original Tribunal that the applicant wished to retain them for her own use. It is appropriate to consider then the value they would realise if sold as second-hand items at the time of disposal in October 2020. At that time these items were around 18 months old, but the bed ensemble and outdoor setting had had only around four weeks of use. While the bed ensemble and outdoor setting would be worth less than new items, it is again difficult to identify an objectively correct rate of discount. We note also that the applicant might have chosen to keep the doona and bedlinens for her own use rather than selling them second-hand. Applying our own knowledge to these factors we would conclude that the reduction in value for the bed ensemble, linens and outdoor furniture as older and used items might be assessed at around 35%-65% of their as new price – we have taken the midpoint of that range being 50%. The applicants loss for these items is thus 50% of their new price.
In relation to the refrigerator, there was no evidence it had been turned off and left inoperative when Nadine vacated the premises. Thus, it was not only 18 months old, but had experienced 18 months of operation. Again, it is difficult to know what this item might have been sold for in October 2020, noting there would be no or a reduced warranty. There is no evidence as to whether whitegoods suffered any supply chain disruptions during the pandemic such that used refrigerators held their value well. There is no suggestion that the applicant might have kept the refrigerator for her own use. Acknowledging the many unknowns, we think a reduction in value from the new price within the range of 30-50% would be possible. We have applied the mid-point of 40%. This means the applicant’s loss is 60% of the new price.
Our assessment of the applicant’s loss in relation to the disposed items can be summarised as:
(a)Westinghouse upside down fridge (60% of $1,749) $1,049.40
(b)Bunnings dining setting (50% of $349) $174.50
(c)Single bed/bed coverings/linen/doona (50% of $500) $250
(d)Towels (70% of $80) $56
(e)Cutlery/saucepans/crockery/linen/kitchen items (70% of $50) $35
(f)Microwave (70% of $49) $34.30
(g)Toiletries – no value
(h)Curtains and tracks (70% of $118, x 6) $82.60 x 6 = $495.60
These losses total $2,094.80 – say $2,095.00
We acknowledge there are discretionary aspects to the assessment of loss, and accordingly reasonable minds might differ and award somewhat higher or lower amounts. Nonetheless, the amount reached on our application of the correct principles ($2,094.80) is so very different to that reached by that of the Original Tribunal ($545), that, even if there were no material errors established, we could not accept the PTG’s submission that the decision of the Original Tribunal was within that reasonable range of exercise of discretion that should not be interfered with.
The decision of the Original Tribunal is therefore set aside and replaced with an order that the PTG pay the applicant the sum of $2,095.

………………………………..

Presidential Member MT Daniel
For and on behalf of the Tribunal

Date(s) of hearing:	17 March 2022
Applicant:	In person
Solicitors for the Respondent:	ACT Government Solicitor