Santos (a pseudonym) v The King

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCR 2023 0129
TREVOR SANTOS (a pseudonym)[1] Applicant
v
THE KING Respondent

[1]To avoid the possibility of identifying the alleged victim of a sexual offence, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.

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JUDGES: PRIEST, BEACH and WALKER JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 12 December 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12 December 2023
DATE OF REASONS: 14 December 2023
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2023] VSCA 320
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: DPP v Santos (a pseudonym) (Unreported, 22 June 2022, County Court of Victoria, Judge Ellis)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Incest and associated offences – Apprehended bias – Where trial judge in former capacity as Crown Prosecutor signed an indictment against applicant ­– Circumstances sufficient to give rise to apprehension of bias on part of judge – Appeal allowed – New trial ordered.

CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Incest – Whether verdict unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence – Whether complainant gave evidence of penetration – Leave to appeal refused.

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Counsel
Applicant: Ms M Cananzi
Respondent: Ms J Warren
Solicitors
Applicant: Emma Turnbull Lawyers
Respondent: Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

PRIEST JA
BEACH JA
WALKER JA:

  1. Following a trial in the County Court, on 22 June 2022, a jury empanelled to try the applicant found him guilty of sexual penetration of a child under 16[2] (charge 2); incest[3] (charge 3); sexual assault of a child under 16[4] (charge 5); and sexual penetration of his child or lineal descendant[5] (charge 7).[6]

    [2]Crimes Act 1958, as amended by the Crimes (Amendment) Act 2000, s 45(1).

    [3]Crimes Act 1958, as amended by the Crimes (Sexual Offences) Act 1991, s 44(1).

    [4]Crimes Act 1958, as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2016, s 49D(1).

    [5]Crimes Act 1958, as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2016, s 50C(1).

    [6]On 27 April 2023, the judge sentenced the applicant to a total effective sentence of 12 years and 3 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 8 years and 9 months.

  2. Ultimately, the applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction on three grounds:

    1The verdict of guilty on charge 3 (incest) was unsafe and unsatisfactory as it was not open to the jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the Applicant had sexually penetrated the complainant.

    2The verdict of guilty on charge 3 (incest) is unsafe and unsatisfactory, in circumstances where it was not open to the jury to be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the conduct alleged occurred at a time when the offence of incest contrary to s 44(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 was in force.

    5A substantial miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the learned trial judge having, as a Crown Prosecutor, signed an indictment against the Applicant which contained the same charges as those…

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Details
Case
[2023] VSCA 320
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Santos (a pseudonym) appealed his conviction for incest and associated offences. The Crown Prosecutor in the original trial had signed the indictment against Santos, and the trial judge had previously held the position of Crown Prosecutor. Santos argued that the trial judge's prior involvement in the case created an apprehension of bias. The appeal centred on whether the trial judge's previous role warranted a new trial due to potential bias and whether the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence. Specifically, Santos contended that the complainant's evidence regarding penetration was insufficient to support the conviction.

The court examined the potential for bias arising from the trial judge's former role as a Crown Prosecutor. It concluded that the circumstances indeed gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, necessitating a new trial. The court emphasised the importance of impartiality in judicial proceedings and determined that the prior involvement of the judge in the case was sufficient to undermine confidence in the trial's fairness. However, the court declined to address the issue of whether the verdict was unreasonable, as Santos had not been granted leave to appeal on this point. The appeal was thus allowed on the grounds of apprehended bias, and a new trial was ordered. The court did not provide further orders beyond the direction for a new trial.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves Santos, referred to by a pseudonym, who was convicted of incest and associated offences. The relevant events leading to the conviction include the complainant, Santos's daughter, reporting the offences to the police. An investigation was conducted, and Santos was charged and subsequently tried. During the trial, it was noted that the trial judge had previously signed an indictment against Santos in their former capacity as a Crown Prosecutor. The trial proceeded, and Santos was convicted. Santos appealed the conviction on the grounds of apprehended bias due to the judge's prior involvement and also challenged the reasonableness of the verdict in light of the evidence presented, particularly questioning whether the complainant had testified to penetration.

The matter came before the court on appeal against the conviction. Santos had previously been tried and convicted in a lower court. The appeal was heard on the grounds that the trial judge's prior role as a Crown Prosecutor in signing the indictment against Santos created an apprehension of bias. Additionally, Santos sought to appeal on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence, specifically questioning the complainant's testimony regarding penetration. The appeal process included a consideration of whether the apprehension of bias was sufficient to warrant a new trial and whether the evidence supported the verdict.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge's prior involvement in signing the indictment against Santos created an apprehension of bias sufficient to necessitate a new trial.
2. Whether the verdict of the trial was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence, particularly with respect to the complainant's testimony about penetration.

Held
1. The court concluded that the trial judge's prior involvement in signing the indictment against Santos created an apprehension of bias sufficient to necessitate a new trial. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.
2. Regarding the second issue, the court found that the verdict of the trial was not unreasonable and was supported by the evidence, particularly concerning the complainant's testimony about penetration. Thus, leave to appeal on this issue was refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court commenced by addressing the first issue concerning the apprehension of bias. It noted that the trial judge had previously signed the indictment against Santos in their capacity as a Crown Prosecutor. The court held that this prior involvement created a real danger of bias and, therefore, an apprehension of bias that warranted a new trial. The court relied on the principle that a fair trial is a fundamental right and that any real danger of bias must be avoided. The court distinguished this case from others where the prior involvement of the judge did not give rise to apprehension of bias, emphasising the unique circumstances of this case. The ratio decidendi here is that a trial judge's prior signing of an indictment against a defendant, where they acted as the Crown Prosecutor, can create a real danger of bias sufficient to necessitate a new trial.

Turning to the second issue, the court examined the evidence presented at the trial, particularly focusing on the complainant's testimony about penetration. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and that the jury was entitled to accept the complainant's testimony as credible. The court highlighted that it was not its role to reassess the weight of the evidence but to determine if the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence. The ratio decidendi on this point is that an appellate court will not interfere with a jury's verdict unless it is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence, which was not the case here. The court refused leave to appeal on this issue, thereby upholding the trial verdict.