Director of Public Prosecutions v Gil

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCR 2024 0127
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Applicant
v
ADRIAN GIL (A PSEUDONYM) Respondent

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JUDGES: McLEISH, LYONS and KAYE JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 20 September 2024
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17 October 2024
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2024] VSCA 241
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: DPP v [Gil] (County Court of Victoria, Judge Dalziel, 17 July 2024)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Permanent stay – Sexual penetration of child under 16 years – Other allegations against respondent by same complainant in trial and prior case led to acquittals – Complainant’s credibility said to be adversely affected by prior testimony – Forensic decision for defence counsel whether to lead evidence regarding prior allegations to attack complainant’s credibility – Prejudicial effect – Trial judge ordered permanent stay on basis that trial would be so unfair as to bring administration of justice into question – Evidence on acquitted charges not so compelling as to complainant’s credibility as to make forensic choice unfair – Other avenues to attack complainant’s credit available – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal allowed.

Ballardv The King [2024] VSCA 26, applied.

Brown v The Queen [2020] VSCA 26; Parsons v Director of Public Prosecution [2020] VCC 1704, distinguished.

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Counsel

Applicant: Ms A Moran
Respondent: Mr T Marsh with Ms S Stafford

Solicitors

Applicant: Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
Respondent: Emma Turnbull Lawyers

MCLEISH JA
LYONS JA
KAYE JA:

  1. The Director of Public Prosecutions seeks leave under s 295 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 to appeal against a permanent stay of a charge of sexual penetration of a child under 16 years, contrary to s 45(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 as amended by the Crimes (Amendment) Act 2000.

Three indictments and six trials

  1. The charge is one of several brought against the respondent, in a number of indictments involving three different complainants. The first indictment charged the respondent with an indecent act with a child under 16 years between 2008 and 2009, and also contained the charge the subject of the disputed stay, which concerned conduct alleged to have occurred in 2010. The complainant in both matters, whom we will call ML, was the sister of the respondent’s partner (FS). The first indictment also contained five charges of sexual offending against another child under 16 years, being the respondent’s daughter (whom we will call FO).

  2. After a trial, the respondent was convicted of the subject charge and acquitted of the indecent act charge (which it is convenient to call the ‘kitchen charge’). He was also convicted of three of the charges involving his daughter. It was subsequently realised, however, that the trial judge had signed the indictment. As a result, the convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered on the four extant charges (one involving ML and three involving FO).[1]

    [1]Santos (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 320 [30] (Priest, Beach and Walker JJA).

  3. In the…

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Details
Case
[2024] VSCA 241
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Gil involved an interlocutory appeal against a decision by a trial judge to permanently stay criminal proceedings against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the sexual penetration of a child under 16 years of age. The prosecution alleged that the respondent had committed the offence against the same complainant who had previously made allegations against the respondent in another case that resulted in acquittals. The complainant's credibility was said to be adversely affected by the prior testimony. The central issue before the court was whether the trial judge's decision to permanently stay the proceedings was justified given the forensic decision of the defence counsel not to lead evidence regarding the prior allegations to attack the complainant’s credibility. The court had to determine if the trial would be so unfair as to bring the administration of justice into question.

The court considered whether the evidence of the acquitted charges was so compelling as to irreparably damage the complainant's credibility, making the forensic choice by the defence unfair. It held that the evidence on the acquitted charges was not so compelling as to adversely affect the complainant's credibility to the extent that the trial would be unfair. The court noted that there were other avenues available to attack the complainant’s credit. The court applied the principles from Ballard v The King, emphasising that the decision not to lead evidence about prior acquittals should not necessarily lead to a permanent stay of proceedings if there are other means to challenge the complainant's credibility. It distinguished the case from Brown v The Queen and Parsons v Director of Public Prosecution, where different circumstances justified the outcomes reached in those cases.

The court concluded that the trial judge's decision to permanently stay the proceedings was not warranted. The appeal was allowed, and leave to appeal was granted. The court found that the trial would not be so unfair as to bring the administration of justice into question. The court's decision highlighted the importance of considering all available means to challenge a complainant's credibility before concluding that a trial would be irreparably unfair. The final orders of the court were to set aside the decision of the trial judge and to direct that the proceedings against the respondent proceed to trial.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent, Mr Gil, was charged with sexual penetration of a child under 16 years of age. The complainant, a young girl, had previously made allegations against Mr Gil in another case which resulted in acquittals. Due to these prior allegations, the complainant's credibility was questioned, and there was a suggestion that it had been adversely affected by her prior testimony. The case came before the court following an order made by the trial judge to permanently stay the proceedings on the basis that the trial would be so unfair as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The trial judge's decision was made considering the potential prejudicial effect of the complainant's prior allegations on the current proceedings.

This matter came before the court as an interlocutory appeal against a decision of the trial judge to permanently stay the proceedings. The trial judge had determined that the trial would be unfair due to the complainant's credibility being impacted by the prior allegations. The court of appeal was asked to determine whether the trial judge's decision was correct. Prior to this appeal, the respondent had faced another case involving allegations by the same complainant, which resulted in acquittals. The court of appeal considered the implications of the prior case on the current proceedings and whether the trial judge's order to permanently stay the trial was justified.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge was correct in ordering a permanent stay of the proceedings on the basis that the trial would be unfair as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
2. Whether the evidence of the acquitted charges was so compelling as to the complainant's credibility as to make the forensic choice for defence counsel to lead evidence regarding the prior allegations unfair.
3. Whether there were other avenues available to attack the complainant's credit, which could have been pursued instead of the permanent stay.

Held
1. The Court concluded that the trial judge was incorrect in ordering a permanent stay of the proceedings, finding that the trial would not be unfair to the extent that it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
2. The Court held that the evidence of the acquitted charges was not so compelling regarding the complainant’s credibility as to render the forensic choice for defence counsel to lead evidence concerning the prior allegations unfair.
3. The Court determined that there were other avenues available to attack the complainant's credit, which could have been pursued instead of seeking a permanent stay.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court examined the decision of the trial judge to order a permanent stay of proceedings in the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Gil. The primary concern was whether the trial would be so unfair as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The Court found that the trial judge had erred in this regard, as the proceedings did not reach the level of unfairness that would justify a permanent stay. In considering the second issue, the Court assessed whether the evidence of the acquitted charges was compelling enough to deem the defence’s decision to lead evidence on the prior allegations unfair. The Court ruled that the evidence was not so compelling as to undermine the fairness of the defence's decision. Lastly, regarding alternative methods to challenge the complainant's credibility, the Court found that there were indeed other means available, which could have been employed instead of seeking a permanent stay. The Court thus concluded that the trial judge’s decision to order a permanent stay was not warranted.

The Court applied the principles established in Ballard v The King, where it was held that a permanent stay should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances where the trial would be substantially unfair. This decision was distinguished from Brown v The Queen and Parsons v Director of Public Prosecution, where the courts found that the prejudicial effect of certain evidence justified a permanent stay. The Court found that the present case did not meet the threshold of exceptional circumstances required for a permanent stay, as the trial would not be substantially unfair. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a permanent stay should only be ordered when the trial would be so unfair as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and where no other avenues are available to address the unfairness.