Salton v Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Salton v Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation [2013] FCA 12

Citation: Salton v Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation [2013] FCA 12
Appeal from: Salton and Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation [2012] AATA 305
Parties: NARELLE SALTON v COMMONWEALTH SUPERANNUATION CORPORATION
File number: ACD 44 of 2012
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 18 January 2013
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – spouse pension under Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) – applicant and deceased married but not living together – whether marital relationship at time of death – whether applicant was taken to be living with the deceased – whether absence because of special circumstances – deceased’s persecutory delusions and alcoholism
Legislation: Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) ss 3(1), 6A(1), 6A(5)(b), 6B(2), 6B(3), 6BA and 39
Cases cited: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Comber (1986) 10 FCR 88 referred to
Main v Main (1949) 78 CLR 636 considered
East Finchley Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 90 ALR 457 referred to
Date of hearing: 18 December 2012
Place: Canberra
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 61
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms JAD Needham SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Howes Kaye Halpin
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr APB Dillon
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 44 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

NARELLE SALTON
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH SUPERANNUATION CORPORATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 JANUARY 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed, with costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 44 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

NARELLE SALTON
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH SUPERANNUATION CORPORATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE:

18 JANUARY 2013

PLACE:

 SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This appeal is from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) given on 21 May 2012 affirming the decision under review that Ms Salton was not entitled to a spouse benefit under the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) (the Act).

  2. The facts shortly stated, as found by the Tribunal, are that Ms Salton is the widow of Mr Dixon. Mr Dixon died on 2 October 2009. Ms Salton and Mr Dixon were married on 11 August 1979. They had two children, a son born in 1981 and a daughter born in 1985. Mr Dixon served in the Australian Army from 1963 to 1971, left the Army for a short while, but rejoined the armed services in the Royal Australian Air Force and served between 1971 and 2002. He was compulsorily retired in 2002, aged 55 years. In October 1991 Ms Salton and Mr Dixon separated and Ms Salton left the…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Salton v Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation, the applicant sought a spouse pension under the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) following the death of her husband, who was a member of the Australian Defence Force. The deceased and the applicant had been married but were not living together at the time of his death. The central dispute was whether the applicant and the deceased were considered to be living together at the time of his death and whether the applicant's absence was due to special circumstances, such as the deceased's persecutory delusions and alcoholism.

The legal issues before the court involved interpreting the deeming provision in section 6A(5) of the Act, which deals with the concept of "living with" another person despite periods of absence. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the absences were due to special circumstances that would trigger the deeming provision. The court also needed to address whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the statutory language and whether it had erred in its reasoning.

The court concluded that the Tribunal's interpretation of the deeming provision was accurate. The deeming provision only addresses the "living with" aspect and considers absences that do not interrupt this status. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its interpretation of the statutory language and that some of the paragraphs identified by the respondent did not contain any objectionable language. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed, with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Despite the single paragraph referred to in the notice of contention, counsel for the respondent also identified [45], [46], [47], [67] and [78] of the Tribunal’s reasons as containing the same error. Rather than approve or disapprove particular language, it is in my view sufficient to repeat that the deeming provision in s 6A(5) deals only with the “living with” aspect and deems the absences with which the subsection deals as not interrupting the parties “living with” each other. The subsection deems the person to be living with the other if the decision-maker is satisfied that the person would have been living with that other person except for a period of temporary absence or absence because of special circumstances. I should also add that I see some of the paragraphs complained of by the respondent, in particular [45], [67] and [78], as unexceptionable in the circumstances of the present case.Conclusion and orders The appeal is dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.