NARELLE SALTON and COMMONWEALTH SUPERANNUATION CORPORATION

Link copied
Case Copied 44 min read

[2012] AATA  305

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Number(s)

2011/1766

Re

NARELLE SALTON

APPLICANT

And

COMMONWEALTH SUPERANNUATION CORPORATION

RESPONDENT

Decision

Tribunal

PROFESSOR RM CREYKE, SENIOR MEMBER

Date 21 May 2012
Place Canberra

The decision under review is affirmed.

...........................[sgd].............................................

PROFESSOR RM CREYKE, SENIOR MEMBER

Catchwords

SUPERANNUATION – beneficiary – commonwealth superannuation scheme – spouse benefit Widow - marital or couple relationship - whether separation due to illness - whether marital relationship would exist but for illness - Delusional Disorder (Persecutory Type) - Schizophrenia - Alcohol Dependence with Physiological Dependence - American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV

LEGISLATION

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s15AB

Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) ss 3, 6A, 6B, 39

Cases

Harris v Trustee of Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (2005) 91 ALD 30

Harris v Trustee of Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (2006) 151 FCR 169
Re Gray and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [2004] AATA 450
Re Mylan and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [1999] AATA 722
Re Palmer and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2004) 85 ALD 148
Re Thompson and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefit Authority (1994) 32 ALD 775

Tulk v Tulk (1906) 13 ALR 45

Secondary Materials

American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases (4th edition, text revised)

Explanatory Memorandum for the Commonwealth Superannuation Schemes Amendment Bill 1992, Hansard, 14 October 1992.

REASONS FOR DECISION

PROFESSOR RM CREYKE, SENIOR MEMBER

21 May 2012

  1. Ms Narelle Salton is the widow of Mr Hugh Dixon. Mr Dixon died on 2 October 2009. Ms Salton seeks a spouse benefit under the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) (Act).

  2. On 2 July 2010, a delegate of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority decided that Ms Salton was not entitled to the spouse benefit.  That decision was affirmed on review on 1 April 2011.

  3. Ms Salton sought further review by the Tribunal on 2 May 2011. The matter was heard in Canberra on 26 April 2012.

    BACKGROUND

  4. The following history has generally been agreed by both parties. Ms Salton and Mr Dixon were married in Western Australia on 11 August 1979. The couple had two children: Liam Garrett Dixon born in 1981 and a daughter, Karmen Barbara Dixon born in 1985, Ms Salton also had a son by a previous relationship.

  5. Mr Dixon served in the Australian Army from 30 September 1963 to 22 January 1971, seeing overseas service in Vietnam in 1967-68.  He subsequently left the Army for a short while, but rejoined the armed services in the Royal Australian Air Force and served between 1971 and 2002. He was compulsorily retired in 2002, aged 55 years. He also had postings in Hong Kong in 1980, and Malaysia, as well as various postings in Australia.

  6. In October 1991, the couple separated and Ms Salton left the matrimonial home.  She was provided with a government house in Kambah, Australian Capital Territory and she has continued to…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read NARELLE SALTON and COMMONWEALTH SUPERANNUATION CORPORATION and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2012] AATA 305
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Tribunal was asked to determine whether Ms. Salton was in a marital relationship with Mr. Dixon at the time of his death, thereby qualifying her as a spouse for the purposes of receiving a spouse benefit under the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme. The case hinged on whether Ms. Salton and Mr. Dixon were living together in a bona fide domestic relationship at the time of Mr. Dixon's death, despite their separation in 1991. Ms. Salton argued that their separation was due to Mr. Dixon's illness, and without it, they would have been living together at the time of his death. The central legal issues revolved around interpreting sections 6A and 6B of the Act to determine the definition of a "marital relationship" and whether Ms. Salton qualified as a spouse under section 39 of the Act.

The Tribunal examined the evidence and found that although Mr. Dixon's delusional disorder may have manifested from 1988 and worsened after his discharge from the military in 2002, the evidence did not support the conclusion that but for his mental conditions, the couple would have been living together at the time of his death. The Tribunal noted that the length of their separation, Mr. Dixon's tendencies to be a loner, and Ms. Salton's reconciliation to her position as a single parent all contributed to their separation. The Tribunal also considered Mr. Dixon's behaviour before and during the 1990s, which indicated a preference for solitude, not attributable to his mental illness. The decision affirmed that Ms. Salton was not in a marital relationship with Mr. Dixon at the time of his death and thus not entitled to spouse benefits.

The Tribunal's reasoning was based on a comprehensive assessment of the evidence, including Mr. Dixon's documented history of mental health issues, his behaviour patterns, and the nature of his relationship with Ms. Salton. The Tribunal concluded that despite Mr. Dixon's mental conditions, the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that they would have been living together but for his illness. The findings underscored the importance of considering the totality of the circumstances, including the length of the separation and the couple's relationship dynamics, in determining whether a marital relationship existed at the time of death.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Salton sought further review by the Tribunal on 2 May 2011. The matter was heard in Canberra on 26 April 2012.BACKGROUND The following history has generally been agreed by both parties. Ms Salton and Mr Dixon were married in Western Australia on 11 August 1979. The couple had two children: Liam Garrett Dixon born in 1981 and a daughter, Karmen Barbara Dixon born in 1985, Ms Salton also had a son by a previous relationship. Mr Dixon served in the Australian Army from 30 September 1963 to 22 January 1971, seeing overseas service in Vietnam in 1967-68. He subsequently left the Army for a short while, but rejoined the armed services in the Royal Australian Air Force and served between 1971 and 2002. He was compulsorily retired in 2002, aged 55 years. He also had postings in Hong Kong in 1980, and Malaysia, as well as various postings in Australia. In October 1991, the couple separated and Ms Salton left the matrimonial home. She was provided with a government house in Kambah, Australian Capital Territory and she has continued to reside there. She said she stayed in Canberra so the children could finish their education in one place. From this time, Mr Dixon had various postings, and his principal residences were in barracks. However, according to Ms Salton, he would return to Canberra for weekends or other short periods. On or about 1998, Ms Salton reverted to her maiden name. She claimed to have done so at the request of Mr Dixon. She said he was concerned about the safety of Ms Salton and the children. After he was discharged, in October 2002, Mr Dixon acquired a motor home and from October 2002, he lived away from Canberra. His postal address from July 2002 was at his sister's address, first in Nimbin, NSW and then in Gympie, Queensland. However, from 7 January 2004, at his sister's request, he no longer used her postal address, changing it to Tamworth, NSW. He was living in Tamworth at a caravan park at the time of his death in 2009. From October 2002 Ms Salton gave evidence that neither she nor the children knew were Mr Dixon was living. In the DFRDB Application for Retirement Pay, Commutation and Superannuation Productivity, dated 8 February 2002, Mr Dixon noted he was married, providing Ms Salton’s name and date of birth, and provided details of a bank account solely in his name for payment of pension. In a document titled ‘My Proposed Will’, last updated on 1 March 2007, Mr Dixon referred to Ms Salton as his ‘estranged Spouse’ and stated: ‘Married 11 August 1979 in Perth WA and Separated 31 October 1991…’ The two children of his marriage were named as his primary beneficiaries, upon condition that ‘with no reconciliation process ever being implemented [Ms Salton] is declared LEGALLY DECEASED’. The draft Will further declared that neither Ms Salton, nor her son by another relationship were to share in his estate. Mr Dixon died on 2 October 2009. Mr Dixon's death certificate showed he was married but separated. Ms Salton was listed as the ‘Informant’ of death and is described as a ‘Widow’.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At that point, in 2002, had reconciliation been sought by Mr Dixon, he could have returned to live with Ms Salton in Canberra. Instead, he bought a motorhome and began an itinerant lifestyle until he settled in Tamworth. That is consistent with the suggestions in several of the Airman Evaluation Reports that even in the workplace, Mr Dixon did not mix well, and was a bit of a loner, and Liam’s evidence that from the early 1990s, Mr Dixon liked ‘to spend most of his time alone’. There is no suggestion in the evidence that this preference for solitude was due to delusionary beliefs. It does, however, reinforce the implication that even without his mental illness, Mr Dixon did not want to be ‘ordinarily living with’ another person, particularly after an eleven year separation. CONCLUSION The Tribunal has found that Mr Dixon’s delusional disorder may have become manifest from 1988, and certainly worsened during the 7 years from his discharge in 2002 till his death in 2009. However, the evidence prior to 2002, and during the 1990s, does not enable the Tribunal to be satisfied that but for Mr Dixon’s mental conditions and his alcoholism, Mr Dixon and Ms Salton would have been likely to have been living together in a bona fide domestic relationship at the time of his death. The length of their separation, Mr Dixon’s tendencies to be a loner, and to lose his temper, personality traits not demonstrably due to Mr Dixon’s psychiatric conditions, and Ms Salton’s reconciliation to her position as a single parent also contributed to the separation. The decision under review is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The issue is whether Ms Salton was in a marital relationship with Mr Dixon at the time of his death, as defined by section 6A of the Act, and was accordingly a ‘spouse’ for the purpose of receipt of spouse benefit under sections 3(1) and 39 of the Act.CONSIDERATION Section 39 of the Act provides for a spouse’s pension following the death of a recipient member. There is no dispute that Mr Dixon was a recipient member; that Ms Salton and Mr Dixon had married in 1979 and remained married at the date of his death in 2009; and that there were two children of the marriage, Liam and Karmen. It was also agreed that the couple lived together in a bona fide domestic relationship until October 1991 in Canberra when there was a separation and Ms Salton moved into a house in Kambah, ACT. Mr Dixon listed himself as separated in 2002 when he left the RAAF. Although Ms Salton’s application for spouse benefits stated that she was wholly or substantially dependent on Mr Dixon, no joint bank account was provided to substantiate her claim that after 2004 monies were paid into her account. At the hearing she suggested that after 2004 Mr Dixon had been paying her in cash. In light of the absence of evidence of these payments, Ms Salton accepted at the hearing that although Mr Dixon had made payments to her through the Child Support Agency from 1992 to 2004, any payments by Mr Dixon to her after this time had ceased. In any event, by the time of the hearing Ms Salton’s application for review did not depend on her meeting this criterion in either section 6A(4), or section 6B(3). Her claim was that the couple were separated due to illness and but for that illness the couple would have continued to be living together on a permanent and bona fide domestic basis at the time of Mr Dixon’s death in 2009. Section 3 of the Act states that the meaning of ‘spouse’ for the purpose of s 39 is affected by section 6B of the Act. Section 6B sets out ‘the circumstances under which a person is to be treated as a spouse who survives a deceased person, and the decisive determinant is if a person has a marital relationship with the deceased person’[5], despite the couple not living together at the relevant time. The ‘relevant time’ is the time of the member’s death[6]. Section 6A provides an exhaustive and exclusive meaning for ‘marital relationship[7]’. That finding is supported by the prefatory words to section 6A(1) ‘For the purposes of this Act’, words which are repeated in section 6B(2) in defining who is a ‘spouse’.[5] Palmer and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2004) 85 ALD 148 at [26].[6] Ibid. See also Re Mylan and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [1999] AATA 722 at [16]. [7] Re Palmer and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2004) 85 ALD 148 at at [27]. The relevant provision on which Ms Salton relied to establish that she remained in a marital relationship with Mr Dixon at the time of his death was section 6A(5)(b). That section provides that a person is taken to be in a marital relationship if ComSuper (formerly the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority) is satisfied that the person would not have been separated from the other person at the time of death of the member but for ‘an absence because of special circumstances, [namely], the person’s illness’.