[2012] AATA 305
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number(s)
2011/1766
Re
NARELLE SALTON
APPLICANT
And
COMMONWEALTH SUPERANNUATION CORPORATION
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal PROFESSOR RM CREYKE, SENIOR MEMBER
Date 21 May 2012 Place Canberra The decision under review is affirmed.
...........................[sgd].............................................
PROFESSOR RM CREYKE, SENIOR MEMBER
Catchwords
SUPERANNUATION – beneficiary – commonwealth superannuation scheme – spouse benefit Widow - marital or couple relationship - whether separation due to illness - whether marital relationship would exist but for illness - Delusional Disorder (Persecutory Type) - Schizophrenia - Alcohol Dependence with Physiological Dependence - American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV
LEGISLATION
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s15AB
Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) ss 3, 6A, 6B, 39
Cases
Harris v Trustee of Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (2005) 91 ALD 30
Harris v Trustee of Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (2006) 151 FCR 169
Re Gray and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [2004] AATA 450
Re Mylan and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [1999] AATA 722
Re Palmer and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2004) 85 ALD 148
Re Thompson and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefit Authority (1994) 32 ALD 775Tulk v Tulk (1906) 13 ALR 45
Secondary Materials
American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases (4th edition, text revised)
Explanatory Memorandum for the Commonwealth Superannuation Schemes Amendment Bill 1992, Hansard, 14 October 1992.
REASONS FOR DECISION
PROFESSOR RM CREYKE, SENIOR MEMBER
21 May 2012
Ms Narelle Salton is the widow of Mr Hugh Dixon. Mr Dixon died on 2 October 2009. Ms Salton seeks a spouse benefit under the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Act 1973 (Cth) (Act).
On 2 July 2010, a delegate of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority decided that Ms Salton was not entitled to the spouse benefit. That decision was affirmed on review on 1 April 2011.
Ms Salton sought further review by the Tribunal on 2 May 2011. The matter was heard in Canberra on 26 April 2012.
BACKGROUND
The following history has generally been agreed by both parties. Ms Salton and Mr Dixon were married in Western Australia on 11 August 1979. The couple had two children: Liam Garrett Dixon born in 1981 and a daughter, Karmen Barbara Dixon born in 1985, Ms Salton also had a son by a previous relationship.
Mr Dixon served in the Australian Army from 30 September 1963 to 22 January 1971, seeing overseas service in Vietnam in 1967-68. He subsequently left the Army for a short while, but rejoined the armed services in the Royal Australian Air Force and served between 1971 and 2002. He was compulsorily retired in 2002, aged 55 years. He also had postings in Hong Kong in 1980, and Malaysia, as well as various postings in Australia.
In October 1991, the couple separated and Ms Salton left the matrimonial home. She was provided with a government house in Kambah, Australian Capital Territory and she has continued to…
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- [2012] AATA 305
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal examined the evidence and found that although Mr. Dixon's delusional disorder may have manifested from 1988 and worsened after his discharge from the military in 2002, the evidence did not support the conclusion that but for his mental conditions, the couple would have been living together at the time of his death. The Tribunal noted that the length of their separation, Mr. Dixon's tendencies to be a loner, and Ms. Salton's reconciliation to her position as a single parent all contributed to their separation. The Tribunal also considered Mr. Dixon's behaviour before and during the 1990s, which indicated a preference for solitude, not attributable to his mental illness. The decision affirmed that Ms. Salton was not in a marital relationship with Mr. Dixon at the time of his death and thus not entitled to spouse benefits.
The Tribunal's reasoning was based on a comprehensive assessment of the evidence, including Mr. Dixon's documented history of mental health issues, his behaviour patterns, and the nature of his relationship with Ms. Salton. The Tribunal concluded that despite Mr. Dixon's mental conditions, the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that they would have been living together but for his illness. The findings underscored the importance of considering the totality of the circumstances, including the length of the separation and the couple's relationship dynamics, in determining whether a marital relationship existed at the time of death.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The issue is whether Ms Salton was in a marital relationship with Mr Dixon at the time of his death, as defined by section 6A of the Act, and was accordingly a ‘spouse’ for the purpose of receipt of spouse benefit under sections 3(1) and 39 of the Act.CONSIDERATION Section 39 of the Act provides for a spouse’s pension following the death of a recipient member. There is no dispute that Mr Dixon was a recipient member; that Ms Salton and Mr Dixon had married in 1979 and remained married at the date of his death in 2009; and that there were two children of the marriage, Liam and Karmen. It was also agreed that the couple lived together in a bona fide domestic relationship until October 1991 in Canberra when there was a separation and Ms Salton moved into a house in Kambah, ACT. Mr Dixon listed himself as separated in 2002 when he left the RAAF. Although Ms Salton’s application for spouse benefits stated that she was wholly or substantially dependent on Mr Dixon, no joint bank account was provided to substantiate her claim that after 2004 monies were paid into her account. At the hearing she suggested that after 2004 Mr Dixon had been paying her in cash. In light of the absence of evidence of these payments, Ms Salton accepted at the hearing that although Mr Dixon had made payments to her through the Child Support Agency from 1992 to 2004, any payments by Mr Dixon to her after this time had ceased. In any event, by the time of the hearing Ms Salton’s application for review did not depend on her meeting this criterion in either section 6A(4), or section 6B(3). Her claim was that the couple were separated due to illness and but for that illness the couple would have continued to be living together on a permanent and bona fide domestic basis at the time of Mr Dixon’s death in 2009. Section 3 of the Act states that the meaning of ‘spouse’ for the purpose of s 39 is affected by section 6B of the Act. Section 6B sets out ‘the circumstances under which a person is to be treated as a spouse who survives a deceased person, and the decisive determinant is if a person has a marital relationship with the deceased person’[5], despite the couple not living together at the relevant time. The ‘relevant time’ is the time of the member’s death[6]. Section 6A provides an exhaustive and exclusive meaning for ‘marital relationship[7]’. That finding is supported by the prefatory words to section 6A(1) ‘For the purposes of this Act’, words which are repeated in section 6B(2) in defining who is a ‘spouse’.[5] Palmer and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2004) 85 ALD 148 at [26].[6] Ibid. See also Re Mylan and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority [1999] AATA 722 at [16]. [7] Re Palmer and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (2004) 85 ALD 148 at at [27]. The relevant provision on which Ms Salton relied to establish that she remained in a marital relationship with Mr Dixon at the time of his death was section 6A(5)(b). That section provides that a person is taken to be in a marital relationship if ComSuper (formerly the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority) is satisfied that the person would not have been separated from the other person at the time of death of the member but for ‘an absence because of special circumstances, [namely], the person’s illness’.