Sales v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sales v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 2094

CHARLES EDWARD SALES v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

NSD 2230 OF 2007

FLICK J
21 DECEMBER 2007
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 2230 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

CHARLES EDWARD SALES
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 DECEMBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Upon the Respondent’s undertaking not to remove the Applicant from Australia prior to the hearing and resolution of any appeal, and provided a Notice of Appeal is provided in time:

1.       The Application be dismissed.

2.       The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 2230 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

CHARLES EDWARD SALES
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE:

21 DECEMBER 2007

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 25 September 2007 the then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship concluded that Mr Sales did not pass the “character test” as defined by s 501(6) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth). The Minister decided to exercise his discretion under s 501(2) to cancel Mr Sales’ Transitional Permanent (Class BF) visa.

  2. Mr Sales was notified of that decision on 26 October 2007 and filed an Application seeking to review that decision with this Court on 13 November 2007. The jurisdiction of the Court invoked is that conferred by s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

  3. Presently before the Court is an Amended Application which sets forth a number of grounds, including a contention that the Minister failed to consider a number of matters and failed to take into account:

    1.  the Convention on the Rights of the Child;

    2.  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    3.  the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and

    4.  the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

    Included is a ground that the Minister’s decision was “so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it.”

  4. The hearing of this Application was expedited on 26 November 2007 upon the basis that there was a prospect Mr Sales could be released from detention if he were successful in these proceedings.  A necessary consequence of expedition and the time of year at which this hearing takes place is that such reasons as may now be given ex tempore are more confined than may otherwise have been desirable.

  5. In support of the Amended Application, two Affidavits were sought to be relied upon. Objection was rightly taken to that material which was not before the Minister when he made his decision. The objection, at the time however, was merely noted and the hearing proceeded. Only that material which was before the Minister has been now considered: see

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 2094
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sales v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved Mr Sales, who was challenging a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship not to cancel his visa despite his criminal record. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Minister's decision was unreasonable, given the statutory discretion afforded under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958. The central issue was whether the Minister's decision, which did not cancel Mr Sales' visa, was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it, considering the broad and unfettered nature of the discretion provided by the statute.

The Court examined the nature of the discretion under section 501 of the Act, which had been described as "unfettered" in various cases. It emphasised that the Act does not specify factors the Minister must consider when deciding whether to cancel a visa. The Court concluded that the decision-maker’s discretion was not constrained by any requirement to consider personal factors specific to the visa holder, such as the circumstances of the offences committed. Instead, the decision could be based on broader considerations like the national interest in regulating the presence of non-citizens in Australia. Given this broad discretion, the Court found that the Minister's decision was not so unreasonable as to be beyond the scope of what a reasonable decision-maker could decide.

The Court ultimately determined that Mr Sales' application should be dismissed. It held that, despite the merits of the decision, no legal error had been identified, and the Minister's decision fell within the permissible range of outcomes. Consequently, the Court ordered that the application be dismissed and that Mr Sales pay the costs of the Respondent, subject to certain conditions regarding his removal from Australia pending any appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Upon the Respondent’s undertaking not to remove the Applicant from Australia prior to the hearing and resolution of any appeal, and provided a Notice of Appeal is provided in time:

1. The Application be dismissed.

2. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FLICK J
A decision on the part of the Minister not to cancel the visa, notwithstanding the criminal record of Mr Sales, was obviously a decision which the Minister could have made. But, equally, it could not be said that the decision in fact taken was a decision “so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it.” That is especially so where the decision-maker is clothed with a discretion as unfettered as that conferred by s 501(2) of the 1958 Act.CONCLUSION It is considered that the Amended Application should be dismissed. In reaching this conclusion, consideration has been given to each of the submissions detailed in the Applicant’s Submissions dated 14 December 2007. Notwithstanding the considerable ingenuity with which those submissions have been drafted, it is considered that no error has been exposed and that the Applicant is in essence simply disagreeing with the merits of the decision made by the Minister.ORDERS The Court orders that, upon the Respondent’s undertaking not to remove the Applicant from Australia prior to the hearing and resolution of any appeal, and provided a Notice of Appeal is provided in time:1. The Application be dismissed.2. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondent.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FLICK J

The difficulties are that first, the discretion conferred by s 501 is “unfettered” and conferred in wide and unqualified terms. The breadth of the discretion conferred and the breadth of the matters that may be taken into account has been repeatedly emphasised. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Huynh [2004] FCAFC 256, 139 FCR 505, Kiefel and Bennett JJ observed:Whether a relevant consideration[71] With respect to his Honour, the fact of possession of a criminal record, the reason why a person does not pass the character test, does not of itself render the circumstances surrounding the offences committed, and the reasons for the sentences imposed for them, relevant considerations to the exercise of the minister’s discretion. A relevant consideration in an administrative law sense has a limited meaning. It is one which the decision-maker is bound to take into account in making the decision in question. The factors which the decision-maker is bound to take into account are determined by the construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If they are not stated, they are to be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39–40; 66 ALR 299 at 308–9 (Peko-Wallsend) per Mason J.[72] The Act does not state what factors the minister is bound to consider in determining whether or not to cancel a person’s visa. The nature of the minister’s discretion under s 501 of the Act has been considered in a series of cases concerning the validity of ministerial directions made under s 499 of the Act. In Aksu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 65 ALD 667 Dowsett J described s 501 as conferring an “unfettered discretion” upon the minister (at 670 [10]). His Honour went on to explain (at 674–5 [24]):Section 501 prescribes failure to satisfy the character test as a condition precedent to the exercise of the discretion to refuse or cancel. It does not create any presumption as to the way in which that discretion should be exercised.[73] This description of the discretion has been cited with approval in subsequent decisions, by Cooper J in Ruhl v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 401 and Stone J in Javillonar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 311. And in Jahnke v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 268 Drummond J observed that although the discretion is not fettered by any express limitation, it must nevertheless be exercised by reference to considerations identified from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute (at 274–5 [17]).[74] A reference to those matters confirms the breadth of the minister’s discretion. The object of the Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens: s 4(1). To advance that object provision is made for the removal or deportation from Australia of non-citizens whose presence is not permitted by the Act: s 4(4). If the minister were able, consistent with the object of the Act, to consider a matter as broad as the national interest, in determining whether a person ought to be permitted to remain in Australia, it does not seem possible to imply some obligation on the minister’s part to consider specific factors, personal to the visa holder, such as the circumstances surrounding the offences they have committed. By way of illustration, the minister may consider that the national interest requires that the commission of a particular type of offence will inevitably result in the cancellation of a visa, where there has been a sentence to imprisonment for the requisite term. To construe the section as requiring the minister to consider factors such as the level of involvement of the visa holder in the offences would cut across that broad discretion. It follows in our view that the obligation of which his Honour the primary judge spoke cannot be read into s 501.The observations of Kiefel and Bennett JJ were referred to with approval by Heydon and Crennan JJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50 at [126]–[127], 228 CLR 566. Their Honours there observed: [129] Parliament has left it to the minister to decide the matters which are relevant to whether a person who fails the character test should be permitted to remain in Australia. Considerations relevant to the exercise of the power depend on the nature, scope and purpose of the power, understood in its context in the Act. As ministerial direction No 21 makes clear, the minister considers that two of the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion are related to the protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the community.