Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd (formerly Mayne Group Ltd) [2008] NSWCA 149
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

FILE NUMBER(S):
40478/06

HEARING DATE(S):
19 and 20 February 2008

JUDGMENT DATE:
11 August 2008

PARTIES:
Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) ACN 003 753 526 - Appellant
Symbion Health Ltd (formerly Mayne Group Ltd) ACN 004 073 410 - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:
Giles JA Hodgson JA Campbell JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
SC 50158/02

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Einstein J

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
16 June 2006; 14 July 2006; 3 August 2006

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
Einstein J, 16 June 2006, unreported;  [2006] NSWSC 654;  [2006] NSWSC 779

COUNSEL:
J T Gleeson SC & J A Watson - Appellant
B Walker SC & D R Pritchard - Resondent

SOLICITORS:
Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd - Appellant
Freehills - Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
Contract - whether parties made binding contract - oral negotiations and exchanges of letters - letter signed acknowledging and accepting "terms and conditions as outlined above" - construction of letter - regard to surrounding circumstances and subject-matter - and to subsequent communications - on balance, no intention to make binding contract.

LEGISLATION CITED:

CASES CITED:
Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309;
Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528;
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540;
Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647;
Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v G R Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 622;
Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] NSWCA 61; (2001) 53 NSWLR 153;
B Seppelt and Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147;
Film Bars Pty Ltd v Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1 BPR 9251;
Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd (1995) 7 BPR 97578;
Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd (1976) 1 NSWLR 669;
Howard Smith and Co Ltd v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68;
Jones v Sutherland Shire Council (1979) 2 NSWLR 206;
Lemon v Scarlet & Co (1921) 29 CLR 499;
Lustre Hosiery Ltd v York (1936) 54 CLR 134;
Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353;
Perry v Suffields Ltd (1916) 2 Ch 187;
Pitcher v Langford (1991) 23 NSWLR 142;
Sinclair Scott & Co v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310;
Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 210 CLR 165.

TEXTS CITED:

DECISION:
Appeal and cross-appeal each dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA  40478/06
ED  50158/02

GILES JA
HODGSON JA
CAMPBELL JA

Monday…

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Details
Case
[2008] NSWCA 149
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd (Sagacious) and Symbion Health Ltd (Symbion) were involved in litigation concerning whether they had entered into a binding contract. The dispute arose from oral negotiations and subsequent exchanges of letters, culminating in a letter signed by Symbion acknowledging and accepting "terms and conditions as outlined above." Sagacious contended that this letter constituted a binding contract, while Symbion argued otherwise. The matter was heard in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was to determine, objectively, whether the parties intended to be immediately contractually bound by the terms outlined in the April letter. This involved considering whether the April letter was intended to be the sole repository of the parties' contractual intention or if it was subject to further negotiations and the execution of a formal contract. The court also had to consider the significance of the surrounding circumstances, the subject-matter of the putative contract, and subsequent communications between the parties in ascertaining their intention.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that the intention to be immediately contractually bound must be objectively ascertained from the words and conduct of the parties. While the signature on the April letter was a significant indicator of commitment, the court held that it was not appropriate to confine the inquiry solely to the text of that letter. The court considered the circumstances in which the letter was sent and signed, its terms, and the nature of the proposed contract. It found that subsequent communications between the parties strongly indicated a lack of intention to be immediately bound. The court concluded that, on the whole, the evidence weighed against the existence of a binding contract at that stage, suggesting that the parties intended to be bound only upon the conclusion of ongoing negotiations, including the results of a trial period and the execution of a formal contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Sagacious's appeal and Symbion's cross-appeal, ordering that each party bear their own costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal and cross-appeal each dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, in oral submissions Mayne made clear that it relied only on communications between the parties. I therefore do not consider use of the absence as an admission. It does, however, have some relevance to Sagacious’ submission that the explanation for failure to assert that the April letter represented the current agreement between the parties was that it was treading carefully. There was no occasion to tread carefully in the privacy of the directors’ meeting. Conclusion As is not uncommon, there are indicators for and against a binding contract constituted by the April letter. I do not think the answer to the question is found from the April letter alone. In my opinion the circumstances in which the letter was sent and signed, the terms of the letter and the nature of the putative contract are on the whole contrary to the requisite contractual intention. The billing and payment consistent with the April letter is material, but businessmen not uncommonly act upon an anticipated contractual relationship prior to the contract. The subsequent communications otherwise tend quite strongly against a binding contract. I consider that the better view is that there was not to be a binding contract until the conclusion of ongoing negotiations, including taking into account the trial period results, and execution of a formal contract. It is not necessary to consider the challenge to the existence of a fourth class of Masters v Cameron cases (but see the discussions in Peden, Carter and Tolhurst, “When Three Just Isn’t Enough: the Fourth Category of the ‘Subject to Contract’ Cases” (2004) 20 JCL 156 and McLauchlan, “In Defence of the Fourth Category of Preliminary Agreements: Or are there Only Two?” (2005) 21 JCL 386). Nor is it necessary to consider the issues concerning breach of contract. An addendum It is regrettably necessary to refer to a matter arising after the Court had reserved judgment on 20 February 2008. In accordance with directions given at that time, some further written submissions were received. On 14 May 2008 Mayne filed a notice of motion in which it sought leave to refer the Court to a decision given by Bergin J on 7 May 2008. Mayne had asked for Sagacious’ consent to referring the Court to the decision, but Sagacious had instructed its solicitors not to consent. Bergin J had held that a promise to pay a “reasonable” fee was unenforceable because in its context the word was “vague and illusory”. The decision was on its own facts, and was no more than illustrative that use in a contract of the criterion of reasonableness may vitiate the contract for uncertainty: it may also be acceptable, for example a term that something shall be done within a reasonable time is often implied in law. Nonetheless, it can be seen why Mayne considered that it should be drawn to the Court’s attention. It was not in accordance with the proper conduct of litigation, and contrary to the duty resting upon Sagacious pursuant to s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, for Sagacious to have declined its consent. The reasons given for the instructions not to consent were without substance. The first reason was that the Practice Note required lists of authorities not less than 24 hours prior to the hearing, an absurdity in the case of a subsequent decision, and the other reasons were no better.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

And so to this litigation.Consideration It was common ground that whether the parties intended immediately to be contractually bound was to be determined objectively, according to the intention disclosed by their words and conduct. It is sufficient to refer to Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 at 548-9 per Gleeson CJ, with whom Hope and Mahoney JA agreed, and the cases there cited. It must be remembered, however, that the intention in question in the present case was not a general intention at some time to enter into a contract, but an intention to make an immediately binding contract. Parties may enter into a binding contract upon terms and conditions necessary for their contractual relationship, in the expectation that at a later time the formal contract will be executed consistently with those terms and conditions or perhaps with additional terms and conditions. Conversely, parties may agree upon quite detailed terms and conditions for a contractual relationship but not intend immediately to be contractually bound on those terms and conditions; this may be pending negotiations on other matters or until execution of a formal contract. Unsurprisingly, a conclusion must be reached in the circumstances of the particular case, although judges are wont to formulate guiding “principles” or “propositions”. While I will refer to some “principles”, they are subservient to the fact-specific objective finding of the parties’ intention. . As I have indicated, Sagacious submitted that the trial judge should not have looked beyond the April letter. It submitted that what it described as “extra-contractual evidence” had no significance, because the April letter was sent as a “proposal” which “merges all the terms and conditions which have been negotiated and agreed to” and “supersedes all previous correspondence in relation to our contract renegotiation to date”, and was signed on behalf of Mayne to “acknowledge and accept the terms and conditions outlined above”. It drew attention to the reference by Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd at 549-50 to a case where the parties had signed a single document containing an expression such as “subject to contract” where the outcome “will ordinarily turn on the construction of the single document”. It referred to the significance of signature of a document as a commitment to its terms, even if the terms were not known or understood, as explained in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 210 CLR 165 at [40]-[45] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. It said that the parties’ contractual intention should therefore be found only by regard to the April letter. Where the question is whether a document constitutes a legally binding contract, McHugh JA said in G R Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd at 634 that “the decisive issue is the intention of the parties which must be objectively ascertained from the terms of the document when read in the light of the surrounding circumstances”. However, there is the prior question whether the document is the sole repository of the parties’ contractual intention. A formal document expressed to be “subject to contract”, for example, may provide that starting-point, but it may nonetheless be shown that a legally binding contract was not intended. McHugh JA gave examples in Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309 at 336-7, and said that a party may prove that before signing an agreement the signatories agreed that it did not constitute a binding contract and that “the intention to be bound is a jural act separate and distinct from the terms of their bargain”.