Sabet v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 5975 of 2008

AHMED M SABET	Applicant
V
MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS BOARD OF VICTORIA	Respondent

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JUDGE:	Hollingworth J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	25-26 June 2008
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	12 September 2008
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Sabet v Medical Practitioners Board
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2008] VSC 346

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Administrative law – Suspension of medical practitioner – Whether disproportionality an independent ground of judicial review – Whether failure to apply proper statutory test – Whether failure to apply relevant considerations – Whether Board applied irrelevant considerations – Administrative Law Act 1978 ss 7,10 – Health Professions Registration Act 2005 ss 3, 40, 59

Charter – Whether Board a “public authority” – Whether Board exercising administrative or judicial power – Whether presumption of innocence applies at hearing before the Board - Whether any limitation on the presumption of innocence – Whether any such limitation reasonable – Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 ss 4, 7, 25, 34, 35, 38, 39

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Applicant	Mr J Ruskin QC with Mr M Richardson	John W Ball & Sons
For the Respondent	Mr T Ginnane S.C. with Ms K Anderson	Minter Ellison
For the Attorney-General for Victoria (intervening)	Ms P Tate S.C., the Solicitor-General for Victoria with Ms K Stern and Ms J Davidson (solicitor)	Victorian Government Solicitor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 2

The allegations against Dr Sabet.................................................................................................... 2

The reasons.......................................................................................................................................... 5

The proceeding................................................................................................................................... 7

The Board’s powers and functions................................................................................................. 8

Grounds for judicial review under the ALA.............................................................................. 10

Acting disproportionately......................................................................................................... 11
Failure to comply with the statutory test................................................................................ 14

What does “necessary” mean in s 40(1)?................................................................................ 15
Did the Board fail to identify and apply the relevant test?...................................................... 16

Relevant and irrelevant considerations................................................................................... 18

Failure to take account of relevant considerations................................................................... 19
Compliance with the initial agreement.............................................................................. 19
Presumed innocence............................................................................................................. 20
The elements under s 40....................................................................................................... 20
Taking into account irrelevant considerations........................................................................ 21
The Board’s views of the evidence..................................................................................... 21
The Board’s “charter” to protect the public...................................................................... 23
The mere fact of the charges................................................................................................ 23

The Charter........................................................................................................................................ 24

The Charter issues in this case.................................................................................................. 24
Is the Board a public authority to which s 38 applies?.......................................................... 26

The Board is a public authority under s 4(1)(b)...................................................................... 26
The Board is also a tribunal..................................................................................................... 27

Was the Board required to have regard to the presumption of innocence?....................... 29

The issues................................................................................................................................. 29
Section 25................................................................................................................................. 30
Foreign and international law................................................................................................. 35
New Zealand.......................................................................................................................... 35
Canada.................................................................................................................................... 35
Hong Kong............................................................................................................................. 37
ICCPR...................................................................................................................................... 38
Europe and the United Kingdom....................................................................................... 38
Conclusions as to whether the presumption is engaged.......................................................... 40

Did the Board impose any limitation on the right?............................................................... 41
Was any such limitation reasonable?....................................................................................... 42

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 44

APPENDIX........................................................................................................................................ 46

HER HONOUR:

Introduction

The Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria is a statutory authority, which regulates the medical profession. The Board can suspend the registration of medical practitioners under s 40 of the Health Professions Registration Act 2005 (“the HPRA”).

Since 2000, Dr Ahmed Sabet has been registered as a medical practitioner in Victoria. In April 2008, the Board suspended Dr Sabet’s registration, due to allegations made against him by two female patients.

Dr Sabet challenges the Board’s decision to suspend him. He seeks judicial review of the decision under the Administrative Law Act 1978 (“the ALA”) on a number of grounds. He also relies upon the recently-enacted Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (“the Charter”). Specifically, Dr Sabet now alleges[1] that, in deciding to suspend him, the Board:
[1]Dr Sabet originally sought review on one additional ground, namely that the Board had shown bias; however, he stated on 13 May 2008 that he did not intend to pursue that ground.

(a) Acted disproportionately;

(b) Failed to comply with the statutory test which granted it the right to suspend his registration;

(c) Failed to take proper account of relevant considerations;

(d) Took into account irrelevant considerations; and

(e) Failed to comply with the Charter, in that it failed to give proper consideration to the presumption of innocence afforded by s 25(1) of the Charter.

The allegations against Dr Sabet

It is alleged that, on 20 July 2006, Dr Sabet conducted an unnecessary and inappropriate vaginal examination on a female patient, Ms AB, and did not provide her with his clinical finding of the examination (“the AB allegations”).

On 7 August 2006, a forensic physician at the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine (“VIFM”) notified the Board of the AB allegations. The notification included an opinion from the physician, and a copy of Ms AB’s statement to police made two days after the consultation.

The Board began an investigation into the AB allegations.[2] Ms AB was interviewed by one of the Board’s investigating officers on 6 June 2007, and subsequently provided a further written statement.
[2]The investigation was presumably commenced under Part 3 of the Medical Practice Act 1994, a predecessor Act to the HPRA, but nothing turns on that for present purposes.

By letter dated 9 July 2007, the Board sought Dr Sabet’s written response to the AB allegations. Dr Sabet responded on 9 August 2007, denying any wrongdoing. Over the next few months, the Board communicated further with Dr Sabet and Ms AB, and sought information from Ms AB’s previous doctor.

At a special meeting of the Board held on 1 November 2007, the Board resolved to conduct a formal hearing into the AB allegations, during which it would consider whether to suspend Dr Sabet’s registration.

At the special meeting, the Board was aware that VIFM had verbally informed a Board officer that police were investigating a complaint against Dr Sabet by another patient, Ms YZ, concerning her consultation with him on 20 October 2007, when she had gone to see him for the “morning after” pill (“the YZ allegations”). The officer told the Board that Ms YZ had made a complaint to the police, but her police statement was not available to the Board at that time. The Board did not begin an investigation into the YZ allegations at that time, because its usual practice is to suspend its own investigations until the completion of any police investigation.

On 2 November 2007, Dr Sabet was given notice of a formal hearing, to be held on 8 November 2007 (“the November hearing”), regarding the AB allegations. He was told he could make submissions as to why the Board should not suspend his registration. The Board also told him what little it knew about the YZ allegations.

Dr Sabet was legally represented at the November hearing. The Board provided Dr Sabet with copies of documents relating to its investigation. Dr Sabet’s counsel made written and oral submissions to the Board. Dr Sabet denied any misconduct, however, during the course of submissions, offered to restrict the manner in which he practised.

The Board accepted Dr Sabet’s offer of restricted practise, as it was permitted to do under s 40(5) of the HPRA. The offer was reduced to writing, in substantially the form that had been proposed by Dr Sabet, and was signed by him on 14 November 2007 (“the initial agreement”). The initial agreement prevented Dr Sabet from:

(a) Consulting with any female patient under 14 years of age without the child’s parent or guardian being present;

(b) Consulting with any female patient without a chaperone being present; and

(c) Conducting any gynaecological examinations or procedures, or breast examinations.

The initial agreement also permitted the Board to conduct random audits of patient records, and required Dr Sabet to provide monthly statutory declarations confirming his ongoing compliance with the agreement.

On 26 March 2008, Dr Sabet was charged by summons with three counts of rape and five counts of indecent assault in relation to Ms YZ (“the charges”). He has not been charged with any offence relating to Ms AB.

On 28 March 2008, police advised the Board of the charges, providing copies of two statements Ms YZ had made to the police, and a request from the police to VIFM to investigate the YZ allegations.

The Board held a special meeting on 3 April 2008, to determine whether, in light of the charges and the further information about the YZ allegations, the Board should consider suspending Dr Sabet’s registration.

The Board resolved to conduct another hearing and, by letter of the same date, notified Dr Sabet of his right to appear at the hearing, to be held on 10 April 2008 (“the April hearing”), and sent him the material it had considered at the 3 April meeting.

On 8 April 2008, two employees of the Board attended Dr Sabet’s clinic, to determine whether he had been complying with the initial agreement. They reported that there was no evidence to suggest Dr Sabet had not done so (“the compliance report”).

Dr Sabet was legally represented at the April hearing, and made written and oral submissions to the Board. Through his counsel, Dr Sabet said he was innocent and intended to defend the charges. However, in order not to prejudice his criminal defence, he did not put forward material as to the substance of the YZ allegations.

During the April hearing, Dr Sabet offered to amend the initial agreement, so as to provide that he would not consult with any female patients except:

(a) To undertake cosmetic procedures on the face and neck, and then only with a chaperone; and

(b) To see female patients under 12 years of age, and then only with the child’s parent or guardian being present,

(“the proposed modified agreement”).

The Board rejected the offer of the proposed modified agreement. It determined at the April hearing to suspend Dr Sabet’s registration, effective from 5:00 pm on 11 April 2008 (“the decision”). It provided written reasons for the decision in a letter sent to Dr Sabet’s solicitors on 22 April 2008 (“the reasons”).

The reasons

The reasons form part of the decision and are incorporated in the record for the purposes of the ALA.[3]
[3]ALA s 10.

The reasons are six pages long. They begin with a reasonably-detailed description of the nature and history of the AB and YZ allegations, the November hearing, the initial agreement, the charges, the 3 April meeting and the compliance report. Because of the pending charges, I will not set out the details of the two women’s specific allegations, other than as already disclosed in open court.

On the second last page, the Board deals with the April hearing, specifically noting that:

(a) Dr Sabet had offered to restrict his general practice to male patients only;

(b) Dr Sabet’s counsel had advised him not to comment on the YZ allegations because of the charges; and

(c) The Board acknowledged that, at that stage, there had been no finding of guilt against Dr Sabet with respect to the charges.

The reasons then state that the Board decided to suspend under s 40(1)(c), as it was of the opinion that it was necessary to do so, because there was a serious risk that the health and safety of the public would be endangered, because the Board believed, on reasonable grounds, that Dr Sabet had or may have engaged in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct.

The last page of the reasons is headed “The Board’s reasons.” Notwithstanding the heading, the last page should not be read in isolation from the earlier pages of the document, upon which it is clearly based.[4]
[4]The opening paragraph of the reasons says “In response to your letters … I provide the following reasons for the decision… to suspend.” The last page itself summarises or makes direct or indirect references back to earlier parts of the document.

As the last page was scrutinised at some length by counsel, I will set it out in full in so far as it was referred to in open court:

In making its determination the Board noted, and expressed significant concern about the similarity of the circumstances in each separate incident, as provided to the Board and the police.
…
[The Board then referred to some factual similarities between the two women’s allegations]
The circumstances of the separate consultations were disturbingly similar and the Board did not consider such similarities could be contrived.
The Board also expressed concern that the second notification had resulted from Dr Sabet’s professional conduct at a time when he was aware that an investigation into his professional conduct was underway.
Against these significant concerns and the Board’s charter to protect the public, the Board had to weigh the information provided to it through the compliance assessment and the further offer of Dr Sabet to restrict his consultations to male patients only at the general practice location.
When the Board considered its statutory responsibility, the disturbing nature of the notifications, the similarities in the circumstances of the two separate notifications and the fact that the second notification occurred whilst Dr Sabet was aware his professional conduct was being scrutinised, the Board determined that an Agreement did not adequately protect the public.
The Board therefore determined to suspend Dr Sabet’s medical registration pursuant to s 40(1)(c) of the Act.

The proceeding

The matter first came before a master on 5 May 2008, by way of ex parte oral application for an order nisi for review. The master ordered the Board to show cause before a judge on 19 May 2008, as to why the decision should not be reviewed.[5] He ordered a stay of the decision until that time.
[5]In fact, the master only listed the non-Charter grounds in his order nisi for review, but no point was taken that I should not consider the Charter ground.

On 15 May 2008, Dr Sabet’s solicitor gave notice to the Attorney-General for Victoria and the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, under s 35 of the Charter, advising that a question of law arose under the Charter. The Attorney-General chose to intervene in the proceeding.[6]
[6]Under s 34 of the Charter, the Attorney-General is entitled to intervene in any proceeding in which a question of law arises that relates to the application of the Charter.

The matter came before me in the Practice Court on 19 May 2008. Dr Sabet, the Board and the Attorney-General were represented. Orders were made by consent between all parties for the delivery of submissions and the matter was fixed for trial.

Dr Sabet and the Board then addressed me as to whether the stay of the decision ought to continue until trial. Following argument, I extended the stay until the trial date, and required Dr Sabet to provide an undertaking to the court to enter into and comply with the proposed modified agreement. At trial, I further extended the stay until the publication of my reasons for decision.

The Board’s powers and functions

In suspending Dr Sabet, the Board acted under s 40(1)(c) of the HPRA, which provides:

40. Suspension of registration at any time
(1)A responsible board may, at any time, suspend the registration of a health practitioner if the responsible board is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so because there is a serious risk that the health and safety of the public will be endangered because the responsible board believes, on reasonable grounds, that –
…
(c)the health practitioner has, or may have, engaged in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct.

Section 40(5) is also of some importance in this case. It provides as follows:

In place of suspending the registration of a health practitioner … under this section, the responsible board may seek and accept an agreement in writing from the health practitioner to alter the way in which he or she practises as a health practitioner …

The Board is a “responsible board”, and Dr Sabet a “health practitioner”, within the meaning of the section.

“Unprofessional conduct” and “professional misconduct” are defined by s 3 of the HPRA. Unprofessional conduct relevantly includes:

(a)conduct of a health practitioner occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner’s profession that is of a lesser standard than a member of the public or the health practitioner’s peers are entitled to expect of a reasonably competent health practitioner of that kind;

(b)professional performance which is of a lesser standard than that which the registered health practitioner’s peers might reasonably expect of a registered health practitioner.

Professional misconduct includes:

(a)unprofessional conduct of a health practitioner, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and
(b)conduct that violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed by members of the profession of good repute or competency; and
(c)conduct of a health practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's health profession or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of a health profession, that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not of good character or is otherwise not a fit and proper person to engage in the practice of that health profession.

Suspension under s 40(1) is an interim measure. It operates until “any investigation or any hearing into the matter is completed and [the Board] is of the opinion that there is no serious risk that the health and safety of the public will be endangered as a result of the health practitioner practising as a health practitioner,” or until the suspension is otherwise revoked.[7]
[7]HPRA s 40(3).

Preparations for the Board’s formal hearing of the AB allegations are underway. However, as mentioned earlier, the Board’s investigation with respect to the YZ allegations has been put on hold, pending the determination of the charges.

At the conclusion of any investigation, the Board has a number of options open to it, including: referring the matter to the Health Services Commissioner or to VCAT; resolving the matter by agreement between the Board and the health practitioner and/or the notifier; or taking no further action.

It is important to note that in making a preliminary or interim decision to suspend, a body such as the Board does not embark on any fact-finding exercise; in particular, it makes no decision as to the guilt or innocence of the practitioner.[8] That has a number of consequences in terms of how such a hearing is conducted. The strict rules of evidence will not apply, and the Board may have to make a decision based, at least in part, on untested complaints and allegations.
[8]General Medical Council v Sheill [2006] EWHC 3025 (Admin) at [35]-[36] per Crane J; cited with approval in Lindsay v NSW Medical Board [2008] NSWSC 40 at [77]-[79] per Hall J.

The main purposes of the HPRA include “the protection of the public” by the registration of health practitioners, and by a common system of investigations into professional conduct and performance.[9] Under s 118 of the HPRA, the Board’s functions include the registration of persons, the regulation of professional standards and the investigation of professional conduct under the HPRA. Section 40(1) itself requires the Board to consider whether the “health and safety of the public” will be endangered. The effect of such provisions is that the Board undoubtedly has a role to play in the protection of the public, through the exercise of its powers under the HPRA.
[9]HPRA s 1(a).

Grounds for judicial review under the ALA

Dr Sabet argues that if any of the non-Charter grounds of judicial review is made out, the Board will have acted contrary to the principles of natural justice and he will be entitled to relief in the nature of certiorari and an injunction, under s 7 of the ALA.

It is important to note that this is not a review of the merits of the Board’s decision. A court’s role in a judicial review case such as this is limited. It is not the function of the court to substitute its own decision for that of the Board, by exercising the very discretion which parliament has vested in the Board. The question is not whether the court would have exercised the discretion in the same way as the Board did and decided to suspend Dr Sabet. Rather, the court’s role is to supervise the exercise of the statutory discretion, including by ensuring that the Board had regard, and only had regard, to relevant considerations.

There is no dispute that, as a matter of principle, the reasons should be read as a whole and are entitled to a beneficial construction. They are not to be read as if they were the judgment of a court. The reasons of an administrative decision-maker such as the Board should not be scrutinised minutely or over-zealously, with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error, looking for some looseness of language or inadequacy in the way the reasons are expressed.[10]
[10]See for example: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 per Neaves, French and Cooper JJ in the Full Federal Court; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-2 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.

Acting disproportionately

Dr Sabet argues that the Board acted disproportionately in determining to suspend his registration, because it cannot demonstrate that it was “necessary” to do so.

There is a dispute as to whether, as a matter of law, disproportionality can be relied upon as a discrete ground of judicial review.

The parties accept for present purposes that a complete lack of proportion between the consequences of a decision and the conduct upon which it operates may demonstrate what is often referred to as “Wednesbury unreasonableness”.[11] “Wednesbury unreasonableness” arises where the decision maker has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could ever have come to it. Dr Sabet does not argue that Wednesbury unreasonableness could be established on the facts of this case.
[11]Based on the formulation by Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.

However, Dr Sabet argues (and the Board disputes) that acting disproportionately constitutes an independent ground of judicial review in Australia, quite apart from Wednesbury unreasonableness. Whilst conceding that the existence of such a ground is not “free of doubt”, Dr Sabet nevertheless argues that there is no binding authority to say that he cannot rely on disproportionality as a separate ground of review. He seeks to draw comfort from developments in English law, as well as some obiter dicta remarks made in a handful of recent Australian cases.

In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service[12], Lord Diplock made a passing reference to the “possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community.”[13] The development of such a principle was further discussed by the House of Lords in later cases such as R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind,[14] R v Shayler,[15] and R (Prolife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation,[16] based on importing European concepts of proportionality into English domestic law. Although the scope and content of such a concept has yet to be fully worked out, it involves moving away from traditional principles of administrative law (including Wednesbury principles, which still apply in Australia) towards principles of constitutional or human rights law.
[12][1985] AC 374.
[13]At 410.
[14][1991] 1 AC 696.
[15][2003] 1 AC 247.
[16][2003] 2 WLR 1403.

The development of this principle in the United Kingdom was discussed at some length in Aronson and Dyer’s textbook, Judicial Review of Administrative Action.[17] In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam[18], McHugh and Gummow JJ noted in a footnote[19] that the debate as to the existence of a proportionality ground of judicial review was “usefully described” in that textbook; however, their Honours said nothing as to whether they thought that such a ground should be imported into Australian law.
[17]2^nd ed, 2000 pp289-92.
[18](2003) 195 ALR 502.
[19]Footnote 48 on p519.

In Bruce v Cole[20], Spigelman CJ described such a ground as being “at the boundaries of accepted administrative law” and said:

Proportionality has not been adopted as a separate ground for review in the context of judicial review of administrative action, notwithstanding a considerable body of advocacy that it be adopted: see State of New South Wales v Macquarie Bank Ltd (1991) 30 NSWLR 307 at 321-325; Minister for Resources v Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 565 at 575-578; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 at 762, 766-767, 756, 750; New South Wales v Law (1992) 45 IR 62 at 63; Craig, Administrative Law, 3^rd ed (1994) at 411-421; Aronson and Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1996) at 375-379.

The concept of proportionality is plainly more susceptible of permitting a court to trammel upon the merits of a decision than Wednesbury unreasonableness. This is not the occasion to take such a step in the development of administrative law, if it is to be taken at all.[21]

[20](1998) 45 NSWLR 163.

[21]At 185 per Spigelman CJ, with whom Sheller and Powell JJA agreed.

Dr Sabet argued that the court in Andary v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs[22] said it was an “open question” whether such a discrete ground exists. However, after referring to the comments of Keane J in Radio Limerick One Ltd v Independent Radio and Television Commission[23] (in which his Honour said that disproportionality could be so gross as to render the decision unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense), the Full Federal Court in Andary actually said:

It seems to be an open question in Australia whether such a test can have application in determining whether a decision is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.[24]

[22][2003] FCAFC 211 per Spender, Cooper and Dowsett JJ.

[23][1997] IESC 3.

[24]At [12].

Accordingly, the court in Andary does not appear to support the availability of disproportionality other than as part of Wednesbury unreasonableness.

The same may be said of the comments of Callinan J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu,[25] where his Honour quoted the following passage from Deane J in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond[26]:
[25](1999) 197 CLR 611 at 670.
[26](1990) 170 CLR 321 at 367.

In so doing, I have treated what are sometimes referred to as “Wednesbury principles” … as encompassed by the obligation to act judicially in cases where the obligation exists (but cf., for a contrary approach, Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Child Service)…

If a statutory tribunal is required to act judicially, it must act rationally and reasonably. Of its nature, a duty to act judicially (or in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness or natural justice) excludes the right to decide arbitrarily, irrationally or unreasonably. It requires that regard be paid to material considerations and that immaterial or irrelevant considerations be ignored. It excludes the right to act on preconceived prejudice or suspicion. Arguably, it requires a minimum degree of “proportionality”.

Callinan J said that it was unnecessary to consider whether Deane J’s “arguably broader statement of the principle of ‘unreasonableness’” had attracted the support of other members of the High Court.[27] But it is not clear to me that the matters referred to in Deane J’s second paragraph were meant to be anything more than a clarification of the Wednesbury principles, to which he referred in the first paragraph of the quote. That is to say, I do not read Deane J’s comments as support for an independent requirement of proportionality; certainly not one based on English law such as Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Child Service.
[27]At [187].

Finally, Dr Sabet referred to the comments of Kirby J in Levy v The State of Victoria[28], where his Honour described the concept of proportionality as a guide to the limits of powers as “a useful concept.”[29] However, that was a constitutional law case, and his Honour’s comments appear to have been limited to the concept of proportionality in the constitutional context.
[28](1997) 189 CLR 579.
[29]At 645.

Therefore, the cases relied upon by Dr Sabet and discussed above do not support the conclusion that disproportionality provides an independent ground of judicial review in Australia. Nor is it clear from Dr Sabet’s submissions precisely what the scope or limits of such a ground of review are said to be. It is not sufficient for Dr Sabet simply to say that there is no contrary authority. If such a ground of review is now to form part of the law of Australia, that is a decision which ought be made by an appellate court, not by a judge at first instance.

It follows that the argument that the decision should be set aside on this ground of disproportionality must fail as a matter of law.[30]
[30]Proportionality also arises in the context of the Charter; that will be considered later in these reasons.

Failure to comply with the statutory test

A statutory decision-maker such as the Board is required to comply with any relevant statutory test.

Here, the relevant statutory test is contained in s 40(1)(c) of the HPRA.[31] The statute permits the Board to suspend a practitioner if the Board:

(a) Is of the opinion that it is necessary to suspend, because there is a serious risk that the health and safety of the public will be endangered;

(b) Because it believes on reasonable grounds that the practitioner has or may have engaged in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct.

[31]Reproduced in full at 32 above.

Dr Sabet argues that the Board failed to identify the elements of, and failed to comply with, the statutory test set out in s 40(1). Dr Sabet’s argument focussed primarily on the question of whether it was necessary to suspend him.

What does “necessary” mean in s 40(1)?

The meaning of “necessary” is a flexible one, and may vary according to the nature of the case. In Thomas v Mowbray[32], the High Court had to consider whether it was “reasonably necessary” to impose an interim control order on the plaintiff. Gummow and Crennan JJ referred with approval to the observations of the Supreme Court of the United States in McCulloch v Maryland[33] as to the flexible meaning of “necessary”:

Does it always import an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that one thing to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist without the other? We think it does not. If reference be had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable. … [The word “necessary”] has not a fixed character, peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison; and is often connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports.

[32](2007) 237 ALR 194 .

[33]4 Wheat 316 (1819) at 413-14; 17 US 316 at 413-14.

Dr Sabet accepts that the meaning of “necessary” must vary depending on the context. But he argues that, in the context of s 40(1), “necessary” has a degree of urgency and must be construed as meaning “essential”, alternatively, that no remedy short of suspension would be sufficient to protect the health and safety of the public.

The context here must include the fact that the Board is essentially undertaking a provisional risk-assessment exercise, on an interim basis, based on such material as is known to it at the time. The context also includes the possible consequences of suspending or not suspending, on the practitioner and the public.

Given the serious consequences of a decision to suspend a health practitioner, I accept that “necessary” should be construed as meaning more than simply “convenient” or “useful”. But it does not follow that it must be construed with quite the degree of urgency that Dr Sabet suggests.

Section 40(5) provides that, “in place of suspending the registration”, the Board may seek and accept a written agreement to alter the way the practitioner practises. In its ordinary and natural meaning, “in place of” means “instead of” or “in exchange for”.[34] So, even if the Board is of the opinion that it is necessary to suspend the practitioner, it may nevertheless choose to accept an agreement instead of, as an alternative to, suspension. If (as Dr Sabet asserts) “necessary” means essential to protect the public, or that no remedy short of suspension is sufficient to protect the public, then s-s (5) would seem to have no role to play.
[34]The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed) defines “In place of” as: instead of; in exchange for.

Did the Board fail to identify and apply the relevant test?

On the last paragraph on page 5 of the reasons, the Board says that it decided to suspend Dr Sabet under s 40(1), as it was of the opinion it was necessary to do so, because there was a serious risk that the health and safety of the public would be endangered, because the Board believed, on reasonable grounds, that Dr Sabet had or may have engaged in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct. The Board thereby correctly identifies the requisite statutory elements of s 40(1).

In arguing that the Board failed to comply with the statutory test, Dr Sabet relies in particular on the following matters. The initial agreement was acceptable to the Board at the November hearing. At that time, the Board knew that Ms YZ had made a complaint to the police about Dr Sabet’s conduct. Dr Sabet says that by the time of the April hearing, the only new information before the Board in relation to the YZ allegations was that the Board had received a copy of Ms YZ’s police statements and knew that Dr Sabet had been charged with offences against Ms YZ. The Board determined at the April hearing that the initial agreement and the proposed modified agreement were not sufficient to protect the public. Dr Sabet says that such matters do not demonstrate a necessity to suspend his registration.

Dr Sabet asks rhetorically: if it was not necessary to suspend him in November, why was it necessary to do so in April? His question (and indeed his entire argument) proceeds on a premise which has not been established, namely, that it was not necessary to suspend him in November. In fact, there is simply no evidence as to the Board’s opinion and belief in November. All the court knows is that the Board was prepared to accept the initial agreement in November, instead of suspending him.

Even assuming the Board had decided that it was not necessary to suspend Dr Sabet in November, it is not clear why the Board’s later decision to suspend is said to demonstrate a failure to apply the relevant statutory test. Much of Dr Sabet’s criticism seems to involve an attack on the merits of the April decision (essentially, by saying that the decision to suspend was wrong), rather than providing a ground for judicial review.

Dr Sabet’s characterisation of what occurred minimises the importance of a number of matters which had changed between November and April, and which the Board identifies in the reasons as relevant to its decision to suspend. At the November meeting, the Board had only very sketchy details of the YZ allegations. By the April meeting, it had before it two statements by Ms YZ to the police, Ms YZ’s medical records and a statement by a VIFM forensic physician about Ms YZ.

Based on those detailed materials, it was able to form certain beliefs and opinions, which it was unable to do in November, including as to:

(a) The similarity of the circumstances giving rise to the two notifications;

(b) The fact that the YZ notification had resulted from Dr Sabet’s conduct at a time when he was aware that an investigation into his professional conduct was underway; and

(c) The insufficiency of the initial agreement to protect the public.

Dr Sabet does not really explain why considering those matters or forming such beliefs demonstrates a failure to apply the correct statutory test. In deciding to whether it is necessary to suspend, the section requires the Board to have regard to risks to public health and safety, as well as forming a belief that the practitioner may have engaged in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct.

Finally, there is no dispute that “necessary” had to be construed in the same way at the November and April hearings. Dr Sabet does not point to anything which suggests that the Board applied a different meaning at the two hearings, and thereby failed to apply the right test.

It follows that Dr Sabet has not established that the Board failed to identify or apply the correct statutory test.

Relevant and irrelevant considerations

An administrative decision may be reviewed by a court if the decision-maker failed to take into account a relevant consideration (being one which it was bound to take into account), or took into account an irrelevant consideration (being one which it was forbidden to take into account). Whether something is relevant or irrelevant is to be determined by construing the relevant statute.[35]
[35]Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40 per Mason J.

Furthermore, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker, and not the court, to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power.[36]
[36]Ibid at 41 per Mason J.

Failure to take account of relevant considerations

Dr Sabet alleges that the Board failed to take proper account of the following relevant considerations:

(a) His complete compliance with the initial agreement;

(b) His presumed innocence; and

(c) Each and every element required to comply with the statutory test under s40(1) of the HPRA.

There can be no dispute that each of the elements required to comply with the statutory test under s 40(1) must be a relevant consideration. But Dr Sabet did not explain why compliance with the initial agreement and his presumed innocence are considerations which the Board was “bound” to take into account.

Even assuming for present purposes that all of the above matters are relevant considerations, Dr Sabet has not established that the Board failed to take proper account of them.

Compliance with the initial agreement

Dr Sabet says that there is no indication on the face of the reasons how the Board weighed the information available to it through the compliance report, and why, notwithstanding that Dr Sabet had complied with the initial agreement, the Board determined it was necessary to suspend his registration.

The Board noted in the reasons that, based on the compliance report, there was no evidence of non-compliance with the initial agreement. But Dr Sabet’s previous compliance with the initial agreement was not the only relevant consideration. It was one of a number of matters which the Board was entitled to consider in undertaking the risk-assessment exercise required by s 40(1). The Board said it had to “weigh the information available to it through the compliance [report] and the [proposed modified agreement]” against its significant concerns about the serious nature of the allegations, the similarities between them, the timing of YZ incident and its charter to protect the public.

The Board clearly did have regard to Dr Sabet’s compliance with the initial agreement. But, as mentioned earlier, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to the various considerations, it is for the Board, and not the court, to determine the appropriate weight to be given to that and other matters.

Presumed innocence

The Board did not purport, and was not required, to make any finding of guilt or innocence in deciding to suspend.

The Board expressly noted in the reasons that there had been no finding of guilt against Dr Sabet with respect to the charges.

Dr Sabet has not demonstrated that the Board failed to have any regard to the presumption of innocence. The mere fact that the Board decided to suspend him does not establish that it had no regard to the presumption of innocence (any more than the fact that the conviction of an accused person does not demonstrate that the criminal court had no regard to the presumption).

In so far as this is an attack on the weight given to the presumption, or the merits of the decision, it must fail for the reasons previously given.

The elements under s 40

Apart from his argument about “necessity”, which has already been considered, Dr Sabet does not really explain how it is said that the Board failed to take proper account of each and every element under s 40(1).[37]
[37] Indeed, Dr Sabet’s written submissions on all aspects of “failure to take proper account of relevant considerations” total no more than half a dozen paragraphs. His oral submissions on the topic run to less than a page of transcript.

I have already found that the Board applied the relevant statutory test and was entitled to determine the weight to be applied to relevant considerations.

It follows that I am not persuaded that the Board failed to have regard to any relevant consideration.

Taking into account irrelevant considerations

Dr Sabet’s written submissions assert that the Board took into account the following irrelevant considerations, which it was prohibited from considering on a proper construction of s 40:

(a) Its view, being “a significant concern”, of the untested evidence as to the similarity or otherwise of the complaints (pointing to prejudgment);

(b) Its view of the untested evidence and its conclusion that such similarity could not be contrived (pointing to prejudgment);

(c) Its view of the untested evidence and its conclusion that the circumstances of the separate consultations showed “disturbing similarity” (pointing to prejudgment);

(d) Its view of the untested evidence and its conclusion as to the “disturbing nature” of the notifications;

(e) Its view as to the timing of each notification;

(f) Its view that its “charter” was to protect the public without regard to the functions and powers actually conferred upon it by statute; and

(g) The mere fact of the applicant being charged with criminal offences.

The Board’s views of the evidence[38]

[38]Paras 911 (a) to (e).

The Board was required to make an interim decision based on such information as was available to it at the time. That information included the fact that there was more than one notification – that is, that the AB allegations were not an isolated incident. It was also appropriate for it to have regard to: the nature and seriousness of the allegations; any similarities and differences between the allegations made by the two women; and the timing of the two incidents[39]. Those matters are all clearly relevant to the formation of a belief that Dr Sabet may have engaged in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct, as well as being relevant to an evaluation of the risk to public health and safety.
[39]The fact that the YZ allegations arose at the time that he was under investigation for the AB allegations is capable of demonstrating a lack of insight into his unprofessional conduct, and no appreciation that what he had done was wrong and must not recur.

In oral submissions, Dr Sabet did not seriously press the argument that those matters were not relevant considerations at all. Rather, the argument focussed on the language used by the Board – expressions such as “significant concern”, “disturbingly similar” and “could not be contrived”. Dr Sabet says that such language “bespeaks final judgment” and shows that the Board had “made up its mind, as a matter of final judgment” that Dr Sabet is guilty of the charges.[40] Even if this can properly be characterised as an “irrelevant consideration” argument, it must fail for the following reasons.
[40]Expressed in that way, this sounds more like an argument that the Board misdirected itself as to the task it had to perform, than an “irrelevant consideration” argument.

As previously mentioned, the Board’s reasons are not to be zealously scrutinised for looseness of language. The mere fact that the Board used the language complained of does not establish that it regarded itself as making any final determination of guilt. That it formed certain beliefs or opinions, even strong ones, does not necessarily establish prejudgment; that is what the section requires it to do. It recited in a neutral manner the circumstances of the two women’s notifications[41] and the history of the Board’s investigation. It noted that Dr Sabet had complied with the initial agreement, had declined to comment on the charges, and there had been no finding of guilt made against him. The last page of the reasons clearly demonstrates that the Board understood it had to undertake a balancing or weighing exercise.
[41]Including using neutral language such as the women “reported” or “stated” certain matters.

I do not accept, on a fair reading of the entire reasons, that it can be said that the Board regarded itself as making any final determination of guilt.

In so far as the parties addressed me as to whether the Board was in fact justified in using language such as “the circumstances … were disturbingly similar and the Board did not consider such similarities could be contrived”, I regard those as arguments going to the merits of the Board’s decision and therefore beyond the court’s review.

The Board’s “charter” to protect the public[42]

[42]Para 91 (f).

In weighing up the various matters before it, the Board said that it had a “charter to protect the public.” Dr Sabet says that is not an apt description of the Board’s role and is an irrelevant consideration.

In fact, “a charter to protect the public” is a not inaccurate shorthand description of the fact that the Board has an important role in the protection of the public, through the various roles discussed earlier in these reasons.[43] In particular, s 40(1) itself specifically requires the Board to consider whether there is a serious risk that the health and safety of the public will be endangered.
[43]See para 4141.

Dr Sabet also asserts that the Board took the view that its “charter” was to protect the public “without regard to the functions and powers actually conferred upon it by statute.” That argument was not really developed and the assertion is simply not borne out by a fair reading of the reasons.

The mere fact of the charges[44]

[44]Para 91 (g).

This ground must fail, as it is not apparent from the reasons that the Board did have regard to “the mere fact” that Dr Sabet had been charged, in deciding to suspend. Although the Board noted in the lengthy historical narrative that Dr Sabet had been charged, and that the charges had not been dealt with, the charges are not mentioned at all on the last page of the reasons, and do not seem to play any role in the analysis of risk. Rather, in reaching the decision the Board seems to have relied (amongst other things) on the contents of the two women’s detailed statements to police.

I am not persuaded that the Board took into account irrelevant considerations in making the decision.

The Charter
The Charter issues in this case

The Charter identifies a number of human rights, which parliament seeks to protect and promote in various ways. One of those human rights is the presumption of innocence, contained in s 25(1) of the Charter.

Section 38 of the Charter provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right or, in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right.[45] Dr Sabet argues that the Board breached s 38 in making the decision, because it failed to give proper consideration to the presumption of innocence in s 25(1).
[45]There are two provisos to s 38, but neither applies in this case.

The Charter was not intended to create new causes of action against public authorities, additional to those already available outside the Charter[46] - which, in this case, are available to Dr Sabet under the ALA. Rather, s 39 of the Charter provides that if a person otherwise has a right to seek relief or remedy on the basis that a public authority’s decision was unlawful, then the person may seek that same relief or remedy on the ground that the act or decision was unlawful because of the Charter.
[46]See: second reading speech in the Legislative Assembly by Attorney-General the Hon. Rob Hulls on 4 May 2006, Hansard at [1294]; and page 28 of the explanatory memorandum.

As mentioned earlier, Dr Sabet seeks relief in the nature of certiorari and an injunction, on the ground of denial of natural justice. The effect of s 39 is that he may also seek that same relief on the ground that the decision was unlawful under the Charter (in this case, unlawful under s 38). It is not necessary that the grounds of review are the same under the Charter and the ALA, merely that the relief or remedy sought is the same.

The threshold question to be decided in every case under s 38 is whether the body is “a public authority”. Here, there is no dispute that the Board is “a public authority” to which s 38 applies.

Finally, it must be noted that the Charter does not give unqualified protection to human rights. It recognises that human rights may be subject to reasonable limitation in certain circumstances, as set out in s 7.

I accept the Solicitor-General’s suggestion that in analysing whether there has been a breach of a human right under the Charter it is useful to ask the following three questions:

(a) Has a Charter right been engaged? (the engagement question)

(b) If so, did the public authority impose any limitation on the right? (the limitation question)

(c) Was any such limitation reasonable and justified within the circumstances set out in s 7(2)? (the justification question)

Some commentators have suggested it is appropriate to adopt to two-staged approach in analysing issues under the Charter, by first asking the engagement question, and then asking a single question which combines the limitation and justification questions. I prefer the three-staged approach, because it forces the court or tribunal to focus on and clearly identify whether there has been any limitation on the right, before moving to consider questions of justification.

Applied to the facts of this case, those questions may be re-framed in the following terms:

(a) Was the Board required to have regard to the presumption of innocence at the April hearing?

(b) If so, did the Board impose any limitation on the presumption of innocence, in deciding to exercise its suspension power under s 40(1)?

(c) Was any such limitation reasonable and justified under s 7(2)?

Is the Board a public authority to which s 38 applies?

Dr Sabet, the Board and the Attorney-General all accept that the Board is a public authority to which s 38 applies. As the matter does not appear to have been the subject of previous judicial determination by this court, I will briefly explain why I agree with that submission.

The Board is a public authority under s 4(1)(b)

The term “public authority” is defined by s 4(1)(b) of the Charter to include “an entity established by a statutory provision that has functions of a public nature”.

The factors which may be taken into account when determining whether functions are of a public nature include whether the function is of a regulatory nature,[47] and whether the entity is publicly funded to perform the function.[48]
[47]Charter s 4(2)(c).
[48]Charter s 4(2)(d).

The Board was established by statute, namely, Part 6 of the Medical Practice Act1994. It has continued in operation under the HPRA, effective from 1 July 2007.[49]
[49]The Medical Practice Act 1994 was repealed by s 163(1)(d) of the HPRA. The Board continues in operation under s 166(1) of the HPRA.

It is publicly funded by way of an advance from the Public Account, which is repaid by registration fees.[50]
[50]Part 8 of the HPRA.

The Board’s functions are set out in s 118 of the HPRA, and include the registration, supervision and regulation of practitioners, including regulation of “standards of practice in the health profession regulated by the [B]oard in the public interest”, and the creation and publication of codes of practice.[51]
[51]See s 118 generally, and especially ss 118(1)(a), (c), (d), (e) and (g).

The regulation and supervision of a profession have been held to be inherently public functions.[52] The explanatory memorandum to the Charter notes that “a professional association which has statutory disciplinary, ethical or qualification powers is likely to be exercising public functions.” [53]
[52]YL v Birmingham City Council [2008] 1 AC 95 at [63], [91], [99].
[53]Explanatory memorandum, p 5.

For these reasons, I accept that the Board is a public authority within the meaning of s 4(1)(b) of the Charter. However, that is not the end of the matter; an entity may fall within one or more of the definitions of “public authority” in ss 4(1)(a) to (h), but nevertheless be excluded if it also falls within any of ss 4(1)(i) to (k).

The Board is also a tribunal

Section 4(1)(j) of the Charter provides that a court or tribunal is not a public authority “except when it is acting in an administrative capacity”.

“Tribunal” is not a term defined by the Charter, but there is no dispute that the Board is a tribunal for the purposes of the Charter.

The question which then arises is whether, in making the decision, the Board was acting in an administrative, or in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. If the former, then it is a public authority to which s 38 applies. If the latter, s 38 does not apply.[54]
[54]The Charter only applies to courts and tribunals acting in a non-administrative capacity to the extent that they have functions under Part 2 and Division 3 of Part 3 of the Charter. Section 38 does not fall within either of those portions of the Charter.

There is no definition of “administrative capacity” in the Charter. The explanatory memorandum says that the term was intended to exclude instances where courts and tribunals are acting in a “judicial or quasi-judicial capacity”.[55] The common law has long recognised a distinction between administrative and judicial (or quasi-judicial) powers. The parties agree that it is appropriate for the court to read “administrative capacity” in s 4(1)(j) as if it equated to “administrative power” at common law.
[55]Page 4 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Charter.

The notes to s 4(1)(j) gives the following examples of acting in an administrative capacity: committal proceedings, the issuing of warrants, the listing of cases and the adoption of practices and procedures.

It is well-established at common law that in conducting committal proceedings to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to stand an accused for trial, a magistrate is exercising an administrative, not a judicial, function.[56]
[56]See for example, Grassby v R (1989) 168 CLR 1 and the cases discussed therein.

In Albarran v Members of the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board[57], the High Court recently held that the decision of a disciplinary board to suspend the registration of two liquidators did not involve the exercise of judicial power. Although Albarran was a constitutional case[58], the court’s analysis is capable of broader application, reflecting as it does the well-established common law distinction between administrative and judicial functions.
[57](2007) 81 ALJR 1155.
[58]The question being whether the liquidators’ disciplinary board was impermissibly exercising the Commonwealth’s judicial power.

The High Court noted that judicial power classically involves either the governance of a trial for the determination of criminal guilt and its punishment or, more broadly, the determination of a dispute inter partes regarding the existence of a legal right or obligation and the application of that law to facts as determined.[59] Although the effect of disciplinary action may have a detrimental impact on the individual concerned, the action is “corporate and self-respecting”, rather than personal and retributive. The proceedings are disciplinary, rather than criminal. The board had not determined whether the liquidators had committed any offence. The disciplinary board’s only task was to assess whether duties had been performed “adequately and properly”, measured against standards familiar to the board’s specialist composition, and whether a person was “otherwise not a fit and proper person” to be a registered liquidator.

[59]At [16] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ; at [94] per Kirby J.

Applying that same reasoning to the Board’s role under s 40(1) of the HPRA, I am satisfied that in exercising its power to suspend Dr Sabet, the Board was acting in an administrative capacity. Therefore, although a tribunal, it is a public authority to which s 38 applies.

Was the Board required to have regard to the presumption of innocence?
The issues

Section 25(1) of the Charter provides that “a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law” (“the presumption”).

It is common ground that the presumption applies in criminal proceedings arising out of the charges. But there is a dispute as to whether and how the presumption might apply in a disciplinary proceeding, such as a hearing under s 40(1) of the HPRA.

Dr Sabet says that the presumption is not limited to criminal proceedings. But Dr Sabet does not suggest that the presumption necessarily applies in all disciplinary hearings. Rather, he argues that a disciplinary body is bound to uphold or give effect to the presumption any time it “deals with” or “considers the impact of” a criminal charge. He says that because the Board considered the charges and the statements relating to the charges, it was therefore required to give effect to the presumption. Dr Sabet concedes that if he had not been charged, or if he had been charged but the Board did not have regard to the charges, then the presumption would not apply at all.

The Board and the Attorney-General argue that s 25(1) is limited in its operation to criminal proceedings, and has no direct operation in disciplinary proceedings (even where the alleged unprofessional conduct or misconduct has a criminal or quasi-criminal character).

They accept that the presumption may have an indirect impact on the proceedings before the Board, in that the Board:

(a) Is entitled to take into account the fact that Dr Sabet will have the benefit of the presumption at his criminal trial; and

(b) Should not make public statements that a person charged is guilty of an offence, at least where the public statement carries a risk of adversely affecting the criminal prosecution.

In support of their respective arguments, each side refers to the structure and language of s 25, as well as various foreign and international human rights provisions and cases.[60]
[60]Section 32(2) of the Charter expressly authorises a court to consider international law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and international courts relating to human rights.

Section 25

There is no dispute that the court should prefer a construction of s 25 which would promote the underlying purpose or object of the Charter, to one which would not.[61] The main purpose of the Charter is to protect and promote human rights, including by requiring public authorities to act in a way that is compatible with human rights.[62]
[61]Interpretation of Legislation Act1984 s 35(a).
[62]Charter s 1(2)(c).

Section 25 is headed “Rights in criminal proceedings.” Dr Sabet argues that the language of s 25(1) is inconsistent with the limitation of the presumption to criminal proceedings, and therefore the heading must give way.[63] He says that the language of s 25(1) is clear and unambiguous in setting out the human right, namely, that “a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” He argues that “such clarity in stating the right is inconsistent with any attempt by the heading to restrict the context of that right solely to criminal proceeding.” He does not really explain why that is so.

[63]Ragless v District Council of Prospect [1922] SASR 299 at 311 per Murray CJ; Silk Bros Pty Ltd v State Electricity Commission (Vic) (1943) 67 CLR 1 at 16 per Latham CJ.

Headings form part of the Charter, and are to be used in its interpretation.[64] The heading is neither ambiguous nor obviously inconsistent with s 25(1).
[64]Interpretation of Legislation Act1984 s 36(2A).

Dr Sabet points out that, in New Zealand, the equivalent legislation expressly provides that the relevant rights (including the presumption of innocence) only arise “in relation to the determination of the charge.” He says that the Victorian drafters could have used such a limiting phrase, had they wished to limit the presumption to the hearing of criminal charges. Obviously, they could have done so. But the New Zealand approach is not the only drafting technique which can achieve that end. The use of a section heading which specifically refers to criminal proceedings is another such drafting technique, as the Canadian courts have recognised.[65]
[65]The New Zealand and Canadian law will be considered shortly.

When one examines the remainder of s 25, it becomes even clearer that the section is only intended to apply in criminal proceedings:

(2)A person charged with a criminal offence is entitled without discrimination to the following minimum guarantees -
(a)to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and reason for the charge in a language or, if necessary, a type of communication that he or she speaks or understands; and
(b)to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his or her defence and to communicate with a lawyer or advisor chosen by him or her; and
(c)to be tried without unreasonable delay; and
(d)to be tried in person, and to defend himself or herself personally or through legal assistance chosen by him or her or, if eligible, through legal aid provided by Victoria Legal Aid under the Legal Aid Act 1978; and
(e)to be told, if he or she does not have legal assistance, about the right, if eligible, to legal aid under the Legal Aid Act 1978; and
(f)to have legal aid provided if the interests of justice require it, without any costs payable by him or her if he or she meets the eligibility criteria set out in the Legal Aid Act 1978; and
(g)to examine, or have examined, witnesses against him or her, unless otherwise provided for by law; and
(h)to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses for the prosecution; and
(i)to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak English; and
(j)to have the free assistance of assistants and specialised communication tools and technology if he or she has communication or speech difficulties that require such assistance; and
(k)not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt.

(3)A child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes account of his or her age and the desirability of promoting the child's rehabilitation.
(4)Any person convicted of a criminal offence has the right to have the conviction and any sentence imposed in respect of it reviewed by a higher court in accordance with law.

If one considers, for example, the “minimum guarantees” in s-s (2), it cannot sensibly be suggested that they create independent rights, exercisable outside of criminal proceedings, merely because a person has been charged with a criminal offence. For example, s-s (2) (i) and (j) must mean that an accused person is entitled to a free interpreter, or free communication assistance, in criminal proceedings concerning that offence; not that they are entitled to a free interpreter or assistance at home, or at work, or in civil proceedings, simply because they happen to have been charged with a criminal offence.

What, then, are criminal proceedings? “Criminal proceedings” are not defined in the Charter.

Dr Sabet seeks to rely on the following passage of King J in R v Williams[66] as support for an argument that “rights in criminal proceedings” under s 25 are much broader than more traditional concepts of criminal proceedings[67]:

When section 25 is examined it can be seen that the rights stated to be protected as “rights in a criminal proceeding” are rights that do not affect only the hearing of any charges which may arise, but provide a prohibition on arbitrary arrest or detention, on the deprivation of liberty, except on grounds and in accordance with procedure established by law, establish a right to be informed if arrested or detained of the reason for the arrest or detention and about any proceedings to be brought, establish a number of procedural rights for persons awaiting trial. It also establishes certain rights in relation to a criminal hearing. As can be seen a number of these rights arise at the time of arrest or charging of the person and are referred to in the Charter as rights in criminal proceedings. [emphasis added]

[66][2007] VSC 2.

[67] Such as in s 3 of the Evidence Act1958, where “criminal proceedings” are defined as “any proceedings for or with respect to the committal for trial of any person for an indictable offence or the trial of any person for a summary or indictable offence”.

With the greatest respect to King J, her Honour is not correct in saying that all of those rights arise under s 25. All of the matters which have been underlined in the above quotation are rights created by s 21 of the Charter, not s 25.[68]
[68]Arbitrary arrest and detention - s 21(1); deprivation of liberty – s 21(2); right to be informed – s 21(3); procedural rights awaiting trial – s 21(4).

Even if, contrary to the above, the underlined rights could be described as “rights in criminal proceedings”, it is not clear how that would assist Dr Sabet. All of them have some connection with the ultimate criminal proceedings, even if they are preparatory to the laying of criminal charges. More importantly, Dr Sabet is not seeking to assert any of those rights.

The parties also addressed the court on the question of whether the Board’s proceedings should be characterised as “protective” or “punitive”. I was referred to a number of authorities for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings against a professional person are protective, not punitive; meaning that, notwithstanding that the exercise of disciplinary power may involve a great deprivation to the person involved, it is done for the protection of the public, not to punish the professional.[69]
[69]Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 201-2; NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177 at 193-4; Richter v Walton (NSW Court of Appeal No CA 40309/93, 15 June 1993, unreported); Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 637-8. In Re a Medical Practitioner [1995] 2 QdR 154 at 164-5, Dowsett J doubted (by way of obiter dicta) whether the same could be said of a suspension (at the end of a hearing) or a fine, which he thought had a more punitive nature than disbarment.

As the High Court more recently pointed out in Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission[70], the supposed distinction between “punitive” and “protective” proceedings or orders is elusive, and suffers the same difficulties as attempting to classify all proceedings as either civil or criminal.
[70](2004) 220 CLR 129 at [32] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. In that case, ASIC sought orders disqualifying two directors from acting in the management of a corporation. The court had to consider whether the directors could refuse to provide discovery to ASIC because of the privilege against exposure to penalties and forfeitures. The courts below had decided the question on the premise that a distinction between “punitive” and “protective” proceedings was possible and useful and that, when applied to the case, it led to the conclusion that the proceedings were protective and the privilege was therefore not available. The High Court rejected that approach in considering the availability of the privilege.

In this case, the court is not required to characterise the Board’s proceedings as protective or punitive. Section 25 requires the court to consider whether the relevant proceedings fall within the description “criminal proceedings”, not whether their purpose is protective or punitive.

Finally, in arguing that s 25 is not limited to criminal proceedings, Dr Sabet seeks to draw comfort from a comment made by the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee, when it was considering the Working with Children Amendment Bill 2007. Section 28 of the Charter requires a Minister who introduces any new legislation to cause a statement of compatibility with the Charter to be laid before the House of Representatives before the second reading speech. The committee considers new legislation as part of that process.

During the course of its deliberations, the committee raised a concern that a determination by the relevant Secretary to the effect that a person posed a risk to children, because they had been charged with a criminal charge, may breach the presumption of innocence of the person the subject of the charge. The committee quoted the following passage from a European decision which will be considered shortly[71]: “The presumption of innocence is binding not only on the court dealing with the case but also on other organs of the State.”[72]
[71]Allenet de Ribemont v France [1995] 20 EHHR 557.
[72]Ibid at [67].

In responding to the committee’s submissions, the Attorney-General reiterated the position he has adopted in this proceeding, namely, that the presumption does not apply outside the context of criminal proceedings. In doing so, the Attorney-General adopted a broad view of criminal proceedings, saying that they were not limited to the trial, but would include pre-trial matters, such as bail, and post-trial matters, such as sentencing.

Even assuming that the court can have regard to views expressed during such a committee meeting[73], it is not clear how the court is assisted by that particular committee debate. At best, it demonstrates that there are differing views as to the breadth of application of the presumption – a point that is already patently evident in this case from the contrary submissions advanced by Dr Sabet on the one hand, and the Board and Attorney-General on the other.
[73]Under s 28 of the Charter, a court or tribunal may have regard to the terms of any statement of compatibility produced by parliament.

Foreign and international law

The presumption of innocence is a human right protected by many national and international statutes and covenants. Although in most cases the presumption of innocence itself is described in a similar manner, there is a difference in the provision headings and the context in which the presumption appears.[74] Unfortunately, there is no provision in identical terms to s 25.

New Zealand

[74]The relevant sections are set out in full in the appendix to these reasons.

Section 25(c) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 expressly limits the operation of the presumption to circumstances “in relation to the determination of the charge”.

Unsurprisingly, given that limitation, the presumption has been held not to apply in disciplinary proceedings involving allegations of professional misconduct, as they do not involve the determination of a criminal charge.[75]

Canada

[75]Dental Council v Bell [1992] 1 NZLR 438, 445 (HC).

Unlike the New Zealand provision, s 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not expressly limited to the determination of the charge. It provides that any person charged with an offence has the right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” Section 11 is headed “Proceedings in criminal and penal matters”.

In deciding whether s 11(d) applies, Canadian courts have focussed on whether the decision-maker is making findings of guilt in respect of criminal charges.

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that s 11(d) is intended to create a procedural and evidentiary rule at the trial of criminal charges that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[76] Accordingly, s 11(d) has been held to have no application at the bail stage of the criminal process, where guilt or innocence is not determined and punishment not imposed.[77]
[76]R v Pearson [1992] 3 SCR 665 at 687.
[77]Ibid at 687-8.

Similarly, s 11(d) has been held not to apply in administrative or civil proceedings.[78] Examples of cases which are similar to this case include the following:

(a) In Thomson v Alberta[79], the Alberta Court of Appeal held that s 11(d) did not apply to hearings before a board which administered a drivers’ licence suspension program, because drivers were not charged with a criminal offence and no findings of guilt were made by the board; and

(b) In Noyes v Board of School Trustees, School District 30 (South Cariboo)[80], a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia held that s 11(d) did not apply to a school board’s suspension without pay of a teacher, upon his being charged with a criminal offence. That is because the school board was not judging the innocence or guilt of the teacher; it was merely deciding whether the circumstances created by his having been charged rendered it “inadvisable for him to continue his duties.”[81]

[78]Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) [2000] 2 SCR 307.

[79](2003) 232 DLR (4^th).

[80](1985) 64 BCLR 287.

[81]At 289-90 per Bouck J.

Dr Sabet primarily seeks to distinguish the Canadian cases on the basis that s 11(d) of the Canadian Charter is not identical with s 25(1) of the Charter. It is true that s 11(d) includes additional words which are not present in our section, namely “in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” But all of the Canadian cases to which I have referred concerned the first part of s 11(d) (the presumption of innocence), not the second part (fair hearing, independent tribunal). There is nothing in the reasoning of the Canadian judges to suggest that the second part of s11(d) was in any way relevant to their conclusions about the limited applicability of the presumption of innocence.

Hong Kong

Article 11 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights is headed “Rights of persons charged with or convicted of criminal offence.” Article 11(1) provides that “[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” Article 11(2) goes on to provide that “in the determination of any criminal charge against him”, every person shall be entitled to certain minimum guarantees.

The Hong Kong Court of Appeal recently held that Art 11(1) has no application to an order of the Commissioner of Police to withhold a portion of the pay of a police officer who had been charged with fraud.[82]
[82]Yeung Chung Ming v Commissioner of Police Civil Appeal No 13 of 2006, CACV 13/2006.

In considering broad matters of principle, the court noted that certain constraints may be imposed on a person charged with a criminal offence, without violating the presumption of innocence. For example, a person may be arrested and refused bail pending trial; this is not done because the person is presumed guilty. It is done because there is a need to consider the potential risk to the well-being of society, or of flight from the jurisdiction prior to trial.

The court expressly rejected the submission that “the presumption of innocence leaves no room for any action based on the possibility of guilt”.[83] That is important to remember when one comes to examine what the Board did here.

ICCPR

[83]At [35]-[36], [104], [105].

Section 25(1) of the Charter (and the presumption of innocence in most foreign statutes) is based on article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has recently issued the following General Comment in relation to the presumption of innocence under article 14(2):[84]

According to article 14, paragraph 2 everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. The presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of the doubt, and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle. It is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused. Defendants should normally not be shackled or kept in cages during trials or otherwise presented to the court in a manner indicating that they may be dangerous criminals. The media should avoid news coverage undermining the presumption of innocence. Furthermore, the length of pre-trial detention should never be taken as an indication of guilt and its degree. The denial of bail or findings of liability in civil proceedings do not affect the presumption of innocence.

Europe and the United Kingdom

[84]See General Comment 30 (21/08/07).

The approach to the presumption in Europe and the United Kingdom, guaranteed by article 6(2) of the European Convention, and incorporated into the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), is more complex and uncertain.

Article 6 of the European Convention is headed “Right to a fair trial.”

Article 6(1) provides for certain rights which expressly apply in both civil and criminal proceedings, including the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

Article 6(2) provides that “[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

Article 6(3) provides for certain minimum rights for “everyone charged with a criminal offence.”

Even though the presumption of innocence is explicitly contained in a different sub-section to the “fair hearing” guarantee, it has also been held to form part of the right to a fair trial.[85]
[85]See, for example, Phillips v United Kingdom (2001) 11 BHRC 280 at [40].

The European case law as to when and how the presumption of innocence applies is not always easy to reconcile.

Albert and Le Compte v Belgium[86] involved a case in which a disciplinary board had considered two doctors’ previous criminal records, in deciding to suspend or debar them. The European Court of Human Rights said that it was not necessary to decide whether the disciplinary proceedings were civil or criminal, because the notion of a fair trial (which applies in civil and criminal proceedings under article 6(1)) enshrines the presumption of innocence in article 6(2). Therefore, the disciplinary board’s consideration of the previous criminal records violated the presumption.
[86][1983] 5 EHRR 533.

On the other hand, in Mongiardo v Italy, the European Commission of Human Rights found the presumption of innocence does not apply in disciplinary proceedings, which did not determine a criminal charge, and where suspension was imposed as a protective measure.[87] Similarly, in Jakumas v Lithuania, the European Court of Human Rights held the presumption had no application in a disciplinary hearing against a police officer, where the officer was also charged with a criminal offence, unless the dismissal in itself was a judgment of guilt that would prejudice the separate criminal proceedings.[88]
[87]Application No 30605/96 (4 July 1997).
[88][2006] ECHR 6924/02.

In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords has recognised that the European law in this area is “not altogether straightforward.”[89]
[89]Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] 3 WLR 681, [2008] 1 All ER 657 at [17] per Lord Bingham.

Even where the presumption of innocence does not have direct application, European courts[90] have recognised that it may have indirect application, in the same way that the United Nations Human Rights Committee has recently said it does. That is to say, even outside of criminal proceedings, public authorities must refrain from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused, particularly where they may prejudice the outcome of the criminal trial.
[90]For example: Allenet de Ribemont v France (1995) 20 EHRR 557 at 576; Krause v Switzerland (1978) 13 DR 73; MC v United Kingdom (1987) 54 DR 162.

Conclusions as to whether the presumption is engaged

If s 25(1) is construed only by reference to the heading and the remainder of s 25, it seems clear that it would apply only in criminal proceedings. Even if the concept of criminal proceedings were given a broad construction, so as to include procedural matters prior to or after the criminal trial, that would not be broad enough to include disciplinary proceedings in which no finding of guilt is to be made.

None of the international provisions is identical to s 25 and there is no single, consistent approach taken in the international decisions as to the applicability of the presumption outside criminal proceedings. The European position is the most confusing, and the European legislation is the least like the Charter (in that the presumption of innocence is included within an article which explicitly deals with both civil and criminal proceedings). Each of the international provisions appears in the context of a charter or convention which has some features which resemble, and some which differ from, the Charter. I have not explored all of these complexities, academically interesting as they may be, because, at the end of the day, they are not critical to my decision, for the following reasons.

Even if I came to the conclusion that the presumption does have direct application at a hearing before the Board under s 40(1), Dr Sabet has not made out his case that the Board imposed any unreasonable or unjustifiable limitation on the presumption, for the reasons which follow.

Alternatively, if I found that the presumption only has an indirect impact on proceedings before the Board, in the sense discussed earlier, Dr Sabet does not suggest that the Board has made public statements that he is guilty of the charges, in particular, any public statement which carries a risk of adversely affecting the prosecution of the charges. It is therefore not necessary to discuss the issue of indirect engagement any further.

Did the Board impose any limitation on the right?

It is critical to identify precisely what the Board is said to have done which limited the operation of the presumption.

The court must consider whether the presumption of innocence was interfered with, not whether Dr Sabet’s capacity to practice medicine was interfered with. This is a critical distinction, which often seems to be blurred in Dr Sabet’s submissions. The mere fact that the Board decided to suspend Dr Sabet, or made adverse comments about him, does not of itself establish that it did not have due regard to the presumption.

Dr Sabet says that the Board limited the operation of the presumption in the following ways:

(a) It took the charges into account;

(b) It noted with concern the similarities between the AB and YZ allegations and expressed the view that they could not have been contrived;

(c) It had regard to the fact that the YZ allegations arose at a time when Dr Sabet knew that an investigation into his professional conduct was underway in relation to Ms AB; and

(d) It decided that a restraining agreement did not provide sufficient protection to the public.

As far as “taking the charges into account” is concerned, I have previously mentioned the very limited context in which the Board referred to the fact that the charges had been laid, as part of the historical narrative. The Board’s reasons specifically and properly noted that there had been no finding of guilt against Dr Sabet with respect to the charges.

As far as the matters in paragraphs 182(b) to (d) above are concerned, Dr Sabet’s written submissions assert that the Board could only have had those concerns or formed those opinions “if it did not take as the starting premise the innocence of the applicant.” That argument proceeds on a fundamental misunderstanding of how the presumption of innocence operates. Dr Sabet is essentially arguing that the presumption operates so as to prevent the Board from evaluating the material before it and forming any opinion which is incompatible with innocence in respect of the criminal charges. The presumption of innocence does not have such an effect. Such a result would be absurd, particularly in the context of disciplinary proceedings such as those before the Board.

Dr Sabet has not established that the Board imposed any limitation on the presumption of innocence, even if the presumption has direct application in a s 40(1) hearing before the Board.

Was any such limitation reasonable?

If, contrary to the previous finding, the Board did limit Dr Sabet’s right to rely on the presumption, it would be necessary to consider whether any such limitation was reasonable and justified under s 7(2) of the Charter, which provides:

A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and taking into account all relevant factors including:
(a)       the nature of the right; and
(b)       the importance of the purpose of the limitation; and
(c)       the nature and extent of the limitation; and
(d)       the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e)any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the purpose that the limitation seeks to achieve.

It should be noted that although many of the international cases to which I was taken apply general notions of proportionality at this stage of their analysis, the Charter requires a Victorian court to have regard to the specific factors mentioned in s 7(2), not to any such general concepts.

As far as s 7(2)(e) is concerned, it is common ground that, in considering whether there is any “less restrictive means available”, there is no obligation on a public authority to choose the least intrusive means possible. Rather, the court is required to consider whether the chosen measure falls within a range of reasonable alternatives.[91]
[91]See, for example: RJR McDonald Inc v Attorney-General (Canada) [1995] 3 SCR 199 at [160].

Dr Sabet focussed on s 7(2)(e). He argues that a restraining agreement under s 40(5) of the HPRA was a less restrictive means reasonably available, and therefore the decision should not have been made to suspend him.

This submission misunderstands the meaning of s 7(2)(e). It must be remembered that it is the limitation on the human right which is relevant in section 7(2). A restraining agreement under s 40(5) of the HPRA may be a “less restrictive means” of limiting Dr Sabet’s capacity to practice medicine, but it is not a “less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the purpose that the limitation [on the presumption of innocence] seeks to achieve.”

Although the Attorney-General addressed the court in relation to the issues raised by s-s (a) to (d) of s 7(2), I will make no findings in relation to those matters. That is because, even assuming that the presumption applies, I am not satisfied there has been any relevant limitation on the presumption. Furthermore, Dr Sabet did not specifically address those matters.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, I find that:

(a) The Board’s decision to suspend Dr Sabet cannot be overturned on the ground of “disproportionality”, as that is not a discrete ground of judicial review recognised by Australian law;

(b) The Board did not fail to identify and apply the correct statutory test under s40(1) of the HPRA;

(c) The Board did not fail to have regard to relevant considerations; and

(d) The Board did not have regard to irrelevant considerations.

Accordingly, Dr Sabet’s application for judicial review under the Administrative Law Act must fail.

In so far as the Charter is concerned, I find that:

(a) The Board is a public authority for the purposes of s 38 of the Charter. It is therefore unlawful for it to act in a way that is incompatible with a relevant human right, or to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right in making a decision;

(b) Even if the Board was required to have regard to the presumption of innocence in deciding whether to suspend Dr Sabet, I am not persuaded that it failed to do so. Using the language of the Charter, it did not impose any limitation on the presumption of innocence; and

(c) It is therefore not necessary for me to make any final decision as to whether, in fact, the presumption of innocence is engaged directly or indirectly in disciplinary proceedings before the Board under s 40(1) of the HPRA. It is also not necessary to make any findings in relation to s 7(2) of the Charter.

For these reasons, Dr Sabet’s application must be dismissed.
---
APPENDIX

The Right to be Presumed Innocent in Other Jurisdictions

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 14
1.All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.
2.Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3.In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b)To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c)To be tried without undue delay;
(d)To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e)To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(f)To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
(g)Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

4.In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
5.Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
6.When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non‑disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
7.No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.

___________________________________________________________________________
New Zealand: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
Fair trial
25. Minimum standards of criminal procedure
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of the charge, the following minimum rights:
(a)The right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court;
(b)The right to be tried without undue delay;
(c)The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;
(d)The right not be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt;
(e)The right to be present at the trial and to present a defence;
(f)The right to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses for the defence under the same conditions as the prosecution;
(g)The right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser penalty;
(h)The right, if convicted of the offence, to appeal according to law to a higher court against the conviction or against the sentence or against both;
(i)The right, in the case of a child, to be dealt with in a manner that takes account of the child’s age.

___________________________________________________________________________

Canada: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Proceedings in criminal and penal matters
11. Any persons charged with an offence has the right
(a)to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence;
(b)to be tried within a reasonable time;
(c)not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence;
(d)to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
(e)not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause;
(f)except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment;
(g)not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations;
(h)if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again; and
(i)if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence has been varied between the time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

___________________________________________________________________________
Europe: European Convention on Human Rights
Article 6 – Right to a fair trial
1.In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
2.Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3.Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a)to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b)to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c)to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
(d)to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e)to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

___________________________________________________________________________
Hong Kong: Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Article 11 – Rights of persons charged with or convicted of criminal offence
1.Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
2.In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a)to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b)to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c)to be tried without undue delay;
(d)to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e)to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(f)to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
(g)not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

3. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
4.Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
5.When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
6.No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of Hong Kong.

[2008] VSC 346

12 September 2008