S1509 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration - [2006] FMCA 1037

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

S1509 OF 2003 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2006] FMCA 1037

MIGRATION – Refugee – challenge of Tribunal’s findings of fact – impermissible merits review – no denial of procedural fairness – grounds raised by the applicant un-particularised and no error demonstrated – application dismissed.

Migration Act 1958, ss.424A, 424A(3)(a)
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998 (No. 113 of 1998)

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
NARV & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) ALR 494
NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 144 ALR 567
Ram vMinister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1995) 57 FCR 565
Applicant A & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs& Anor (1997) 190 CLR 225
Chen Shi Hai vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Abdi (1999) 87 FCR 280

Applicant:

APPLICANT S1509 OF 2003

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG 593 of 2004

Judgment of:

Nicholls FM

Hearing date:

18 July 2006

Date of Last Submission:

05 July 2006

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

25 July 2006

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Nil

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Nil

Counsel for the Respondents:

Mr. T. Reilly

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

The application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $4900.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 593 of 2004

APPLICANT S1509 OF 2003

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application filed in this Court on 5 March 2004 seeking review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 6 October 1998 to affirm the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.
The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on
18 February 1995. The applicant applied for a protection visa on
20 October 1995. This application was refused on 26 May 1997. He then sought review of this application by the Tribunal on 24 June 1997. The applicant claimed to fear persecution for reasons of his political opinion in Bangladesh. He claimed to be an active member of the Jatiya Party (JP) and to fear harm from members of the rival Bangladesh National Party (BNP). He further claimed that there were outstanding charges against him in Bangladesh. He also claimed that he would be targeted by BNP supporters, and the police, if he were to return to Bangladesh because of an incident in 1989 when BNP supporters were killed. The applicant’s claims are reproduced in his application for a protection visa (Court Book (“CB”) 1 to CB 23, particularly in a statement at CB 24 to CB 26), in his application for review (reproduced at CB 53 to CB 55), and in the Tribunal’s decision record at CB 74.4 to CB 81.6, which includes the Tribunal’s report of the hearing that it conducted with the applicant on 23 July 1998.
In its “Findings are Reasons”, set out at CB 81.6 to CB 85.1, the Tribunal found:
1)It accepted that the applicant was involved with the JP from the late 1980s until he left Bangladesh in 1992 (CB 82.3).
2)It accepted that the applicant participated in demonstrations leading up to and following the general elections in 1991 and was an active member of the JP in Australia (CB 82.4).
3)That the applicant did not demonstrate a “high level of knowledge” about the JP and that his evidence at the hearing before the Tribunal was “vague” where he was, for example, unable to name the parties that came together to form the JP when the party was founded, or the political philosophy and policies of the party (CB 82.5).
4)It was not satisfied that the applicant was a high profile member of the JP, because a high profile member who performed significant political activities would have knowledge specific to the party (CB 82.6).
5)That while it accepted that the applicant was a member of JP in Bangladesh and that he participated in demonstrations, it did not accept that any charges, false or otherwise, were laid against the applicant (CB 82.7). The reasons for this were:
a)In light of inconsistencies in his accounts as to what he did once he found out about the false charges, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was ever in hiding prior to leaving Bangladesh and was not of any interest to the authorities between December 1991 and February 1992 (CB 83.1).
b)That he formed the intention to leave Bangladesh “well prior” to the time when he claimed to have found out about the false charges (CB 83.3).
c)That notwithstanding the applicant’s claim that there were charges laid against him, he had returned to Bangladesh on three occasions. The Tribunal was of the view that this indicated that the applicant did not have any fear of the authorities, and found it implausible that he would have been able to avoid arrest on these occasions by paying bribes (CB 83.5).
d)Based on independent evidence regarding the high incident of document fraud in Bangladesh. The Tribunal did not accept the documents provided by the applicant (relating to false charges against him) as evidence that there were charges laid against him (CB 83.7).
6)That there was an incident in 1989 (where BNP activists were killed) and that as a result the applicant had a “genuine subjective fear” of being targeted by BNP activists. However, the Tribunal was of the view that the applicant would not be targeted “for reasons” of his political opinion, but because the BNP activists would be seeking revenge for the deaths of their colleagues (CB 83.9 to CB 84.2).
7)That independent evidence suggested that members of JP are not subjected to treatment by members of other political parties which could be characterised as “persecution” within the meaning of the Convention, and hence was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the applicant would face persecution if he returned to Bangladesh (CB 84.3 to CB 84.7).
I have before me for the applicant:
1)The originating application filed on 5 March 2004.
2)An amended application filed on 18 October 2004 putting two particularised grounds of review (although the particulars following ground “2” appear to be assertions of additional grounds of complaint):
“1.The Tribunal denied the Applicant procedural fairness and, in so doing, made a jurisdictional error.
2.The Tribunal failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in that the Applicant was not provided with the independent country information which was not “just about a class of person of which the Applicant was member” and which fell outside the meaning of section 424A(3)(a) of the Migration Act, where such information was relevant to the Tribunal’s Decisions not only because it concerned the class of persons, but also because it went to a separate issue in the proceedings: NARV & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous affairs (2003) 203 ALR 494.”
3)An outline of submissions filed on 5 July 2006.
For the respondent:
1)A Notice of Objection to Competency filed on 24 June 2004 objecting to this Court jurisdiction to review the decision made by the Tribunal pursuant to s.477(1A) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) (not subsequently pressed).
2)Written submissions filed on 2 May 2006.
Before me today the applicant was unrepresented and appeared with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bengali language. Mr. Reilly appeared for the respondents. At the hearing before me the applicant sought to put before the Court:
1)The circumstances relating to his political involvement, and his insistence that he was a “local leader” of the JP.
2)That notwithstanding that the Tribunal believed that he was a member of JP it did not accept the documents that he provided as evidence that there were charges against him.
3)That the Tribunal had stated that the documents were false, but the applicant asserted that the documents were not false and were “all true”.
4)That the Tribunal should have investigated or made “searches”, but instead it went ahead and said the documents were false without any investigation.
5)That it was true that BNP activists had been killed as the applicant had stated and that the Tribunal accepted this but still did not find for him.
6)That the Tribunal accepted that he was the leader of the JP, but still came to an adverse conclusion about his claims.
7)That he had explained to the Tribunal his movements into and out of Bangladesh, India and Korea.
A large part the applicant's complaints (as put in the outline of submission, and as put at the hearing before me) go to challenging the Tribunal’s factual findings. I sought to explain to the applicant that the Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (“Wu Shan Liang”)). Further, that there was a difference between the role of the Tribunal, and the role and power of the Court, and that the Court was properly concerned with seeking to discern jurisdictional error (explained to the applicant as “a legal mistake” of a particular type) in what the Tribunal had done. The applicant confirmed that he was seeking to rely on the grounds set out in the amended application.
Dealing first with ground 2, the applicant complains that the Tribunal failed to comply with its statutory requirements in relation to its use of independent country information. In particular, that the independent country information relied on by the Tribunal (although it is not clear what specific independent country information the applicant is referring to) does not fall within the exception provided in s.424A(3)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) and therefore should have been put to the applicant for comment. Section 424A was added to the Act by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998 (No. 113 of 1998). This Act was granted assent on 11 December 1998 and became operational some time later. This clearly post-dates the making of the Tribunal decision on 6 October 1998, and its notification to the applicant by letter dated the same date. As such s.424A cannot be said to be relevant to the matter before the Court. The applicant's complaint as set out in ground 2 of his amended application is therefore not made out.
The applicant's first ground of complaint asserts a denial of procedural fairness. The particulars of this complaint centre on how the Tribunal is said to have dealt with the documents provided by the applicant to the Tribunal to show that false charges had been made against him. These documents are said to be reproduced at CB 27 to CB 39. The Tribunal's account of what occurred at the hearing it conducted with the applicant shows that:
“[The applicant] provided a number of photocopied documents which he claims are evidence that there are charges against him in Bangladesh.” (CB 75.8)
This complaint appears to have two limbs. The first is that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness in that it found that the documents that the applicant had put before the Tribunal were either fraudulently produced or “written to assist the applicant in making his claims in Australia”. Further, that the Tribunal failed to give the applicant an opportunity to deal with the adverse information contained in the independent country information on which the Tribunal relied in its dealing with these documents. The reference here is to the material reproduced in a Supplementary Court Book (“SCB”) filed by the respondent on 1 July 2004 and particularly at SCB 98. The second limb, developed in written submissions and pressed at the hearing before me, is that the Tribunal found the applicant’s documents were fraudulent without conducting any proper investigation or inquiries, specifically relating to those documents which he insists were “true”. Further, that the Tribunal merely rejected the documents as fraudulent on the basis that it had country information before it which said that documents in Bangladesh were likely to be false.
I cannot see, on a plain reading of the Tribunal's decision, that it made any express finding that the particular documents provided by the applicant had been forged, or fraudulently obtained. Nor that they had been written for the express purpose of assisting the applicant in making a claim for protection in Australia, as the applicant now asserts.
In its decision record at CB 83.8 the Tribunal stated:
“I also note the documents provided by [the applicant] in support of his claims. However, the independent evidence before me, which I accept, is that there is a high level of document fraud in Bangladesh, with fraudulent documents being able to be obtained with the assistance of the police. In the circumstances, I do not accept the documents provided by [the applicant] as evidence that there are charges against him.”
To be properly understood, this statement by the Tribunal needs to be seen in the context of what precedes it. Beginning at CB 82.7 the Tribunal turns its mind to the issue of false charges. While the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been a member of the JP in Bangladesh, and participated in demonstrations, it did not accept that any charges “false or otherwise” had been laid against him. The Tribunal then gave three reasons for this finding. When read in context therefore, by the time the Tribunal looked at the documents provided by the applicant in support of this claim, it had already found, for reasons given, that it did not accept any false charges, or otherwise, had been made against him. It noted that in the context of high-level document fraud in Bangladesh it could not accept that the documents provided by the applicant were evidence to show that charges had been laid against him. The rejection of the claim that false charges had been laid against him was clearly made on the basis of information not related to the documents. The Tribunal's rejection of this claim does not rely specifically on any finding of fraudulently obtained, or falsely created, documents.
Further the Tribunal, in dealing with these documents, indicated that “in the circumstances” it did not accept that these were evidence that there were charges against the applicant. Having rejected the claim that false charges had been laid against the applicant, the Tribunal could not see that the documents, in circumstances where it had independent evidence before it asserting a high level of document fraud in Bangladesh, could amount to evidence in support of the applicant’s claim. The phrase “I also note” at the beginning of the paragraph at CB 83.7 reinforces this reading of the Tribunal’s reasons. It rejected the claim that false charges had been made for the reasons it gave. The Tribunal then, properly, felt compelled to deal with the documents. It dealt with them on the basis that it could not accept them “in the circumstances” as evidence of this claim. This was open to the Tribunal. I do not see, in light of this approach, that the applicant’s stated reliance on NARV & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) ALR 494 (“NARV”) can assist the applicant.
In any event, in relation to the complaint that the Tribunal’s dealing with this issue was a denial of procedural fairness, then the clear unchallenged account of what occurred at the hearing with the Tribunal reveals that this issue was raised by the Tribunal with the applicant at the hearing. The Tribunal's decision record reveals (at CB 78.1) that the Tribunal put to the applicant that it had information indicating that there was a high level of document fraud in Bangladesh. The applicant is reported as stating that he did not “know anything about this”. I relevantly note Mr. Reilly’s submission that NARV is distinguishable in that no such discussion took place
Clearly (as it relates to procedural fairness) in the circumstances the applicant was put on notice of this issue at the hearing (false documents and the ease of availability). Between the date of the hearing on 23 July 1998 and the making of the Tribunal's decision (some 2 ½ months later on 6 October 1998) the applicant would have had the opportunity to make any further submissions, or to provide any other evidence in relation to this issue. The applicant has provided no evidence to contradict the Tribunal's account in this regard of what occurred at the hearing (NAOA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 241). Further, he would have been aware of the possibility of generally providing additional material to the Tribunal following the hearing, in that in the Tribunal's account of what occurred at the hearing (CB 78.5) the Tribunal states that the applicant was given the opportunity to provide further material in support of his claims (in particular a letter and from Bangladesh). He subsequently did write to the Tribunal on 10 September 1998, advising as to the progress of his obtaining this letter. Ultimately, he made no further communication with the Tribunal. In all the circumstances therefore, I cannot see that the Tribunal can be said to have the denied the applicant procedural fairness on the issue of document fraud in Bangladesh. He was clearly made aware of this issue, and had the opportunity to comment.
In relation to the applicant's further complaint that the Tribunal should have specifically investigated the authenticity of the documents, there is, of course, no specific duty on the Tribunal to inquire (Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510). Further, and in particular, there is nothing that can be said to arise from the circumstances of this case which would have required the Tribunal to have engaged in any further inquiry in any event. The Tribunal's conclusion in relation to the false charges issue (to which the documents related) was based on inconsistencies in the applicant's account in three specific instances (again with reference to what occurred at the hearing conducted by the Tribunal), on the Tribunal's view of the applicant's intention to leave Bangladesh at a time prior to when he claimed to have found out about the alleged charges, and on the applicant's return to Bangladesh from other countries at least three times before coming to Australia. While the applicant now seeks before the Court to further explain, in particular, his coming and going from Bangladesh prior to coming to Australia, it is clear from the Tribunal's account of what occurred at the hearing, that it discussed each of these matters, which subsequently formed the basis for its rejection of his claim that he had been the subject of false charges. The Tribunal's account in this regard is set out from CB 77.1 to CB 77.10. The applicant had the opportunity to put his explanations before the Tribunal, and I cannot see that on what was before it the Tribunal's findings in relation to each of the issues, that led it to forming its ultimate view of not accepting that charges had been made against the applicant, were not open to it on the material that had been put before it, including the applicant's explanations. In all the circumstances therefore, having rejected the applicant's claim in this regard, essentially on what the applicant himself had put before the Tribunal (other than the documents), and in taking into account the applicant’s explanations, by the time the Tribunal came to turn its mind to the documents, it could not accept that the documents provided evidence to support the applicant's claims. This does not, in my view, require the Tribunal to have made some other independent inquiry about the specific documents. In all the therefore, this aspect of the complaint now also does not succeed.

The applicant also complained before me that the Tribunal accepted that he was a leader of JP and yet ultimately found against him. When I asked the applicant to point to that part of the Tribunal's decision record containing this finding his response was that he had not brought the “green book” with him. In any event, I cannot see any such finding by the Tribunal, and in fact it found to the contrary. The Tribunal stated that it found that the applicant was “not a prominent JP member when he was in Bangladesh” (CB 82.3 to CB 82.7). This was a finding that was open to it on the material before it, and for which it gave reasons.
Similarly, the applicant's attempt to explain the reasons for his travel in and out of Bangladesh before the Tribunal, and his claims before me that he returned to Bangladesh “in secret”, does not reveal error on the part of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's account of the hearing that it conducted with the applicant reveals, at CB 77.6, that it specifically asked him about his travels in and out of that country, and also shows that with the applicant present it examined his passport. The applicant was clearly, in what follows in the Tribunal's account of the hearing, given the opportunity to comment and provide explanation for his travel out of and return to Bangladesh on the occasions that he did so prior to ultimately coming to Australia. As for the complaint that the Tribunal made adverse findings, notwithstanding the applicant’s explanations, it is a matter for the Tribunal, and not an issue that reveals error, so long as the findings were open to it.
In written submissions the applicant also complained that the Tribunal decision was “contradictory” in that it accepted that he had been involved with the JP, and that there was a genuine “subjective fear of being targeted by BNP activists” who would be seeking revenge for the incident that occurred in 1989, and yet still found that he would not be persecuted on return to Bangladesh. The Tribunal's decision record shows that the Tribunal accepted that there had been an incident in 1989 “such as that described by the applicant”. It further accepted that the applicant had “a genuine subjective fear of being targeted by BNP activists seeking revenge for this incident”. However, with reference to its understanding of the relevant law relating to the meaning of “persecution” pursuant to the Refugees Convention (and in particular as the set out at CB 73.7), the Tribunal found that with particular reference to the phrase “for reasons of” (CB 73.6) that the persecution claimed must be found as arising out of one, or more, of the reasons set out in the Refugee Convention. That this phrase, used in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution.
In the case before me the Tribunal found that it could not single out one, or more, of the five Convention reasons as being relevant to the applicant's claims as they arose from the circumstances put before it. The Tribunal found that if the applicant were to be targeted by BNP activists on his return to Bangladesh because of the 1989 incident, it would not be “for reasons of” his political opinion, but because “they are seeking revenge for the deaths of their colleagues”. It is clear that the Refugees Convention definition of a refugee (essentially) requires an applicant who is seeking recognition as a refugee not only to establish a fear of persecution but that the persecution feared must be for one or more of the reasons set out in Article 1A(2) to the Refugees Convention (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 144 ALR 567 at 570). The consideration by a Tribunal of the causal connection between the harm feared by an applicant, and the necessary relationship to a Convention ground, is not always a simple process. What is clear however is as Burchardt J. set out in Ram vMinister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs & Anor (1995) 57 FCR 565 (“Ram”) at 568 (see also Applicant A & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs& Anor (1997) 190 CLR 225):
“There is thus a common thread which links the expressions “persecuted” “for reasons of” and “membership of a particular social group”. That common thread is a motivation which is implicit in the very idea of persecution is expressed in the phrase “for reasons of” and fastens upon the victim's membership of a particular social group he is persecuted because he belongs to that group.”
In Chen Shi Hai vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293 at 12 and 24 the Court pointed out that the link between being persecuted “for reasons of” relates to each of the grounds specified in the definition set out in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention not just membership of a particular social group as was dealt with in Ram.
In all therefore I can see no contradiction in what the Tribunal has done in this regard as complained of by the applicant. It was open to the Tribunal to find that the incident described by the applicant as having occurred in 1989 did occur. It was also open to the Tribunal to find that this incident could give rise to the applicant having a genuine subjective fear of being targeted by BNP activists. But it is not contradictory, and it was open to the Tribunal to find, that any such targeting would not be for reasons of the applicant's political opinion but that it was because the BNP activists would be seeking revenge for the deaths of their colleagues. The Tribunal clearly addressed its mind to the relevant question, that is, did the harm feared have a Convention nexus. It found that it did not do so. Relevantly, I also note Mr. Reilly's reference to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Abdi (1999) 87 FCR 280 (“Abdi”) at [44]-[46] and his submission that the Tribunal's finding in this case, that a motivation of revenge does not, without more, involve a Convention reason (or reasons), was consistent with Abdi.
At page four of his amended application the applicant sets out a number of what are stated to be “Particulars”, but which clearly can be seen to be additional complaints made about the Tribunal decision. These complaints do not in themselves necessarily provide any particularity to the grounds already claimed. In any event if taken as additional grounds of complaint they also lack any particularity, and on what is before me I cannot see that any of these complaints would assist the applicant in showing jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision:
“3.The procedures that were required by the Migration Act or the regulations to be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed.”
To the extent that this is a reference to s.424A, then I have dealt with that issue above. Nor is any other failure of any relevant “procedure” under the Act, as it was at the time of the Tribunal's decision, evident in what has been put before me.
“4.The Tribunal ignored the merits of the claim and the Tribunal gave the decision on the basis of the dated information without any investigation.”
To the extent that this is a failure to investigate or inquire by the Tribunal, that has already been dealt with. To the extent that this complains that the Tribunal decision was based on “dated information” there is nothing before me to support this claim. The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claims essentially because it did not find them to be credible based on what the applicant himself had said. The documents relied on by the Tribunal are reproduced in the SCB. For the great part they are documents dated 1995 to 1998 and in any event are therefore contemporary to a decision made in 1998. The few exceptions (documents 1, 18 to 19 – SCB 1 to SCB 2: index) appear as general background to the applicant’s claims which relate to the late 1980s, the killing of BNP supporters in 1989 and the applicant’s time in Bangladesh until he left in 1992.
“5.The Tribunal failed to take a relevant consideration into account in exercising its power to determine the Applicant as a Refugee.”
The Tribunal's account of the hearing with the applicant appears comprehensive when viewed in context of the applicant's claims. I cannot see, on what is before me, that this can assist the applicant.
“6.That the decision involved a jurisdictional error of law an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law to the fact of the case was found by the refugee review tribunal.”
The applicant has not said, and nor is it evident, what jurisdictional error of law can be relied upon to show error on the part of the Tribunal.
“7.The Tribunal decision was unjust and was made with the taking into account the full gravity of the applicant’s circumstances and consequences of the claim.”
The Tribunal took into account all of the applicant's claims as put by the applicant. The claim that it was “unjust”, and did not take into account “the full gravity”, does not in all the circumstances rise above a claim for impermissible merits review (Wu Shan Liang).
“8.The decision by the Tribunal is not justifiable by the evidences used in the decision. The used documents have indicated clear violation of human rights, which is tantamount to persecution. The Tribunal ignored its own information in deciding the case.”
Nothing was put before the Court to show what “evidences” the Tribunal ignored. While the material before it was such that the Tribunal referred to a “robust political culture in Bangladesh” and that “violence is a pervasive part” and that there were “armed clashes with police” (CB 84.4), the Tribunal found that the independent evidence did not suggest that members or supporters of JP were “subjected to treatment which could be characterised as persecution” (CB 84.4). This was open to the Tribunal. I can see no error in this regard.
“9.The decision was an improper exercise of the power confirmed [sic: conferred] by this Act or the regulations and the Applicant was deprived to attain natural justice to [the applicant].”
The applicant has not said how the decision was an improper exercise of power pursuant to the relevant statute. If the subsequent reference to natural justice seeks to explain some failure of statutory obligation as to a hearing or how the Tribunal dealt with information then with reference to what is set out above none can be discerned. The applicant was invited to a hearing and on the only evidence before me was given the opportunity to explain his situation particularly in relation to those matters on which the Tribunal ultimately relied to reject the application. This complaint does not assist the applicant.
In all the therefore, the material before me shows that the Tribunal considered all of the claims as made by the applicant, made findings that were open to it, and it gave reasons for those findings. I cannot see any jurisdictional error in what the Tribunal has done. This application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding twenty-three (23) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Nicholls FM.

Associate:

Date: 25 July 2006