VSAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 32 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VSAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 239

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Magistrate’s decision – finding by Refugee Review Tribunal that nationality of appellant husband that of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – claim that finding made without any evidence to support it – meaning of “nationality” – whether Refugee Review Tribunal bound to act only upon direct evidence, such as text of statute, or expert evidence, when determining questions of “derivative acquisition of nationality” – whether distinction to be drawn between “original acquisition of nationality” and “derivative acquisition of nationality”

Applicants in V 722 of 2000 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1059 discussed
Joyce v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 347 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Petrovski (1997) 73 FCR 303 referred to
Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178 referred to
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Second Phase) [1955] ICJ Rep 4 referred to
Oppenheimer v Cattermole (Inspector of Taxes) [1976] AC 249 referred to
R v Burgess; ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608 referred to
Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 referred to
SFGB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 231 referred to
Sykes v Cleary (1992) 176 CLR 77 referred to
Tji v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 55 ALD 508 referred to
VHAJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 186 cited

VSAB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

VID 1076 OF 2004

WEINBERG J
17 MARCH 2006
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1076 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

VSAB
FIRST APPELLANT

VSAC
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The Refugee Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to this proceeding.

2.        The appeal be dismissed.

3.        The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1076 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

VSAB
FIRST APPELLANT

VSAC
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE:

17 MARCH 2006

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Connolly FM delivered on 24 August 2004: VSABv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FMCA 520. His Honour ordered that an application for judicial review of certain decisions made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 7 June 2002 be dismissed.

  2. The issue raised by this appeal is whether the Federal Magistrate erred in declining to set aside the Tribunal’s decision, it having…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read VSAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indige... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] FCA 239
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellants, including the wife and her family, appealed against the Federal Magistrate's decision not to set aside the Tribunal's decision regarding their protection visa application. The central issue before the court was whether the Federal Magistrate had erred in not overturning the Tribunal's decision, particularly concerning the husband's nationality. The husband had claimed to be a national of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), despite entering Australia on a FYROM passport. The Tribunal had concluded that the husband was a FYROM national and thus could return there safely, deeming the husband's claims about persecution in Bosnia-Herzegovina moot.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal had erred in its finding that the husband was a FYROM national, if the Tribunal had failed to determine whether the husband was a national of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if the Tribunal had misunderstood the requirements for establishing FYROM nationality, and if there was sufficient evidence to support the Tribunal's finding. The appellants argued that the Tribunal had not adequately considered the husband's claim regarding his Bosnian nationality and had misunderstood the requirements for establishing FYROM nationality. They also contended that the passport evidence was insufficient to prove FYROM nationality.

The court considered the arguments and found that the Tribunal's decision was correct. The court held that the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the husband was a FYROM national based on the evidence, including the passport, and that this conclusion justified the decision not to consider the husband's claims regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in its understanding of the requirements for establishing FYROM nationality and that there was sufficient evidence to support the Tribunal's finding. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Refugee Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to this proceeding.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issue raised by this appeal is whether the Federal Magistrate erred in declining to set aside the Tribunal’s decision, it having been contended before his Honour that the Tribunal had mistakenly found that the second appellant (“the husband”) was a citizen of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (“FYROM”).THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND The first appellant, (“the wife”), and at least one, and possibly both, of the appellants’ children, are citizens of FYROM. The wife and children arrived in Australia on 13 December 2000, as the holders of visitor visas. The husband followed them several weeks later, on 3 January 2001. He entered Australia on a FYROM passport issued on 23 July 1998. However, despite that fact, he claimed from the outset that he was a national of Bosnia-Hezergovina, and not a national of FYROM. On 25 January 2001, the husband lodged an application for a protection visa. The wife and the two children were included in this application as members of the family unit. In the application, the husband described his current citizenship as Bosnian, and stated that he sought protection in Australia so that he would not have to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. He claimed that he feared harassment and persecution from Serb nationalists if required to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina because of his opposition to their policies, and his “mixed marriage” to a Macedonian. He insisted that he was not, and never had been, a national of FYROM. He also claimed that he was not entitled to reside in that country. On 12 April 2001, a delegate of the respondent Minister refused to grant the husband and the other members of his family a protection visa. The delegate rejected his claim that he had no right to reside in FYROM, and found that he was, in fact, a national of that country. The delegate noted that the husband had not been mistreated in FYROM, and that he did not claim to fear persecution if required to return to FYROM. On 31 May 2001, after the delegate’s decision was given, the wife lodged a separate application for a protection visa. Included in that application were the husband, and the two children, again as members of the family unit. The wife claimed to fear harm in FYROM “on account of the widespread ethnic violence in that country”, and the “total breakdown of law and order in Macedonia with the uprising of the Albanian minority”. Perhaps not surprisingly (given that the wife’s claim did not really address the issue of persecution on Refugees Convention grounds), a different delegate of the respondent Minister, on 15 November 2001, refused the wife’s application for a protection visa. The delegate noted that the wife did not claim to have suffered discrimination, or to have been persecuted, in FYROM in the past. The delegate accepted that the husband might have difficulty in finding employment in FYROM because of his Serbian ethnicity. However, the delegate concluded that any discrimination that the husband might suffer in that regard would not be of sufficient gravity to amount to persecution. Importantly, the delegate did not accept that there was more than a remote chance that the wife would become a victim of any instability or conflict between Albanians and Macedonians in the foreseeable future if she returned to FYROM.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
Having found that the husband was a national of FYROM, and having also found that he could return to that country and live there in safety, the Tribunal concluded that it was unnecessary to go on and determine whether his claims regarding the risk of persecution in Bosnia-Herzegovina had any substance. THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE’S DECISION The focus of the proceedings before the Federal Magistrate, and in the present appeal, involves a challenge to the Tribunal’s finding that the husband was a national of FYROM. It was accepted, on his behalf, that if that finding stood, the Tribunal had been entitled to refrain from considering whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution if required to relocate to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the Tribunal’s finding, that question was moot. It is important to appreciate that, before the Federal Magistrate, the husband did not challenge the Tribunal’s finding that neither he, nor his wife, had a well-founded fear of persecution if required to return to FYROM. In other words, there was no challenge to the Tribunal’s conclusion that, though the husband might be subjected to some low-level discrimination in FYROM, this would not be of sufficient seriousness to amount to persecution. Before the Federal Magistrate, it was submitted on behalf of the husband that the Tribunal’s reasons disclosed jurisdictional error on three separate grounds:(a)it had failed to determine whether the husband was a national of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and therefore failed to deal with an essential aspect of his claim;(b)it had misunderstood the requirements which had to be established in order to find that the husband had acquired FYROM nationality; and(c)it had found that the husband was a national of FYROM with no evidence to support that conclusion. Alternatively, there was insufficient evidence to support that finding. In relation to ground (a), it was accepted that the Federal Magistrate’s finding that the husband was a national of FYROM, and could return there at any time would, if valid, justify the Tribunal’s decision not to consider his position as regards Bosnia-Herzegovina. In relation to ground (b), it was contended that in a case of this type, involving what was described as “derivative acquisition of nationality”, there were stringent requirements that had to be met before such a finding could be made. In particular, it was submitted that the Tribunal had been required, as a matter of law, and as a matter of irreducible evidentiary standards, to acquaint itself with the domestic law of FYROM regarding acquisition of nationality, whether through the text of the relevant statute, expert evidence, or scholarly works. In relation to ground (c), it was contended that the only basis upon which the Tribunal had found that the the husband was a national of FYROM was his possession and use of a FYROM passport. If, however, as the husband claimed, he had bribed officials to secure the issue and renewal of that passport, it could not properly be assumed that the passport provided any evidence of FYROM nationality.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J