S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

S, DJ v CHANNEL SEVEN ADELAIDE PTY LTD

[2008] SASC 60

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Bleby and The Honourable Justice Layton)

5 March 2008

DEFAMATION - JUSTIFICATION - GENERALLY - WHETHER PLEA ESTABLISHED

Respondent broadcast promotion for television programme - alleged libellous statements that appellant a suspect in murder investigation - appeal from interlocutory order of Master allowing defence plea of particulars of justification - whether plea of justification supported by particulars - whether plea based on objective facts which could justify reasonable grounds to suspect - whether repetition rule breached - insufficient to plead existence of evidence that may prove conduct occurred - plea of justification must answer appellant's pleaded imputation that there were reasonable grounds of suspicion - appeal allowed.

Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd & Anor v S, DJ (2007) 248 LSJS 75, applied.
Shah v Standard Chartered Bank [1999] QB 241; Chase v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772; Jackson v John Fairfax Sons Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 36; Stern v Piper [1997] QB 123; Hamilton v Clifford [2004] EWHC 1542 (QB), considered.

S, DJ v CHANNEL SEVEN ADELAIDE PTY LTD
[2008] SASC 60

Full Court:      Duggan, Bleby and Layton JJ

  1. DUGGAN J.         I would allow the appeal.  I agree with the orders proposed by Bleby J and the reasons which he has prepared.

    BLEBY J.

    Introduction

  2. No-one has ever been charged with the murder of Corinna Marr.  She was shot in July 1997.  However, that and other events have given rise to a fiercely contested defamation action, the subject of these proceedings.

  3. Excluding this appeal, the action has been the subject of at least six considered judgments of judges and masters of this Court, three of them by the Full Court.[1]  At the time of the alleged defamation, the plaintiff, the present appellant, was a 34-year-old professional photographer.  In August 2000 he accompanied Ms Patricia Draper, then a South Australian Member of the House of Representatives, on a trip overseas.  The trip was described as “overseas study travel”.

    [1]    S v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd & Anor (2005) 91 SASR 466, [2005] SASC 182 (White J); Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd & Anor v S, DJ (2006) 94 SASR 296, [2006] SASC 10 (Full Court); S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd & Anor [2006] SASC 268 (Master Burley); S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd & Anor (2007) 97 SASR 118, [2007] SASC 80 (Full Court); Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd & Anor v S, DJ (2007) 248 LSJS 75, [2007] SASC 117 (Full Court); S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd & Anor (unreported) 26 June 2007 (Master Lunn).

  4. The defendant and present respondent (“Channel Seven”) is a commercial broadcaster of free-to-air television in South Australia.  On 14 and 15 May 2004 Channel Seven broadcast a promotion for a television programme entitled “Today Tonight” in the…

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Details
Case
[2008] SASC 60
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd, the appellant, DJ S, challenged a decision made by a Master that allowed the respondent, Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd, to amend its defence to include a plea of justification in response to defamation allegations. The dispute centred around promotional content broadcast by the respondent that implied DJ S was a suspect in a murder investigation. The legal issues revolved around whether the plea of justification was adequately supported by particulars and whether it was based on objective facts that could justify reasonable grounds for suspicion, without breaching the repetition rule.

The court held that the plea of justification required the respondent to plead the facts that justified the reasonableness of the grounds for suspicion, rather than merely the evidence that might establish those facts. The respondent's plea did not adequately address the appellant's claim that there were reasonable grounds to suspect him. Furthermore, the court found that the plea did not sufficiently address the objective reasonableness of the grounds for suspicion, as it did not detail the specific facts supporting the suspicion. The court also noted that the respondent's reliance on the existence of evidence did not suffice to establish the plea of justification.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed by the court. The interlocutory order permitting the respondent to amend its defence was set aside, and the specific paragraph of the defence was struck out. The court agreed with the reasons provided by Bleby J and supported the proposed orders, affirming that the plea of justification needed to be based on the objective facts justifying the suspicion, not just the existence of evidence that might establish those facts. This decision underscores the importance of a plea of justification in defamation cases being founded on concrete, objective facts rather than speculative evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DUGGAN J BLEBY J LAYTON J
He does not plead that the promotion meant that any particular person entertaining the suspicion in fact did so on reasonable grounds. He pleads that the imputation of the promotion was that, objectively, there were reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff. A plea of justification therefore, requires pleading of the facts which justify the reasonableness of those grounds, not the evidence by which those facts may be established.Conclusion For these reasons, I would allow the appeal. I would direct that the order of the Master granting leave to Channel Seven to amend the defence be set aside and that paragraph 7.2 of the defence be struck out. I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by Bleby J. I also agree with the orders which he proposes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DUGGAN J, BLEBY J, LAYTON J

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