Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 9)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 9) [2019] FCA 1383

File number: NSD 2179 of 2017
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 28 August 2019
Catchwords:

DEFAMATION – application for permanent injunction to restrain republication of the defamation – whether, if permanent injunction not granted, leave would be required to commence further proceedings in relation to the same or any other publication of the same or like matter pursuant to s 23 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for permanent injunction to restrain republication of the defamatory imputations – whether injunction should issue –consideration of Court’s jurisdiction to grant permanent injunctions – consideration of whether there is a real or appreciable risk of republication of the defamation – consideration of the public interest in the right of free speech – where carve out in proposed injunction for fair report of proceeding and appeal proceeding – whether the ordinary reasonable reader would read expressions of disagreement and criticisms in post-judgment articles as comments or expressions of opinion or whether they repeat or republish the defamatory imputations

Legislation:

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 4, 23, 29

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23

Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; 227 CLR 57

Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 135 FCR 105

Carey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2012) 84 NSWLR 90

Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 351

Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Manock (2007) 232 CLR 245

Ghosh v Nine Digital Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 90

Graham v Powell (No 4) [2014] NSWSC 1319

Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] All ER (D) 355 (Oct); 4 All ER 732; 1 WLR 3024

Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 750; 237 FCR 127

Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284

Munsie v Dowling (No 10) [2018] NSWSC 709

Nokia Corporation v Truong [2005] FCA 1141; 66 IPR 511

Phillips v Robab Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1520; 110 IPR 184

Polias v Ryall [2014] NSWSC 1692

Proctor v Bayley (1889) 42 Ch D 390

Rastogi v Nolan [2010] NSWSC 735

Reid v Dukic [2016] ACTSC 344

Roache v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1998] EMLR 161

Tavakoli v Imisides (No 4) [2019] NSWSC 717

Wagner & Ors v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 201

Date of hearing: 23 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 93
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S T Chrysanthou
Solicitor for the Applicant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T D Blackburn SC with Ms C Amato
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ashurst Australia

ORDERS

NSD 2179 of 2017
BETWEEN:

GEOFFREY ROY RUSH

Applicant

AND:

NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LIMITED

First Respondent

JONATHON MORAN

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1383
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 9) involved an application by the plaintiff, Mr Rush, for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant, Nationwide, from republishing defamatory imputations contained in articles published by Nationwide. The application was brought following a defamation judgment in favour of Mr Rush against Nationwide. The court was required to decide whether a permanent injunction should be granted, considering factors such as the risk of republication, the public interest in free speech, and the potential hardship to Mr Rush if further defamation proceedings were required.

The court reasoned that while some of the media coverage had deprived Mr Rush of the benefits of his defamation victory, this did not necessarily mean a permanent injunction was warranted. The post-judgment articles published by Nationwide, which criticised the judgment, were not found to simply repeat or republish the defamatory imputations, but rather were reports or opinions about the judgment. Although Nationwide might publish similar articles in the future, it was not concluded that these would necessarily republish the defamatory imputations. Additionally, the public interest in free speech weighed against granting the injunction, as Nationwide had a right to criticise the judgment. The court concluded that the discretionary factors against granting the injunction outweighed the potential hardship to Mr Rush of having to commence further proceedings.

The court dismissed Mr Rush's application for a permanent injunction. It noted that no specific costs order was requested by either party and considered making no order as to costs, but invited the parties to file brief written submissions if they wished to argue for a costs order. The court vacated certain previous orders and outlined the procedure for entry of the new orders.

The court did not need to conclusively determine the operation of section 23 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) in this case, as it was sufficient to note that Mr Rush might need to seek leave of the court to commence further defamation proceedings depending on the nature of any republication. The court also noted that other discretionary considerations might apply in determining whether to grant a permanent injunction, such as the potential for injustice, hardship to the defendant, and the public interest in free speech.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application by the applicant for a permanent injunction against the first respondent restraining it from republishing the defamatory imputations be dismissed.

2. If either party wishes to submit that a costs order should be made in respect of this application, they should file and serve written submissions, not exceeding two pages in length, by 4.00 pm on 30 September 2019.

3. If submissions are filed and served in accordance with order two, the question of costs will be determined on the papers.

4. If no submissions are filed in accordance with order two, there be no order as to the costs of this application.

5. Orders 4 and 5 of the orders made on 23 May 2019 be vacated.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It may also be accepted that some of the media coverage to date, including the post-judgment articles published by Nationwide, has largely deprived Mr Rush of the benefits of the vindication of his reputation that ordinarily accompanies a favourable defamation judgment. Unfortunately for Mr Rush, however, that is largely beside the point on the question whether a permanent injunction should be granted against Nationwide. That is because articles which criticise or express adverse opinions about the liability judgment are likely to have that effect whether or not it could be said that they repeat or republish the defamatory imputations. In addition, as has already been pointed out, other media organisations cannot be enjoined in any event. Conclusion Mr Rush has not demonstrated that it is appropriate, in all the circumstances, to make the permanent injunction sought by him. In particular, he has failed to demonstrate that there is a real or appreciable risk that, if not restrained from doing so, Nationwide will repeat or republish the relevant defamatory imputations. Following the handing down of the liability judgment, Nationwide published articles that expressed disagreement with and criticised the judgment. Properly considered, however, those articles were either reports of the judgment or comprised comment or opinion about it. They did not simply repeat or republish the defamatory imputations. While it is likely that Nationwide will publish similar articles in the future, most likely in the context of the appeal proceedings, it cannot be concluded that any such articles will republish the defamatory imputations. While Nationwide has not given any express assurance or undertaking not to republish the imputations, it has removed the defamatory articles, and a number of other articles, from its websites. The other discretionary consideration which weighs against making a permanent injunction is the public interest in the right of free speech. Nationwide, like any other person, has a right, within limits, to criticise and express disagreement with the liability judgment. There is at least a risk that the injunction sought by Mr Rush might effectively impinge on or restrict that right in a way which is not warranted or justified in all the circumstances. While it may readily be accepted that it would be burdensome for Mr Rush to have to resort to fresh defamation proceedings to remedy any republication of the defamatory imputations, and that he might require the leave of the court to commence or prosecute any such proceedings, that consideration does not outweigh the other factors which weigh against the grant of a permanent injunction. DISPOSITION Mr Rush’s application for a permanent injunction restraining Nationwide from republishing the defamatory imputations should be dismissed. Neither party submitted that any specific costs order should be made in respect of this application, which but for the position taken by the parties would have been considered and determined as part of the main proceedings. It may, in those circumstances, be appropriate to make no order as to costs. It should also be noted in that regard that the application was heard on the same day as Nationwide and Mr Moran’s unsuccessful application for me to recuse myself from determining the issue of injunctive relief. It would nevertheless be appropriate to allow the parties to file brief written submissions, should they wish to do so, in relation to whether an order for costs should be made. If either of the parties wish to avail themselves of that opportunity, they should put the other party on notice of their position and file their written submissions, not exceeding two pages in length, before 4.00 pm on 30 September 2019. Any issue in relation to costs will be determined on the papers. If no submissions are filed, there will be no order as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is ultimately unnecessary to reach a concluded view on the proper construction of s 23 of the Defamation Act or its potential operation in Mr Rush’s case. It suffices to note that, depending on the nature of any further publication that might occur, Mr Rush may or may not be required to seek the leave of the court pursuant to s 23 of the Defamation Act before commencing or prosecuting any defamation action in relation to the further publication. Even if he is required to seek leave pursuant to s 23 of the Defamation Act, however, it does not necessarily follow that that would constitute a significant or material hurdle for Mr Rush. While again much will depend on the precise circumstances, it is difficult to imagine this Court, or any other court in which Mr Rush may choose to prosecute any new action, would be likely to refuse to grant leave to do so if the republication arguably gives rise to new or additional damages. Other discretionary considerations The grant of a permanent injunction is discretionary. Reference has already been made to some of the key discretionary considerations: the degree or extent of the risk or apprehension of any republication of the defamatory imputations, the extent of the hardship that would be caused if the plaintiff or applicant was required to resort to new proceedings if the defamatory imputations were to be republished, the nature and seriousness of the defamatory imputations and the general undesirability of a multiplicity of actions between the parties. Reference has also already been made to the possible relevance, as a discretionary consideration, of the risk that the public interest in the right to free speech would be relevantly curtailed by the making of a permanent injunction in the particular circumstances of the case. The relevant authorities in the defamation context are mostly silent on whether there are any other discretionary considerations which may feed into the decision whether or not to grant a permanent injunction restraining any republication. General principles in relation to the making of permanent injunctions in other contexts would suggest, however, that there may be other discretionary considerations depending on the particular circumstances of the case. In Equitable Remedies, Spry suggests (at p 334), by reference to the decision of the House of Lords in Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284, that ultimately the key criterion is injustice: that the court may grant an injunction where that is required to avoid injustice. He also identified (at pp 399-416) the other discretionary considerations that might arise as including any hardship that might be caused to the defendant if an injunction were granted, any inequitable conduct on the part of the plaintiff, the ability of the defendant to comply with the injunction, the prospect that compliance with the order will not ultimately benefit the plaintiff and any acquiescence or delay on the part of the plaintiff. SHOULD A PERMANENT INJUNCTION BE GRANTED?