FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 9) [2019] FCA 1383
File number: NSD 2179 of 2017 Judge: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 28 August 2019 Catchwords: DEFAMATION – application for permanent injunction to restrain republication of the defamation – whether, if permanent injunction not granted, leave would be required to commence further proceedings in relation to the same or any other publication of the same or like matter pursuant to s 23 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for permanent injunction to restrain republication of the defamatory imputations – whether injunction should issue –consideration of Court’s jurisdiction to grant permanent injunctions – consideration of whether there is a real or appreciable risk of republication of the defamation – consideration of the public interest in the right of free speech – where carve out in proposed injunction for fair report of proceeding and appeal proceeding – whether the ordinary reasonable reader would read expressions of disagreement and criticisms in post-judgment articles as comments or expressions of opinion or whether they repeat or republish the defamatory imputations
Legislation: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 4, 23, 29
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; 227 CLR 57
Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 135 FCR 105
Carey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2012) 84 NSWLR 90
Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 351
Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Manock (2007) 232 CLR 245
Ghosh v Nine Digital Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 90
Graham v Powell (No 4) [2014] NSWSC 1319
Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] All ER (D) 355 (Oct); 4 All ER 732; 1 WLR 3024
Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 750; 237 FCR 127
Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284
Munsie v Dowling (No 10) [2018] NSWSC 709
Nokia Corporation v Truong [2005] FCA 1141; 66 IPR 511
Phillips v Robab Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1520; 110 IPR 184
Polias v Ryall [2014] NSWSC 1692
Proctor v Bayley (1889) 42 Ch D 390
Rastogi v Nolan [2010] NSWSC 735
Roache v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1998] EMLR 161
Date of hearing: 23 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 93 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S T Chrysanthou Solicitor for the Applicant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T D Blackburn SC with Ms C Amato Solicitor for the Respondents: Ashurst Australia ORDERS
NSD 2179 of 2017 BETWEEN: GEOFFREY ROY RUSH
Applicant
AND: NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LIMITED
First Respondent
JONATHON MORAN
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 AUGUST 2019
THE COURT…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1383
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court reasoned that while some of the media coverage had deprived Mr Rush of the benefits of his defamation victory, this did not necessarily mean a permanent injunction was warranted. The post-judgment articles published by Nationwide, which criticised the judgment, were not found to simply repeat or republish the defamatory imputations, but rather were reports or opinions about the judgment. Although Nationwide might publish similar articles in the future, it was not concluded that these would necessarily republish the defamatory imputations. Additionally, the public interest in free speech weighed against granting the injunction, as Nationwide had a right to criticise the judgment. The court concluded that the discretionary factors against granting the injunction outweighed the potential hardship to Mr Rush of having to commence further proceedings.
The court dismissed Mr Rush's application for a permanent injunction. It noted that no specific costs order was requested by either party and considered making no order as to costs, but invited the parties to file brief written submissions if they wished to argue for a costs order. The court vacated certain previous orders and outlined the procedure for entry of the new orders.
The court did not need to conclusively determine the operation of section 23 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) in this case, as it was sufficient to note that Mr Rush might need to seek leave of the court to commence further defamation proceedings depending on the nature of any republication. The court also noted that other discretionary considerations might apply in determining whether to grant a permanent injunction, such as the potential for injustice, hardship to the defendant, and the public interest in free speech.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application by the applicant for a permanent injunction against the first respondent restraining it from republishing the defamatory imputations be dismissed.
2. If either party wishes to submit that a costs order should be made in respect of this application, they should file and serve written submissions, not exceeding two pages in length, by 4.00 pm on 30 September 2019.
3. If submissions are filed and served in accordance with order two, the question of costs will be determined on the papers.
4. If no submissions are filed in accordance with order two, there be no order as to the costs of this application.
5. Orders 4 and 5 of the orders made on 23 May 2019 be vacated.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is ultimately unnecessary to reach a concluded view on the proper construction of s 23 of the Defamation Act or its potential operation in Mr Rush’s case. It suffices to note that, depending on the nature of any further publication that might occur, Mr Rush may or may not be required to seek the leave of the court pursuant to s 23 of the Defamation Act before commencing or prosecuting any defamation action in relation to the further publication. Even if he is required to seek leave pursuant to s 23 of the Defamation Act, however, it does not necessarily follow that that would constitute a significant or material hurdle for Mr Rush. While again much will depend on the precise circumstances, it is difficult to imagine this Court, or any other court in which Mr Rush may choose to prosecute any new action, would be likely to refuse to grant leave to do so if the republication arguably gives rise to new or additional damages. Other discretionary considerations The grant of a permanent injunction is discretionary. Reference has already been made to some of the key discretionary considerations: the degree or extent of the risk or apprehension of any republication of the defamatory imputations, the extent of the hardship that would be caused if the plaintiff or applicant was required to resort to new proceedings if the defamatory imputations were to be republished, the nature and seriousness of the defamatory imputations and the general undesirability of a multiplicity of actions between the parties. Reference has also already been made to the possible relevance, as a discretionary consideration, of the risk that the public interest in the right to free speech would be relevantly curtailed by the making of a permanent injunction in the particular circumstances of the case. The relevant authorities in the defamation context are mostly silent on whether there are any other discretionary considerations which may feed into the decision whether or not to grant a permanent injunction restraining any republication. General principles in relation to the making of permanent injunctions in other contexts would suggest, however, that there may be other discretionary considerations depending on the particular circumstances of the case. In Equitable Remedies, Spry suggests (at p 334), by reference to the decision of the House of Lords in Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284, that ultimately the key criterion is injustice: that the court may grant an injunction where that is required to avoid injustice. He also identified (at pp 399-416) the other discretionary considerations that might arise as including any hardship that might be caused to the defendant if an injunction were granted, any inequitable conduct on the part of the plaintiff, the ability of the defendant to comply with the injunction, the prospect that compliance with the order will not ultimately benefit the plaintiff and any acquiescence or delay on the part of the plaintiff. SHOULD A PERMANENT INJUNCTION BE GRANTED?