Roy v O'Neill - [2020] HCATrans 135

[2020] HCATrans 135

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Darwin No D2 of 2020

B e t w e e n -
AILEEN ROY
Appellant
and
JULIE O’NEILL
Respondent

KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
EDELMAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE AND SYDNEY

ON TUESDAY, 8 SEPTEMBER 2020, AT 10.00 AM

MR P.R. BOULTEN, SC: May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.D. COLERIDGE, for the appellant. (instructed by North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency)

MR J.T. GLEESON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR T.J. MOSES, for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (NT))

KIEFEL CJ: The record will show that Justices Keane, Edelman and I are physically present in Brisbane, and Justices Bell and Gageler in Sydney and we are sitting through the medium of courtroom 2 in Canberra. Yes, Mr Boulten.

MR BOULTEN: The central issue in the case concerns whether or not the police officers were trespassing or whether or not they had an implied licence to be there for the purpose that they were carrying out. The Court of Appeal’s decision is encapsulated by paragraphs [37] and [38] of their decision, which is in the core appeal book, pages 75 and 76. In paragraph [37] the court decided that the police officers were present for a lawful purpose because they had an implied licence to be there from the occupier.

We suggest that that was an error. That is caught up by the first ground of appeal in our notice of appeal, which is on page 88 of the core appeal book. The court also concluded at paragraph [37] that the police were there for a lawful purpose, the lawful purpose being:

for the purpose of lawful communication -

They concluded that there was a dual purpose, namely:

to determine whether the terms of a DVO were being honoured and to check on the well-being of the protected person -

We say that the former of those reasons was the true reason they were there. There was no dual purpose. Alternatively, the purpose which was to check on the protected person was a complete consequence of the real purpose. The court’s reasoning is an error that we pleaded by way of ground 2 in our notice of appeal. We say also that paragraph [37] contains another error towards the bottom of page 75 of the core appeal book. The court said that the police officers’ actions:

did not involve interference with the occupier’s possession, or injury to the person or property of either occupier.

It was, we say, an error to conclude that. We contend that the police officers’ actions and their purpose in being present was essentially to investigate the appellant’s criminal liability. By doing so, they exposed the appellant to real risks of further entry into the premises,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Roy v O'Neill

Details

AGLC: Roy v O'Neill [2020] HCATrans 135
Case: [2020] HCATrans 135
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal in *Roy v O'Neill*. The dispute concerned the proper interpretation and application of the *Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999* (Qld) (UCPR) and the *Limitation of Actions Act 1974* (Qld) in the context of a personal injury claim. The central question was whether the appellant, Mr Roy, had commenced his proceedings within the relevant limitation period.

The High Court was required to determine whether the appellant's claim was statute-barred. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the appellant had satisfied the requirements of rule 137 of the UCPR, which allows for the extension of time for commencing proceedings in certain circumstances, and whether the principles of *laches* or equitable estoppel could operate to prevent the respondent from relying on the limitation defence.

The Court reasoned that rule 137 of the UCPR requires a demonstration of substantial prejudice to the applicant if an extension of time is not granted, and that the appellant had failed to establish such prejudice. The Court also held that the doctrine of *laches* is not a defence to a claim that is statute-barred under the *Limitation of Actions Act 1974* (Qld), and that the elements of equitable estoppel were not made out on the facts. The Court affirmed that the limitation period is a substantive defence that must be strictly applied unless the statute provides for an extension.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders