RESPONDENT. DEFENDANT, Defamation-Slander--Libel-Defumatory words concerning professional man-
Clergyman - Politician - Privilege - Justification - Repetition of defumatory statement-Trial by jury- Validity of findings-Appear from Supreme Court of a State-Admission of further evidence-Jurisdiction of High Court - Ver- MELBOURNE, dict obtained on perjured evidence.
By the law of Victoria, in order that defamatory words which tend to injure a person in respect of his business or profession may be actionable without proof of special damage, they must have been spoken of him in the way of that business or profession.
Where one says that he has heard a statement defamatory of another, repeating it, if the circumstances of the repetition are such as to show that the speaker does not give the defamatory statement his own authority, the speaker may, in an action against him for defamation, if the repetition is justifiable, rely on the truth of the actual words spoken by him although the defamatory statement is untrue.
Where defamatory words are spoken on a privileged occasion the presump- tion arising from the occasion that the speaker had a proper motive will con- tinue until displaced by proof of the presence of an improper motive.
A wrong finding by a jury on one issue does not necessarily vitiate their findings on other issues.
R., who was a member of Parliament and also a minister of the Presbyterian Church, was about to stand for re-election. During a discussion as to his
chances of re-election, H. said that he had been informed that R. had been rebuked by some members of the Labour Party for using improper language, or words to that effect. In an action by R. against H. for slander R. alleged that the words were spoken of him as a minister.
Held, that a jury might properly find that the words were spoken of R. in his character of a politician and not in that of a minister, and, further, (Barton J. dubitante), that, had it been alleged that the words were spoken of R. In his character of a politician, the occasion was privileged.
A tribunal of the Presbyterian Church being about to inquire as to the truth of defamatory statements concerning R., said to have been made by S. on the authority, as alleged by him, of H., requested H. to attend the inquiry. H. wrote refusing to attend, and setting out what he had said to S. including a statement defamatory of R.
Held, that the letter was written on a privileged occasion. On an appeal from the Supreme Court of a State, the High Court has no jurisdiction to receive further evidence.
Held, therefore, that leave to read affidavits for the purpose of showing that the evidence on which an original judgment in the Supreme Court of Victoria had been obtained was perjured should be refused.
Whether observations made by the Judge in the course of his summing up to the jury are to be regarded as directions…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Ronald v Harper [1910] HCA 43
Case
[1910] HCA 43
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appellant, James Black Ronald, a clergyman and former Member of Parliament, sued the respondent, Robert Harper, for slander and libel. Ronald alleged that Harper made defamatory statements about him, both orally and in writing, which tended to injure him in his profession as a minister.
The legal issues before the High Court included whether the defamatory words were spoken of Ronald in his capacity as a minister or as a politician, the applicability of privilege to the occasions on which the statements were made, the validity of the jury's findings on issues of truth and malice, and the High Court's jurisdiction to admit further evidence of perjury discovered after the original trial. The court also considered whether a jury's incorrect finding on one issue necessarily vitiated their findings on other issues.
The High Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The court reasoned that a jury could properly find that the defamatory words were spoken of Ronald in his character as a politician, not as a minister, particularly as the statements were made during a discussion about his re-election chances. The court also held that the occasion on which the libel was written was privileged, and that the presumption of proper motive on a privileged occasion continues until displaced by proof of improper motive. Furthermore, the High Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to admit further evidence of perjury to impeach a judgment from the Supreme Court, stating that such applications should be made to the original court. The court also found no merit in the argument that a jury's error on one issue invalidated their findings on others.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The court refused leave to read affidavits concerning alleged perjury, finding it had no jurisdiction to do so. The jury's findings, including that the words were spoken of Ronald as a politician and not a minister, and that the statements were true and made without malice, were upheld.