PARTIES: OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
MOSELEY, Neil
TITLE OF COURT: FULL COURT OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: FULL COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO: 86 of 2012 (21231745)
DELIVERED: 1 March 2013
HEARING DATE: 6 November 2012
JUDGMENT OF: RILEY CJ, KELLY and BARR JJ
CATCHWORDS:
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL – DECISION OF COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL ALLEGED BASED ON FRAUD – JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT TO SET ASIDE – EQUITABLE JURISDICTION Decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, setting aside the defendant’s conviction and granting retrial, alleged to have been actuated by fraud – whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in equity to set aside decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal – action on original bill part of the equitable jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of South Australia immediately before 1 January 1911 – incorporated into the original civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory by s 14(1)(b) Supreme Court Act (NT) – held Supreme Court has jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the event fraud is established. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Preliminary questions as to jurisdiction of Supreme Court – referral by single Justice pursuant to s 21(1) Supreme Court Act – whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in equity to set aside decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal – if jurisdiction exists, whether the Supreme Court should decline to exercise – held no reason based on principles of criminal justice or equity for Supreme Court to decline exercise of jurisdiction in the event fraud is established.
Criminal Code (NT), s 407(1) Supreme Court Act (NT), s 14 (1)(b), s 21(1) Equity Act 1866 (SA) Supreme Court Act 1878 (SA)
Plaintiff: Office of Director of Public Prosecutions
Defendant: Ward Keller
Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID Number: Bar1304
Number of pages: 24
IN THE FULL COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA AT DARWIN
DPP v Moseley [2013] NTSC 8
No. 86 of 2012 (21231745)
BETWEEN:
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Plaintiff
AND:
NEIL MOSELEY
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Moseley, the defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and appealed against the conviction. The defendant sought to have his conviction set aside by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory on the basis that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal was actuated by fraud. The Court of Criminal Appeal had quashed the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the fresh evidence presented was of sufficient quality that there was a significant possibility that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had they heard it. The Supreme Court was required to determine whether it had the jurisdiction to set aside the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal on the grounds of fraud.
The court held that the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory has concurrent jurisdiction in law and equity and that its equitable jurisdiction includes the power to set aside common law judgments on the grounds of fraud. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Supreme Court’s equitable jurisdiction did not extend to appeal judgments. The court noted that there were no statutory provisions that abolished, excluded or limited the Supreme Court’s equitable jurisdiction to impeach judgments based on fraud. The court also noted that the potential of fraud to corrupt and bring into disrepute the system of justice administered by the courts has been referred to in strong terms by other courts.
The court held that the plaintiff would bear the onus of proof of the alleged fraud and that a judgment would only be set aside on the ground of fraud after an affirmative finding of the fraud alleged. The required standard of proof was on the balance of probabilities. The court concluded that it had the jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal if fraud was established.
The court ordered that the matter be remitted to the Registrar of the Supreme Court to be listed for hearing on a date to be fixed by the Registrar.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Ultimately the plaintiff will bear the onus of proof of the alleged fraud. As Taylor J pointed out in McDonald v McDonald,[2] a judgment will be set aside on the ground of fraud only after an affirmative finding of the fraud alleged. The required standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, as explained by the High Court of Australia in its decisions in Briginshaw v Briginshaw,[3] Rejfek v McElroy[4] and Neat Holdings v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd.[5]Background The defendant was charged on indictment with aggravated robbery alleged to have been committed in company with Maximilian Tippett on 2 March 2011. At the trial, there was no dispute that two men committed an aggravated armed robbery at a Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) shop in Coconut Grove, a Darwin suburb, shortly after 10.30 pm on 2 March 2011. The amount stolen in the robbery was $2,900 in cash and coins. The coins were wrapped in brown coloured paper with the word “Armaguard” printed on it. The issue at trial in relation to the defendant was whether the prosecution could prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was one of the two robbers. Both robbers wore black clothes and were masked, and there was no identification evidence in respect of the defendant or Tippett. The prosecution relied upon circumstantial evidence, and upon alleged admissions made by the defendant to a man named Frank Holden, a friend of the defendant and Tippett. During the robbery, one of the robbers attempted to pursue a KFC employee who jumped over the counter and ran away. However, the pursuing robber slipped and fell to the floor. Immediately after the robbery, the robbers ran towards the back door of the KFC shop and left. The KFC shop manager went outside and saw the robbers sitting in a car which he identified as a red Commodore. That vehicle drove away quickly. There was no dispute at trial that the appellant had rented a red Commodore on 26 February 2011, and that he was arrested in that car on 3 March 2011 driving towards Katherine. At the time of his arrest, the defendant had more than $1,300 in cash in his wallet. The cash was all in good condition. The appellant said in evidence that he had received $600 of that money as Centrelink payments; $400 for some work that he had done; that he had won a couple of hundred dollars at the Casino; and that he had borrowed $300 from Frank Holden, $150 of which he had given to Tippett. There was also evidence that he had spent some money on purchasing petrol and food for the Katherine trip. At the time of the defendant’s arrest, Police found a pair of black pants on the rear seat of the red Commodore. In a pocket of the black pants was brown paper with the word “Armaguard” printed on it, similar to the wrapping on coins taken during the robbery. The defendant gave evidence at trial, but was unable to provide any explanation of how he might have innocently obtained the coins in such paper rolls. He claimed that he had never seen that paper before.[6] At the time of his arrest, the defendant had a number of bruises to the side of his knee and the underside of his forearm which the Crown submitted to the jury were caused by a fall inside the Kentucky Fried Chicken shop.[7]
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Tippett did not give evidence at the trial. He, also, was found guilty of the aggravated robbery charge. He was convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Fresh evidence On 6 October 2011, Miguel Franco Da Silva, a prisoner at Darwin Correctional Centre, confessed in a statutory declaration that he was the person who accompanied Tippett during the commission of the robbery. Da Silva subsequently maintained that confession, including in an interview with police on 17 January 2012. Tippett corroborated Da Silva’s confession in an affidavit sworn on 2 February 2012, in which he deposed that the person who had committed the robbery with him was Da Silva. The defendant swore an affidavit on 20 December 2011 asserting that certain evidence given by him at trial was false, including that he had lent the Commodore vehicle to William Phillips when, in fact, he had lent it to Tippett, and that he had given $150 to Tippett. He maintained that the rest of the evidence he had given at his trial was true. The defendant subsequently instituted an appeal against conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The ground of the appeal was that there had been a miscarriage of justice resulting from the absence at the trial of new and/or fresh evidence. At the appeal hearing, Da Silva and Tippett both gave evidence to the effect that Da Silva was the person who had accompanied Tippett during the commission of the robbery. The defendant gave evidence that he had not been involved in the robbery, but that he had innocently loaned the getaway vehicle to Tippett, who confessed to him the next day that he had used the car in the robbery.[11] On 6 June 2012, the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the conviction of the defendant and ordered a new trial.[12] In so doing the Court adopted and applied the principles summarised by Kirby J in R v Abou-Chabake[13] and found that the quality of the fresh evidence was, “in the context of the evidence given at the trial, of a sufficient quality that there was a significant possibility that the jury acting reasonably would have acquitted the accused.” The appeal was allowed on that basis. Although both Tippett and Da Silva alleged and agreed, in their evidence before the Court of Criminal Appeal, that they had committed the robbery together, the evidence of Da Silva was probably determinant of the successful outcome of the appeal, for reasons which appear from the appeal judgment: “… Da Silva was arrested on 4 March 2011 for breach of a domestic violence order and was remanded in custody on the same day. He believes he is due to be released sometime between mid August or November 2013 and he had no other charges outstanding against him. There is no evidence that he had previously been involved in a robbery. There is no evidence that Da Silva has anything to gain by admitting to a robbery which he did not commit. No motive has been established to explain why Da Silva would give false evidence. Da Silva was made aware by the police of the kind of sentence which the appellant is serving and he is also aware that his confession was likely to result in a lengthy term of imprisonment for him, although his evidence is that he believes that his sentence would not be anywhere near the term imposed on the appellant, particularly as he intends to plead guilty and he does not have any prior convictions for armed robbery.”[14]
Decision
Reasons for decision
In our opinion, the effect of s 14(1)(b) Supreme Court Act (NT) is that the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory has concurrent jurisdiction in law and equity (as did the Supreme Court of South Australia immediately before 1 January 1911) and that its equitable jurisdiction includes the jurisdiction to set aside common law judgments on the grounds of fraud. Jurisdiction in equity in relation to appeal judgments The defendant has raised an issue as to whether the Supreme Court’s equitable jurisdiction may be exercised in relation to an appeal judgment (in particular a ‘criminal appeal judgment’) as distinct from a first instance judgment. Counsel for the defendant submitted that there is nothing in the English cases to suggest the availability of collateral proceedings in equity to set aside a decision of a court of appeal where the fraud arises only in that court (as distinct from setting aside a judgment of first instance that has been affirmed on appeal).[32] There is no reason in principle or otherwise why the Supreme Court’s equitable jurisdiction would not extend to or include the jurisdiction to set aside an appeal judgment on the grounds of fraud. We note that there are no statutory provisions which, expressly or by implication, abolish, exclude or limit the Supreme Court’s equitable jurisdiction to impeach judgments based on fraud. In our view, it does not matter that the fraud may have been perpetrated on an appeal court rather than on a first instance court. To the extent that it is relevant, we note that the Court of Criminal Appeal in the present case exercised a first instance function of hearing, viva voce, the evidence of the defendant, Da Silva and Tippett now sought to be impugned in this proceeding. In any event, as mentioned in par [37] above, the Court of Criminal Appeal is a statutory emanation of the Supreme Court created by the Criminal Code. Since there is only one court – the Supreme Court – there would be no valid reason, based on court hierarchy, for the Supreme Court to lack jurisdiction to rescind or set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal. We note finally that the passage extracted from Grierson v The King in par [38] above contemplates the application of the fraud exception to judgments on appeal in criminal matters.[33] The potential of fraud to corrupt and bring into disrepute the system of justice administered by the courts has been referred to in strong terms by other courts. For example, in Harrison v Schipp (supra) Ipp A-AJ said: Due regard has to be given to the fact that fraud is one of the “pillars which support the entire structure of the equitable jurisdiction” (Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 3rd ed (1992), p.339, par 1207). It has always been recognised that “equity has a broad jurisdiction to unravel fraud and set to rights its consequences” (per the full Federal Court in Monroe v Schneider Associates (Inc) v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 234 at 240). The jurisdiction to impeach judgments obtained by fraud is so deeply embedded in equity that very clear words would be required in any legislation before it would be construed as interfering in any way with the powers of a court of equity in this respect.[34]