Robert Sankey v Sales Personnel Australia Pty Ltd

[2018] ATMO 176

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition  by  Robert  Sankey  to  registration  of  trade  mark  application 1781837 (37) - MANLY WARRINGAH PEST CONTROL - in the name of

Sales Personnel Australia Pty Ltd.

DELEGATE:

Katrina Brown

REPRESENTATION:

Opponent: Reynier Van Der Westhuizen, Chrysiliou IP

Applicant: Frances St John of counsel, Sophie Glover of Legalvision ILP Pty Ltd

DECISION:

2018 ATMO 176

Trade Marks Act 1995 – section 52 opposition – grounds pursued under ss 41, 42, 43 and 62A – s 41(3) established – registration refused.

Background

1. TradeMark Number:

   1781837

   TradeMark:

   MANLY WARRINGAH PEST CONTROL

   (‘the Trade Mark’)

   Applicant:

   Sales Personnel Australia Pty Ltd (‘the Applicant’)

   FilingDate:

   13 July 2016

   Specification:

   Class 37: Extermination of pests; Non-agricultural pest and vermin control advisory, information, and inspection services; Pest control; Pest exterminating (other than for agriculture); Proofing of buildings against pest and vermin access; Proofing of land against pest and vermin access; Proofing  of  premises  against  pest  and  vermin  access;

   Proofing of structures against pest and vermin access (‘the Designated Services’)

   Endorsement:

   Registration  is  limited  to  New  South  Wales.  Evidence provided under subsection 41(3).

    
   This decision is in respect of an opposition under section 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’) by Robert Sankey (‘the Opponent’) to the registration of the following trade mark:

1. The Trade Mark was examined as required under s 31 of the Act. Acceptance of the Trade Mark was advertised in the Official Journal of Trade Marks on 8 December 2016.

1. The Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose on 7 February 2017 followed by a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) on 3 March 2017.

1. The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 4 May 2017.

1. In due course the parties filed evidence in support of the opposition, evidence in answer and evidence in reply.

1. The matter came before me, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, in Canberra on 20 August 2018. The Opponent was represented by Reynier Van Der Westhuizen of Chrysiliou IP. The Applicant was represented by Frances St John of counsel, instructed by Sophie Glover of Legalvision ILP Pty Ltd.

Grounds of opposition and onus

1. In the SGP the Opponent nominated grounds of opposition under ss 41, 42(b), 43, 62 and 62A of the Act. At the hearing, the Opponent confirmed that the ground under

s 62 of the Act was not being pursued.

1. The Opponent bears the onus of establishing at least one of the grounds of opposition.1 In the event that the Opponent establishes one of the grounds in relation to all of the services claimed in the trade mark application, there is no requirement for me to consider the other grounds of opposition.

1. The standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard of the balance of probabilities.2

1. The date at which the rights of the parties are to be determined is 13 July 2016 (‘the relevant date’).

Evidence

1. The parties rely on the following declarations:

1 Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58 [32].

2 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156 [132] (‘Telstra’).

Evidence in support

• Declaration of Robert Sankey (Owner of Dee  Why Pest  Control)  made on 4 August 2017 with Exhibits RS-1 to RS-45 (‘Sankey Declaration’).

Evidence in answer

• Declaration of Ritchie Journeaux (Director of Sales Personnel Australia Pty Ltd) made on 15 November 2017 with Annexures A to T (‘Journeaux Declaration’).

Evidence in reply

• Declaration of Reynier Van Der Westhuizen (Chrysiliou IP) made on 22 January 2018 with Exhibits RW-1 to RW-2 (‘Westhuizen Declaration’).

1. During the examination of the Trade Mark, the Applicant filed a declaration by Ritchie Journeaux made on 18 October 2016. Exhibit RS-44 to the Sankey Declaration consists of a heavily redacted version of the declaration that was filed during the examination of the Trade Mark. I note that the non-redacted material is included in the Journeaux Declaration that was filed as evidence in answer in this matter.

The Opponent

1. In the Sankey Declaration, the Opponent is described as:

…doing business under the name and style of Dee Why Pest Control (my business)…The services of my business include, amongst others, pest, termite and vermin control and extermination, for industrial premises and buildings, office premises and buildings, domestic premises and buildings, electronic information and advice on pest and pest control, which services I have provided for the past 25 years.

The mentioned services are provided in a wide area in Sydney and surrounds, but predominantly in the Northern Beaches and North Shore of Sydney.

The Applicant

1. In   the   Journeaux   Declaration,   Ritchie   Journeaux   provides   the   following information about the Applicant and the history of the Trade Mark:

   The Applicant provides pest control services, and in particular provides services to customers in the Manly-Warringah area of Sydney…

The trade mark MANLY WARRINGAH PEST CONTROL, which is the subject of trade mark application 1781837 is used by the Applicant’s business of the same name (the Business) in relation to pest control and proofing against vermin…

The Trade Mark was first used in Sydney, New South Wales between 1976 and 1979. In 1979, the Business and its Trade Mark was purchased by Tom Nichols (the Previous Owner), who continued to use the Trade Mark until March 1999.

In March 1999, the Business and the Trade Mark were sold by the Previous Owner to the Applicant, owned by Freddie Journeaux. On 1 March 2008, I purchased the business from Freddie Journeaux and became the owner of the Applicant company.

Upon purchasing the Business, the Applicant chose to continue to use the Trade Mark due to substantial goodwill and reputation that this Trade Mark had acquired in respect of the Services, and continues to use the Trade Mark to this day.

1. The Applicant is the owner of the following trade mark registration in Australia:

TradeMark Number:	1781838
TradeMark:	(‘the Registered Trade Mark’)
Owner:	Sales Personnel Australia Pty Ltd
Registeredfrom:	13 July 2016
Specification:	Class 37:  Extermination of pests; Non-agricultural pest and vermin control advisory, information, and inspection services; Pest control; Pest exterminating (other than for agriculture); Proofing of buildings against pest and vermin access; Proofing of land against pest and vermin access; Proofing of premises against pest and vermin access; Proofing of structures against pest and vermin access

Section 41

1. Section 41 of the Act relevantly provides:

Trade mark not distinguishing applicant’s goods or services

(1)An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (the designated goods or services) from the goods or services of other persons.

…

(2)A trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons only if either subsection (3) or (4) applies to the trade mark.

(3)This subsection applies to a trade mark if:

(a)   the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and

(b)    the applicant has not used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application to such an extent that the trade mark does in fact distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant.

(4)This subsection applies to a trade mark if:

(a)     the trade mark is, to some extent,  but  not  sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the designated  goods  or services from the goods or services of other persons; and

(b)     the trade mark does not and will not distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant having regard to the combined effect of the following:

i.the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;

ii.the use, or intended use, of the trade mark by the applicant;

iii.any other circumstances.

Note 1: Trade marks that are not inherently adapted to distinguish goods or services are mostly trade marks that consist wholly of a sign that is ordinarily used to indicate:

(a) the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or some other characteristic, of goods or services…

(5)For the purposes of this section, the use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant for the registration of the trade mark is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the applicant.

1. The Opponent submits that the Trade Mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the Designated Services and that the Applicant’s evidence of use is

either not evidence of trade mark use, or is not evidence of use of the trade mark as applied for.

1. The Applicant contends that the Opponent has not established that the Trade Mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the Designated Services. In the Applicant’s view, the Trade Mark is, to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish and that this, combined with the Applicant’s evidence of use, demonstrates that the Trade Mark does and will distinguish the Designated Services from those of other traders.

1. My first consideration is the extent to which the Trade Mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the Designated Services from the services of other traders.

Inherent adaptation to distinguish

1. The inherent adaptation of a trade mark is to be tested:

[B]y reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives – in the exercise, that is to say, of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage, for the sake of the signification which they ordinarily possess – will think of the word and want to use it in connexion with similar goods in any manner which would infringe a registered trade mark granted in respect of it. 3

1. The signification which the words ordinarily possess (ordinary signification) is the ordinary meaning of the words to any person in Australia concerned with the Designated Services.4

2. The Trade Mark consists of the words ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’ in plain text. The Opponent asserts that Manly Warringah is a geographical area in Sydney. This is not disputed by the Applicant, and I note that in the evidence in answer, the Applicant’s business is described as providing ‘services to customers

   in the Manly-Warringah area of Sydney’.5

1. The Opponent has provided definitions of ‘pest’ and ‘control’ from the Macquarie Online Dictionary. I do not think it is necessary to reproduce them here. It is sufficient for me to say that, broadly speaking, pest control is the regulation or

3 Clark Equipment Company v Registrar of Trade Marks [1964] HCA 55 [5].

4 Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Modena Trading Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 48 [70] (‘Cantarella’).

5 Journeaux Declaration 2 [2].

management of organisms which have an undesirable effect on humans, their food or their living conditions.

1. In my assessment, the expression ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’ has an ordinary meaning which would be clear and immediate to persons concerned with the Designated Services. The ordinary signification is that the pest control originates, or is offered, in the Manly Warringah area of Sydney.

1. Having determined the ordinary signification, the enquiry turns to whether other traders might legitimately desire to use the expression ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’, for its ordinary signification, in respect of the Designated Services.6

2. The Applicant highlights that the Opponent’s evidence does not show  other traders using the expression ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’ and that it only shows one trader using ‘Manly Warringah’ in relation to pest control services. Evidence demonstrating that other traders are using the Trade Mark or something so nearly resembling it, for its ordinary signification can be instructive, but the absence of it is not determinative. In this respect I refer to the observations of Murphy J in Phone Directories Company Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited:

   [I]t is not necessary for an opponent to registration to establish that the trade mark is required by other traders. It is enough if innocent traders want to use it. For example in Clark Equipment at 513 to 514 Kitto J spoke to the “desire” of other traders to use the same mark, and said that traders may “think of the word and want to use it”. In Burger King at 425 Gibbs J took the reference to “likelihood” by Kitto J as a reference to whether another trader “might”, without improper motive, want to use the

   mark.7

3. The ‘other traders’ test posits an ‘essentially hypothetical question’;8 it has been said that ‘the question is not one of ‘need’ but whether traders are likely, with no improper motive, to desire to use the words for the ordinary signification which they possess’.9 The practical approach to the question was considered by the Full Federal Court in Telstra:

6 Cantarella [2014] HCA 48 [71].

7 [2014] FCA 373 [200].

8  Sports Warehouse, Inc v Fry Consulting Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 664 [96]; Telstra [2015] FCAFC 156 [146].

9 Bohemia Crystal Pty Ltd v Host Corporation Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 235 [158].

If a word mark is taken as an example, the ordinary signification of the mark, and the question of “whether other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their business and without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in connection with their own goods”…are closely related questions. Often the answer to the first question, i.e., what is the ordinary signification of the word mark will provide the answer to the second question, i.e., is it the case that other traders might legitimately need to use the mark in respect of their goods. Sometimes the issues will be relatively clear and little evidence will be

required.10

1. The Trade Mark has an ordinary meaning that directly describes the location and the kind, or intended purpose, of the Designated Services. It strikes me as a combination of words which a trader might, without any improper motive, want to use to describe their pest control services in the Manly Warringah area.

1. I agree with the Opponent’s view that the Trade Mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the Designated Services from those of other traders and accordingly it should be considered under s 41(3) of the Act.

1. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered, but ultimately found myself unable to agree with, the Applicant’s contention that the Trade Mark should be considered under s 41(4) because it is not descriptive in the sense of a narrative phrase, such as ‘Pest Control Services in the Manly Warringah Region’, and it has the crisp effect of a brand.11 The particular arrangement of the Trade Mark is not unusual being the simple combination of a geographical area and a direct description of the kind or intended purpose of the Designated Services. The Trade Mark, as filed, is rendered in an unadorned form. It contains no devices or embellishments. Considered in the context of the Designated Services, the particular arrangement of the Trade Mark is not sufficient to remove it from the ambit of s 41(3).

1. As I have found that the Trade Mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the Designated Services, the ground of opposition will be established if the Applicant, or its predecessor,12  has not used the Trade Mark before the

10 [2015] FCAFC 156 [126].

11 Applicant’s hearing submissions [38].

12 Section 41(5) of the Act.

relevant date to such an extent that the Trade Mark does in fact distinguish the Designated Services as being those of the Applicant.

1. Accordingly, I now turn to the evidence of use of the Trade Mark by the Applicant or its predecessor.

Evidence of use

1. The Applicant submits that the evidence of use is strong, going back some 40 years, and that the examples of use feature the Trade Mark prominently. In the Applicant’s view, the evidence shows that the Trade Mark does in fact distinguish the Designated Services as being those of the Applicant.

1. In contrast, the Opponent is critical of the evidence purporting to prove acquired distinctiveness. The Opponent submits that the evidence overwhelmingly shows use of the Registered Trade Mark (the details are set out at [15] of this decision) and it does not show use of the Trade Mark as a trade mark.

1. My impression of the evidence is that the bulk of the annexures to the Journeaux Declaration show use of the Registered Trade Mark or slight variations of it. In the Applicant’s hearing submissions, this is referred to as ‘use of the Trade Mark in a stylised form’. Notwithstanding this artful characterization, it will only constitute use of the Trade Mark if the additions or alterations, namely the spider device and elongated ‘M’ and ‘W’, do not substantially affect the identity of the Trade Mark.13

Additions or alterations

1. The test for determining whether additions or alterations do not substantially affect the identity of a trade mark is the same as the test for substantial identity.14 In Sports Warehouse Inc v Fry Consulting Pty Ltd Kenny J stated (citations omitted):

   Windeyer J’s statement of the test for substantial identity (see s 44 of the Act) in Shell Co (Aust) Ltd v Link Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd is also a guide as to whether “a person has used the trade mark with additions or alterations that do not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark” (s

13 Section 7(1) of the Act.

14  Optical 88 Limited v Optical 88 Pty Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 1380 [256]; Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 6 [119] (‘Anchorage’).

7(1)). Adapting Windeyer J’s statement to the inquiry under s 7(1), whether a person has used the trade mark with additions or alterations that do not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark requires a side by side comparison of the trade mark with the alleged use, assessing the importance of their similarities and differences having regard to the essential features of the trade mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison.15

1. The Applicant put forward Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd16 as authority for the proposition that the use of a trade mark in stylised form constitutes use of the trade mark. In Accor, after strongly doubting that five gold stars above the words ‘Harbour Lights’ constituted a device, the Full Court found that the five gold stars were ‘simply an addition to the registered trade mark’ that did ‘not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark in the words alone’. It is no doubt tempting to interpret this to mean that you can add any device to words simpliciter and it will not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark in the words alone. In my opinion the decision of the Full Court is far more nuanced. It reflects that each case turns on its own facts and the trade mark in question must be viewed in the context of those facts.

1. At the hearing, the Applicant’s representative also made a passing reference to E

   & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd.17 I do not consider Gallo to be analogous to the matter at hand; whilst the spider device certainly has some association with pest control, it is not an illustration of the words that form the Trade Mark.

1. Unlike the recent decisions of Accor and Anchorage, in this matter the addition is being added to a combination of words that are not distinctive. In Fry Consulting Pty Ltd v Sports Warehouse Inc (No 2) Dodds-Streeton J stated:

   the addition or subtraction of a prominent element to or from a mark which is capable of distinguishing only as a combination is likely to affect the identity of the mark.18

The spider device is visually striking. The elongated letters ‘m’ and ‘w’, presumably a rudimentary likeness of a  spider,  also  command attention.  The addition of these

15 [2010] FCA 664 [154].

16 [2017] FCAFC 56 (‘Accor’).
17 [2010] HCA 15.

18 [2012] FCA 81 [112].

elements to the words ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’, which I have already found to be utterly devoid of the capacity to distinguish, forms a combination that is capable of distinguishing. The spider device and the stylisation of the letters ‘m’ and ‘w’ are additions that affect the identity of the Trade Mark. I do not consider use of the Registered Trade Mark or slight variations of it, to be use of the Trade Mark.

1. It was also open to the Applicant to submit that the evidence, which showed use of the Registered Trade Mark with slight variations of the placement of the spider device, was in fact use of two separate trade marks (the Trade Mark and a trade mark consisting solely of the spider device) in close proximity. My impression of the relevant examples is that they do not show use of separate trade marks:

   That device was part of the trade mark use; it had a capacity to distinguish. It did not, in my view, operate as a separate mark, or as a mere descriptor. It operated as part of a combination with the word…19

Even if I were of the opinion that the spider device and the words were two separate trade marks, the fact that the device always appears in very close proximity to the words significantly dilutes any trade mark significance that the words may have otherwise had.

Use as a trade mark

1. The Applicant’s evidence contains limited examples of the Trade Mark, many of which do not clearly impart trade mark significance. Use ‘as a trade mark’ is:

   use of the mark as a ‘badge of origin’ in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark to the goods.20

2. Annexures G, H, I, J, N, Q to the Journeaux Declaration contain a variety of documents including Certificates of Registration of Business Name, extracts from the Australian Business Register, Agreement for Sale of Business, policy documents for general public and products liability insurance and certificates of accreditation and membership.

1. Each of the documents contains the words ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’. However, most of the references do not amount to use ‘as a trade mark’. The

19 Colorado Group Limited v Strandbags Group Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 184 [110].

20 Coca-Cola v All-Fect Distributors Ltd [1999] FCA 1721 [19].

annexures listed above overwhelmingly show use of the words ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’ as a business name rather than ‘as a trade mark’. In Shahin Enterprises Pty Ltd v Exxonmobil Oil Corporation Lander J stated:

There is a clear distinction, in my opinion, between conducting business under a particular name and using a mark in respect of goods and services. The intention which the applicant needed to establish was an intention to use a mark to distinguish goods or services in the course of the applicant’s trade from goods or services provided by another person. Because it was established that it intended to use the name to brand its businesses, that does not mean, however, it has established that it has used a mark or a

sign to distinguish goods or services in the course of trade.21

1. Registration of a business name is not prima facie evidence that a sign has been used ‘as a trade mark’. As such, the Certificates of Registration of Business Name and the extracts from the Australian Business Register do little on their own to support the Applicant’s claims. The remaining documents, some of which only contain the Trade Mark in the addressee details or in references such as ‘Ligano T/A Manly Warringah Pest Control’, are obviously referring to, or identifying the business rather than being, in my estimation, use ‘as a trade mark’ in relation to the services.

1. The Journeaux Declaration states that the Applicant has operated the website – - since 2002. Use of a domain name can amount to use ‘as a trade mark’.22 However, in this instance the domain name does not incorporate the entirety of the Trade Mark; the domain name does not include the word ‘control’. As such, it does not amount to use of the Trade Mark. I also note that the examples of the website sourced from the Wayback Machine

   show the Registered Trade Mark. At the hearing, the Applicant asserted that the captures of this website dated 10 May 2013 and 4 March 2016 show use of the Trade Mark on a vehicle. As pointed out by the Opponent, the use on the vehicles is in combination with the spider device.

1. I accept that Annexure F to the Journeaux Declaration shows use of the Trade Mark ‘as a trade mark’. Annexure F consists of quotes in relation to pest control services issued by the Applicant’s predecessor between 1997 and 1999. The Trade

21 [2005] FCA 1278 [73].

22 Sports Warehouse, Inc v Fry Consulting Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 664.

Mark is shown prominently on the top of each quotation. However, this use is limited to a two year period, approximately 20 years before the filing date of the Trade Mark.

Third party declarations

1. The Applicant has provided approximately 70 statements from individuals and businesses. Each statement attests to how long the person, or business, has known of ‘the business MANLY WARRINGAH PEST CONTROL for its pest management services’ and that they have ‘never been confused or misled as to the origin of the pest control services’.

1. The fact that people attest to knowing of the business Manly Warringah Pest Control, does not on its own demonstrate that the Trade Mark has the capacity to distinguish one trader services from those of another trader.23 It is necessary to establish that the awareness or association is because of the use of the words ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’ as a trade mark. In this regard, I note the following from Woolworths Limited v BP Plc (No. 2):

   It is necessary for BP to establish that the association is referrable to the use of the mark as a trade mark.24

I do not find the 70 or so statements to be of great assistance to the Applicant’s case. The standard wording that has been used in the statements refers to awareness of ‘the business MANLY WARRINGAH PEST CONTROL’. This suggests to me that the awareness is of the business named Manly Warringah Pest Control; it says nothing about the awareness being referable to the use of the words ‘Manly Warringah Pest Control’ as a trade mark.

Sales figures, advertising expenses etc.

1. The Applicant has provided annual revenue and advertising expenditure for the financial years 2008/2009 through to 2016/2017. The relevance of this evidence depends on whether it could be linked to sales and other relevant transactions that have occurred by reference to, or in relation to, the Trade Mark.

1. Given that the Applicant’s evidence overwhelmingly shows use of the Registered Trade Mark, it is not clear what portion of the revenue and expenditure is attributable to use of the Trade Mark, or one that consists of additions or alterations that do not substantially affect its identity.

23 Chocolaterie Guylian N.V. v Registrar of Trade Marks [2009] FCA 891 [100].

24 [2006] FCAFC 132 [117].

1. When I weigh the evidence before me together with the extent that the Trade Mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the services, I find that the combined effect does not overcome the s 41 ground for rejection.

1. The s 41 ground of opposition has been established.

Decision

1. Section 55 of the Act relevantly provides:

(1)Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:

(a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or

(b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;

having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.

1. The Opponent has established the ground of opposition under s 41 of the Act. Accordingly I refuse to register trade mark number 1781837.

1. As I have found that the ground of opposition has been established in relation to all of the services claimed in the trade mark application, it is unnecessary for me to consider the remaining grounds that were argued. Those grounds, and any others under the Act, will be available to the Opponent to pursue in the event that this decision is appealed.

Costs

1. The parties sought costs. It is usual for costs to follow the event, and I see no reason to depart from that principle. I award costs, according to the official scale set out in Schedule 8 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995, against the Applicant.

Katrina Brown Hearing Officer

Oppositions & Hearings 30 October 2018