Rivett Arboricultural & Waste Equipment Hire Pty Ltd v Conor Patrick Evans

Link copied
Case Copied 86 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

RIVETT ARBORICULTURAL & WASTE EQUIPMENT HIRE PTY LTD & ORS v CONOR PATRICK EVANS & ORS

[2007] SASC 108

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Duggan and The Honourable Justice Gray)

29 March 2007

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - ESSENTIALS OF  ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE - DUTY OF CARE

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

EMPLOYMENT LAW - RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND THIRD PERSONS - LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYER - FOR TORTS OF EMPLOYEE - FOR WHAT ACTS LIABLE -- COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT AND SCOPE OF AUTHORITY

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DAMAGES

TRADE AND COMMERCE - TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) AND RELATED LEGISLATION - CONSUMER PROTECTION

Appeal against findings of liability - the first respondent (Conor) was injured whilst using a wood chipper that was manufactured by the first appellant (Rivett), retailed by the second appellant (Arbor) and owned by the third respondent and cross-appellant (WMC) – the second respondent (Christopher) suffered psychological injury as a result of witnessing Conor's injury - Conor worked for a voluntary organisation that had use of the wood chipper on WMC’s premises – trial Judge found that Rivett, Arbor and WMC breached duties of care owed to Conor and Christopher - the Judge apportioned responsibility - 70% against Rivett and Arbor and 30% against WMC – Rivett, Arbor and WMC appealed on the grounds that they were not liable that Conor was contributorily negligent and that the Judge erred in apportioning liability – Rivett and Arbor further appealed on the ground that the Judge erred in rejecting the claim against the fourth respondent (Mr Zwar)– duty of care and scope of duty of WMC, Rivett and Arbor – whether WMC was vicariously liable for the actions of Mr Zwar – contributory negligence – apportionment - consideration of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – Held: Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

Trades Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52, s 53(aa), s 53(c) and s 75AD; Occupational Health Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA) s 19, s 23 and s 24A; Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) s 17C; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 20, referred to.
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; James v Williams (2003) 228 LSJS 232; Evans & Evans v Rivett Arboricultural & Waste Equipment Hire P/L & Ors [2005] SADC 172; Graham Barclay Oysters P/L v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511; Fitzgerald v Penn (1954) 91 CLR 268; March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 506; Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408; Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1; Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232; Betts v Whittingslowe (1946) 71 CLR 637; Donoghue…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Rivett Arboricultural & Waste Equipment Hire Pty Ltd v Conor... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2007] SASC 108
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Rivett Arboricultural & Waste Equipment Hire Pty Ltd and two others appealed against findings of liability in the South Australian District Court, which held that they were liable for injuries sustained by Conor Patrick Evans and his father, Christopher Evans. Conor was injured while using a wood chipper on premises owned by WMC, and Christopher suffered psychological injury as a result of witnessing Conor's injury. The trial judge found that Rivett, Arbor, and WMC breached duties of care owed to Conor and Christopher and apportioned responsibility, with 70% against Rivett and Arbor, and 30% against WMC. The appellants argued that they were not liable, that Conor was contributorily negligent, and that the judge erred in apportioning liability. Rivett and Arbor further argued that the judge erred in rejecting the claim against the fourth respondent, Mr Zwar, regarding the duty of care and scope of duty of WMC, Rivett, and Arbor, and whether WMC was vicariously liable for Mr Zwar's actions. The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The court had to determine whether WMC, Rivett, and Arbor were liable for Conor's and Christopher's injuries, whether WMC was vicariously liable for Mr Zwar's actions, and if Conor was contributorily negligent. The court also had to consider the apportionment of responsibility and the applicability of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The appellate court reviewed the trial and the judge's reasons, bearing in mind the limitations of an appellate court proceeding on the record. The court found that the trial judge's findings were not erroneous and that the appellants' arguments were not persuasive.

The court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding that WMC, Rivett, and Arbor were liable for Conor's and Christopher's injuries. The court found that WMC was vicariously liable for Mr Zwar's actions, and that Conor was not contributorily negligent. The court also found that the apportionment of responsibility was appropriate and that the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was not applicable. The court varied the costs order made by the trial judge, ordering that the first defendant (Rivett) and the second defendant (Arbor) pay the third defendant's (WMC) costs in relation to the quantum of the first plaintiff's damages after 12 August 2005, these costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client. The parties were to be heard as to any incidental orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Fox v Percy,[4] Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ summarised the approach to be taken by intermediate appellate courts:[5]The “rehearing” does not involve a completely fresh hearing by the appellate court of all the evidence. That court proceeds on the basis of the record and any fresh evidence that, exceptionally, it admits. …The foregoing procedure shapes the requirements, and limitations, of such an appeal. On the one hand, the appellate court is obliged to “give the judgment which in its opinion ought to have been given in the first instance”. On the other, it must, of necessity, observe the “natural limitations” that exist in the case of any appellate court proceeding wholly or substantially on the record. These limitations include the disadvantage that the appellate court has when compared with the trial judge in respect of the evaluation of witnesses’ credibility and of the “feeling” of a case which an appellate court, reading the transcript, cannot always fully share. Furthermore, the appellate court does not typically get taken to, or read, all of the evidence taken at the trial. Commonly, the trial judge therefore has advantages that derive from the obligation at trial to receive and consider the entirety of the evidence and the opportunity, normally over a longer interval, to reflect upon that evidence and to draw conclusions from it, viewed as a whole.…Within the constraints marked out by the nature of the appellate process, the appellate court is obliged to conduct a real review of the trial and, in cases where the trial was conducted before a judge sitting alone, of that judge’s reasons. Appellate courts are not excused from the task of “weighing conflicting evidence and drawing [their] own inferences and conclusions, though [they] should always bear in mind that [they have] neither seen nor heard the witnesses, and should make due allowance in this respect”.The foregoing principles govern this appeal.[6][4] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118.[5] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [22] – [23], [25] (footnotes omitted)[6] James v Williams (2003) 228 LSJS 232 at [26]-[27].Background Before coming to address the issues on appeal it is necessary to consider the background to the incident leading to the plaintiffs injuries. The Incident On Saturday 28 April 2000, Conor was working at the Green Machine yard on premises owned and occupied by WMC, in Roxby Downs, South Australia. At the time, Conor had worked as a volunteer with the Green Machine for 2 to 3 years. Throughout the afternoon, Conor dragged foliage towards the wood chipper, fed foliage into the wood chipper, loaded the chipped material onto the trailers of customers and generally cleaned up. The Judge described the incident as follows:[7][7] Evans & Evans v Rivett Arboricultural & Waste Equipment Hire P/L & Ors [2005] SADC 172 at [14]-[16].Conor said that around 5:00 pm, it was towards the end of the day, he still had some further vegetation to be mulched. The material was at ground level and he was behind and to the right of the machine facing the infeed chute. He described what happened as follows:Around the time of the accident the mulch pile was starting to get quite low, it was almost time to knock off, but there was still a fair bit of – it was mainly smaller stuff. I think, from memory, it was probably wattle, or something along that line, just small bushy and very leafy, and it was, like I said, towards the end of the day, so things were getting a lot smaller, the job seemed a lot easier.Conor said that he had been bending down to ground level to collect the material. He was unable to recall clearly, but thought that he was to the right of the infeed chute with his knee within the vicinity of the knee bar. He went on:A.I remember dragging materials up. It was just like any other time of the day, just hard work, dragging the materials up to the machine. I noticed mum and dad were both off to the side of the machine, they were preparing – turning around and stacking things so it was a bit easier to feed through the machine. I jumped off a pile of branches and started feeding them through the machine. I don’t have a memory at all of how I got caught at all – I just remember hanging on – I’m pretty sure I was to the top of the feed chute. I just remember hanging on.Q. With what. What were you hanging on with?A.Sorry, my left hand. I just remember hanging on and threw my leg up. I don’t think I even thought about it. I think I just did it and managed to hit the reverse bar, which put the roller in reverse. I just instantly started to feel relieved. I slid out of the machine. I was more being pushed, really, and I slid out onto the ground just in front of the feed chute. I remember looking at where my hand was. …It was quickly apparent to all present that Conor had lost the lower part of his right arm.…On 29 April 2000, the following day, Conor noticed a small lump above his right ear which was tender. He said that the lump was two to three centimetres long, five to seven millimetres wide and about five millimetres high. He also noticed a series of lacerations/ abrasions across his arm at approximately three to four centimetre intervals which, he surmised, were caused by the teeth of the infeed roller. He also had a large laceration/ abrasion on his right shoulder blade.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ (dissent) DUGGAN J (dissent)
The Judge made a slip with respect to costs. It was agreed that in the event of the appeal being dismissed it was appropriate for this court to vary the costs order made by the Judge. The variation to be made is to order that the first defendant (Rivett) and the second defendant (Arbor) pay the third defendant’s (WMC) costs in relation to the quantum of the first plaintiff’s damages after 12 August 2005, these costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client. Conclusion These appeals should be dismissed. The parties should be heard as to any incidental orders.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.