Richardson v Poon

Case [2023] QCATA 85


QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Richardson v Poon  [2023] QCATA 85

PARTIES:

NEIL CHARLES RICHARDSON

(appellant)

v  

SARAH POON

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL096-22

ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S:

MCD148/21

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

4 July 2023

HEARING DATE:

19 April 2023

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Richard Oliver

ORDERS:

Leave to appeal is refused

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – LEGAL PROFESSION – CONTRACT BETWEEN SOLICITOR AND BARRISTER – where the respondent barrister provided to the applicant solicitor a costs disclosure and retainer agreement – where applicant did not specifically accept the terms of the agreement – where agreement included a term of deemed acceptance by conduct – where the respondent undertook work in accordance with the applicant’s briefed instructions – whether the applicant accepted the offer contained in the costs agreement – whether acceptance by conduct – whether applicant bound by the costs agreement – whether the applicant liable for the fees rendered to the applicant under the costs agreement – whether separate agreement between the client and barrister to pay fees.

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 209 s 143(3)(a)(i)

Legal Profession Act 2007 ss 309 and 322

Principles of Contract Law; Robertson & Paterson 6th ed.

Empirnall Holdings Pty Ltd v Machon Paull Partners ty Ltd

(1988) NSWLR 523 at 535

Rintoul v State of Queensland & Ors [2018] QCA 20

Bayly v Westbank Banking Corporation [2020]

QCA148;

RWC Plumbing & Excavations v Camporeale Holdings

Pty Ltd [2017

Terera v Clifford [2017] QCA 181

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented

Respondent:

Self-represented

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. There was a time when a barrister could not sue an instructing solicitor for fees when briefed to act on behalf of a client. Traditionally the relationship between barrister and solicitor was not one of contract but what might be called a moral obligation, or convention, on the solicitor to pay a barrister fee. It was for the solicitor to ensure that sufficient monies were secured from the client to pay the fees. The usual procedure, in most cases, is for the anticipated outlays for counsel to be paid into the solicitor’s trust account.

  2. However, since the introduction of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (“LPA”) a barrister can now enter into a costs agreement with the instructing solicitor and can sue on the agreement to recover fees if not paid. [1]  In fact, it is recommended as good practice to do so to ensure there is no doubt about the liability of the solicitor to pay the barrister’s fee. It goes without saying that the costs agreement must satisfy all of the necessary criteria to be a valid and enforceable contract.

    [1]Legal Profession Act 2007 s 322

  3. This is an appeal from a decision of the minor civil disputes jurisdiction of the Tribunal where it was found that Ms Poon, a practicing barrister, and Mr Richardson, as practising solicitor, did enter into an enforceable…

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AGLC
Richardson v Poon [2023] QCATA 85
Case
[2023] QCATA 85
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Richardson, a solicitor, filed an appeal against a decision to enter judgment in default against him for unpaid fees owed to Poon, a barrister. The dispute arose from a costs disclosure and retainer agreement provided by Poon to Richardson, which included a clause that deemed acceptance by conduct if Richardson did not expressly reject the terms. Richardson did not specifically accept the agreement but proceeded to undertake work as instructed by Poon. The primary legal issue was whether Richardson was bound by the costs agreement and liable for the fees rendered, given his conduct did not expressly reject the terms.

The court examined whether the terms of the costs agreement were clear and if Richardson's conduct amounted to acceptance by conduct. It noted that Poon had provided clear terms and conditions, including a deemed acceptance clause. The court found that Richardson's actions in proceeding with the work and receiving the services without objection constituted acceptance by conduct. It held that the costs agreement was binding on Richardson and that he was liable for the fees rendered.

The court concluded that Richardson's conduct of continuing to receive services without objection to the terms amounted to acceptance by conduct, binding him to the costs agreement. The court further held that Richardson was liable for the fees rendered under the agreement, and there was no separate agreement between Richardson and Poon's client to pay the fees.

The court refused leave to appeal, affirming the original decision that Richardson was liable for the fees as per the costs agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

Leave to appeal is refused

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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