Renton and Stapleton
[2014] FCCA 1598
•24 July 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| RENTON & STAPLETON | [2014] FCCA 1598 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Priority of Court’s attention to protection of children from family violence and exposure to risk thereof – parenting issues in light of domestic violence of Father and his assault on Mother’s brother – best interest considerations in application by Mother to remain in town to which she relocated without Father’s consent – Mother’s application to travel overseas to visit sick grandparent. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975, ss.60CA, 60B(1) & (2), 60CC(2)(a) & (b), 60CC(2A), 60CC(3)(a) – (i), 61DA, 65DAA |
| Cales v Cales (2010) 251 FLR 454; (2011) 44 Fam LR 376 Collu & Rinaldo [2010] FamCAFC 53 McCall v Clark (2009) 41 Fam LR 483 Maluka v Maluka (2012) 45 Fam LR 129 Mazorski v Albright (2008) 37 Fam LR 518 Moose & Moose (2008) FLC ¶93-375 Morgan v Miles (2008) 38 Fam LR 275 Sayer v Radcliffe (2013) 48 Fam LR 298 Taylor v Barker (2008) 37 Fam LR 461 |
| Applicant: | MR RENTON |
| Respondent: | MS STAPLETON |
| File Number: | CAC 378 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Neville |
| Hearing dates: | 27 & 28 November 2013; 28 May 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 28 May 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Canberra |
| Delivered on: | 24 July 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr P. Glissan |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | P W Gilderdale, Forbes |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr M. Hassall |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Sheekey Williams, Wagga Wagga |
| Solicitor/Advocate for the Independent Children's Lawyer: | Ms L. Hansen |
| Solicitors for the Independent Children's Lawyer: | Friedlieb Byrne, Wagga Wagga |
ORDERS
The Mother is to have sole parental responsibility for the children, X (born (omitted) 2009) and Y (born (omitted) 2011) (“the children”);
The Mother is to keep the Father informed of all major, long-term decisions regarding the children;
The children are to live with the Mother;
The Mother be permitted to reside with the children in (omitted), New South Wales;
For a period of four (4) months from the date of these orders, the Father’s time with the children be supervised and the facilities of the Children’s Contact Service in (omitted) be utilised, to the maximum extent provided by that contact centre and in consultation with the Independent Children’s Lawyer;
After a period of four (4) months has passed, and upon compliance with Orders 10 and 11 of these orders, the Independent Children’s Lawyer is to review the notes from the contact centre, and if in her view the children’s time with their Father has proceeded without relevant incident, for the following two (2) months the children are to spend time with their Father at the paternal grandparents’ house every second Saturday from 10am until 4.00pm;
If the time the children spend with their Father continues to proceed without relevant incident in the view of the Independent Children’s Lawyer, the children will spend time with their Father every second weekend from 4.00pm Friday until 4.00pm Sunday, unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parents;
If the time the children spend with their Father does not proceed smoothly or to the satisfaction of the Independent Children’s Lawyer, supervised time is to resume (or continue) for a period of four (4) months, again to be reviewed by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, and an increase in time to take place when the Independent Children’s Lawyer is satisfied that this is appropriate;
For the purposes of Orders 5-7 of these orders, changeover is to occur as determined by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, with regard to the progress of the ongoing contact arrangements, and after input in writing from each of the parties (of no more than one (1) page);
The Father is to enrol in, attend and complete a post-separation parenting course within four (4) months of the date of these orders, and he is to provide evidence of doing so to the Independent Children’s Lawyer;
The Father is to enrol in, attend and complete an anger management course within four (4) months of the date of these orders, and he is to provide evidence of doing so to the Independent Children’s Lawyer;
This matter is now finalised and will be immediately removed from the docket.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Renton & Stapleton is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT WAGGA WAGGA |
CAC 378 of 2013
| MR RENTON |
Applicant
And
| MS STAPLETON |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is a parenting matter that has some elements of issues that are more usually found in cases that involve relocation, albeit after the event. It concerns two young boys, X (aged almost 5 years) and Y (aged 3 years). Their Father lives in (omitted); their Mother (who is a national of (country omitted) and who also has dual citizenship, Australia and (country omitted)) now lives in (omitted). The distance between these two cities is approximately 250 kilometres or a drive of some 3 hours or thereabouts.
The boys live with their Mother. Unfortunately, for some time, they have not spent time with their Father.
It is accepted that the Mother moved the residence of the children from (omitted) without the consent of the Father, and without the consent of the Court. She says that, for safety reasons, it was necessary that she move urgently to a safe location away from the Father, and also (she says) from his family in the (omitted) area. The Mother says that she was assaulted by the Father in January 2013 shortly before he left (omitted) and moved to (omitted) the following month.
There have been criminal proceedings against the Father, which have involved, among other things, an assault on the Mother’s brother, which assault took place in front of the children. In July 2013, the Father was convicted of common assault. He was placed on a good behaviour bond for 12 months.
By way of overview, I note the following in relation to the Father’s engagement with police. In January 2010, the Father was charged with two counts of destroy/damage property; he received a s.10 dismissal of the two charges. In January 2013, the Father was convicted for “cultivating”; he received a fine. In February 2013, the Father was charged with common assault on the Mother; it was dismissed in March 2013. In March 2013, the Father was arrested and charged with breach of an ADVO. Later in March, the Father pleaded guilty to breach of the ADVO. Also later in March, the Father was again charged with assault of, and breach of an ADVO in relation to, the Mother.
In addition to the above, there have been a number of occasions when the Father has retained the children without the Mother’s consent.
In general terms, I accept the following list, provided by the independent children’s lawyer (“the ICL”), as the issues in dispute between the parties:
(a)Whether the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies.
(b)Whether there has been family violence within the meaning of section 60CC (2) (b).
(c)Whether the Mother and the children should return to live in (omitted).
(d)The Father's anger issues and their impact on his ability to have any relationship with the Mother, promote the Mother’s relationship with the children and care for X and Y.
(e)The Father's use of marijuana and the extent to which it impacts on the well-being of the children and the Father's ability to care for the children.
(f)The attitude of the Father to the responsibilities of parenthood and towards the Mother.
(g)The fact that the Father has not complied with the Interim Orders made by this Court on 30 July 2013 in that he refused to:
·Enrol in and complete a post separation parenting course;
·Enrol in and complete an anger management course;
·Attend the (omitted) Children's Contact Service and complete the required intake assessment to enabled supervised visits between the Father and the children to take place;
·Undergo random drug urinalysis testing as requested by the ICL;
(h)Whether there is sufficient evidence to make final Orders other than orders for supervised contact.
(i)The extent to which final Orders which provide for the children to spend supervised time with their Father would be practicable and otherwise promote X and Y’s relationship with their Father in the long term.
In addition to the above “list”, in her case outline, the ICL noted the following matters or related “concerns” about which there is or can be little dispute (save perhaps in relation to sub-paragraph (d)):
The ICL is concerned about the Father’s attitude towards to the Mother and the negative impact that this could have with respect to the children. The ICL is further concerned about the Father’s apparent lack of insight into the children’s needs in that he:
(a) Refuses to accept that the Mother is likely the primary emotional attachment figure for the children (letter dated 5 June 2013) particularly in light of ages of the children and the fact that the Mother was breast feeding Y until March 2013;
(b) Has on previous occasions refused to return the children to the Mother’s care despite there being an earlier agreement and, later, Orders;
(c) Has refused to undertake any intake assessment with the Children’s Contact Service in (omitted) which would have enabled supervised time with the children to have commenced as early as August 2013. The Father has in correspondence from his solicitor advised that “he will not agree under any circumstances to supervised contact only at the (omitted) Contact Centre.” (letter dated 26 July 2013). The primary reasons given for this refusal is that the Father’s extended family will not be able to spend time with the children and also the Father’s current financial situation although there is no formal evidence from the Father in this regard.
(d) Refuses to acknowledge that his actions may have in any way negatively impacted on the overall well-being of the children.
(e) Refused to comply with any of the interim orders dated 30 July 2013 in relation to enrolling in and attending a post separation parenting programme or an anger management course.
(f) Refused to comply with the request of the ICL to undergo drug urinalysis testing made 1 August 2013 until 6 November 2013, three months after the initial request. The Father has refused to comply with two further requests for urinalysis testing on the basis of financial hardship.
Some of the issues that need to be taken into consideration are:
(i) The ages of the children;
(ii) The distance between the parties;
(iii) The need for the children to have a meaningful relationship with the Father.
(iv) The practicability of Father spending time with the children given the distance between the parties and the parties’ financial circumstances.
Although the final hearing took place in Wagga Wagga in November 2013, and final written submissions were received by the Court in February 2014, there has been a further, more recent application (by the Mother) in relation to, among other things, passports and overseas travel for the boys. This application was heard in Wagga Wagga on 28th May 2014, at which time the Father gave sworn evidence in relation to parenting matters more generally. This more recent evidence is relevant to the Court’s determination of final parenting orders. There was the opportunity to cross-examine the Father at this recent hearing, but both the Mother’s lawyer and the ICL had no questions for the Father, and otherwise did not challenge his brief oral evidence.[1]
[1] Noted later in these reasons are details (including submissions and orders) in relation to the Mother’s more recent application to travel overseas, which the Court permitted.
It is sufficient for current purposes simply to note that the Father’s most recent evidence indicates, finally, a more amenable and child-focussed approach, as opposed to his [former] belligerent and oppositional stance, about which I comment later in these reasons.
Further written submissions were provided by the parties and the ICL in the light of the Father’s most recent evidence.
After setting out the orders sought by the parties and the ICL, these reasons proceed with a consideration of the evidence (oral and written) from each of the parties as well as the family consultant (Ms S), followed by a discussion of the legislative schema set out in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”).
Orders Sought
The Applicant Father sought orders in the following terms:
1. Each party be and are hereby restrained from removing and/or causing or allowing the children, X, born (omitted) 2009 (X) and Y, born (omitted) 2011 (Y) (hereinafter referred to as “the children”) to be removed from the Commonwealth of Australia;
2. The Mother return to the (omitted) area with the children and reside there;
3. The Mother and the children be restrained from residing outside the (omitted) Local Area;
4. The children X and Y live with the Mother from 5pm Sunday until 5pm Sunday in alternate weeks;
5. The children live with the Father at all other times;
6. The children spend time with each parent during alternate weeks as otherwise agreed between the parties;
7. The parties have equal shared parental responsibility of the children;
8. The parties provide each other with up to date contact details, including address and telephone contact number and advise of any change to these details no more than 24 hours after the change has occurred;
9. The Mother/Father authorise any school or day care the children may from time to time be attending to forward to the Father copies of all school reports, notices, newsletters or other documents usually sent to the parents and the Mother/Father is permitted to attend any school, sport or other function involving the children or order any photographs depicting the children that parents are invited to order;
10. Each party will authorise any medical practitioner or paramedical service provider to provide to the other party details of all medical conditions and treatments for the children;
11. Each party will inform the other as soon as practically possible of any medical or other emergencies involving the children whilst the children are in the relevant parent’s care.
The orders sought by the Respondent Mother are as follows:
1. The children, X, born (omitted) 2009 and Y, born (omitted) 2011 (“the children”) live with the Mother;
2. The Mother have sole parental responsibility for the children;
3. The children spend time with the Father as agreed between the parties;
4. Both parties sign all documents and do all things necessary to allow the Mother to obtain Australian and (country omitted) passports for the children;
5. The Mother be permitted to travel with the children out of Australia for up to one month each year;
6. Such further or other Orders as this Honourable Court deems fit.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer proposed orders in the following terms:
1. The children live with the Mother in (omitted).
2. For a period of not less than six months from the date of any Order that:
a.The children spend time with the Father for the maximum amount of time in a supervised setting as follows:
i. On two occasions per month at the Children’s Contact Service in (omitted);
ii. On two occasions per month at Interrelate in (omitted).
b.The Father enrol in and complete:
i. An anger management course; and
ii. A post separation parenting course.
And provide proof of enrolment and completion to the ICL.
3. The Father undergo random drug urinalysis testing within 48 hours of a request being made by the ICL and provide a copy of the report to the ICL when available.
4. The matter is reviewed further after the period of supervised time.
Evidence of the Parties
The Father’s Evidence
At the outset of the Father’s evidence, he confirmed that he was pursuing an (omitted) degree through (omitted) University and that he continued to live with his parents in (omitted). He had completed four units as at the date of the trial, which would give him approximately another three or four years to complete his studies. In the meantime, he said that he receives money pursuant to ‘New Start’. His limited income, he said, makes it extremely difficult for him to travel to (omitted) to see his children with any degree of regularity.
Putting aside his well-developed and often-expressed grievance at earlier Court orders to spend time initially with his children supervised at a contact centre in (omitted), Mr Renton said that his primary or sole reason for not spending time with the children as directed was because of the financial constraints to which I have referred.
Also at the beginning of his oral evidence, Mr Renton confirmed his vehement disagreement with the order that his time be supervised, even at the outset and even if only for a relatively short period of time. This was a theme and/or comment to which he referred with alarming frequency in the course of his evidence at trial and at a later hearing in May 2014 pursuant to a more recent application by the Mother. It did not matter one jot how many times the Court requested, directed and even pleaded with Mr Renton to refrain from repeating that supervision was not required; he maintained his rage throughout the whole of the proceedings and beyond.
He said that he would be willing to participate in supervised time “if he had to” but did not see any justification for it.[2]
[2] T 20.
Also as he did regularly in his oral evidence, Mr Renton said that the person who was in need of supervised time with the children was the Mother because, he said, she cannot handle the boys, she is the one with a history of mental illness, and that he was the primary attachment figure and caregiver for the boys. Again he stated that if he had to spend supervised time with the children he would, but that he and his parents “totally disagreed to it” because there was no need.[3]
[3] T 22.
It was put to him that if he complied with Court orders it would show that he was prepared to cooperate even in circumstances where he disagreed with the orders, and to put the children’s needs before his own. To this he replied that he was sure that it would, but “the point of the matter is, it’s not needed”.[4]
[4] T 22.
He also confirmed that if supervision was part of the final orders of the Court, he would immediately appeal the decision.[5]
[5] See T 22 and 23.
He said he understood the distinction between orders that were good for the boys, as opposed to orders that he wished and that suited himself better. However, from the Court’s perspective, given his hostility towards the orders generally, and his lack of compliance with them, there is some doubt as to whether his professed understanding and acceptance of what was in the children’s best interests was/is properly or sufficiently understood or appreciated.
In relation to an incident that gave rise to charges being laid against him for assault on the Mother’s brother, the Father said that the children were “present, but not in the vicinity” of where the assault took place. He would not accept that his actions could have a significant negative impact on the children; invariably he sought to deflect his responsibility, and instead to focus upon what he saw as the negative and controlling impact of the Mother’s conduct on the children.[6]
[6] T 23.
Again he professed that he did not need and would not agree to his time being supervised, nor would he agree that, even for a short time, by way of reintroduction of the children to the Father, that his time with them be spent at a contact centre.[7]
[7] T 24-25.
Mr Renton stressed that he would be content for the Mother to return to (omitted) which is approximately 20 minutes away from his residence (with his parents); he also said that there was a large amount of his family in the area who could assist with the boys and with whom the boys had a good relationship.[8]
[8] T 26.
The paternal grandparents have assisted the Father financially and otherwise in the past; Mr Renton said he would seek financial assistance from them if it was the only way of ensuring he would get to see the children. Unfortunately, as at the time of the trial, Mr Renton had taken no such course.[9]
[9] T 28.
Mr Renton also said that he would be content to comply with orders if someone else assisted him financially.[10]
[10] See T 29.
Mr Renton confirmed that, prior to orders being made regarding supervision, he was travelling between (omitted) and (omitted) on a regular basis.[11] Although he said that he would do anything, “whatever it takes”, to spend time with his boys, the reality is that he has not done so primarily because of his abject refusal to comply with orders to spend time initially with the children at a contact centre.
[11] T 32.
In terms of his general disposition, he said that he was frustrated with the Court proceedings (a not unusual outlook in litigation in this Court) that generally he was a reasonably calm person, and that it took quite a lot to get him “worked up”. From the Court’s perspective, over the course of the matter, and in the light of his assault on the Mother’s brother, his claim to be usually reasonably calm perhaps needs to be qualified somewhat.[12]
[12] T 33.
With a very obvious sense of grievance if not outrage, Mr Renton said he did not see that it was fair that the Mother could simply leave (omitted) with the children with the consequence that their time with the Father was thereby prevented or made very much more difficult.[13]
[13] T 34.
The Father confirmed that he was convicted for assault but then remonstrated about the evidence that was used in the criminal proceedings.[14]
[14] T 36.
Later in his evidence he returned to the question of financial assistance from his parents in order to enable him to see the boys at the contact centre. He stressed that that assistance would not be provided because they (i.e. the grandparents) were not going to get anything out of it, nor did the grandparents agree with it.[15]
[15] T 37.
It might be remarked here that regularly throughout his cross-examination, the Father was quite argumentative with Counsel for the Mother. It was also the case that, regularly throughout his cross-examination, the focus of the Father was significantly upon the imposition on him or his parents (and the converse – what was the benefit to him and/or to the grandparents), rather than what was in the best interests of the children. It is also perhaps fair to observe that in Mr Renton’s perspective, the children’s interests and his interests, are, in large measure, identical or very similar. Again, he indicated that it was the Mother who needed supervision.[16]
[16] T 38.
While I accept Mr Renton’s frustration at cumbersome Court processes, as well as his inability to spend time with his children, at the same time he often showed very poor insight into the needs of the children and his own responsibilities as a parent. He regularly allowed his frustrations to get the better of him; he struck me often as being unable to control his frustration and equally, that frustration (or other things) made it extremely difficult for him to have the necessary insight into the best interests of the children, as I have said.
Further to his earlier evidence, Mr Renton confirmed his view that all of the issues before the Court were caused by the Mother’s actions. He said: “she has created the whole situation”.[17]
[17] T 40.
Quite alarmingly, he said further that he did not see the Mother’s interests at all related to the welfare of the boys. It was, in his view, an “all or nothing” situation. The boys would be better off with him and his family in (omitted), and not with the Mother.[18]
[18] T 41.
The following evidence related to the Father’s cross-examination by the ICL.
The Father confirmed that he would have to fund his studies into the future, and that he would just simply have to “work it out”. This and related questions obviously related to his capacity to pay for travel to and from (omitted) to spend time with the children.[19]
[19] T 43-44.
It was confirmed to him by the ICL that the Mother had offered to pay the cost at the contact centre for the Father to spend time with the boys. He would not accept this offer.[20]
[20] T 46.
In this regard he also said that he could not afford to do any anger management course.[21] And again, he confirmed that although he could seek financial assistance from his parents, he would not do so, and they would not provide funds (he said) because, like him, the grandparents would not agree to Mr Renton’s time with the children being supervised.[22]
[21] T 47.
[22] T 48.
The Father confirmed that he would not consider moving to (omitted); he said he knew the boys did not wish to live in (omitted).[23]
[23] T 52.
The Father also confirmed that the boys were completely happy when they were in his care, and that they are very different children when they are with their Mother. This evidence was part and parcel of his unvarnished, undiminished and unrelenting antipathy towards the Mother and his general denigration of her.[24]
[24] T 55.
In answer to some questions put by me to Mr Renton in the light of comments that are recorded in the Family Report, Mr Renton said that in his view he was being discriminated against as the Father of the children and that everything was more positive for Ms Stapleton, simply because she was the children’s Mother. In this regard he also repeated that he was the primary attachment figure for the boys.[25]
[25] T 56.
It is convenient to record here that, in the context of the Mother’s recent application for the children to travel with her overseas (noting that she had sought orders in her Further Amended Response filed 7th November 2013 for regular – as in once per year up to a period of one month – travel overseas with the boys), the Father gave further sworn evidence on 28th May 2014. He was very briefly asked questions by me.
Unlike his position at the hearing last November, on this more recent occasion the Father said that he would accept seeing the children supervised at a contact centre. The change in attitude is surely to be welcomed. The ICL indicated that she would assist him in ensuring the relevant procedural matters were complied with to facilitate supervised time taking place at the earliest opportunity.
The Mother’s Evidence
At the outset of the Mother’s oral evidence, the Mother confirmed that she had enrolled at (omitted) University with a view to studying (course omitted), which was to commence in the first semester “next year” (i.e. 2014).[26]
[26] T 63.
As is noted later in these reasons, in the course of the Mother’s more recent application to travel overseas with the children, her solicitor advised the Court that she had in fact enrolled in (omitted) University in Melbourne to study (course omitted) in the second semester of 2014.[27]
[27] T 63.
The Mother confirmed that she did not seek, either from the Father or from the Court, permission to relocate to (omitted) and to remain living there.
Ms Stapleton was asked a series of questions relating to the Father’s “anger” (a) at the time of separation and (b) since separation. The Mother confirmed that there “have been numerous occasions where I have witnessed the Father’s anger.”[28] She confirmed that when he was angry, she would not feel safe in his presence. She could not comment on the different levels of intensity of the Father’s anger.
[28] T 70.
She acknowledged that the boys missed their Father and wished to spend time with him.[29]
[29] T 70.
She wished that time with the Father to be in a “safe environment”, which she said should be at the contact centre in (omitted). She did not think that “at this stage” the paternal grandparents’ residence would be such a safe environment.[30] She confirmed that she would be amenable to some sort of transition going from supervised time at a contact centre to the boys spending time with their Dad at the grandparents’ residence.[31]
[30] T 70.
[31] T 71.
The Mother confirmed that X also loved to play with his cousin A at the grandparents’ place. The Mother acknowledged that the boys wished to go to their grandparents’ house, also to obtain presents that are being kept there from Christmas and other occasions. The Mother acknowledged that the children have a good relationship with the paternal grandparents.[32]
[32] T 73.
In the context of the children learning (country omitted), the Mother said that this was to facilitate, among other things, the children speaking with the maternal Grandmother via Skype on almost a daily basis. In the same answer, the Mother said that she did not intend immediately to repatriate but wanted the boys to have education and employment opportunities from being able to speak a second language.[33]
[33] T 73.
The Mother further confirmed that she could not give a definitive answer regarding moving back to (country omitted), but then confirmed that she had no intention “of ever illegally taking the children and abducting them from this country”.[34]
[34] T 74.
The Mother confirmed that when she lived in (country omitted), she was prescribed some anti-depressant medication, and that in 2006 she had seen a psychologist for depression. She has also, from time to time, seen a psychologist in (omitted), however the psychologist in (omitted) related to counselling under the NSW Victims’ Compensation Scheme.[35]
[35] T 75-76.
In answer to questions relating to her being required to return to (omitted), the Mother said that she did not think that it was safe to do so, although she would accompany the children there if the Court so ordered.[36]
[36] T 77.
While the Mother was giving her answer to this and related questions, not for the first time the Father was smirking and laughing; he was given a formal warning by the Court.[37]
[37] T 77-78.
Ms Stapleton said that the main reason why she considers (omitted) not to be a safe place is primarily because, in her view, the Father is unpredictable in his actions.[38] Later in her evidence the Mother said that the Father was just as unpredictable during the course of the relationship.[39]
[38] T 77.
[39] T 81-82.
She also said that she was conscious of the need for the children to spend time with their Father, and because of this, she enrolled in the contact centre as soon as possible.[40]
[40] T 78.
The Mother said that there were two or three factors that bound her to (omitted) and which had been established in more recent months: she does some freelance (omitted) work in (omitted); and in this regard she said that (omitted) provided greater opportunities for her work than did (omitted). Secondly, there is a small (country omitted)-speaking community in (omitted) which she and the children are part of and enjoy. The third factor is that her brother also resides and studies in (omitted), and lives only a few houses away from where the children live. This led to her to comment that she has family in (omitted) but no family in (omitted).[41]
[41] T 78.
She confirmed further that, although she had not made recent enquiries, in the not too distant past she had explored employment prospects in (omitted). When she was living in (omitted) she was employed.[42]
[42] T 79.
She confirmed further that her brother financially assists her, and she assists him from time to time.[43] She confirmed also that she did not put her relationship with her brother above the children’s relationship with their Father.[44]
[43] T 80.
[44] T 80.
Report of Family Consultant
An extensive report, dated 25th November 2013, was prepared by Ms S. It became Exhibit B. It warrants careful attention, which necessitates a detailed setting out of relevant parts of it.
Regarding Mr Renton, Ms S noted the following matters.
An early observation from Ms S is at [26] of her report:
Forcefully, Mr Renton said he would not agree to his time with the boys being supervised, commenting there was absolutely no reason for this. Mr Renton said he had tried to enrol at the Contact Centre but had learned he was to go there to do a two hour evening course, go back again and do an interview and then go back yet again and complete some paperwork, all before he could see the boys. Mr Renton objected to having to pay for someone to watch over him seeing “my boys”. He commented “I’m sorry that’s just not fair at all. There’s never been any reason for that”. Mr Renton said he could not afford to meet the Contact Centre’s enrolment requirements given his very limited Newstart pension. He was not working at present. Mr Renton said he had tried to look at a little bit of work but queried how he could work if he had the boys for the five days a fortnight ordered by the court.
Then at [31] and [33], Ms S noted (emphasis added):
[31] Mr Renton argued that his ex-partner had “done nothing but lie and be deceitful the whole time”. He went on to say that Ms Stapleton “was in a mental institution in (country omitted) from a previous relationship” and said this led to him being very worried about his sons when she first left with them.
[33] Mr Renton said his parents refused to assist him with the Contact Centre costs because they would not see their grandchildren. He became angry when I suggested it might show good faith to co-operate with supervised time for a period angrily asking how it could be “right that she can just take off with my boys and stop them seeing family and friends. That is wrong”. Mr Renton became very angry at the suggestion the boys were Ms Stapleton’s as well shouting “Exactly, they are my boys as well. … They are just as much my boys as they are her’s. She does not have the right to take off and stop me from seeing them. It is wrong. I don’t care about any legal anything. That is not right. That is sexist. That is discriminating. That she’s allowed to because she’s the Mother. Boo hoo. She’s never been the primary attachment figure ever. … You were never there in the relationship. Do you have the statements from the rest of my family? … Well there you go”.
At [35], Ms S recorded that, when she indicated to him that his desire for a 50:50 parenting arrangement was unlikely to work, “Mr Renton furiously asked if this then meant Ms Stapleton was to be the primary carer and argued she had not been able to manage the boys by herself in the past.”
In a slightly similar vein, at [38], Ms S noted:
Shakily Mr Renton argued it was not fair that he had been put in the position he was in. He acknowledged he “messed up and hit her brother after everything she’s done to me”. He argued he acted protectively when he refused to send the boys back to their Mother when Ms Stapleton had backpackers staying.
Then at [40] and [41], Ms S stated (emphasis added):
[40] In the event that the Court did decided [sic] the boys could remain in (omitted) with their Mother and that he could have visits only, Mr Renton said “I’m going to have to live with it and take it back to Court again”….
[41] … “The only thing in the best interests of the boys is her relocating to (omitted) so the boys can see their Father on a regular basis …”. He went on to argue Ms Stapleton was using the boys as a weapon and angrily said “What about me? I’m their parent as well. I should have every single right”.
In relation to Ms Stapleton, Ms S noted the following matters.
First, concerning the relationship with Mr Renton when the parties were living in Western Australia, the Mother said to Ms S, at [45]:
When she [first] became pregnant, Ms Stapleton was reluctant to undergo a termination because she had always been told that she could not have children. Ms Stapleton said that by this time in her life she had completed an honours degree at (omitted) University in (course omitted) and had been working in (employer omitted). Ms Stapleton wanted the relationship to work but considered the only way was if Mr Renton gave up using cannabis.
Also in terms of the relationship, at [50], Ms S noted:
[After moving back to (omitted)] The couple had another baby. Ms Stapleton told me “Things were okay when he was working”. She pushed Mr Renton to study and said that he undertook a tertiary enabling program because he had never finished school. He then commenced an (omitted) degree in (omitted). With hindsight Ms Stapleton said that she was probably pushing Mr Renton too hard. Difficulties built up and she said for example that he would object to her visiting friends in Melbourne because they all had degrees and he did not feel good enough.
Regarding the separation of the parties, at [52], it was noted that:
Just before they separated, Ms Stapleton had been hopeful that Mr Renton would move out and that she could go to (omitted) for a few days to see her brother. She said she had a bag packed to do this but when Mr Renton saw the bag, he started hitting her and seemed unable to stop. This was on 31 January this year. Ms Stapleton said that she was bruised on the back of her neck to the extent that she had difficulty lying down. Ms Stapleton said while she was being hit she was very concerned that the boys were hearing what was happening…
At [56], Ms S recorded:
Following the incident that precipitated her leaving, Ms Stapleton said Mr Renton was charged with assault and an AVO was taken out on her behalf. She reported that he was found not guilty of the assault because there were no witnesses. However on the day of the hearing at Forbes Courthouse on 19 March 2013, Ms Stapleton said Mr Renton assaulted her again outside the Courthouse. She said he angrily asked her if she did not know what she was doing to their sons because they missed him and needed to see him. Ms Stapleton said Mr Renton accused her of ruining the boys’ lives. After verbally abusing her, Ms Stapleton alleged Mr Renton raised his arm and tried to punch her while she had the boys in the pram. She said a solicitor witnessed the whole incident, gave a statement in court and called the child protection hotline. Mr Renton was found guilty and given a suspended sentence.
Then at [59] and [60] of her Report, Ms S noted from the Mother as follows:
[59] At the last handover in mid-June, Ms Stapleton reported that Mr Renton assaulted her brother. She said this was outside McDonalds and alleged Mr Renton got out of the car and punched Mr M on the neck. Ms Stapleton said Mr Renton was charged for this but failed to attend the hearing on 16 September. A warrant was issued and Ms Stapleton advised the next hearing was on 16 December.
[60] Ms Stapleton asked for a safety plan to be put in place for the couple’s interviews with me. She said that she felt reasonably safe at home now because Mr Renton did not know her address and because she had a duress alarm in the house. Ms Stapleton feared Mr Renton’s unpredictable behaviour which depended on his mood. Before they separated, Ms Stapleton said that X had figured this out asking her each day if his Father was happy or cranky.
At [64] and then at [66], the Mother told Ms S of how the boys are following spending time with their Father, and more generally:
[64] Ms Stapleton said there had been many concerning incidents including X coming home from visits and constantly blaming her. She said that he would say “My Mummy does not let me see my Daddy” and said he would bang on her front door demanding to be let out to see his Father. Ms Stapleton said X would sit under the table and cry at every handover. She said the boys were always excited to see their Father.
[66] Ms Stapleton acknowledged the boys missed their Father but said that he needed to take responsibility for his actions. She was concerned that even though Mr Renton has been found guilty of assault, he was not taking any responsibility for this. Ms Stapleton described Mr Renton’s parents as really nice and said that they tried. She did not think that they were violent [to] each other. Ms Stapleton feared Mr Renton’s behaviour was substance induced. She did not know what his current drug status was and said that he refused to undertake drug tests, refused to do an anger management course and refused to do a parenting after separation course.
Regarding her own welfare generally, Ms Stapleton commented to Ms S, at [71], [73] and [74]:[45]
[71] Ms Stapleton told me that she has seen a psychologist for depression in the past because “I’m really good at overloading myself”. Since coming to (omitted), Ms Stapleton that she had been seeing a psychologist at the (omitted) Women's Centre for support and had also consulted a local psychologist about X’s behaviour. In 2006, Ms Stapleton said that she had “a complete breakdown” with depression and attended a pain management clinic because she had suffered chronic headaches since she was five. Ms Stapleton was in (country omitted) at the time. She was only very briefly on antidepressant medication and told me that she was good at caring for herself. Ms Stapleton was not aware of any significant family history of mental illness in her or her ex-partner’s families.
[73] Ms Stapleton was concerned that Mr Renton was not emotionally capable of putting the boys’ needs and perspectives before his own and considered that this represented a long-term problem. Realistically, Ms Stapleton commented that of course at times she wished she had her life back and could just work “at this and that” but said she realised the boys were only young for such a short time. She said that she had good support from her brother and his girlfriend, who was not working at present.
[74] Nowadays Ms Stapleton reported that the boys were fine. She said after the extended visits to their Father it used to take her four or five days to get the boys back to normal.
[45] It seems to me that the matters recorded here add emphasis, or otherwise relate directly, to the kinds of considerations referred to in the joint judgment (Bryant CJ & Finn J) in Taylor v Barker (2008) 37 Fam LR 461 at [109] ff.
In relation to the children, Ms S observed as follows, at [76], [81], [82], [84] and [89] of her Report:
[76] X and Y happily stayed in the play room with their Uncle Mr M during their Mother’s interview with me. Mr M appeared to have been coping very well. The boys happily greeted their Mother when she returned to the room. In front of his Mother, because he had been told that he could tell me everything that had been bothering him, X told me that he wanted his Father to live with them. X told me that he missed his Father and his uncle and Mother encouraged him to talk to me about this. The boys had brought a lot of suitable toys with them. X showed me a card he had made for his Father that morning.
[81] Mr Renton told the boys that he had all their birthday presents from him as well as “from Nanny and everyone else” at his house. X chatted to his Father about his toy cars and Mr Renton commented that he still had all his cars at his Grandmother’s house as well. X volunteered “I love you” to which his Father responded that he loved him as well. Y briefly sat on his Father’s knee and Mr Renton cuddled him. Mr Renton asked the little boys what else they have been doing and told them “Everyone misses you back in (omitted)”. X offered his Father a drink of water.
[82] Mr Renton again told the boys that he had lots of presents back at home for them and did not know what he would have been allowed to bring. Mr Renton again commented that he had not seen them for a long time. X said “I missed you”, to which Mr Renton tearfully responded “I missed you too, every day”. X asked when he could go to his house and Mr Renton assured him he would go there soon. Mr Renton complimented Y on how much better he was talking. Mr Renton told X his cousins missed him all the time and said they wanted to ring him up as well but said they could not because “Daddy’s not allowed to talk to you”. He reiterated “Daddy misses you and Nanny Ms G says to say hallo. Nanny Renton. We’ve got all the presents back at Nanny’s house, all your toys are still there”. In response to X’s query, Mr Renton advised he had not brought anything with him.
[84] X asked his Father if he knew how to make a car from play dough. He chatted to his Father about movies and Y, who was still hard to follow, talked about (omitted) toys. Mr Renton told the boys “Nanny’s already got some Christmas presents for you and we’re going to get you lots more. Nanny always gets you lots and lots of presents, doesn’t she?” X said he could open them when he went to “Nanny’s house” and Mr Renton assured him he could. He told X he also had his birthday presents waiting for him.
[89] X chatted about having a particular toy at his Mother’s house to which Mr Renton responded they had them at his house as well. They chatted about movies. Both boys were very engaged with their Father vying for his attention.
During the boys’ time with their Father Ms S recorded how frequently Y asked for or wanted to look for his Mother: see the Report at [83], [87] and [88].
Ms S’s evaluation was as follows. It is important to record in full her comments at [95] – [98] of her Report, thus (emphasis added):
[95] In my opinion, from the start the marked differences in this young couple’s backgrounds, intellectual levels and educational achievements made some challenges inevitable. Having two children stressed their relationship further as did Ms Stapleton’s brother and his girlfriend coming to stay with them. The end result was that their relationship foundered and this current dispute ensued.
[96] X and Y are very young and in my opinion too young for the week about shared arrangement sought by Mr Renton even if the parties were in the same town and there were not so many other concerns.
[97] Both boys were very excited about seeing their Father and their Mother had clearly promoted this as an event to look forward to. She readily stayed to facilitate the handover to Mr Renton despite having asked for a safety plan. Both boys were very pleased to see their Father. However X was sensitive to his Father’s wishes and emotions, reacting by often telling his Father that he missed him. The emotional pressure Mr Renton exerts on his sons risks making them into anxious children overly responsible for their Father’s emotional well-being. During the observation session, Mr Renton used every opportunity to try to convey his views to me at the expense of just enjoying seeing his children. He also tried to encourage the boys to seek to visit him by often mentioning the presents he had for them at his house. Mr Renton’s behaviour did not display good judgement or any awareness of the effects of what he was saying on his sons. Mr Renton was pre-occupied with his own needs.
[98] In my opinion, Mr Renton did not demonstrate an ability to co-operate sufficiently with Ms Stapleton for a co-parenting arrangement to be feasible, even if the parties did reside in closer proximity. While I understand the assault charge against him has yet to be resolved, Mr Renton admitted to hitting Ms Stapleton’s brother, an action he said he regretted. However he showed no insight into the effects of such behaviour on his ex-partner or his sons. Taking no responsibility, Mr Renton blamed Mr M’s previous behaviour for his own behaviour and indeed for them separating. Mr Renton’s poor impulse control would not engender confidence in Ms Stapleton even if she was willing to try to instigate a shared or indeed any parenting arrangement in a small town, where she had no family support.
Then at [100] – [103], Ms S observed and commented as follows (emphasis added):
[100] Indeed, Mr Renton had trouble regulating his emotions even in the one to one office situation with me. As noted, he pressured the boys continually during the observation session about his love for them and about how much he and his family missed them. While Mr Renton was very fearful of being marginalised or excluded from his sons’ lives, in his frustration during his interview, he was quick to anger and to allege he was being discriminated against because he was male.
[101] Mr Renton’s actions in withholding the boys from their Mother showed no insight into the effects of such separations on such young children and selfishly his actions were entirely about his own needs. Mr Renton criticised Ms Stapleton for calling the police when he withheld the boys in March, showing no insight into her being concerned for their sons. This does not bode well for future co-operation.
[102] The relocation issue as always is a vexed one. Mr Renton’s wish for the boys to relocate was to enable the boys to see him and his extended family frequently. Mr Renton and Ms Stapleton only resided in (omitted) for about three and a half years and it is difficult to see how Ms Stapleton, given her cosmopolitan background, would readily settle into such a country town or what opportunities she would be offered there. Any unhappiness she experienced would of course adversely impact on her parenting. Ms Stapleton rather wished to remain in (omitted) where, for a few years at least, she can anticipate having her brother’s support.
[103] It was very obvious that both of these parents loved their boys but not at all obvious that Mr Renton was able to promote their Mother to them. He did not show good judgement in his efforts to see them. His efforts to date have been counterproductive to say the least and he must learn to curb his impatience. Mr Renton denied any continued use of marijuana or that he had any mental health issues. His poor anger management appeared to reflect a lack of skill coupled with a strong sense of entitlement. In my opinion this reflected his upbringing and personality rather than any mental illness or substance abuse in itself, although the latter would not assist him.
All of the general matters noted here by Ms S were plainly on display during the course of the trial, not least being poor insight into the best interests of the children, and a significant pre-occupation with his own self-interest.
Finally, still in the ‘evaluation’ section of her Report, Ms S said, at [105] – [107] (emphasis added):
[105] Mr Renton could see no merit in being seen to be co-operative with supervised contact even in the short-term, rigidly adhering to his view it was not merited and that he could not afford to comply. Mr Renton totally rejected my suggestion that if he co-operated with supervised contact for a while, at least this would demonstrate good faith and reassure Ms Stapleton. Heatedly he asserted he could not afford to do this. When I suggested the arrangements could then be reviewed in perhaps six months, angrily Mr Renton said “I’m not letting six months go by to bring my boys back to (omitted) again. Hell no, that’s why I want Family Court sorted in November. Supervised visits are totally unreasonable. How’s everyone else meant to see the boys?”
[106] Ideally such young children should see both parents frequently, however the distance of at least two hundred and fifty kilometres precludes this in this matter. Although Mr Renton argued that Ms Stapleton should be made to return to (omitted), the Court must also consider the boys’ right to a happy childhood, not marred by violence and hostility between their parents. Mr Renton has not complied with strategies such as attending anger management or a post-separation parenting course which might have effected some attitudinal changes. I am somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of change even if Mr Renton does attend.
[107 In my opinion it would not be in these boys’ interests to disrupt them again. Given the concerns about Mr Renton’s behaviour towards his ex-partner, contact should be supervised at the (omitted) Contact Centre for the next six months before a graduated unsupervised regime firstly in (omitted) and eventually in (omitted) is considered. The ages of the boys make final orders highly problematical. Both parties have indicated their intention to appeal if they do not get what they want and I fear a rocky road is ahead to the likely detriment of their children.
Finally, Ms S made the following recommendations (at p.42 of her Report):
·That the boys primarily reside with their Mother in (omitted);
·That the boys see their Father as often as possible initially on a supervised basis for the next six months at the (omitted) Contact Centre;
·That Mr Renton attends an anger management course;
·That both parties attend a co-parenting after separation course;
·That the boys’ time with their Father is reviewed after six months of supervision.
Oral Evidence of Family Consultant
Ms S confirmed that the boys have a very strong attachment to their Father and wish to see more of him, and he likewise.[46]
[46] T 7.
By reference to paragraph 97 of her report where she referred to Mr Renton’s conduct which “did not display good judgment”, she agreed with the proposition that while his desire to see the children was perfectly understandable, it was the way he went about it that caused her concern.
She rejected the proposition that she was unduly critical of the Father in her report; rather, she said that she was concerned by his conduct in the course of her interview with him. She confirmed her view, expressed in paragraph 98 of her report, that the inability of the Father to demonstrate that he could co-parent with the Mother indicated to her that a shared or co-parenting arrangement was not appropriate.
Further, Ms S firmly stated that even if the Mother was to return to (omitted), such a course would not solve the difficulties within the parents’ relationship, or “within Mr Renton’s behaviour”. Nor would it deal with the understandable sense of isolation to which the Mother’s evidence plainly referred, which is to be contrasted to the situation in (omitted) where, on her evidence (which I accept) she has a degree of support from her brother and the (country omitted)-speaking community in that city.[47]
[47] T 10-11. Again, it seems to me that Ms S’s comments here are relevant to the considerations to which I have already referred from the joint judgment in Taylor v Barker at [109] ff.
She also confirmed (by reference to paragraph 107 of her report) that it would not be in the boys’ best interests to disrupt them again by requiring the Mother to return to the (omitted) area. She also noted that the behaviour of the boys, and of X in particular, exhibited symptoms of an anxious type of behaviour.[48]
[48] T 12.
In answer to questions put by Counsel for the Mother (and by reference to paragraph 97 of her report), Ms S said that in her view, the pressure which the Father exerts on the children risks making them into anxious children. She observed: “I think a continuation of such behaviour might – could well lead – to them becoming increasingly anxious.”[49]
[49] T 13.
She confirmed further that it would be concerning that the paternal grandparents were not a restraining influence on Mr Renton, which would only pose further risks for the children.[50] Later in her oral evidence, Ms S also said that the grandparents’ view that supervised time was a waste of time showed, in her view, a short-sighted, rather than a long term, perspective on their part.[51]
[50] T 13-14.
[51] T 16.
In relation to questions from the ICL, Ms S said: [52]
I would struggle to see what future there would be for her [the Mother] in (omitted), and obviously an unhappy, unfulfilled Mother … it’s going to affect her children’s happiness and ability to settle. The parties are from … very, very different backgrounds and just very disparate in education and intellect …
[52] T 15. The following comments likewise are relevant to the psychological disposition and welfare of the Mother, as discussed in Taylor v Barker.
Subject to the discussion later in these reasons regarding Part VII of the Act, I accept Ms S’s evidence, both from her Report and from her oral evidence. As I note later in these reasons, I agree with her assessments, in particular, the understandable but inappropriate pressure the Father exerts on the boys, and (in my words) the inability of the Father to place the boys’ interests above his own. His insight generally is poor, and the [lack of] control of his anger and frustration was palpable in the course of the trial. It was certainly pleasing to see in his more recent evidence (given in (omitted) in late May 2014 in the course of a separate application, to which I have already referred) at least some recognition of the need for a process by which he and the children could resume their relationship, rather than, as at the hearing, where he steadfastly refused to acknowledge the strong suggestion or recommendation of such a course to commence with time at a contact centre before progressing to time elsewhere with the boys.
The Legislative Scaffold
I note the following in relation to the statutory scaffolding that must be negotiated in determining orders that are in the children’s best interests, pursuant to s.60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”).
Subject to what is said later in these reasons, a convenient jurisprudential touchstone for the following discussion is the summary of principle by Brown J in Mazorskiv Albright in relation to Part VII of the Act, noting, of course, that there have been significant changes to the primary and additional considerations in relation to “family violence”. Respectfully, and cognisant of the ‘family violence’ changes to the ‘pathway’, I adopt Brown J’s overview of relevant sections (and principles) of Part VII of the Act. Her Honour’s comments should, of course (as I have said), be considered in the light of relevant statutory changes, for example, to s.60CC(3)(c).[53] At [3] – [6] her Honour said:
[3] The provisions in the Family Law Act 1975 (the Act) relating to children rest on twin pillars. The first is the importance to children of having a meaningful relationship with both parents; the second is the need to protect children from physical and psychological harm. These are stressed in s.60B(1) which sets out the objects of the legislation relating to children and are reiterated as the primary considerations in s.60CC(1).
[4] When deciding what parenting orders to make it is the best interests of the children which are the paramount consideration. In determining where those best interests lie, the Court must consider the primary and additional considerations set out in s.60CC.
[5] There is a presumption that it is in a child’s best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for him or her (s.61DA). The presumption relates to the allocation of parental responsibility, not the time a child spends with each parent. The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in abuse of the child or family violence. The presumption may be rebutted if the Court finds that it would not be in the best interests of the child for it to apply.
[6] If the presumption applies, and there is an order for equal shared parental responsibility, the court must consider whether spending equal time with each parent would be in the child’s best interests (s.65DAA(1)) and, if no such order is made, consider whether spending substantial and significant time with each would be in the child’s best interests (s.65DAA(2)).
[53] (2008) 37 Fam LR 518. Her Honour’s remarks in relation to the “twin pillars” have been consistently cited with approval by the Full Court, for example in Moose & Moose (2008) FLC ¶93-375; McCall v Clark (2009) 41 Fam LR 483; Sigley v Evor (2011) 44 Fam LR 439; Shaeffer v Jacobs (2011) FLC ¶93-468; Maluka v Maluka (2012) 45 Fam LR 129.
Her Honour also made important observations about “meaningful” as that term is used in Part VII of the Act in the context of what is comprehended by a “meaningful relationship.” At [20] - [26], her Honour outlined a range of relevant considerations. I set them out below, and again respectfully (and gratefully) adopt Brown J’s observations, thus:[54]
[54] Brown J’s remarks in this regard have been endorsed by the Full Court in Moose & Moose (2008) FLC ¶93-375 at [69], and by a differently constituted Full Court in McCall & Clark (2009) 41 Fam LR 483 at [115] & [121]. More recently still, a further Full Court in Collu & Rinaldo [2010] FamCAFC 53 at [335] similarly approved Brown J’s remarks.
[20] The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum (2006) refers to the concept of a meaningful relationship on a number of occasions. At para 52 it noted that the primary factors mirror the first two objects set out in the new s 60B and that the objects are elevated to primary considerations as they deal with important rights of children and encourage a child-focused approach. The paragraph continues:
The elevation of the object relating to the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both parents is consistent with the introduction of a presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility.
[21] Here, the concept of a meaningful relationship is closely tied with the introduction of the presumption of equal shared responsibility, and the passage links the concept of a meaningful relationship with the objects of the Division. The objects use the words “meaningful involvement”.
[22] At para 128, discussion of a meaningful relationship is again linked to discussion of the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, the explanatory memorandum noting:
The government considers that it is important to ensure that a child has a meaningful relationship with both parents and that both parents participate in decisions about the child. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility is not a presumption of 50:50 joint custody. The presumption relates solely to the decision making responsibilities of both parents. New section 65AA inserted by Item 31 is the provision dealing with the time a child spends with each parent and the circumstances where the court should consider equal time arrangements.
[23] When considering s 65DAA, the explanatory memorandum states (at [196]–[199]):
[196] Subsection 65DAA(2) recognises that an equal time arrangement will not be appropriate in some cases but that the court must consider other arrangements that promote a meaningful relationship. This provision places an obligation on the court in situations where there is equal shared parental responsibility and equal time is not appropriate, to consider whether it would be in the best interests of the child and reasonably practicable for the child to spend substantial and significant time with both parents. This is intended to ensure that in making parenting orders related to time that the court focuses not just on the substantial quantity of time that is spent with each parent, but also on the significant type of time. The note in this section emphasises that the best interests of the chid remain the paramount consideration for parenting orders. This is set out in s 60CA by item 9.
…
[199] Section 65DAA (2) – (4) is intended to ensure that the courts consider arrangements that are much more than “1 weekend a fortnight and half of the holidays” or an 80:20 arrangement. It is intended to ensure a focus both on the amount of time and the type of time. It would include both day time contact and night time contact. It recognises that what is important is that the focus be on ways that both parents are able to develop a meaningful relationship with their children and share important events including everyday time with the child. It recognises that in order to have a meaningful relationship and to share equal shared responsibility that this would generally involve “both” parents spending both substantial and significant time with their children.
[24] The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, defines “meaningful” as “full of meaning or expression; significant; amenable to interpretation; having a recognisable function in a language or sign system; able to function as a term in such a system”. “Meaning” is defined as “having intention or purpose; chiefly with a qualifying adverb (as well-meaning)”. A second definition is “conveying or expressing meaning or thought; expressive, meaningful, significant; suggestive”. These definitions are repeated and further fleshed out in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989. It defines “meaning” (in generalised use) as “significance”. The examples provided take the matter no further.
[25] The Macquarie Dictionary, 4th ed, Macquarie University Press, Sydney, 2005, defines meaningful as “full of meaning; significant”. Within the definitions of meaning, the relevant one defines the word as “expressive or significant: a meaning look”.
[26] What these definitions convey is that “meaningful”, when used in the context of “meaningful relationship”, is synonymous with “significant” which, in turn, is generally used as a synonym for “important” or “of consequence”. I proceed on the basis that when considering the primary considerations and the application of the object and principles, a meaningful relationship or a meaningful involvement is one which is important, significant and valuable to the child. It is a qualitative adjective, not a strictly quantitive [sic] one. Quantitive [sic] concepts may be addressed as part of the process of considering the consequences of the application of the presumption of equally shared parental responsibility and the requirement for time with children to be, where possible and in their best interests, substantial and significant.
Against the background of principle just outlined, and in the light of the evidence before the Court, I note the following by reference to the statutory scaffolding in Part VII of the Act.[55] I begin with whether there should be equal shared parental responsibility. Of course, what follows should be understood, as the Full Court indicated in Sayer v Radcliffe, against the competing orders sought by the parents, namely the Mother seeking to continue to reside with the children in (omitted) and spending time with the Father as set out in her orders, and the Father’s position of the Mother returning to the (omitted) area and the other orders as sought in his Application.[56] This is also to say that the issue of ‘relocation’ is treated after having considered the competing proposals of the parties in relation to parenting orders generally.
[55] Without necessarily naming every sub-paragraph in s.60CC(3), unless otherwise specified, I should be taken to follow the order of considerations there set out sequentially.
[56] Sayer v Radcliffe (2013) 48 Fam LR 298 at [28], [79] – [80] and [101].
In her submissions filed on 7th February 2014, the ICL observed:
[2] The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in family violence (s61DA(2)(b)). In this case, the Father has been convicted of assaulting the Mother and, later, of assaulting the Mother’s brother (Mr M) in the presence of the children. The children are close to their uncle and this assault would have had a significant impact on them.
[3] The Father admitted to the Family Consultant, Ms S, that he assaulted the Mother’s brother and stated that he “messed up and hit (the Mother’s brother) after everything she’s done to me.” (38).
[5] In the Family Report prepared by Ms S, the question of the Father’s insight into his behaviour and the impact that this might have on the children was considered. At paragraph 97 of the report, Ms S notes that “both boys were very excited about seeing their Father..”, however, was of the view that the “emotional pressure” the Father put on the children “risks making them into anxious children” and “responsible for the their Father’s emotional wellbeing.”
[6] Ms S further notes, at paragraph 97 that the Father did not display good judgment or “any awareness of the effects of what he was saying on his sons” and he was “pre-occupied with his own needs.”
[7] It is submitted that the Father’s demeanour during the hearing, his inability to control this frustration and temper suggested that he holds a large amount of hostility towards the Mother. At no time during the hearing did the Father demonstrate an understanding of his past actions and the effect that those actions had on either the Mother or the children. This lack of insight into his behaviour indicates, I submit, that the Father will not be able to communicate with the Mother effectively so that decisions can be made jointly about the long term care, welfare and development of the children. My view is supported by the comments of Ms S in the Family Report at paragraph 98 where she considered that the Father “did not demonstrate an ability to co-operate sufficiently with the Mother for a co-parenting arrangement to be feasible...” even if they lived closer.
I accept the ICL’s submissions. Nothing from the trial, and nothing in the Father’s much more recent evidence, alters the Court’s considered view that there should be an order for sole parental responsibility in favour of the Mother. The parties cannot work together at all on any front, especially and most immediately relevant to the current matter, in relation to the children. As aggrieved as he feels by the Mother, and by the Court, he is singularly incapable of accepting either direction from professionals (such as Ms S), or his responsibility for even some of the situation in which he finds himself. His sense of entitlement (and overwhelming sense of being slighted in every respect, especially by the Mother) points overwhelmingly to an order for sole parental responsibility for the Mother. That said, she is nonetheless required to keep Mr Renton informed of any relevant decision that relates to major, long-term parenting matters involving the boys.
In relation to the legislative scaffold in Part VII of the Act, I note the following.
First, in relation to the primary considerations, the ICL submitted as follows:[57]
[12] The Father has been convicted of assaulting the Mother and also of assaulting the Mother’s brother, Mr M. This second assault took place in front of the children at McDonald’s where the parties had met for the purposes of changeover.
[13] The Father has also been convicted of breaching the current ADVO that is in place for the protection of the Mother.
[14] The Father admitted the assault on Mr M to the Family Consultant but defended his actions as being the result of “everything she’s (the Mother) done to me.”
[15] Although not family violence as defined by s4B(1) Family Law Act 1975, Ms S noted that X is sensitive to his Father’s emotions and reacts accordingly. Ms S was of the view that the “emotional pressure Mr Renton exerts on his sons risks making them into anxious children overly responsible for their Father’s emotional well-being.” (paragraph 97)
[57] The matters relevant to these protective primary considerations are also relevant to the additional considerations in s.60CC(3)(j) in relation to family violence.
Save that the Father was not actually convicted of assault on the Mother, I accept the ICL’s submissions that the children need to be protected from psychological harm and from family violence.
In relation to the considerations set out in s.60CC(3), firstly, given the ages of the boys, there are no relevant views to be considered. They are too young to comprehend the issues that are involved.
Secondly, I accept that both boys have a good and close relationship with both parents. And although there is little formal evidence before the Court, I accept also that the boys have a good relationship with the wider family of Mr Renton, as they do with Ms Stapleton’s brother, who resides and studies in (omitted).
In relation to sub-paragraph (c) of s.60CC(3), I note and accept the following submission from the ICL which, in my view, captures the relevant features of the evidence and its import. She submitted:
The Father agreed to interim orders allowing him to spend time with the children, however, repeatedly breached the orders by refusing to return the children to the Mother. These breaches prompted further interim orders for the Father’s time with the children to be supervised. The Father has refused to spend time with the children on any terms other than his own and has spent no time with the children since June 2013 because he felt that there was “no reason” and that it is “just not fair at all”. The Father gave oral evidence that he could not financially afford the fees associated with the supervision, nor could he afford the travel from (omitted) to (omitted) and return. The Mother offered to pay the fees associated with the supervised time so that the children could spend time with the Father but the Father refused the offer on the basis that he did not consider supervision to be necessary.
The comments just observed, in my view, also relate to the considerations captured by s.60CC(3)(ca). Notably, the Father’s refusal to undertake supervised time with the boys, as directed by the Court, is a clear example of his failure to acknowledge any proper responsibility for his actions, as well as (among other things) his abject lack of insight into the best interests of the boys.
Indeed, the Mother noted in her submissions that
Between 30 July 2013 and the hearing on 27-28 November 2013 the father did not comply with orders of the Court in that he:
·Refused or failed to enrol in and complete a post-separation parenting course;
·Refused or failed to complete an anger management course;
·Refused or failed to attend the (omitted) Children's Contact Service to complete the required intake assessment to enable supervised visits between the father and the children to take place; and
·Did not undergo drug urinalysis until November 2013.
In my view, such failures (which I accept) highlight (if more be needed) the self-centred flaws in the Father’s approach to parenting.
Ms S noted the excitement of the boys to see their Father. Clearly, they love and wish to spend time with him. This only makes Mr Renton’s refusal to comply with Court orders, and to heed the suggestions and advice of Ms S all the more foolish. His own actions have prevented him spending time with the boys. He has been advised by Ms S that an initial period of supervised time may assist in a transition to more regular, un-supervised time. Until late May this year, Mr Renton abjectly refused to acknowledge let alone to accede to such a course. The longer he refuses to acknowledge his own conduct and its consequences, the longer he risks spending less time with the children. The longer he is away or separated from the children, the greater the risk there is to his relationship with them. His refusal to see or acknowledge this is very unfortunate, and worse. To a lesser extent, the same is true in relation to the children being separated from the wider paternal family.
In relation to sub-paragraph (d), the ICL submitted that Ms S had opined, at [107] of her Report that “it would not be in the boys’ best interests to disrupt them again.”[58]
[58] As already noted, evidence such as this, if more be needed, points to the Mother being permitted to remain in (omitted). The evidence, I suggest, is significantly clear that the principles articulated in the joint judgment in Taylor v Barker, at [109] ff., clearly apply here.
I accept Ms S’s view, which is obviously adopted by the ICL.
There is no question, for the purposes of s.60CC(3)(e), and as I noted at the outset of these reasons, that the practical difficulty of the Father (and members of his family) spending time with the children is not insignificant, given the distance between (omitted) and (omitted), a drive of approximately 3 hours. The Father’s evidence was that he was financially supported by his parents, but that they had withdrawn some or all of that support for the purposes of travel to (omitted) because they were not seeing or spending time with the children.
Further, the Mother, who is of limited means, has offered to pay at least for the cost of the Father’s time at the contact centre. This was refused.
There is no dispute, from the Court’s perspective, that the Mother has the relevant capacity to provide and care for the children. The Father’s capacity is less clear. He maintains that he was the children’s primary carer in the not too distant past. The best the Court can properly infer from the evidence is that when the parties were together, both parents had significant involvement in the lives of the boys. Beyond that, it is very difficult to say or determine what the Father’s capacity is.
In relation to sub-paragraph (f), the ICL submitted:
The Mother is living in (omitted) and has the emotional and physical support of her brother. She gave evidence that there is a large (country omitted) community in (omitted) and that her opportunities for employment are significantly higher than if she were living in (omitted).
I accept these comments of the ICL.
In relation to sub-paragraph (i), the ICL submitted:
There is no doubt the Father cares deeply for the children and that they care for him. It is submitted, however, that he is less able to provide for the children’s emotional and intellectual needs, because he does not have insight into their needs, is unable to control his animosity towards the Mother, and has an overly controlling manner that is detrimental to the children’s development. The antagonism the Father feels towards the Mother was evident throughout the trial. The Father’s attitude towards the Mother indicates that he does not understand the children’s need to have a meaningful relationship with her. The Father refuses to accept or even consider that the Mother is the children’s primary attachment. He has withheld the children from the Mother because she “would not come to an agreement”. Ms S finds at paragraph 100 that the Father “has trouble regulating his emotions” and “pressured the boys... during the observations session.”
Ms S at paragraph 72 notes that the Mother has incorporated the Father’s existence in their day to day life because “the boys asked about him.” Small rituals were in place that confirmed to the children in a positive light, their relationship with their Father. The Mother, in Ms S’s view (97), had promoted the interview with her as a “positive event” and the children were clearly happy to see their Father and spend time with him. Ms S noted, however, that the Father exerted an amount of emotional pressure on the children that “risks making them into anxious children overly responsible for the Father’s emotional well being.” Ms S commented further that during the interview and the time with the children the Father was “pre-occupied with his own needs.” (97).
I accept these submissions of the ICL.
For the purposes of s.60CC(3)(l), both parents confirmed that in the event that they did not secure the orders they sought they would appeal the decision. Accepting that any party is at liberty to appeal a decision, pre-emptively to confirm that if the Court makes orders that do not accord with that party’s wishes could be taken to show either a determination to punish the other parent, or a refusal to acknowledge the impartiality of the Court in making orders that are in the best interests of the children. I do not necessarily attribute either view to the parents in this matter. However, such attitudes suggest, at least, that the parties are engaged in a contest that will not, or that is unlikely to, abate any time soon. This can only further entrench the embittered view of one for the other; it also cannot aid the boys in having the benefit of both parents in their lives.
In relation to sub-paragraph (m), the ICL further submitted:
On the Father’s evidence it is unlikely, in my submission, that he would comply with any Orders of the Court whether they provided for his time with the children to be supervised or otherwise. The Father has failed to comply with the existing interim orders that have been made to date. He has refused to undertake an anger management course, a parenting course or urinalysis testing when requested and within the requested time frame. Previously he had refused to return the children to the Mother in accordance with any prior agreement or interim order and it is lack of insight into the effect that this had on both the children and the Mother that is concerning.
The order for sole parental responsibility already made obviates the need to consider the terms and operation of s.65DAA.
Two final matters need to be addressed. Formally, the Court needs to consider, in accordance with Boland J’s instruction in Morgan v Miles, the issue of ‘relocation’ in a ‘structured exercise of the Court’s discretion.’ This is also to say that the considerations in Part VII of the Act must inform the Court’s decision whether to permit the Mother to remain living with the boys in (omitted), or to order, as the Father seeks, that she return to the (omitted) region.
The second matter that needs to be addressed in these reasons relates to the Mother’s recent application to travel overseas with the boys to see her ill Mother. While she had made a general application for travel with the boys some time ago, the maternal Grandmother’s significant ill-health, and the Father’s refusal to accede to the travel and matters related to it, has prompted the formal application.
At the time it was heard, and following brief oral reasons granting the Mother’s application, the Court indicated that it would incorporate the reasons for that discrete application into the reasons for the principal parenting matter.
Relocation
The Mother’s evidence was that she left the Father following an assault on her. She also testified that for some time she had experienced a significant level of unpredictability in the Father’s behaviour, which made the relationship between the parents increasingly unstable, and the Mother increasingly fearful of the Father. I accept the Mother’s evidence in this regard. There is sufficient independent evidence of the Father’s volatile behaviour to be able to more than infer that he is not capable of clear and calm behaviour in the face of any opposition to any course that he perceives will thwart him attaining what he wants.
In addition to this patent fear of the Mother, in written submissions filed on 7th February 2014, the ICL submitted:
The Mother relocated to (omitted) with the children in February 2013. Although this was done without the Father’s knowledge or consent it is submitted that the Mother and the children are now well settled in the area. The Mother gave oral evidence of having the emotional, physical and financial support of her brother and his partner who live very close by. She gave evidence of having formed friendships and support networks within the local (country omitted) community and was intending on resuming study via distance education to complete her (omitted) degree.
If the Mother were ordered to return to (omitted) with the children she has stated that she would appeal the decision. The evidence filed in support of the Father’s application from his family members suggested, in my submission, that there are feelings of hostility towards the Mother that could serve to alienate her from the (omitted) community. Ms S, at paragraph 102 opines that “any unhappiness she (the Mother) experienced would of course impact on her parenting.”
In light of the above I submit that it would be in the children’s best interests to remain living with the Mother in (omitted).
I accept the ICL’s submissions. Moreover, they are (as earlier indicated) supported by the evidence of Ms S.
In Morgan v Miles, Boland J said Then at [80] – [81], the Court observed:[59]
[59] Morgan v Miles (2008) 38 Fam LR 275 (Boland J was sitting as a Full Court. More recently, see the general discussion in Cales v Cales (2010) 251 FLR 454 and Sayer v Radcliffe (2013) 48 Fam LR 298.
[80] It follows from my exposition of the legislation that earlier core principles:
- that the child’s best interests remain the paramount but not sole consideration;
- that a parent wishing to move does not need to demonstrate “compelling” reasons;
- that a judicial officer must consider all proposals, and may himself or herself be required to formulate proposals in the child’s best interests; and
- the child’s best interests must be weighed and balanced with the “right” of the proposed relocating parent’s freedom of movement,
remain valid.
[81] What the legislation now requires is:
- consideration of the competing proposals against the criteria now in s 60CC informed by s 60B;
- if a parenting order is made (or proposed to be made) and the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies the consequences of an order for equal shared parental responsibility -
but there is no specific legislative requirement which proscribes a requirement that matters under s 60CC or s 65DAA be determined in any priority. It appears to me, however, as a matter of practical utility, that the structured exercise can be effectively carried out by examining the issues in dispute against the relevant s 60CC factors, and then applying those findings to a consideration of the criteria of s 65DAA to craft appropriate orders.
And at [91] and [92], Boland J said (emphasis added):
[91] … it is not distance per se which should be the determinative criteria. In many cases what is relevant is the consequence of the move or proposed move. The issues to be determined may be quite different for example, for an infant or toddler developing attachments, to those of older children; or for economically impoverished families where fuel costs may be unaffordable thus impeding maintenance of a meaningful relationship. Conversely, there may be little impact on maintaining a meaningful relationship between a child and the non relocating parent particularly if the child has a history of living predominantly with the relocating parent, and spending time with the other parent where, with alternate arrangements, the child’s relationship with the non relocating parent can be maintained and fostered.
[92] Sensibly, the legislation does not seek to define “local”, intrastate, interstate or international moves. Rather, it requires a judicial officer to consider, on a case by case basis, the effect of a move on the particular child in determining the overall parenting application (see particularly s 60CC(2)(d) and (e), and if applicable s 65DAA(1)(a) and (b), s 65DAA(2)(a) and (b) and s 65DAA(5)), and affords the opportunity to craft orders which are in that child’s bests interests.
In the light of the evidence noted earlier in these reasons (e.g. the best interests of the children not to be moved again and therefore to remain in a more stable living situation with their primary carer, and having regard to the Mother’s psychological well-being as per the comments in Taylor v Barker), and in the light of the principles in Morgan v Miles, in my view, the Mother should be permitted to remain in (omitted) with the children. Such a course is in the best interests of the children, pursuant to s.60CA of the Act.
Mother’s Application to Travel Overseas
I have already noted the Mother’s Amended Application in a Case in which she sought orders permitting her to travel overseas with the children to visit her seriously unwell Mother. While there was initially some urgency in the application, that has been tempered somewhat by the Mother’s proposal not to travel immediately but rather in the next few months.
At the time of granting the Mother’s application, I indicated that the Court accepted and adopted as its own the submissions of the ICL. Set out below are those submissions, filed on 20th June 2014. Thus, in relation to the Application itself, the ICL said (I have inserted paragraph numbering):
(i)Ms Stapleton would like to travel to (country omitted) with the children, X (aged 4 years) and Y (aged 3 years) to see Ms Stapleton's Mother who was recently diagnosed with endometroid ovarian adenocarinoma stage 1C.
(ii)Ms Stapleton’s evidence in her affidavit, affirmed 26 May 2014 is:
a)she will “stay with her Mother for one month” (paragraph 6); and
b)that she has “no intention of taking the children from Australia permanently” (paragraph 15). I note that this is consistent with a previous statement to the Family Report writer, Ms S (paragraph 70).
(iii)On 10 June 2014 Ms Stapleton set up a web page headed “End domestic violence, some home time.” I understand that the web site is a fund raising page inviting people to donate money to the Mother.
(iv)The initial post by the Mother causes concern in that she mentions “reuniting with my Family overseas.” Needing “funds to build long lasting safety,” and that she would “like to publish...” “....once we have arrived in true safety.”
(v)I note, however, that in later posts the Mother refers to the “family court system” and how “even through(sic) the courts are slow, we are guided and carried through the process.”
(vi)It should be noted that to date Ms Stapleton has taken proper steps to have this matter determined by the Courts and has followed due process.
In relation to the Response from Mr Renton, the ICL submitted:
(i)I submit that Mr Renton’s application to have the children live with him whilst Ms Stapleton travels to (country omitted) is not realistic in the circumstances.
(ii)Mr Renton has not seen the children for any length of time since June 2013 although he did see them both with the Family Consultant in October 2013.
(iii)It was the recommendation of the Family Consultant that the children’s time with Mr Renton initially be supervised for a period of 6 months. Whilst Mr Renton initially disputed the need for such arrangements, he has recently conceded the point and has commenced the intake process required by the (omitted) Children's Contact Service ((omitted)) to enable supervised time to commence.
(iv)I have today made enquiries of the (omitted) and have been informed that Mr Renton is yet to complete all of the required paperwork and that he has not yet booked into the “Parenting After Separation” course. I am informed that the (omitted) has vacancies for supervised time available on Fridays and as soon as Mr Renton completes the process supervised time can commence.
(v)I agree with Mr Renton’s position that there is a degree of risk of the Mother not returning to Australia with the children. I note:
a)Ms Stapleton is not currently working;
b)Ms Stapleton is not currently studying [but is now enrolled in a course of study at (omitted) in Melbourne in the second half of 2014];
c)Ms Stapleton does not own any property;
d)Neither X nor Y have commenced school;
(vi)I submit, however, that any possible risk should be weighed against the possible impact on Ms Stapleton not being able to see her Mother when the evidence filed suggests that her Mother is gravely ill. This may well impact negatively on Ms Stapleton’s parenting capacity and have a negative impact on the children.
By way of disposition, in the light of submissions I have recorded, the ICL submitted:
(a)The children are aged 4 years and 3 years respectively.
(b)Ms Stapleton has been the primary carer of the children at least since June 2013.
(c)There is no-one to care for the children for a longer period in (omitted).
(d)(country omitted) (and for that matter (country omitted)) is a signatory country to the Hague Convention.
(e)It was Ms Stapleton’s evidence that her brother, Mr M, will remain in Australia, is a full time student studying at (omitted) in (omitted) and his course finishes in December 2015. Mr M has a strong attachment to the children and she “wouldn’t consider keeping the children” from Mr M.
The ICL submitted further that:
(a)If the Court is minded to grant the orders sought by Ms Stapleton then, in my submission, orders could also be included that:
(b)Ms Stapleton provide to the Father and to the ICL:
·A copy of the front page of each of the children’s passports;
·A copy of the full itinerary including dates of travel, addresses and contact telephone numbers of where the children will be staying;
·A copy of the return flight air tickets for each of the children once they have been issued.
(c)It might also be appropriate for Ms Stapleton to provide some sort of security that would provide for Mr Renton to take action if it became necessary. Whilst the Mother does not appear to have significant cash reserves available to her, she did indicate to the Court that she owns a motor vehicle and a violin.
Because the Court accepted, and adopted the submissions of the ICL, orders were made as sought by the Mother, as amended in accordance with the orders proposed by the ICL.
Conclusion
I accept unhesitatingly that the Father loves his children, and that he does so unreservedly. As I have said, on the evidence before the Court from the Family Consultant and from the Court’s observations during the trial, unfortunately, he is not able to distinguish (or distinguish appropriately) between what are in the boys’ best interests and his own interests. Indeed, his evidence strongly suggested that he saw that his own interests and those of the boys as being essentially identical. What was best for them was, he said, spending time with him.
As a general proposition there is no argument with such logic. However, it must properly be tempered and examined in the light of the evidence. That evidence points overwhelmingly to a very much more structured and protective approach to the boys spending time with their Father, not because he does not love them (plainly he does) but because everyone (including the Father) needs quite a level of protection from the Father’s ill-disciplined action. He has assaulted (and been convicted for it) the Mother’s brother in front of the boys. He is openly hostile and contemptuous of the Mother, and has been convicted of breaching an ADVO that is in place for the protection of the Mother. The Family Consultant also noted the emotional pressure the Father exerts on the children.
He shows a significant inability to restrain his emotionally volatile responses, particularly to the Mother.
In these circumstances, the protection of the children must be the Court’s priority in accordance with s.60CC(2A) of the Act. In this case, to act protectively towards the children will be to act protectively towards the parents also.
For these reasons, the orders that the Court considers to be in the best interests of the children are those proposed by the ICL, but with the following transitional regime in mind.
In my view, in the light of the evidence, it is important that (a) there be a time of supervised time to re-introduce the Father and the children to an orderly, regularly regime of time together, as well as the ensure that there is an appropriate oversight and record of that time, and (b) assuming that the supervised time proceeds without incident, and subject to review by the ICL of the contact centre notes, there should be a regime of transition by which the Father and the children (and the paternal family) are all able to enjoy each other’s company. That transition would be to one full day each alternate weekend at the paternal Grandparent’s residence, then, after another period of time (specified in the orders), it would then move to weekend and overnight time, each alternate weekend. Assuming also that the transition envisaged by the orders, changeover details shall be determined by the ICL.
The Court so orders.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-four (144) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Neville
Associate:
Date: 24 July 2014
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
Legal Concepts
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Procedural Fairness
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