Lorde & Chu
[2015] FamCAFC 3
•15 January 2015
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| LORDE & CHU | [2015] FamCAFC 3 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – where the trial Judge allowed the mother to take the children to China for a 2 month visit – where the father did not establish an error on the part of the trial Judge when exercising his discretion to allow the children to go to China – no order for costs – appeal dismissed. |
| House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 |
| APPELLANT: | Mr Lorde |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Chu |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Naidu |
| FILE NUMBER: | CAC | 478 | of | 2012 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | EA | 1 | of | 2015 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 15 January 2015 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne by video link to Canberra |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Bryant CJ, Finn & Strickland JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 14 January 2015 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Circuit Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 19 December 2014 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2014] FCCA 3035 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPELLANT: | In person by video link from Canberra |
| THE RESPONDENT: | In person by video link from Canberra |
Orders
The appeal be dismissed.
There be no order for costs in relation to the appeal.
The mother be relieved from the obligation to lodge the children’s passports with the Canberra Registry of the Federal Circuit Court prior to the children travelling to China on 17 January 2015.
The Court requests the Australian Federal Police to remove from, or otherwise amend or note, the airport watch list at all points of international arrivals and departures in Australia, the entry on the watch list relating to R (dob … 2008) and C (dob … 2012) for the purpose of permitting those children to travel to China in the period from midnight on 16 January 2015 until 17 March 2015.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Lorde & Chu has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
Appeal Number: EA 1 of 2015
File Number: CAC 478 of 2012
| Mr Lorde |
Appellant
And
| Ms Chu |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an appeal filed on 5 January 2015 by Mr Lorde
(“the father”) against certain orders made by Judge Neville of the Federal Circuit Court on 19 December 2014, including an order that the two children (aged about seven and three years respectively) of the father’s marriage to Ms Chu (“the mother”) be permitted to travel with the mother to China from
17 January 2015 to 17 March 2015.
Because of the imminent date on which the orders appealed permit the children to depart for China, this appeal has had to be dealt with as a matter of urgency.
The appeal is opposed by the mother (who like the father is without legal representation). The Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) advised the Appeal Registrar that she did not wish to be heard in relation to the appeal.
Background
A history of the relationship between the mother and the father, of the proceedings between them concerning their children, and in particular of proceedings which were commenced by an application filed by the mother on
3 April 2014 (seeking that the children’s names be removed from the airport watch list so that they could visit relatives in China), is to be found in the reasons for judgment of the Full Court delivered on 27 November 2014
(see Lorde & Chu [2014] FamCAFC 228). Those reasons related to an appeal by the father against earlier orders made by Judge Neville on 3 September 2014, which also permitted the mother to take the children to China for a visit. It is unnecessary to repeat in these reasons that history.
What is, however, important to explain in these reasons is that in its judgment of 27 November 2014, the Full Court set aside Judge Neville’s orders made on 3 September 2014 which permitted the mother to take the children to China. The Full Court remitted the mother’s application for urgent rehearing by the Federal Circuit Court.
The essential reason why the appeal against the orders of 3 September 2014 was successful was that the father had not had the opportunity to be properly heard in relation to those orders before they were made.
Following the Full Court’s judgment of 27 November 2014, both parties and the ICL appeared before Judge Neville on 3 December 2014 apparently for the purpose of making directions for the further conduct of the matter including the rehearing of the mother’s application to be permitted to take the children to China.
At a relatively early stage during that directions hearing, his Honour indicated (Transcript, 3 December 2014, p. 8) that he proposed determining what he described as “the airport watch list/travel issue” on the basis of brief written submissions from each party, and he asked the father first whether he
had any difficulty with that course. The father said that he did not
(Transcript, 3 December 2014, p. 8, line 21). His Honour then asked the mother if she was content with that course. She responded in the affirmative (Transcript, 3 December 2014, p. 9, line 8), but then immediately informed his Honour that a difficulty had arisen because she had just discovered that the children’s passports had been cancelled by the father. The father then confirmed that he had done that in 2012. (Transcript, 3 December 2014, p. 9, line 30).
Following a discussion between his Honour and the father concerning the father’s reasons for cancelling the passports and his reluctance to consent to the issuing of new passports, his Honour indicated that he would make orders for the issue, without the consent of the father, of new passports which would
be held in the Court registry pending orders being made permitting the
children to travel abroad (Transcript, 3 December 2014, p. 14-15). Having heard submissions from the ICL in favour of his making such orders in relation to the passports, his Honour then can be read as having made such orders together with directions for written submissions in relation to the airport watch list and travel issue. (Transcript, 3 December 2014, p. 16, line 1-12).
A further issue concerning the need for an order for the older child (who had been born in China) to have a certificate of Australian citizenship so that a passport could be obtained for him was then discussed (Transcript, 3 December 2014, p. 17-18) before the matter was adjourned indefinitely.
The orders made on 3 December 2014
The orders made by his Honour on 3 December were as follows:
1) The Applicant Mother, Ms [Chu], may apply for passports for [R] (DOB [omitted] 2008) and [C] (DOB [omitted] 2012) (“the children”) without first obtaining the consent of the children’s father, Mr [Lorde].
2) In the absence of the Father’s signature on the passport applications for the children, and to the degree that it is necessary, the Registrar of this Court is immediately authorised to sign the passport application for each of the children in place of the Father pursuant to s106A of the Family Law Act 1975.
3) The Court requests that the children’s passports issue at the earliest date possible.
4) In accordance with s 67ZD of the Family Law Act 1975, upon issue, the children’s passports are to be released to and held by the
Federal Circuit Court Canberra Registry and will not be released unless:a) The Court Orders the release of the passports; or
b) Written and signed consent by both parents is provided to the Court.
5) The parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer are to file no more than 3 pages of written submissions regarding:
a) The children’s names being removed from the Airport Watchlist; and
b) The application by the mother to travel overseas with
the children between the dates of 17 January 2015 and
17 March 2015.6) The written submissions in accordance with Order 5 above are to be filed with the Registry by midday 12:00pm on Friday 12 December 2014 and are to be served on all other parties.
7) Parties are not to file any additional affidavit material between the date of these Orders and a future date to be advised, unless they have sought and received the leave of the Court.
8) The Mother be at liberty to apply for the Certificate of Citizenship, without the Father’s consent, for [R] (DOB [omitted] 2008) and the Court requests this to issue at the earliest date possible.
AND THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.The Respondent Father, Mr [Lorde], cannot and will not agree to sign the passport applications for the children, or to provide a copy of [R]’s Certificate of Citizenship.
(Original emphasis)
On 19 December 2014 his Honour delivered reasons for judgment to which were annexed written submissions filed by the father on 9 December 2014, written submissions filed by the ICL on 15 December 2014, and an affidavit from the mother, affirmed and filed on 2 December 2014, which his Honour was prepared to treat as her submissions (see [23] of his reasons).
In his reasons (at [24]) his Honour “accept[ed] and adopted[ed] the submissions of the ICL as the reasons of the Court”, although he also added some brief observations of his own which we will later set out.
The orders made on 19 December 2014
The orders then made by his Honour on 19 December 2014 were:
(1). The children [R] (DOB [omitted] 2008) and [C] (DOB [omitted] 2012) (“the children”) are permitted to travel with the mother to the People’s Republic of China from 17 January 2015 to 17 March 2015.
(2)The mother pay a security bond to a solicitor’s trust account of $2,500 with the following to occur:
(a)The monies to be returned to the mother upon her return to Australia on 17 March 2015 and confirmation that the children’s passports have been returned to the Family Law Courts Registry in Canberra; or
(b)If the mother fails to return on 17 March 2015, the father may apply to the Court for the monies to be released to the father.
(3) The mother ensure that the father is provided with:
(a)A detailed written itinerary of the proposed trip, including the date of departure and return, flight details and times, all locations and destinations of travel, and details of accommodation for the entire period of travel (including, if applicable, the name of the accommodation venue, address and telephone and email contact details);
(b)A copy of the pre-booked tickets for the departure and return flights; and
(c)Details of an email address and telephone number at which the children can be contacted during the trip.
(d)Copies of updated immunisation records for both children showing compliance with immunisations for the children for travel to China as recommended by the children’s General Practitioner.
(4)For the period the mother is away, that the mother provide to the father a telephone number for the father to call the children on Mondays and Thursdays (or other such days as agreed between the Mother and Father.)
(5)Within 48 hours of the mother’s return to Canberra, the mother shall return the passports to the Canberra Registry of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
It is Orders 1, 2 and 4 that are subject to the present appeal.
Grounds of appeal and orders sought on the appeal
In his Notice of Appeal the father has applied for leave to appeal and has set out seven matters in support of his application for such leave. Given that the orders appealed relate to arrangements for children, the father does not require leave to appeal those orders, but can appeal them as of right. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to consider the matters on which he has relied in support of his application for leave.
The seven grounds of appeal contained in the father’s Notice of Appeal are prefaced by the statement: “This unfair court order”, and then continue:
1.Ignores the best interests of my vulnerable children at heart.
It aggrevated [sic] their current situation by placing them at his [sic] risk of abuse, poor health, exploitation, violence, safety and unsafe return to Australia2.Contributes in depriving my children two months of invaluable compulsory primary education which will negatively affect their confidence, performance, continuity and association with their classmates.
3. Deprives my daughter, [C] 2 months of invaluable Day Care training and caring opportunities.
4. Deprives my children invaluable opportunities spending time with their father getting used to their surroundings at their homeland, Australia.
5. Distracts & deprives my children invaluable training and professional development opportunities with the Australian Scouts, outdoor camping and participating on weekends [sic] church services and training activities
6. Subjects my children to high risk of abuse, safety, health, exploitation and safe return
7. Puts my children in high risk of stress, diseases and difficulties in adapting to cultural, linguistic & food/diet differences at this early age.
The five orders sought by the father in his Notice of Appeal are as follows:
1. I seek the stay of the orders 1, 2 and 4 of Judge Neville order
No. (P)CAC478/2012 dated December 19, 2014.2. I seek a Corder [sic] order that [R] and [C] remain on the flight risk Watch list indefinitely.
3. Alternatively children may permitted to travell [sic] to China with the mother and return to Canberra, Australia within a month during school holiday only.
4. I seek a Court order that the mother pays $7000 security bond with a solicitor in Australia to be released to the father in case children have not been returned on time and date determined.
5. I seek a Court order that the father permitted [sic] to communicate with children freely and privately on a daily basis by all means with out [sic] hinderance [sic], distraction and other means of obstraction [sic].
In relation to the first order sought by the father, being for a stay of the orders appealed, we point out that this is an order appropriately sought at first instance. We understand that application has been referred to the relevant first instance registry.
Before considering the father’s grounds of appeal, it is necessary to refer in more detail to his Honour’s reasons for the orders made on 19 December 2014.
The reasons for the orders made on 19 December 2014
His Honour commenced his reasons for judgment by providing a “Procedural History” of the case from 3 April 2014 (when the mother filed her application for the removal of the children from the airport watch list for purposes of the proposed visit to China) up until the making of his orders and directions on
3 December 2014. His Honour then explained (at [22]) that he proposed to “incorporate” the submissions of the father and of the ICL by annexing those submissions to his reasons. He had earlier (at [16]) also “incorporated” into his reasons the mother’s affidavit filed 2 December 2014.
Shortly thereafter, and as we mentioned earlier, his Honour adopted the submissions of the ICL “as the reasons of the Court” subject to some comments of his own, saying:
24.Formally, subject to some very brief further comment noted shortly, I accept and adopt the submissions of the ICL as the reasons of the Court. In addition to those submissions, I would only note and adopt also the comments of Judge Brown in Kothari & Kothari [2014] FCCA 2843 at paragraph 78 to 84, where his Honour refers, in particular, to the benefits to children of being able to travel to the cultures of their parents.
25.The Father does not acknowledge or deal with his written agreement, in which he allowed the mother to travel to China with the children in 2012. Unfortunately, because his submissions are (a) so generalised in relation to the risks of children travelling overseas, and (b) replete with reference to many matters which date from 2007 and earlier, I do not see how such matters relevantly assist the Court. One example among many from the Father’s submissions will suffice.
26.At the seventh dot point on page 2 of Mr [Lorde’s] submissions, he said: “Since 2009, on many occasions, Ms [Chu] has been verbally threatening to me, kill my children or kill herself. How then, I guarantee the safety, health and safe return of my children this time?”
27.In relation to this and similar comments, I simply note that (a) notwithstanding his grave concerns about his welfare and the welfare of the Mother and the children, the parties had another child in 2012, and (b) the Mother and the child (or children) have travelled to China twice (most recently in 2012) and have returned on each occasion.
28.As already noted, I accept and adopt the orders of the ICL, very slightly amended: the amount to be paid by way of security will be $2500.00, not the amount of $3000.00 as sought by the ICL.
29. The Court so orders.
The orders which his Honour then made on 19 December 2014 have been earlier set out.
The submissions of the ICL adopted by his Honour
Because his Honour adopted the ICL’s submissions as the Court’s reasons for its decision to permit the children to visit China, it is necessary for us to set out the greater part of those submissions, although it is unnecessary to set out the discussion of various relevant authorities (being Mazorski v Albright (2008)
37 Fam LR 518, Travis & Weaver [2014] FCCA 1279 and Line & Line (1997) FLC 92-792) which appears at the commencement of the submissions.
After that discussion of the authorities and under the heading: “In support of prohibiting overseas travel of the children”, the following six matters are listed:
1. China is not a signatory to the Hague Convention.
2. The eldest child [R] previously travelled to China with the mother and become [sic] ill.
3. The mother has access to family support in China which may provide the mother motive to [sic] not to return to Australia.
4. In the father’s affidavit filed 13 February 2013, the father states at paragraph 44 that “I am convinced that now we have separated, [Ms Chu] has fewer reasons to remain in Australia given she has a strong family unit in China who want her to return. I believe it is likely she will attempt to return there. My fear is that she will take our children with her.”
5. The Family Report of [Ms D] for 22 June 2014 does not address overseas travel and it does not appear that either party raised concerns or views in relation to overseas travel to the report writer. The report writer only addressed travel within Australia, namely that it should be permitted.
6. The mother’s proposed travel dates would necessarily mean that [R] would miss the commencement of the schooling year in 2015.
The submissions next contained a heading: “In support of permitting the overseas travel of the children”. Under that heading thirteen paragraphs (numbered 7 to 20) appear. Because of his Honour’s adoption of the submissions which supported the children’s visit to China, these thirteen paragraphs have to be regarded as being his Honour’s reasons for permitting the children to travel to China, and thus they must also now be set out:
7. The father conceded in Court that the mother did not intentionally try to harm the eldest child when he contracted rotavirus in China by accident.
8. The children eldest child ([R]) has previously travelled overseas with the mother and returned with the mother to Australia and the father has agreed in writing to the children travelling overseas to China on a previous occasion.
9. [R] and [C] are entitled to spend time with their relatives and enjoy their cultural background with other relatives who share that culture with them. In Travis & Weaver [2014] FCCA 1279
(18 June 2014) per Brown J [sic] at 105:“The guiding hand of the legislature can be seen in section 60B, where the objects and principles of Part VII are set out. These principles… emphasise the entitlement of children to spend time with their relatives, particularly grandparents and speak of their right to enjoy their cultural background with other relatives who share that culture with them.
10. Relevantly in Gin & Hing [2010] FamCA 617 (20 July 2010), Cronin J said at 66:
“China is not a signatory to The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction but that does not mean that it does not have a legal and justice system that would simply ignore the fact that there are two Australian citizens with a baby born here who have a parenting dispute. I have no evidence to the contrary but I have little doubt that there is a justice mechanism in China to which the husband could turn if the wife did not returm”
11. The mother is prepared to provide a security bond.
12. The mother did not act unilaterally in purchasing tickets. She only purchased tickets following orders by the Court permitting the travel.
13. The father lived in China with the mother previously and is familiar with the locality and reference is made in the father’s affidavit filed 13 February 2013, particularly paragraphs 6, 8, 9 and 10. The mother is proposing to travel to an area that father appears to be familiar with given that he regularly travelled there, lived there and worked there. Given that the father’s familiarity with the area and his experience living abroad and specifically in China, the father would have greater capacity to navigate if the children did not return.
14. Arguably, the mother has not attempted to remove the children from Australia previously without consent of the court, as she indicated at Court on 3 December that she was not aware (until 2 or 3 December 2014 when she tried to obtain a visa for the children) that the children’s passports had been cancelled. The father advised the Court on 3 December that he had cancelled the passports in 2012 and not advised the mother (or anyone else) he had done this.
15. The mother, in her affidavit of 2 December 2014, deposes that she is an Australian Citizen and regards Australia as her home; she has travelled to China with the child(ren) by herself in 2009 and 2012 and returned on both occasions to Australia; [t]hat the child, [R], was born in China and has had most of his immunizations in China; [t]hat [C] has had her immunisations for the Rotavirus; and she has health insurance and has travel insurance.
16. In the matter of Renton & Stapleton [2014] FCCA 1598
(24 July 2014), Your Honour noted at paragraph 135 that there is a degree of risk of the mother not returning to Australia with the children. There is risk of the mother not returning in this case including that the mother does not own real property in Australia. However, in contrast to Ms Stapleton, Ms [Chu] is currently employed in Australia and [R] has already commenced his schooling in Australia.17. Mr [Lorde] is agreeable for Ms [Chu] to travel, but not to travel with the children. However, neither party has advised the court of any alternate carer for the children if the mother were to travel to China, in circumstances where the father is currently permitted supervised time with the children.
18. In the matter of Thomason & Malhotra (2010) FamCAFC 85 (29 April 2010), travel was permitted to India (not a signatory to the Hague Convention). Federal Magistrate (as then known) Purdon-Sully’s decision to allow the children overseas to visit the extended maternal family in India was upheld by the Full Court of the Appeal Court. Federal Magistrate Purdon-Sully considered that a risk existed in the mother taking the child overseas but this risk could be managed by requiring the mother to pay a bond as incentive for her return.
19.Her Honour allowed the travel and ordered the mother to pay security of $5,000 and the Full Court of the Appeal Court noted Her Honour’s comments at paragraph 15 that “whilst the sum of $5000 is not a significant sum of money and possibly unlikely to meet all of the father’s costs if he is required to pursue any recovery options in India, I must and do take into account the mother’s financial circumstances and find that it will provide some incentive for her return, which, when coupled with the risk to her of losing the primary care of [S] should she not return, provides overall sufficient incentive for the mother’s return.”
20. Whilst decisions about international travel are difficult to make because no-one can foretell the future, the Court determines discretionary matters within the framework of the evidence that it is presented (Gin & Hing [2010] FamCA 617 (20 July 2010) per Cronin J at 64). It is submitted that the mother should be permitted to travel on the terms set out in the Minute of Orders Sought by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
Consideration of the grounds of appeal
The seven grounds of appeal contained in the father’s Notice of Appeal and to which he had to be bound in arguing his appeal (absent any application to amend those grounds) can be divided into two broad groups.
The first group, being Grounds 1, 6 and 7, assert that the orders permitting the children to travel to China will subject them to the risks of abuse, poor health, exploitation, violence, safety and unsafe return to Australia, and to high risk of stress, diseases and difficulties in adapting to cultural, linguistic and food/diet differences.
The second group, being Grounds 2, 3, 4 and 5, assert that the orders deprive the children:
·of two months of “compulsory primary education” (but presumably only in relation to the elder child) and in the case of the younger child “Day Care, training and caring opportunities”; and
·of spending time with the father getting used to Australia; and of training with Australian Scouts, camping and church activities.
In his written summary of argument in support of his appeal, the father endeavoured to address each, or at least some aspect of each, of his seven grounds of appeal, although he added what appears to be an eighth ground concerning asserted mutual rights of children and parents to spend equal time together.
In his oral submissions to us the father confirmed that his concerns about the children’s proposed trip to China are broadly twofold, being the risks to their safety and health associated with the trip and his concerns about their absence from school or child care, scouting activities, and church attendance during the proposed trip.
Our consideration of the father’s appeal has to be undertaken against the background that his Honour’s decision to permit the children to visit China is what is known in law as a discretionary decision. An appeal court can only interfere with such a decision if it finds that in reaching that decision the primary judge made a mistake of law or made a material mistake of fact, or if the judge took into account an irrelevant matter or overlooked a relevant matter, or if the decision is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appeal court concludes that the discretion must have been wrongly exercised.
(House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-5). A person who seeks to appeal successfully a discretionary judgment must establish such an error on the part of the trial Judge.
In both his written and oral submissions in support of the first group of grounds, being those directed to the risks to the children of the proposed trip to China, the father placed particular emphasis on his concerns that the children could be abducted by the mother, her relatives or associates, and also on his concerns for their health while in China.
The risk of the children not returning from China and the illness of one of the children on a previous visit there, were matters which were well canvassed by the ICL in her written submissions, and thus must be taken to have been considered by his Honour. Moreover, in his Honour’s own observations at [27] of his reasons, he noted that “the mother and the child (or children) have travelled to China twice (most recently in 2012) and have returned on each occasion.” No ground of appeal challenged that finding by his Honour.
Similarly, the father’s concern regarding the elder child missing some initial weeks of schooling, which were part of the concerns contained in his second group of grounds, was also expressly referred to by the ICL, and thus adopted by his Honour, as one of the arguments against the children being permitted to travel to China.
However, the concerns about the children’s health and their safe return from China and the concern about the elder child missing some school were balanced by the ICL, and thus by his Honour, against (amongst other things) the following matters:
· that on a previous occasion the father had agreed to overseas travel for the children;
· that one child had previously travelled with the mother to China and had returned with her;
· that the mother had not on this occasion sought to take the children unilaterally, but rather had sought the permission of the Court;
· that the mother was prepared to provide some security and that she now has Australian citizenship and is employed here; that the children have had certain vaccinations (which is a matter which the mother relied on in her written submissions to us); and
· that it would be a benefit for the children to meet their relatives who live in a different cultural environment.
On the basis of that balancing exercise, with which we would not be justified in interfering given no error by his Honour is demonstrated in this regard, the children were permitted to go to China.
While it is true that neither the ICL nor his Honour referred specifically to concerns raised by the father about the elder child missing his scouting and other outdoor activities, or about the younger child missing the benefit of child care, or about either child missing religious services, the relatively short period of time that these activities would be missed by the children and the young ages of the children would mean that his Honour’s failure to have regard to those matters could not possibly undermine his exercise of discretion.
It is important that we reiterate for the benefit of the father, that for his appeal to succeed, it was necessary that he demonstrate in his grounds of appeal that there was some error made on the part of his Honour within the scope of the principles which govern appellate interference with discretionary judgments. The father was not able to do so, and thus his appeal must be dismissed.
Both in the orders sought in his Notice of Appeal and in his oral submissions to us, the father sought that if the children were to travel to China, the bond of $2,500 that his Honour ordered the mother to lodge should be increased to $7,000 and that the children should communicate with the father on a daily basis rather than twice weekly as ordered by his Honour. There was no ground of appeal specifically directed to these issues, and therefore it is not open to us to interfere with his Honour’s orders about those matters.
Orders required as a consequence of the dismissal of the appeal
We earlier referred to the orders which his Honour made on 3 December 2014 for the issuing of new passports for the children and for the new passports to be lodged at the Canberra Registry of the Federal Circuit Court pending the Court ordering their release.
We were informed by the mother at the hearing of the appeal that the passports had only been issued last Friday (9 January 2015) and that she had then required the passports for purposes of the applications for visas, which had taken four days to be processed. She had therefore not yet been able to lodge the passports at the Court Registry.
Given the time between the delivery of this judgment and the children’s departure for China on 17 January 2015, it is impractical to require the mother to comply with the obligation to lodge the passports with the Registry. We will therefore make an order relieving her from that obligation. She will, however, still be required to lodge the passports within 48 hours of the children’s return as required by his Honour’s orders of 3 December 2014.
It will also be necessary for us to make orders in the required terms to ensure that the children’s names are removed from the airport watch list for the period of their trip to China.
Costs of the appeal
As both parties were self represented for the appeal and as no appeal books were required to be prepared for the appeal, no issue arises in relation to the costs of the appeal.
I certify that the preceding forty five (45) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (Bryant CJ, Finn & Strickland JJ) delivered on 15 January 2015.
Associate:
Date: 15 January 2015
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