Reihana v QCAT Client Services Manager

Link copied
Case Copied 10 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Reihana v QCAT Client Services Manager & Ors [2017] QCA 117

PARTIES:

TONI COLIN REIHANA
(appellant)
v
QCAT CLIENT SERVICES MANAGER
(first respondent)
QCAT OPERATIONAL MANAGER
(second respondent)
BEENLEIGH SHOW SOCIETY
(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 11178 of 2016
SC No 6260 of 2016

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – Unreported, Holmes CJ, 11 October 2016

DELIVERED ON:

6 June 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

25 May 2017

JUDGES:

Morrison and McMurdo JJA and Byrne SJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   Appellant to pay each respondent the costs of the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL MATTERS – where the appellant, who was self-represented, successfully applied to the Supreme Court for statutory orders of review of a QCAT determination of a tenancy dispute – where the appellant sought remuneration for his own time in preparing his case on the basis of what he termed “Reasonable Man’s Remuneration” – where the appellant contended that there was, or that the Court should establish, an equitable jurisdiction to award such compensation – whether the appeal was incompetent because it was made without a grant of leave by the Chief Justice or a judge of the Trial Division under s 64 Supreme Court Act 1991 (Qld) – whether there was an equitable jurisdiction to award compensation for the time of a self-represented litigant

Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld), s 64

COUNSEL:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf
S A McLeod for the first and second respondents
A Laylee for the third respondent

SOLICITORS:

The appellant appeared on his own behalf
Crown Law for the first and second respondents
McCarthy Durie Lawyers for the third respondent

  1. MORRISON JA:  I have read the reasons of McMurdo JA and agree with those reasons and the orders his Honour proposes.

  2. McMURDO JA:  The appellant, Mr Reihana, successfully applied for a statutory order of review against the respondents.  His application had arisen from a matter which was being litigated between him and the third respondent, the Beenleigh Show Society, in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).  With the consent of the respondents, last August Boddice J ordered that the matter be remitted to QCAT for further consideration.

  3. Mr Reihana, who was then and remains without legal representation, also sought an order that he be compensated for his legal expenses and for what he describes as his “time, labour and preparation in successfully prosecuting his review against the respondents”. He did not argue that this order could be made as an order for costs under Ch 17A of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Qld) (UCPR). Rather, the order was sought upon an argument that he had an equitable cause of action which entitled him to what he described as a “Reasonable Man’s Remuneration”. Ultimately,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Reihana v QCAT Client Services Manager and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] QCA 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Reihana v QCAT Client Services Manager involved Mr Reihana, a self-represented litigant, who sought to challenge a Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) determination in relation to a tenancy dispute. Mr Reihana had his caravans removed from the Beenleigh Show Grounds, which was compulsorily acquired by the Logan City Council. He had refused to move his vans and subsequently sought to resist their removal and reopen the termination of his tenancy in QCAT. Although his applications were unsuccessful, Mr Reihana sought to have the termination of his tenancy set aside through statutory orders of review in the Supreme Court. The primary issue was whether the appeal was incompetent because it was made without a grant of leave by the Chief Justice or a judge of the Trial Division under s 64 Supreme Court Act 1991 (Qld). Additionally, Mr Reihana argued for the existence of an equitable jurisdiction to award compensation for the time of a self-represented litigant.

The Supreme Court found that the appeal was not incompetent, as the Chief Justice's refusal to direct QCAT to reconsider the matter with an oral hearing was not an error. The Court held that there was no demonstrated basis for the Chief Justice to make such a direction, as it was not shown that Mr Reihana would not receive a fair and appropriate reconsideration of his case in the absence of an oral hearing in QCAT. Furthermore, the Court rejected Mr Reihana's argument for an equitable jurisdiction to award compensation for the time of a self-represented litigant. The Court found that Mr Reihana's argument had no basis in law and was not supported by any relevant authority.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr Reihana to pay each respondent the costs of the appeal. Byrne SJA and McMurdo JA agreed with the decision. The Court held that it was an interesting argument, but it could not be acceded to. Mr Reihana was entitled to some very limited costs arising from his success in the application on which Justice Boddice ruled, and they were for photocopying and filing fees, which amounted to $160.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. Appellant to pay each respondent the costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

He has a further complaint about what was ordered, or not ordered, by the Chief Justice. He asked her Honour to direct that the matter which had been remitted to QCAT be reconsidered by an oral hearing rather than on the papers. The order for the reconsideration of the matter by QCAT had been made months earlier by Boddice J. That had left open, apparently, only the question of this entitlement to remuneration. The Chief Justice declined to so direct QCAT, for two reasons: there was no power to do so because the proceeding had been concluded (save for the question of remuneration) and that, in any case, there was no basis by which she could conclude that it would be improper for QCAT to reconsider the matter on the papers. Although the notice of appeal does not mention that decision, it is challenged by Mr Reihana’s submissions.Background The third respondent owns the Beenleigh Show Grounds. Mr Reihana owned two caravans which, like many others, were parked in a part of the show grounds which was compulsorily acquired by the Logan City Council for the building of a road. He refused to move his vans and at first, he filed several applications in QCAT to resist their removal. In March 2013, the third respondent applied to QCAT to terminate Mr Reihana’s tenancy. That application was not opposed. An order terminating the tenancy was made in QCAT and in May 2013, his caravans were removed pursuant to a warrant of possession. But more than two years later, in September 2015, Mr Reihana applied to QCAT to reopen the termination of his tenancy. That required an extension of time which QCAT refused to grant. He unsuccessfully applied to the QCAT Appeal Tribunal for leave to appeal that decision. In 2016, Mr Reihana filed a number of applications for statutory orders of review, to the end of having the termination of his tenancy set aside. In one of those proceedings (BS 6260/16) Boddice J made the order for a reconsideration by QCAT to which I have referred. The respondents consented to the order because it had emerged that Mr Reihana’s written submissions to QCAT, in support of his application to reopen the termination of his tenancy, had been sent within QCAT to the adjudicator only to the extent of the first page. By this clerical error, the adjudicator had refused to reopen the termination of the tenancy without a proper consideration of Mr Reihana’s case. Boddice J further ordered as follows:“3.The Application for costs and/or expenses to be paid to the Applicant by the Respondents be adjourned to a date to be fixed, to be brought on, on giving of three business’ days written notices to the other side.4.The Application for interlocutory orders filed 25 August 2016 is otherwise dismissed.” It was that application for “costs and/or expenses” which was decided by the Chief Justice. But before that application was heard, Mr Reihana made another application, which came before Martin J on 4 October 2016. Mr Reihana was concerned about the course which the matter was taking in QCAT. Directions had been made (on 16 September 2016) for the matter to be determined on the papers. Mr Reihana wanted an oral hearing. Martin J said that this could be decided by the judge who was to hear the costs (remuneration) question in the following week. Mr Reihana also sought an order that QCAT make no directions in the matter and that no QCAT member be allocated to hear it, until the Court had “finally disposed of … BS 6260/16”. That order was also refused, partly because the third respondent, Mr Reihana’s adversary in QCAT, had not been served with this application.The argument for remuneration

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, it may not have been too late for an order to be made that QCAT’s reconsideration be conducted with an oral hearing. But alternatively, the Chief Justice would not have made that direction, in the exercise of her discretion, because of the absence of a demonstrated basis for doing so. In other words, it was not demonstrated to her Honour that Mr Reihana would not receive a fair and appropriate reconsideration of his case in the absence of an oral hearing in QCAT. There was no error in that discretionary judgment by the Chief Justice.Conclusion and order I would order as follows:1. Appeal dismissed.2. Appellant to pay to each respondent the costs of the appeal. BYRNE SJA: I agree with McMurdo JA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It was that application for “costs and/or expenses” which was decided by the Chief Justice. But before that application was heard, Mr Reihana made another application, which came before Martin J on 4 October 2016. Mr Reihana was concerned about the course which the matter was taking in QCAT. Directions had been made (on 16 September 2016) for the matter to be determined on the papers. Mr Reihana wanted an oral hearing. Martin J said that this could be decided by the judge who was to hear the costs (remuneration) question in the following week. Mr Reihana also sought an order that QCAT make no directions in the matter and that no QCAT member be allocated to hear it, until the Court had “finally disposed of … BS 6260/16”. That order was also refused, partly because the third respondent, Mr Reihana’s adversary in QCAT, had not been served with this application.The argument for remuneration Mr Reihana’s argument for remuneration, which was rejected by the Chief Justice and reargued in this Court, can be summarised as follows. It is anomalous that a legally represented party, which is successful in litigation, should have its costs of the preparation and presentation of its case paid by the unsuccessful party, whilst an unrepresented party, which is successful, should bear his or her own costs and expenses of prosecuting or defending the case. That anomaly is inequitable: in particular, it offends the maxim that equity is equality. Although there is no authority for this argument, Kirby J, writing extra-curially in 2008, said that “the categories of equity are never closed”[1] and that courts have a responsibility in the further development of the general law by “the ongoing renewal of equity’s doctrines and remedies”.[2][1]Michael Kirby, ‘Equity’s Australian Isolationism’ (2008) 8(2) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 444, 445.[2]Ibid. In rejecting this argument the Chief Justice said as follows:“[T]he applicant … seeks remuneration, which he says in equity ought to be granted, effectively for the time and effort and stress of the proceedings, both in relation to the application as before Justice Boddice, which was successful, and the proceeding of this application before me in relation to compensation in equity for his efforts. He has advanced some interesting arguments and submissions in relation to the nature of the rules of equity. His essential argument is that equity would dictate that a litigant in person ought, just as much as a lawyer who proceeds on behalf of a client in a case, be reimbursed; and, if anything, that the impetus for doing so is all the more pressing, because the litigant in person has the stress of the proceedings as well.It is an interesting argument; it has no basis in law and it certainly can’t be acceded to. Mr Reihana is entitled to some very limited costs arising from his success in the application on which Justice Boddice ruled, and they are for photocopying and filing fees, which I understand amount to $160. That is the amount which can be ordered.”