Reid v State of South Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 36 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Reid v State of South Australia [2007] FCA 1479

NATIVE TITLE – motion to strike out – whether claim group description unclear – whether claim group constitutes all the persons who hold the native title – whether claim is made on behalf of a sub-group – whether bases of authorisation meet the requirements of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) – purported self authorisation, authorisation by elders from surrounding areas and authorisation through an incorporated association

COSTS – s 85A of the Native Title Act – whether there was unreasonable conduct on the applicant’s behalf – deterrence of other possible claimants

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 13(1)(a), 61, 61A, 62, 67, 84C, 85A, 251B
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 43
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA)

Thomas v State of South Australia [2004] FCA 951 cited
Harrington-Smith v State of Western Australia (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 cited
Landers v State of South Australia (2003) 128 FCR 495 cited
Colbung v State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 774 cited
Risk v National Native Title Tribunal [2000] FCA 1589 cited
McKenzie v State of South Australia (2005) 214 ALR 214 cited
Bodney v Bropho (2004) 140 FCR 77 cited
Briggs v Minister for Lands for the State of New South Wales (2004) 209 ALR 75 cited

Bolton v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 760 cited
Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 cited
Re Wilcox;  Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 727 cited
Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 188 ALR 143 cited
McKenzie v State of South Australia [2006] FCA 891 cited
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 cited

RICHARD REID (NINGIL REID) v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

No SAD 85 of 2007

FINN J
21 SEPTEMBER 2007
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 85 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

RICHARD REID (NINGIL REID)
Applicant

AND:

STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 SEPTEMBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Order 2 of 17 August 2007 be vacated. 

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 85 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

RICHARD REID (NINGIL REID)
Applicant

AND:

STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

21 SEPTEMBER 2007

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 17 August 2007 I ordered that the claimant application made in this matter be struck out under s 84C of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). I suspended the operation of the order pending the publication of these reasons. The applicant, Richard (Ningil) Reid, filed this application on 24 May 2007. It overlapped at least eight other claims including (inter alia) the Kokatha Native Title Claim (SAD 6013/98). Mr Reid, who is acknowledged by the claimants in that claim to be a Kokatha elder, is a member of that claim both as a claimant…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Reid v State of South Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1479
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Reid v State of South Australia, Mr Reid sought to challenge the authorisation of a native title claim made by the Kokatha people of South Australia. The primary dispute involved the validity of the claim group description and the authorisation process, with Mr Reid arguing that the claim was made on behalf of a sub-group without proper authorisation and in non-compliance with statutory requirements. The case required the court to determine whether the authorisation process was adequately representative and whether the application complied with the statutory provisions of the Native Title Act.

The court examined the authorisation process and the nature of the claim group. It found that the notice of the meeting authorising the claim was insufficient, and there was no evidence that the group members were asked to adopt a non-traditional process for authorising the claim. Additionally, the court noted that the meeting did not have a reasonably arguable basis for being fairly representative of the claim group. The court concluded that the authorisation process was inadequate and did not meet the requirements of the Act.

The Federal Court ordered the application to be struck out under section 84C of the Native Title Act. The court also addressed the issue of costs, noting that the usual principle that costs follow the event was displaced by section 85A of the Native Title Act, which provides that each party must bear their own costs unless unreasonable conduct by a party causes another party to incur costs. The court considered Mr Reid's actions in good faith and his circumstances, including health issues and lack of legal advice, in deciding not to impose costs against him.

The court vacated the earlier order suspending the strike-out order, highlighting that Mr Reid's dissatisfaction with the conduct of the native title claim and overlap proceedings did not warrant punitive measures or deterrence. The final orders included vacating the suspension of the strike-out order and addressing the costs associated with the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order 2 of 17 August 2007 be vacated.

Background

Background to the litigation

The bases of the motion were, variously, that (i) the native title claim group description was unclear; (ii) the claims were made impermissibly on behalf of a sub-group; (iii) the claimed bases of authorisation did not meet the requirements of the Act; and (iv) the application failed to comply with the requirements of s 61A and s 62 of the Act.BACKGROUND Mr Reid’s application would appear to be his response to a long standing dispute he has with the applicants in the Kokatha Native Title Claim of which claim group he describes himself as a “dissentient member”. It is clear on the material before me that he has been involved in meetings relating to that claim and its authorisation. The most notable of these are as follows. (i)A meeting was held at Stirling North on 30 and 31 January 1999 when the Kokatha people authorised the claim without dissent. Mr Reid would seem to have made and signed alterations to the Memorandum of Understanding resulting from that meeting and he appears to have affixed the common seal of the Kokatha Peoples Committee Inc to it. One of the terms of the MoU was that the parties agreed to negotiate in good faith on “(b) the bringing of all Kokatha groups into the same native title claim or series of claims”. (ii)A meeting was convened by the ALRM at Spear Creek on 21 May 2004 at which a written decision was reached and signed (inter alia) by Mr Reid that Roger Thomas was to be the spokesman and to be responsible for the native title application and related matters. Mr Reid and Mr Starkey were to be “responsible for all Aboriginal law, culture and heritage”. Mr Reid now disavows any approval he gave to Mr Thomas. In 2003 Mr Reid sought, unsuccessfully, to have that native title claim struck out for want of authorisation: see Thomas v State of South Australia [2004] FCA 951.THE CLAIMANT APPLICATION After filing the application on 24 May 2007, Mr Reid purported to file two further amended applications, one on 14 June 2007, the other on 9 July 2007. I have had regard to these for the purposes of the State’s motion and, formally, I have proceeded as if leave had been given to file and serve that of 14 June 2007. The State’s submissions proceeded on that basis. I took this course because I would in any event have had to strike out the original application because, according to the express terms used in Schedule of O of that application, Mr Reid was, as a member of another claim group, “specifically excluded from this application’s claim group”. (i) The native title claim group The Schedule A claim group is made up of a two page list of 103 named persons followed by the reference to “other living Kokatha persons as described in Attachment A”. Mr Reid claims that access to this Attachment is “restricted”. The Attachment provided greater detail about Mr Reid and the named persons and then continues:“4.The Claim group also has the capacity to contain descendents of prior attendees and participants in KPC meetings and activities, (if they are not already in the claim group) and if they are have the necessary ancestry relating to inheritance (i.e. if they are valid Kokatha). Such live persons or live descendents will be included in the claim group in due course (at the discretion of KPC Elders and Advisors). 5.The Claim Group also has the capacity to contain live descendents of prior Custodians over parts of the Kokatha Nation Territory. Such persons will be included in the claim group in due course (at the discretion of KPC Elders and Advisors).6.The Claim Group also has the capacity to contain adopted persons from other tribes (and their Kokatha descendents) using criteria such as whether such people acknowledge and are schooled in Kokatha law and custom, participate in Kokatha activities, or have valid interests in part of Kokatha Nation territory. (The exact criteria that [sic] used will be up to the Elders to decide).”(Original emphasis)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J (dissent)
It is at this point of tracing back that the alleged authorisation’s ineffectiveness becomes apparent. While there is evidence that the less than 20 of the 103 members of the claim group who were present at the meeting voted unanimously for the application to be made, there is no evidence at all that such notice of the meeting as was given, advertised other than that an AGM was to be held. There is nothing to suggest that the group members were being asked to agree to and adopt a non-traditional process for authorising a claimant application. This would, of itself, be enough to reject the legitimacy of the claimed authorisation process. Further, and in light both of the evidence on notice and of the limited attendance, there is no reasonably arguable basis on which one could infer that the meeting was fairly representative of the claim group: see Bolton at [46]. There is not, in my view, any arguable basis for contending that the meeting was in the circumstances adequate to satisfy the requirements of s 251B(b).CONCLUSION For the above reasons I have ordered that the application be struck out under s 84C of the Native Title Act. I will order that my order suspending the above order be vacated.COSTS Both the State of South Australia and the ALRM seek orders that Mr Reid pay their respective costs of the proceeding or else of the strike-out motion.Applicable principles The Court’s general discretion to award costs is conferred by s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). It is well accepted that the general discretion conferred by s 43 is absolute and unfettered but that it must be exercised judicially and not on grounds unconnected with the litigation: see Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 at 11; Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 727 at 732. In the exercise of that discretion the usual principle applied is that ordinarily costs follow the event so that a successful litigant receives costs in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order: Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 188 ALR 143 at [11]. That usual principle has been displaced by s 85A of the Native Title Act which provides:“(1)Unless the Federal Court orders otherwise, each party to a proceeding must bear his or her own costs. Unreasonable conduct(2)Without limiting the Court’s power to make orders under subsection (1), if the Federal Court is satisfied that a party to a proceeding has, by any unreasonable act or omission, caused another party to incur costs in connection with the institution or conduct of the proceeding, the Court may order the first-mentioned party to pay some or all of those costs.” In McKenzie v State of South Australia [2006] FCA 891 at [8] I referred to the case law on s 85A. Here I need only repeat what I said there:“The most authoritative statement of the matters which should inform the exercise of discretion in awarding costs in light of this section was given by Lee J in Ward v Western Australia (1999) 93 FCR 305, in comments later endorsed by the Full Court in De Rose v State of South Australia (No 2) [2005] FCAFC 137. His Honour noted first, that s 85A(1) is intended to remove the expectation that costs will follow the event but that despite this, the Court retains its discretion as to costs unlimited by subrule (1); secondly the ‘unreasonable conduct’ of the parties is not a jurisdictional fact which preconditions the exercise of the discretion and, conversely, s 85A(2) will not control or limit the discretion in subrule (1); thirdly, whilst the exercise of the discretion when making a costs order should be judicial, the starting point is that each party will bear their own costs.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The one additional comment I should make is that it is not proper to use the power to award costs to punish either a successful or an unsuccessful party: cf Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 566-567; or as a deterrent to other would-be applicants. I refer to these matters as Mr Reid clearly has been an irritant to others involved in the Kokatha Overlap Proceedings (SAD 6013 of 1998) and his stances and actions have, probably, in some degree impacted adversely upon their expectations in the conduct of those proceedings.Consideration The parties have filed written submissions on this matter. I do not intend to outline them in any detail. I have had regard to them. There are, though, two matters arising out of the submissions made by Mr Reid’s counsel to which I should refer lest he continue to labour under several obvious illusions. First, I did not strike out Mr Reid’s claim because of an alleged misunderstanding arising out of responses he made to questions I asked him and to which I referred above at [11] to [13]. Secondly, I did not strike out the application for the reason that I did not want it to get in the way of a scheduled case management conference. It is clear that the application itself was a product of Mr Reid’s increasing dissatisfaction both with the conduct of the Kokatha Native Title claim and with the overlap proceedings (SAD 6013 of 1998) in relation to the Barngala applicants. Even though he had other avenues open to him to express his point of view after his unsuccessful attempt to strike out the Kokatha Native Title Claim, I am satisfied that his own application was brought in good faith and I am satisfied that as a litigant in person for all practical purposes, he acted reasonably in instituting the proceedings even though the application itself was misconceived when considered in light of the distinctive requirements of the Native Title Act. I am not prepared to assume in light of his previous involvements in proceedings relating to the Kokatha Native Title claim that he should be regarded as adequately versed in the mysteries of the Native Title Act and hence as bearing the risk of his misconceptions. Further, I am not satisfied that the timing of his application was informed by some improper motive and in particular that of disrupting the conduct of other proceedings to the extent of any overlap: see s 67 of the Act. I accept that health considerations and the paucity of advice and assistance go far to explain the timing of the application. However, it is the case that prior to the strike out motion the State pointed out to Mr Reid the deficiencies in his application as it did subsequently in the materials filed in support of the motion. For its part the ALRM asserted throughout that the application was fundamentally flawed and could not be remedied by amendment. The strike out motion was filed on 3 July 2007. This brought s 84C(2) into play. I was required to consider the motion before any further proceedings took place in relation to the application. It is apparent from what transpired at a directions hearing several weeks later that Mr Reid had been assisted by a legally trained anthropologist who apparently had arranged some (unspecified) legal advisers for him. When the motion came on for its listed hearing a recently instructed lawyer appeared for Mr Reid. He sought an adjournment. He said that if the application had merit further submissions would be made. If not it would be discontinued. I adjourned the hearing of the matter for three weeks.