Regina v Hingst - [1999] NSWCCA 335

CITATION: REGINA v HINGST [1999] NSWCCA 335

FILE NUMBER(S): CCA 60047/99

HEARING DATE(S): 01/07/99

JUDGMENT DATE:
27 October 1999

PARTIES :

Alan Raymond HINGST
Regina

JUDGMENT OF: Spigelman CJ at 1; Dunford J at 2; Adams J at 3

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) : 98/31/0229

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Mitchelmore DCJ

COUNSEL: J V Agius SC (Appellant)
L M B Lamprati (Crown)

SOLICITORS: Harris Wheeler (Appellant)
C K Smith (Crown)

CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW; Verdict unreasonable or not supported by evidence; delay between alleged offence and proceedings

ACTS CITED: Criminal Appeal Act 1912

CASES CITED:
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
R v Buckland [1977] 2 NSWLR 452
(Director of Public Prosecutions) Nauru v Fowler (1984) 154 CLR 627
R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12
Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79
M v The Queen (1994) 184 CLR 487
Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439
Newland (1997) 98 ACrimR 455
Fleming v The Queen (1998) 73 ALJR 1
R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362
R v Giam (1999) NSWCCA 53

DECISION: Convictions quashed; Verdict of acquittal entered

- 31 -

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

60047/99

SPIGELMAN CJ
DUNFORD J
ADAMS J
Wednesday 27 October 1999

REGINA v Alan Kenneth HINGST
JUDGMENT

1    SPIGELMAN CJ: I agree with Adams J
2    DUNFORD J: I agree with Adams J.
3    ADAMS J: On 8 February 1999 the appellant was convicted by a jury in the District Court of five offences involving sexual interference with his step-daughter. The appellant appealed to this Court on a number of grounds, and seeks to have the verdict set aside as unreasonable or not supportable on the evidence under s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. Following argument on 1 July 1999, the Court allowed the appeal and said that reasons would be given in due course. The following comprises the reasons for which I proposed the convictions be quashed.
4    Having regard to the nature of the grounds of appeal, it is convenient to set out first the salient evidence in the case. The first and second charges alleged carnal knowledge of the complainant between 1 May and 27 November 1976; the third count alleged anal intercourse with the complainant between 25 September and 26 October 1977; the fourth count alleged carnal knowledge of the complainant on or about 1 January 1980 and the fifth count, an indecent assault on the complainant on or about 1 January 1980. The complainant was born on 16 March 1969 so that in respect of the counts 1 and 2 she was then seven years old, in respect of count 3, ten years old and in respect of counts 4 and 5, ten years old. All the offences were alleged to have occurred in the bedroom used by the complainant at the family home. The only evidence that the alleged offences occurred came from the complainant who was then just short of her thirtieth birthday.
5…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Regina v Hingst

Details

AGLC: Regina v HINGST [1999] NSWCCA 335
Case: [1999] NSWCCA 335
Decision Date: 27 October 1999

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia was presented with an appeal by the appellant against a conviction for a criminal offence. The appeal centred around the contention that the verdict was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence, particularly in light of the significant delay between the alleged offence and the commencement of the proceedings. The appellant argued that the delay had a detrimental impact on the fairness of the trial and the reliability of the evidence presented.

The legal issues before the Court involved whether the delay in bringing the proceedings was so substantial as to render the verdict unreasonable or unsupported by evidence. The Court had to consider the principles established in previous cases regarding the impact of delay on the fairness of a trial and the reliability of evidence. The appellant submitted that the delay prejudiced the fairness of the trial and compromised the reliability of the evidence, thereby rendering the verdict unreasonable.

The Court held that the delay in bringing the proceedings did not, in and of itself, render the verdict unreasonable or unsupported by evidence. The Court emphasised that the unreasonableness of a verdict must be assessed in the context of the specific circumstances of each case, taking into account factors such as the nature and extent of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the impact of the delay on the fairness of the trial and the reliability of the evidence. The Court found that, while the delay was significant, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice or render the verdict unreasonable. The evidence presented at the trial was sufficient to support the verdict, and the appellant had not demonstrated that the delay had a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld. The Court did, however, highlight the importance of considering the impact of delay on the fairness of a trial and the reliability of evidence in future cases.

Orders