Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1294

Citation: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1294
Parties: RAYLENE REEVE v RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD and FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA
File number: WAD 186 of 2012
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 21 November 2012
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment – no reasonable prospect of success – frivolous or vexatious

INDUSTRIAL LAW – out of time application to Fair Work Australia – extension of time application refused – natural justice – Fair Work Australia not required to hold a hearing – bar under s 723 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 365, s 366, s 366(1)(a), s 366(1)(b), s 366(2), s 577, s 578, s 591, s 593(1), s 593(2), s 593(3), s 604, s 723, s 772(1), s 772(1)(e), s 773, s 774, s 774(2), s 777, Pt 3-1, Pt 6-4
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) R 26.01(a), R 26.01(b)
Cases cited: O’Donoghue v Australian Information Commissioner (No 3) [2012] FCA 1244
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Limited [2012] FWA 3141
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited [2012] FWAFB 5601
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Limited [2012] FMCA 120
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Limited [2011] FWA 5349
The Queen v The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte The Angliss Group [1969] HCA 10; (1969) 122 CLR 546
Date of hearing: 14 November 2012
Place: Perth
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 89
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr THF Caspersz
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

WAD 186 of 2012

BETWEEN:

RAYLENE REEVE
Applicant

AND:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
First Respondent

FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 NOVEMBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The summary judgment application of the first respondent filed 20 September 2012 be granted.

2.The originating application of the applicant filed 10 August 2012 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

WAD 186 of 2012

BETWEEN:

RAYLENE REEVE
Applicant

AND:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
First Respondent

FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE:

21 NOVEMBER 2012

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLICATION BY FIRST RESPONDENT

  1. By originating application filed 10 August 2012, the applicant (Ms Reeve) seeks a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the Full Bench of the second respondent (FWA) made 20 July 2012, as well as a writ of mandamus requiring the Full Bench to determine according to law the application she made under s…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1294
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd involves Ms Reeve, who seeks to challenge a decision of the Fair Work Australia (FWA) Full Bench which dismissed her appeal against the refusal of an extension of time for her application to FWA. The primary contention in this case is that Ms Reeve's natural justice rights were violated because her extension of time application was decided on the papers without an oral hearing. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the application for summary judgment by Ramsay Health Care should be granted, effectively dismissing Ms Reeve's originating application on the grounds that it had no reasonable prospect of success.

The legal issues central to this case revolve around the interpretation of procedural fairness and natural justice in the context of administrative decision-making by FWA. Ms Reeve argued that the Commissioner’s decision to determine the extension of time application without an oral hearing denied her the right to be heard, which she claimed was a violation of natural justice. Furthermore, she contended that the Commissioner and the Full Bench did not adequately consider her personal circumstances, which she argued constituted exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time.

In assessing the arguments, the Court examined the nature of FWA as an administrative body rather than a judicial court. It found that FWA is not mandated to adhere to the same procedural rigours as a court, including the requirement to hold an oral hearing for every application. The Court held that the procedural directions issued by the Commissioner were appropriate for the circumstances and did not infringe upon Ms Reeve's natural justice rights. Additionally, the Court concluded that the Commissioner and the Full Bench had sufficiently considered the relevant factors in deciding the extension of time application. The Court found no merit in Ms Reeve’s contention that her originating application had a reasonable prospect of success.

Consequently, the Court granted the summary judgment application filed by Ramsay Health Care, dismissing Ms Reeve’s originating application. The Court ruled that there was no reasonable prospect that her appeal would succeed, as the procedural steps taken by FWA were lawful and appropriate, and the Full Bench’s decision was correctly made. The Court's decision underscored the distinction between administrative decision-making and judicial proceedings, affirming that FWA is not required to conduct hearings in the same manner as a court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The summary judgment application of the first respondent filed 20 September 2012 be granted.

2. The originating application of the applicant filed 10 August 2012 be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Reeve opposes the application relying on her affidavit filed in support of the originating application on 10 August 2012, other materials in the appeal booklet lodged with the originating application and her submissions.BACKGROUND In March 2011, Ms Reeve’s employment with Ramsay ceased. In 8 July 2011, Ms Reeve made an application to FWA to deal with a dispute under s 365 of the FW Act on the basis that she had been dismissed in contravention of Pt 3‑1 of that Act. Her application was well out of time. By s 366(1)(a) the application under s 365 had to be made within 60 days after the dismissal took effect or by subs (1)(b) within such further period as FWA allows under subs (2). By s 366(2) the FWA may allow a further period if satisfied that there are “exceptional circumstances”, taking into account:(a)the reason for the delay; and(b)any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and(c)prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and(d)the merits of the application; and(e)fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position. On 18 August 2011, Commissioner Williams refused Ms Reeve’s extension application as he was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to allow it: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Limited [2011] FWA 5349. Ms Reeve’s subsequent appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Full Bench of FWA. Ms Reeve then applied to the Federal Magistrates Court concerning unlawful termination purportedly under s 773 FW Act, but this application was also dismissed as no certificate had issued under s 777 of the FW Act: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Limited [2012] FMCA 120. Ms Reeve then made a second unlawful termination application under s 773 of the FW Act, this time to FWA. This application has led to the present proceeding in this Court. Section 773 falls within Div 2 of Pt 6‑4 of the Act and enables an employee to apply to FWA to deal with a dispute if an employer has “terminated an employee’s employment in contravention of subsection 772(1)”. Section 772(1) provides:(1)An employer must not terminate an employee’s employment for one or more of the following reasons, or for reasons including one or more of the following reasons:(a)temporary absence from work because of illness or injury of a kind prescribed by the regulations;(b)trade union membership or participation in trade union activities outside working hours or, with the employer’s consent, during working hours;(c)non‑membership of a trade union;(d)seeking office as, or acting or having acted in the capacity of, a representative of employees;(e)the filing of a complaint, or the participation in proceedings, against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative authorities;(f)race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family or carer’s responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin;(g)absence from work during maternity leave or other parental leave;(h)temporary absence from work for the purpose of engaging in a voluntary emergency management activity, where the absence is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ms Reeve’s further appeal application to the Full Bench of FWA was dismissed: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited [2012] FWAFB 5601. It is that decision that Ms Reeve now seeks to quash, although she focuses on the decision of Commissioner Cloghan in doing so, alleging the Full Bench erred in not finding the Commissioner erred. Her main complaint though is that Commissioner Cloghan denied her natural justice by deciding the extension of time issue on the papers and without giving her a hearing.FWA DECISIONS ON EXTENSION OF TIME When the application to extend time came before Commissioner Cloghan, he issued a document called Statement and Directions under the FW Act, which recited the nature of the application, the reliance on s 772(1)(e) and the need to establish exceptional circumstances taking into account the matters referred to in s 774(2) in order to extend time. To assist in the “efficient and effective determination” of whether the applicant should be allowed to proceed with her application out of time, the Commissioner made procedural directions that required:·The applicant to email the representative of Ramsay a statement of facts upon which the applicant relied, any documentary material and other relevant submissions to allow an extension of time.·Ramsay to provide the applicant by email with a copy of a response to the statement of facts asserted or submitted, a statement of facts asserted upon which the employer relies and any documentary material or submissions in response to the applicant’s materials.·The applicant to respond if she wished by email.·Having received the “written submissions” the Tribunal would then make a determination as to whether it was satisfied there were exceptional circumstances.·Should the Tribunal not be satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances, the application would be dismissed.·If the Tribunal found there were exceptional circumstances, the matter would proceed to a conference under s 776 of the FW Act. In his written decision dated 23 April 2012, Commissioner Cloghan dismissed the application. His written reasons cited the relevant statutory framework, summarised the applicant’s case, summarised the employer’s case and then considered the matter. In the process the Commissioner considered the background including statements made in the materials supplied by Ramsay that included a statement that Mr James MacWatt had engaged in five discussions with Ms Reeve before he met with Ms Young, the manager of Human Resources, where it was decided that the applicant’s employment was likely to be terminated, and that there was then a further meeting on 16 March 2011 when it was determined following a meeting with Ms Kane, the coordinator of employee relations, that Ms Reeve’s employment would be terminated for performance reasons. Then on 24 March 2011, Mr MacWatt and Ms Kane met with Ms Reeve and her employment was terminated. A letter of termination was provided. In this part of the background the Commissioner simply sets out facts and did not make any findings as to whether the termination was justified or not, or lawful or not.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In all these circumstances, the applicant denies that her originating application has no reasonable chances of success or that it is vexatious.CONSIDERATION For the reasons which follow, the summary judgment application of Ramsay should be granted on the basis there is no reasonable prospect of her originating application succeeding. The practical question to be assessed often will be whether the applicant has more than a “fanciful” prospect of success: see O’Donoghue v Australian Information Commissioner (No 3) [2012] FCA 1244 at [16]‑[18]. The history of Ms Reeve’s various concerns since her employment with Ramsay ceased in March 2011 has been set out in some detail above. As the various materials and submissions lodged by Ms Reeve indicate, and as she explained in her written and oral submissions to the Court on the hearing of the summary judgment application, she feels indignant that her allegations as a whistle blower should not find their way to consideration in a final hearing of her unlawful termination application to FWA. Further, she is aggrieved that Commissioner Cloghan and subsequently the Full Bench on the appeal did not appreciate that both before and at the time she made the unlawful termination application and sought an extension of time for doing so that she was under great stress due to her personal circumstances, including Family Court proceedings, criminal proceedings involving a neighbour, the whistle blower allegations and her own personal health. The circumstances when the extension application came before Commissioner Cloghan were, as set out in detail above, that Ms Reeve: had taken a general protection proceeding in FWA and had been unsuccessful; had then commenced proceedings for unlawful termination in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, but had been unsuccessful; and had then renewed that application in FWA. Quite some considerable time had passed. When the unlawful termination application came before Commissioner Cloghan it was necessary to determine whether the time for making that application should be extended. To that end the Commissioner issued the document called Statement and Directions in which he directed that the parties should put on materials and make submissions in writing and he would determine the extension of time question on the papers so submitted. It is primarily this step that Ms Reeve now complains about, because she believes she was denied primary right to be heard orally in a hearing and if necessary to call witnesses and cross‑examine witnesses before Commissioner Cloghan. That primary submission is not correct as a matter of law. Ms Reeve at the summary judgment hearing mentioned a number of principles that bear upon the obligation of a court to provide natural justice, not to be biased and to conduct hearings in public. The position in this case is that FWA is not a court. It is an administrative decision‑maker, albeit an important administrative decision-maker dealing with various matters arising in relation to workplace disputes.