Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 499

Citation: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 499
Appeal from: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1294
Parties: RAYLENE REEVE v RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD  and FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA
File number: WAD 400 of 2012
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 24 May 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment – applicable principles
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A) and (1B)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 365, 366(1)(a), (2), 341(1)(c), 577, 593, 723, 772, 773, 774, 776, 777, 779,
Cases cited: Atieh v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2013] FCA 20
Bahonko v Sterjov (2008) 247 ALR 168
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1294
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Limited [2011] FWA 5349
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited [2012] FWAFB 5601
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Limited [2012] FWA 3141
Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Limited [2012] FMCA 120
Date of hearing: 26 March 2013
Place: Perth
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms R Reeve appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Caspersz
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for the Second Respondent: No appearance

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

WAD 400 of 2012

BETWEEN:

RAYLENE REEVE
Applicant

AND:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
First Respondent

FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 MAY 2013

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal be refused.

2.The notice of appeal be struck out.

3.The parties have liberty to apply on the question of costs. 

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

WAD 400 of 2012

BETWEEN:

RAYLENE REEVE
Applicant

AND:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
First Respondent

FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE:

24 MAY 2013

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant sought to appeal as of right from the orders of a judge of this Court by which summary judgment was entered for the first respondent (Ramsay), and consequentially, her originating application filed 10 August 2012 was dismissed: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1294 (Reasons).

  2. However, these were interlocutory orders, and accordingly, leave to appeal is required: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A) and (1B). Siopis J referred this matter from an Appellate Callover hearing to my docket in order that the necessary leave application could be heard. I have treated the notice of appeal as a draft notice of appeal.

  3. During the course of these reasons I will continue…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 499
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd, the applicant sought to appeal against a decision of the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia (FWA), which dismissed her application to extend time to bring an application for unlawful termination. The applicant alleged that she had been dismissed without justification and contrary to the provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The primary issue before the Court was whether the Full Bench of FWA erred in dismissing the applicant's appeal against the refusal of the Commissioner to grant an extension of time to lodge the application for unlawful termination.

The applicant argued that the Commissioner denied her natural justice by deciding the extension of time issue on the papers and without giving her a hearing. The Court considered the principles of natural justice and whether they were complied with by the Commissioner. The Court found that the procedural directions issued by the Commissioner were consistent with the statutory framework and aimed at ensuring an efficient and effective determination of the application. The Commissioner provided the applicant with an opportunity to submit written materials, which she did, and considered the materials before making a decision. The Court held that the Commissioner did not err in deciding the application on the papers and without a hearing, as the procedural directions provided an adequate opportunity for the applicant to present her case.

The Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and refused leave to appeal. The Court held that the Full Bench of FWA did not err in dismissing the applicant's appeal against the refusal of the Commissioner to grant an extension of time to lodge the application for unlawful termination. The Court also held that the applicant had not demonstrated that the Full Bench's decision involved a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The Court struck out the notice of appeal and granted the parties liberty to apply on the question of costs. The Court's decision highlights the importance of complying with procedural directions and providing an adequate opportunity for parties to present their case, while also recognising the need for efficient and effective determination of applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal be refused.

2. The notice of appeal be struck out.

3. The parties have liberty to apply on the question of costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

During the course of these reasons I will continue to refer to Fair Work Australia (FWA) by this name despite the fact that it has been amended to the Fair Work Commission (FWC).Background The following background is derived from the judgment of the primary judge. On March 2011, the applicant’s employment with Ramsay ceased. On 8 July 2011, the applicant made an application to the second respondent, FWA, to deal with a dispute under s 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act) on the basis that she had been dismissed in contravention of Pt 3‑1 of that Act. Her application was well out of time. By s 366(1)(a), the application under s 365 had to be made within 60 days after the dismissal took effect or by subs (1)(b) within such further period as FWA allows under subs (2). By s 366(2), FWA may allow a further period if satisfied that there are “exceptional circumstances”, taking into account:(a)the reason for the delay; and(b)any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and(c)prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and(d)the merits of the application; and(e)fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position. On 18 August 2011, Commissioner Williams refused the applicant’s extension application as he was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to allow it: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Limited [2011] FWA 5349. The applicant’s subsequent appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Full Bench of FWA. The applicant then applied to what was then called the Federal Magistrates Court concerning unlawful termination. Such an application is made under s 779 of the FW Act. This application was also dismissed as no certificate had been issued under s 777 of the FW Act: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Limited [2012] FMCA 120. The applicant then made a second unlawful termination application under s 773 of the FW Act, this time to FWA. This application has led to the present proceeding in this Court. Section 773 falls within Div 2 of Pt 6‑4 of the Act and enables an employee to apply to FWA to deal with a dispute if an employer has terminated an employee’s employment in contravention of subsection 772(1). Section 772(1) provides:(1)An employer must not terminate an employee’s employment for one or more of the following reasons, or for reasons including one or more of the following reasons:(a)temporary absence from work because of illness or injury of a kind prescribed by the regulations;(b)trade union membership or participation in trade union activities outside working hours or, with the employer’s consent, during working hours;(c)non‑membership of a trade union;(d)seeking office as, or acting or having acted in the capacity of, a representative of employees;(e)the filing of a complaint, or the participation in proceedings, against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative authorities;(f)race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family or carer’s responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin;(g)absence from work during maternity leave or other parental leave;(h)temporary absence from work for the purpose of engaging in a voluntary emergency management activity, where the absence is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant’s further appeal application to the Full Bench of FWA was dismissed: Reeve v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited [2012] FWAFB 5601. It is that decision that the applicant applied to quash, although she focused on the decision of Commissioner Cloghan in doing so, alleging the Full Bench erred in not finding the Commissioner erred. Her main complaint was that Commissioner Cloghan denied her natural justice by deciding the extension of time issue on the papers and without giving her a hearing.FWA decisions on extension of time When the application to extend time came before Commissioner Cloghan, he issued a document called Statement and Directions under the FW Act, which recited the nature of the application, the reliance on s 772(1)(e) and the need to establish exceptional circumstances taking into account the matters referred to in s 774(2) in order to extend time. To assist in the “efficient and effective determination” of whether the applicant should be allowed to proceed with her application out of time, the Commissioner made procedural directions that required:·The applicant to email the representative of Ramsay a statement of facts upon which the applicant relied, any documentary material and other relevant submissions to allow an extension of time.·Ramsay to provide the applicant by email with a copy of a response to the statement of facts asserted or submitted, a statement of facts asserted upon which the employer relies and any documentary material or submissions in response to the applicant’s materials.·The applicant to respond if she wished by email.·Having received the “written submissions” the Tribunal would then make a determination as to whether it was satisfied there were exceptional circumstances.·Should the Tribunal not be satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances, the application would be dismissed.·If the Tribunal found there were exceptional circumstances, the matter would proceed to a conference under s 776 of the FW Act. In his written decision dated 23 April 2012, Commissioner Cloghan dismissed the application. His written reasons cited the relevant statutory framework, summarised the applicant’s case, summarised the employer’s case and then considered the matter. In the process, the Commissioner considered the background including statements made in the materials supplied by Ramsay that included a statement that Mr James MacWatt had engaged in five discussions with the applicant before he met with Ms Young, the manager of Human Resources, where it was decided that the applicant’s employment was likely to be terminated, and that there was then a further meeting on 16 March 2011 when it was determined, following a meeting with Ms Kane, the coordinator of employee relations, that the applicant’s employment would be terminated for performance reasons. Then, on 24 March 2011, Mr MacWatt and Ms Kane met with the applicant and her employment was terminated. A letter of termination was provided. In this part of the background, the Commissioner simply sets out facts and did not make any findings as to whether the termination was justified or not, or lawful or not.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established