FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
O’Donoghue v Australian Information Commissioner (No 3) [2012] FCA 1244
Citation: O’Donoghue v Australian Information Commissioner (No 3) [2012] FCA 1244 Parties: VINCENT THOMAS O'DONOGHUE v AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION COMMISSIONER and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: WAD 183 of 2012 Judge: GILMOUR J Date of judgment: 9 November 2012 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application made by the second respondent for the applicant’s application to be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Legislation: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ss 54(2), 54B(1)(a), 54C(3), 54D
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31ACases cited: O’Donoghue v Australian Information Commissioner [2012] FCA 995 cited
O’Donoghue v Australian Information Commissioner (No 2) [2012] FCA 1152 cited
Priestley v Godwin (No. 3) (2008) 172 FCR 139 cited
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2008) 241 CLR 118 citedDate of hearing: 6 November 2012 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr P Macliver Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 183 of 2012
BETWEEN: VINCENT THOMAS O'DONOGHUE
ApplicantAND: AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 NOVEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The oral application for an adjournment be refused.
2.The oral application to state a case to the High Court of Australia be refused.
3.The application dated 7 August 2012 be dismissed.
4.The applicant pay the costs of the second respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 183 of 2012
BETWEEN: VINCENT THOMAS O'DONOGHUE
ApplicantAND: AUSTRALIAN INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE:
9 NOVEMBER 2012
PLACE:
PERTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The second respondent, the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal), by application dated 18 September 2012, applies pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act) for the application filed by Mr O’Donoghue, on 7 August 2012, to be dismissed.
Previously the applicant had sought to have me recuse myself from hearing his substantive application on the grounds of bias. This was unsuccessful: O’Donoghue v Australian Information Commissioner [2012] FCA 995. Then on 18 October 2012, the applicant unsuccessfully applied for an adjournment of the dismissal application: O’Donoghue v Australian Information Commissioner (No 2) [2012] FCA 1152.
At the outset of the hearing the applicant, without any prior notice either to the Court or, it appears, to the Tribunal, renewed his application for an adjournment as he wanted the Court to state a case to the High Court “seeking the inclusion or…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 1244
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Commissioner's decision to extend time for the Tribunal to make an internal review decision was lawful. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the Commissioner's decision was made without appropriate consideration of the relevant statutory provisions and whether it violated principles of procedural fairness. The court also needed to consider whether the applicant had any reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the application.
The court found that the applicant's application was without merit and was frivolous. The court noted that the statutory framework for granting extensions of time under the Freedom of Information Act allowed the Commissioner to extend time if certain conditions were met, and the Commissioner had done so in this case. The court also found that the applicant was not entitled to procedural fairness in relation to the Commissioner's decision to grant an extension of time. The court concluded that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the application, and the application was dismissed. The court also ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the second respondent.
In summary, the court found that the Commissioner's decision to grant an extension of time to the Tribunal to make an internal review decision was lawful and that the applicant's application was without merit. The court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the second respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The oral application for an adjournment be refused.
2. The oral application to state a case to the High Court of Australia be refused.
3. The application dated 7 August 2012 be dismissed.
4. The applicant pay the costs of the second respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant did not provide an outline of written submissions. His oral submissions were, in effect, that as the 30 day period provided in s 54C(3) and referred to in s 54D(1)(b) of the Act had ended, time for the Tribunal to make a decision on his application for an internal review could not be extended. Consideration The actual position is the very opposite of that contended for by the applicant. The power vested in the Commissioner by s 54D(4) of the Act is predicated upon their being no notice of a decision on the internal review being received by the applicant within the 30 day period: s 54D(1) of the Act. This, on the uncontentious facts, is the case here. No such notice had been received by the applicant by 5 July 2012. An entitlement in the Tribunal to request the Commissioner to extend the time for the Tribunal to deal with the application for internal review was thereby enlivened. It sought that extension the following day, 6 July 2012, pursuant to s 54D(3) of the Act. Time was then extended by the Commissioner: s 54D(4) of the Act. Section 54D of the Act does not specify any criteria the Commissioner must consider. It is sufficient if the Commissioner considers that the time requested is appropriate. The Commissioner, in granting the request, took into account that the extension sought was a short one and that it represented the fastest means of providing the applicant with a decision, other than a deemed decision. Whilst the application states that the decision to extend time was made “without just cause” no submissions were made in support of this claim, unless one views the applicant’s submissions concerning the effect of the 30 day period ending with no decision on the internal review application under that rubric. The applicant’s stated claim that he was denied procedural fairness is also without merit. It is correct that he was not given an opportunity to make submissions on the Tribunal’s request for an extension of time before the extension was granted. However, there is no obligation upon the Commissioner to refer the request for an extension of time to an applicant for internal review. That person’s consent to an extension of time of this kind is not required. I have reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, s 54(D) of the Act does not require it in terms nor by necessary implication. Second, this absence is in contrast to the requirement for an applicant’s written consent to an extension of time in relation to the original request: ss 15(5)(b), (6), (8) read together with s 15AA of the Act. The application has no reasonable prospects of being successfully prosecuted by the applicant. Indeed, it is entirely unmeritorious. Section 54D of the Act caters for the very circumstances that occurred here. There was a deemed decision under s 54D(2) of the Act affirming the FOI decision. A request for an extension of time to deal with the application for internal review was made under s 54D(3) of the Act. The Commissioner extended time under s 54D(4) of the Act. The Tribunal made a decision on the application for internal review within the extended time period whereby the deemed affirmation under s 54D(2) of the Act then did not apply: s 54D(6) of the Act.