FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| REES v WORTHINGTON SERVICES PTY LTD & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 2245 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application by employer for leave to file a cross-claim out of time – consideration of discretionary factors. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.340, 352, 570 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.1.05, 1.06, 28.04 |
| Applicant: | JOEL REES |
| First Respondent: | WORTHINGTON SERVICES PTY LTD |
| Second Respondent: | BRAD WORTHINGTON |
| File Number: | SYG 1087 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Barnes |
| Hearing date: | 27 July 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 15 September 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Swaab Attorneys |
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Kane |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Yates Beaggi Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Martin |
ORDERS
The First Respondent’s Application in a Case filed on 10 May 2017 be refused.
Any further application by the First Respondent for leave to file a cross-claim be filed within 21 days of today’s date.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1087 of 2016
| JOEL REES |
Applicant
And
| WORTHINGTON SERVICES PTY LTD |
First Respondent
| BRAD WORTHINGTON |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 3 May 2016 the Applicant, Mr Rees, commenced proceedings in this court against his former employer, Worthington Services Pty Ltd (Worthington BMW) and against Mr Worthington under the general protections provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act). He alleged contraventions of ss.340 and 352 of the Act and seeks declarations, compensation and pecuniary penalties. He filed a statement of claim on 10 June 2016. The Respondents filed a Response and a Defence on 21 September 2016.
On 10 May 2017 Worthington BMW filed an Application in a Case seeking leave to file a cross-claim in the form annexed. In support of such application Worthington BMW relied on an affidavit of Mr Worthington of 18 April 2017 and an affidavit of Tamara Rabadi (a solicitor employed by its solicitors) sworn 13 July 2017.
Mr Rees opposed the grant of leave. He relied on an affidavit of his solicitor, Simon Obee, affirmed 16 June 2017.
Leave to file a cross-claim is necessary because the cross-claim was not included in Worthington BMW’s Response or…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Rees v Worthington Services Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCCA 2245
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether to grant the respondent leave to file its cross-claim, which was sought after the expiry of the relevant time limit. This required the Court to consider the discretionary factors relevant to such an application, balancing the prejudice to the applicant against the respondent's reasons for the delay and the merits of the proposed cross-claim.
Judge Barnes considered the established principles governing applications for leave to file out of time, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the applicant's knowledge of the proposed claim, the merits of the proposed claim, and the potential prejudice to the parties. The Court found that the respondent had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in filing the cross-claim and that granting leave would cause substantial prejudice to the applicant.
Consequently, the Court dismissed the respondent's application for leave to file the cross-claim out of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.