Re Opposition by Corn Products Developments Inc to registration of trade mark application number 2019454 (class 30) - CLEARFLO in the name Cargill, Incorporated

[2021] ATMO 92

TRADEMARKSACT1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

ReOpposition by Corn Products Developments Inc to registration of trade mark application number 2019454 (class 30) – CLEARFLO - in the name Cargill, Incorporated.

DELEGATE:                 Nicole Worth

REPRESENTATION:       Applicant: Phoebe Arcus of Counsel instructed by Griffith Hack.

Opponent: No written submissions or attendance at hearing.

DECISION:                   2021 ATMO 92

Trade Marks Act 1995

(Cth) – opposition to registration – grounds of opposition under ss 44, 60, 42, 58 and 62A – none established – trade mark to proceed to registration.

Background

1. This decision is pursuant to an opposition brought by Corn Products Developments Inc (‘Opponent’) under s52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘Act’) to registration of the trade mark detailed below in the name of Cargill, Incorporated (‘Applicant’)

   Trade Mark:             CLEARFLO (‘Trade mark’) Application No.:  2019454

   Filing Date:               28 June 2019

   Goods:Class 30: Flavor enhancers used in food and beverage products

1. The Trade Mark was accepted for possible registration and advertised as such in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 12 December 2019. The Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose registration followed by a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) on 11 March 2020. The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 12 May 2020.

1. The parties filed evidence in due course, discussed in more detail below, and following a request from the Applicant the matter was set down to be heard. The hearing was before me, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, on 4 August 2021. The Applicant was represented by Phoebe Arcus of Counsel, instructed by Griffith Hack lawyers, who made verbal and written submissions on its behalf. The Opponent did not file written submissions or attend the hearing.

1. Any references to parts, sections or regulations, below, are references to parts, sections or regulations of the Act or the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’), unless otherwise indicated.

Grounds of Opposition, Onus and Standard of Proof

1. In its SGP, the Opponent nominated grounds of opposition under ss 44, 60, 42, 58 and 62A. It did not withdraw any of those grounds and so all have been taken to be pursued.

1. The onus of proof in an opposition rests upon the Opponent.1 The relevant standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard based on the balance of probabilities.2 The rights of the parties are to be determined as at the date of the application 3 which is generally, but not always, the filing date.4 Here the relevant date is the filing date, being 28 June 2019.

Evidence

1. The evidence filed in this matter comprises declarations by the following persons, as set out below.

Evidence in support

Jacqueline Marie Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Opponent, with Annexures JMC-1 to JMC-19 (six of them being identified as confidential), dated 13 August 2020.

Evidence in answer

Daniel Enebo, Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel of the Applicant, with Annexures 1 to 7, dated 11 November 2020.

Shannon Fati, attorney at Griffith Hack Lawyers, with Annexures SF-1 to SF-3, dated 13 November 2020.

Evidence in reply

Jacqueline Marie Cohen, with Annexures JMC-1 to JMC-4, dated 22 January 2021.

1. A summary of the evidence is as follows.

¹ Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32] (Keane CJ, Stone and Jagot JJ).

² Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [133] (Besanko, Jagot and Edelman JJ).

³ Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd [1954] HCA 82, [4] (Kitto J).

⁴ See sections 6, 12, and 72 of the Act.

1. The Opponent is an entity of the USA and a wholly owned subsidiary of a multinational corporate group, Ingredion Incorporated (‘Ingredion’). The Opponent owns all of the intellectual property of Ingredion and licenses its use through inter-company agreements.

1. Among the trade marks owned by the Opponent are the following three which have been registered in Australia:

   Trade Mark: COL-FLO

   Registration no. 204259
   Priority Date: 12 August 1966

   Class 30: Coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, rice, tapioca, sago, coffee substitutes; flour, and preparations made from cereals; bread, biscuits, cakes, pastry and confectionery, ices; honey, treacle; yeast, baking-powder; salt, mustard, pepper, vinegar, sauces, spices, ice; dry starch for use as an additive to food products.

Trade Mark: PURE-FLO

Registration no. 408873
Priority Date: 23 May 1984

Class 30: Modified starches, particularly for use as a stabilizer and thickener in the preparation of food products.

Trade Mark: THERMFLO

Registration no. 1352835
Priority Date: 25 March 2010
Class 1: Starch for industrial purposes.
Class 30: Starch and starch products for foods.

1. Ms Cohen says of Ingredion:

Ingredion is an ingredients solutions company. It makes sweeteners, starches, nutrition ingredients and industrial material for use in everyday products from food and beverages to paper and pharmaceuticals. Its primary business is the production and sale of starches and sweeteners, corn oils and similar products as well as animal feed products.

…

Ingredion’s core wholesale customers in Australia are in the savoury, bakery and dairy sectors of the foods industry. The savoury sector includes consumers of such products as sauces, dressings, marinades, ready-prepared meals, batters & coatings, vegan and meat products, and pizza.

1. Ingredion has a long corporate history dating back to 1906 and now supplies customers in more than 60 countries around the world generating, in 2019, global sales of approximately USD $6.2 billion.

1. Ms Cohen provides confidential sales revenue and advertising expenditure for goods sold in the Australian market under the above trade marks as well as a further trade

mark not registered in Australia, INSTANT CLEARJEL (although the figures for this trade mark date back only to 2019). The figures are significant.

1. Ms Cohen broadly summarises the Opponent’s case in this opposition:

The Opponent’s COL-FLO mark and the Opposed Mark both begin with the letter “C” and end with the same syllable (FLO). The Opponent’s COL-FLO mark is also often used as one word and without the hyphen, which increases the mark’s visual similarity with the Opposed Mark. The Opponent’s PURE-FLO mark and the Opposed Mark also share semantic similarities. I am aware that the word “PURE” means, “without discordant quality; clear and true”, or “clear from blemishes” and that the word “CLEAR” evokes similar qualities meaning “of a pure, even colour” or “transparent”…

In view of the Opponent’s and its licensees’ reputation and extent and duration of use of its FLO-formative marks, particularly in Australia (as set out in paragraph 60 and Annexure “JCM-5”), I am of the view that consumers would consider the FLO-range of goods as being part of a family of products originating solely from the Opponent and, or, its licensees.

In view of the Opponent’s and its licensees’ reputation and use of CLEAR-formative marks (as set out in paragraph 60 and Annexure “JCM-6”), I am of the view that consumers may well consider the CLEAR-range of goods as being part of a family of products originating from the Opponent and its licensees.

[Exhibits JCM-5 and JCM-6 are, respectively, the Opponent’s international trade mark portfolios of FLO-formative marks and CLEAR-formative marks. I note none of the CLEAR formative marks are registered in Australia, although the Opponent holds a registration for CLEARFLO in the USA in respect of ‘starch for the use in the manufacture of paper and textiles’].

…

In general terms, the goods covered by the Opponent’s Marks and the Opposed Application are the same as or otherwise very similar to each other because the goods are all additives for food, or used in the process of preparing food products, and are bought and sold through the same trade channels.

…I consider that consumers would likely be misled, confused or deceived into thinking that the Applicant’s goods are those of the Opponent, including by considering that the Applicant’s goods are a simple brand extension of the Opponent’s.

1. In her evidence in reply Ms Cohen also points out that the Applicant’s registration of the Trade Mark in the USA was filed in 1994 and cancelled in 2004 because it did not file an acceptable declaration of use or excused non-use.

1. In respect of the ground of opposition under s 62A, Ms Cohen states that the parties are known to each other, both having been involved in two European patent oppositions. Ms Cohen says of the Applicant that it is a food corporation engaged in the business of providing agricultural, food/food processing, industrial, trading and financial products and services, and posits:

The Applicant would also be aware of the Opponent’s registered trade mark 3925706 for the identical mark “CLEARFLO” in the United States of America, filed 24 August 2010…

I am of the view that the Applicant filed the Opposed Application in full knowledge not only of the Opponent’s Australian trade marks, but also its identical US CLEARFLO mark, to take unfair advantage of the Opponent’s rights in its FLO- formative marks – and, or, to create, in the minds of consumers, an impression that COL-FLO, PURE-FLO, THERMFLO and CLEARFLO are marks that originate from the same trade source (being the Opponent and not the Applicant).

1. Turning to the Applicant’s evidence, Mr Enebo describes the Applicant as a global food corporation, based in Minnesota. It is declared to be one of the largest privately held corporations in the USA and its revenues in 2018 were at least USD $114.7 billion. It provides goods and services in the agriculture, food, financial and industrial sectors. Of the Trade Mark and the goods upon which it is intended to be used, Mr Enebo states:

   The Applicant introduced the Trade Mark in Las Vegas in October 2019 as the brand for a new botanical extract which had flavour enhancing properties…

   The Goods are intended for use with the Applicant’s EVERSWEET^TM stevia sweetener product, a sweetener derived from the stevia rebaudiana plant. The two products are designed to create a highly concentrated sweetener solution for use in the manufacture of soda and drinks syrups, primarily. The EVERSWEET^TM product acts as the sweetener for the product, whereas the CLEARFLO^TM product works with it to create a clean and enhanced flavour. While the application of the combined products may be used in goods other than drinks, the overall function or purpose is to provide sweetness and clarity/enhancement of flavour.

   …

   Prior to the 2019 launch in Las Vegas, the Applicant had in fact used the Trade Mark in the US for a number of years from 1995 in respect of dry corn derived sweeteners. This product range was discontinued in 2004 and the Trade Mark was subsequently repurposed for use in respect of the Goods.

   …

   Accordingly, the Trade Mark is not new to the Applicant, but is rather an existing proprietary right used for a different, but related, product type. The adoption of the Trade Mark was honest and in good faith.

1. Ms Fati’s evidence relates to searches of various trade mark registers, conducted on behalf of the Applicant. Ms Fati declares that she searched the Australian Trade Marks Register for pending, registered and refused marks in class 30 (and not in associated classes) for trade marks containing the suffix FLO. The search results revealed eight trade mark registrations and one pending application (being that of the Trade Mark) for the trade marks:

   Registration 204259:     COL-FLO       (owned by the Opponent)

Registration408873:	PURE-FLO	(owned by the Opponent)
Registration644444:	FRUITFLO
Registration711223:	QWIK-FLO
Registration 1254736: Registration 1352835:	STYFLO THERMFLO	(owned by the Opponent)

Registration 1500923:

Registration 1500925: Yoflo frozen yoghurt and fruit Application 2019454: CLEARFLO (the subject Trade Mark)

1. Ms Fati also searched the New Zealand Trade Marks Register and identified that the Trade Mark and the Opponent’s COL-FLO and THERMFLO trade marks coexist upon that register, for what is declared to be the same or similar goods as the Australian registrations and application (although the Opponent points out that the New Zealand registration of COL-FLO is in class 1). Ms Fati further identified that the Trade Mark is registered upon the Canadian Trade Marks Register in respect of ‘dry corn derived sweeteners for use in the food industry’, and that it coexisted there with the Opponent’s COLFLO and THERMFLO registrations, registered for the same or similar goods as its Australian registrations.

The Law Section 44

1. Section 44 relevantly provides:

44 Identical etc. trade marks

(1)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant’s trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant’s goods) must be rejected if:

(a)   the applicant’s trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

(i)  a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or

(ii)    a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and

(b)   the priority date for the registration of the applicant’s trade mark in respect of the applicant’s goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.

1. Subsections (3) and (4) of s 44 deal with acceptance of trade marks on the basis of honest concurrent use, prior continuous use or other circumstances making registration proper, none of which have been asserted here.

1. The SGP identifies the Opponent’s registered trade marks COL-FLO (registration no. 204259), PURE-FLO (registration no. 408873) and THERMFLO (registration no. 1352835) as the basis for the ground of opposition under s 44. In order to succeed on this ground the Opponent must show that at least one of the identified trade marks has a priority date earlier than the Trade Mark (the priority date here being the same as the filing date); is registered in respect of goods that are similar to, or services that are closely related to, the goods of the Trade Mark; and is at least deceptively similar to the Trade Mark.

1. I turn first to the question of whether any of the Opponent’s trade marks are at least deceptively similar to the Trade Mark. The principal authority for determining deceptive similarity is Shell Co (Aust) Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd:

   On the question of deceptive similarity, a different comparison must be made from that which is necessary when substantial identity is in question. The marks are not now to be looked at side by side. The issue is not abstract similarity, but deceptive similarity. Therefore the comparison is the familiar one of trade mark law. It is between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of the plaintiff’s mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have; and, on the other hand, the impressions that such persons would get from the defendant’s [trade mark].5

1. I consider that the parties’ marks are not deceptively similar. The prefixes of the Opponent’s marks are visually and conceptually distinct from the Trade Mark. COL- conveys no immediate meaning; PURE- has a readily apparent meaning which may be somewhat similar to CLEAR but is not identical or equivalent, and in any event is visually and aurally quite different; and THERM- is readily understood to refer to heat or temperature, which is quite different to CLEAR. It is commonly (although not

⁵ [1963] HCA 66, [13] (Windeyer J).

always) the first part or syllable of a word that is most important for the purposes of distinction,6 and here they are all quite different.

1. Whilst all of the trade marks contain the suffix FLO, I am not satisfied that this is a basis upon which deception or confusion is likely to arise. The Assistant Comptroller noted in Beck Koller & Co Limited’s Application:7

   When an application for registration is before the Registrar, it frequently happens that the search for conflicting marks reveals several marks having some characteristic feature in common with the mark of the application, which marks may stand on the Register in the name of one proprietor only, or in the name of several different proprietors.

   If, therefore, all the marks were owned by one proprietor, the Registrar would presume that the latter was using a “series” of marks and judge the conflict between the applicant’s mark and each of the proprietor’s marks with this consideration in mind.

   On the other hand, if the registered marks found were owned by several different proprietors, this would be a circumstance which might considerably assist the applicant who would be in a position to submit that the common characteristic was one well recognised in marks in use in the particular trade. In short, when the Registrar comes to compare the applicant’s mark with the registered marks ... the presence of marks on the Register other than the one with which the comparison is being made is regarded as one of the surrounding circumstances which he is required to take into account.

1. It should be noted first that the ‘family of marks’ principle is generally reliant upon use and recognition as opposed to registration.8 In any event, as noted in paragraph 18 there are several marks upon the register owned by different parties that contain the suffix FLO, all of which are registered for goods of varying degrees of similarity – STYFLO in particular is registered in respect of ‘starch, starch derivatives and goods made from or containing starch’ and is owned by a third party. I am therefore not persuaded that the Opponent owns or uses a family of marks, the common feature of which is so associated in the public’s mind with the Opponent that other traders’ use of that feature would lead to deception or confusion.

1. Given I am not satisfied that any of the Opponent’s marks are deceptively similar to the Trade Mark, I need not consider whether the parties’ goods are similar. The ground under s 44 fails accordingly.

⁶ Re London Lubricants (1920) Ltd (1925) 42 RPC 264 at 279 (CA UK) (Sargant LJ).

⁷ (1947) 64 RPC 76, 83

⁸ See for example M Davison, I Horak Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks & Passing Off

(Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2016) [30.1560] and the cases cited therein.3

Section 58

1. Section 58 allows for opposition to a trade mark on the ground that the applicant for its registration is not its owner. It requires three limbs to be satisfied: that the trade marks are at least substantially identical; that the respective goods or services of the parties are the same kind of thing; and that another party used the trade mark prior to the application for its registration and any actual use of it by the applicant.

1. The Opponent relies upon its COL-FLO trade mark to establish the ground, but in the alternative relies upon all of its trade marks identified in the s 44 ground. I have found that the parties’ trade marks are not deceptively similar. It therefore stands to reason that they do not meet the higher threshold of substantially identical either. The ground under s 58 therefore cannot succeed.

Sections 60 and 42

1. It is convenient to address both ss 60 and 42 together as the Opponent’s case in respect of these grounds rests upon similar principles – the primary difference being that a higher threshold applies to its case under s 42, as will be discussed below. The particularisation of the ground under s 42 makes clear that it falls under s 42(b) (as opposed to s 42(a)).

1. Section 60 provides:

60 Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia

The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:

(a)   another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and

(b)     because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the

first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

Note:    For priority date see section 12.

1. Section 42 of the Act provides:

42 Trade mark scandalous or its use contrary to law

An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if:

…

(b) its use would be contrary to law.

1. The Opponent particularises its ground under s 42 as follows:

The Opponent has used the Opponent’s trade marks 204259 for COL-FLO in class 30 and 408873 for PURE-FLO in class 30 in Australia continuously since 1970 in relation to starch and starch products. Further, the Opponent has used the Opponent’s trade mark 1352835 for THERMFLO in Australia continuously since 2000 in relation to starch and starch products.

In the light of the Opponent’s reputation in the Opponent’s Trade Marks, use of the Opposed Trade Mark in relation to the goods for which registration of the Opposed Trade Mark is sought would be likely to mislead or deceive consumers contrary to sections 18 and 29 of the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) and, or alternatively, constitute the common law tort of passing off.

Use of the Opposed Mark would therefore be contrary to law within the meaning of section 42.

1. Both of these grounds of opposition rely upon consumer confusion and/or deception because of the reputation of another trade mark: the ground under s 60 requires only that consumers are likely to be confused, whereas the ground under s 42(b) requires that consumers would be misled or deceived (a higher threshold).9 If the Opponent cannot establish its ground under s 60 then, where the case is framed as relying upon reputation, it likewise cannot establish its ground under s 42(b).¹⁰

1. There is no requirement that the trade marks of the parties or their respective goods have any particular degree of similarity, although it is a matter of logic that the more similar either or both of these are the greater the likelihood of confusion or deception. What must be shown is that the trade marks identified by the Opponent had a reputation in Australia at the filing date, and that because of that reputation consumers will be confused or deceived.

1. To establish reputation Ms Cohen declares that the COL-FLO and PURE-FLO trade marks were first used in Australia in the 1970’s. A ‘How to choose Food Starches – a professional’s guide’ from the 1970’s is adduced, however there is no information about who saw it or how many were distributed. Ms Cohen states that goods branded with the

9 See for example Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co v Hy-line Chicks Pty Ltd [1979] RPC 410, at 423 (Richardson J) for an explanation of the difference between confusion and deception.

¹⁰ See for example the comments of the delegate in Monster Energy Company v USA Nutraceuticals Group Inc [2017] ATMO 22 [57]-[58], regarding the relationship between a failure to establish s 60 and ss 18 and 29 of the Australian Consumer Law as well as the tort of passing off.

COL-FLO, PURE-FLO and THERMFLO trade marks are currently sold in Australia via the Opponent’s distributors or through the Opponent’s affiliated company Ingredion ANZ Pty Ltd, and that the trade marks are used in Australia on products, via the Opponent’s websites or on promotional materials. Examples of various promotional materials are given. They show that the COL-FLO, PURE-FLO and THERMFLO trade marks are used as sub-brands of either ‘Ingredion’ or various distributors to identify particular products. The great majority of examples relate to the trade mark COL-FLO. At times it is alphabetically listed amongst products which include possible trade marks (‘Cerebind’ or ‘Continental Sharps Flour’) and clearly generic descriptions (‘Croissant Improver’ or ‘Corn Maize Starch’). At other times images of the goods show that its size and placement is very subordinate, as shown on the next page wherein the word COLFLO appears in small printed text on the side of the package. The degree to which the reputation resides in COL-FLO, as opposed to the Ingredion mark or a distributor’s mark, is therefore somewhat obscured. Few examples relate to PURE-FLO and THERMFLO.

1. There is no information as to how widely these promotional materials have been distributed or how many Australian users have accessed the Opponent’s websites (which appear to be of the USA). Nonetheless confidential advertising and revenue figures have been provided, from which it may be possible to infer reputation (however that is not to say that I do). Rather, although there may be a basis to show some reputation in COL-FLO (the mark primarily relied upon for the s 60 ground), I am not satisfied that it would likely be the cause of confusion or deception amongst the public. For the reasons outlined in respect of the s 44 ground of opposition, I consider the parties’ trade marks are quite different and this difference is not surmounted by the reputation that might be inferred. Nor is any evidence of confusion adduced (such evidence is not required to establish the ground, but where it exists it may be persuasive).

1. For these reasons the ground under s 60 is not established, and as a corollary the ground under s 42 is not established either.

Section 62A

1. Section 62A provides:

62A Application made in bad faith

The registration of a trade mark may be opposed on the ground that the application was made in bad faith.

1. The ground of opposition is particularised in the SGP as follows:

The Opponent has used the Opponent’s trade marks 204259 for COL-FLO in class 30 and 408873 for PURE-FLO in class 30 in Australia continuously since 1970 in relation to starch and starch products. Further, the Opponent has used the Opponent’s trade mark 1352835 for THERMFLO in Australia continuously since 2000 in relation to starch and starch products.

By reason of the Opponent’s reputation in the Opponent’s Trade Marks, or any one or more of them, the Applicant should, or should reasonably, have been aware that the Opponent enjoyed such a reputation and that it owned the Opponent’s Trade Marks in Australia.

The Applicant sought to take advantage of the Opponent’s reputation by filing, in bad faith (within the meaning of section 62A), an application for registration of a trade mark that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, one or more of the Opponent’s Trade Marks and in relation to goods that are the same as, or similar to, the Opponent’s Goods.

1. This case is largely reiterated in Ms Cohen’s first declaration, as well as the additional factor that the parties are known to each other having been involved in a patent dispute in another jurisdiction.

1. The assessment of whether an application has been filed in bad faith involves an assessment of whether the decision to file the application would fall short of the standards of acceptable commercial behaviour observed by reasonable and experienced persons,11 whilst not disregarding the subjective intentions of the Applicant at the time it filed the application.

1. I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s awareness of the Opponent’s trade marks implies any kind of bad faith, nor the fact that the parties are known to each other by virtue of their patent dispute. As established in Fry Consulting Pty Ltd v Sports Warehouse Inc (No 2), mere knowledge of the use of a trade mark by another is not, without more, an indication of bad faith.

¹¹ Fry Consulting Pty Ltd v Sports Warehouse Inc (No 2) [2012] FCA 81, [145]-[167] (Dodds-Streeton J).

1. The ground under s 62A is therefore not established.

Decision and costs

1. Section 55 of the Act relevantly provides:

55 Decision

(1)    Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:

(a)    to refuse to register the trade mark; or

(b)    to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;

having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.

Note:     For limitations see section 6.

1. The Opponent has failed to establish any of the grounds of opposition it nominated in the SGP. Accordingly, application 2019454 may proceed to registration after one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar is served with a notice of appeal before that time, I direct that the disposition of the application be in accordance with the court’s orders.

1. The Applicant has sought an award of costs in its favour. I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. As the Opponent has failed to establish a ground of opposition, I award costs against the Opponent under s 221 of the Act in accordance with the amounts in Schedule 8 of the Regulations.

Nicole Worth Hearing Officer

Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks 30 August 2021