Re City of Perth; Ex parte Lord

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE FULL COURT (WA)

CITATION:   RE CITY OF PERTH; EX PARTE LORD & ORS [2002] WASCA 254

CORAM:   PARKER J

TEMPLEMAN J
HASLUCK J

HEARD:   9 AUGUST 2002

DELIVERED          :   12 SEPTEMBER 2002

FILE NO/S:   FUL 91 of 2002

FUL 92 of 2002

MATTER                :Application for a Writ of Certiorari against the City of Perth

EX PARTE

KELVIN ERNEST LORD
KAMINA HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 009 178 474)
KELDEN SECRETARIAL SERVICES PTY LTD (ACN 009 089 454)
ROBERT JEFFREY BAKER
VERONICA ANN BAKER
Appellants (Applicants)

AND

CITY OF PERTH
First Respondent (First Respondent)

KERRYN BOHN
ANTHONY BURTON
LYNNE SYLVESTER BURTON
CHRISTOPHER JAMES UPSTONE
PAULA NEILAN
MICHAEL PETER LOTYCZUCK
PAUL MATTHEW WILSON
DARON NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 009 199 526)
REAGENT PTY LTD
CHAD BENJAMIN HENVILLE
DON COLASANTE
ROBERT COLASANTE
AMANDA LEE
SUNIL VARMA
PAUL JAMES BROWN
CARRI SOREL BROWN
Second Respondents (Second Respondents)

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Appeal from refusal of orders nisi

Administrative law - Prerogative writs of certiorari - Town planning - Local council approval - Whether Council approval was beyond its power - Whether there is jurisdictional error - Whether there are errors on the face of the record - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal allowed
Orders nisi for writs of certiorari made absolute

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellants (Applicants)  :        Mr C B Edmonds SC

First Respondent (First Respondent)                 :        Mr A Roberts

Second Respondents (Second Respondents)     :        Mr R L Le Miere QC

Solicitors:

Appellants (Applicants)  :        Kott Gunning

First Respondent (First Respondent)                 :        Minter Ellison

Second Respondents (Second Respondents)     :        Phillips Fox

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Ex parte Helena Valley/Boya Association Inc & Ors; State Planning Commission and Beggs (1989) 2 WAR 422

Re Smith and the West Australian Development Corporation; Ex parte Rundle & Ors (1992) 5 WAR 295

Savage v Teck Explorations Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 7285; 16 September 1988

Settlers Holdings Pty Ltd v Coles Myer Property Developments Pty Ltd & Anor [2000] WASCA 147

Case(s) also cited:

Ackroyd v Whitehouse (Director of National Parks and Wildlife Service) (1985) 2 NSWLR 239

ACI Operations Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council & Ors [1998] NSWSC 784

Attorney-General for Western Australia v Cockram & Anor (1990) 2 WAR 477

Australian Electoral Electronics Foundry & Engineering Union Western Australia Branch & Ors v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1997) 19 WAR 145

Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297

Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110

Burns v Grigg [1967] VR 871

Caswell & Anor v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales (1990) 2 AC 738

Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission & Anor (2000) 199 CLR 135

Excell v Harris & Ors (1983) 51 ALR 137

Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council (1999) 110 LGERA 235

Gavranich & Anor v…

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Details
Case
[2002] WASCA 254
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Re City of Perth; Ex parte Lord, the appellants sought relief from the court regarding a local council's approval for a development application. The City of Perth had approved the development application, and the appellants challenged the decision, leading to a legal dispute. The case was heard and determined by the court, which examined the administrative law aspects of the matter, specifically focusing on the prerogative writs of certiorari and the jurisdictional powers of the local council.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the City of Perth's approval for the development application was beyond its power and whether there was a jurisdictional error in the decision. The court also had to determine if there were any errors on the face of the record that would warrant the issuance of the prerogative writs of certiorari. The case hinged on the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the approval process and the compliance with the town planning scheme.

The court found that the City of Perth's approval for the development application was indeed beyond its power and constituted a jurisdictional error. The court held that strict compliance with the requirements of the law should be given great weight, and the discretionary power of the court to grant writs of certiorari should be exercised with caution. The court concluded that the delay on the part of the appellants and any prejudice suffered by the respondents did not justify denying relief to the appellants. The court also found that the six-month period prescribed by the relevant rule did not apply in this case, and therefore, the appellants were not required to seek an extension of time.

The court ordered that the appellants be awarded 50 per cent of their taxed costs of the appeals, including reserved costs, to be paid as half by the first respondent and the other half by the second respondents severally. Each party was to bear its own costs in respect of the hearing before Heenan J. The appellants were also allowed to amend their grounds of appeal to accord more precisely with the court's decision on the substantive application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

TEMPLEMAN J
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: When the decision in this matter was delivered on 12 September 2002, the question of costs was reserved so that the parties could make written submissions. Having now considered those submissions, the Court has decided to make the following orders in relation to costs:(4)The appellants are to be awarded 50 per cent of their taxed costs of the appeals, including reserved costs, taxed as one bill. On taxation there is to be an allowance for Senior Counsel and for solicitor attending. Such costs are to be paid as to one‑half by the first respondent and as to the other half, by the second respondents severally.(5)Each party is to bear its or their own costs in respect of the hearing before Heenan J. Our reasons are as follows. The hearing before Heenan J proved to have been somewhat pointless. Although the present appellants were unsuccessful, they had not then identified the more material of the errors in the first respondent's decision which have now resulted in the quashing of that decision. However, the first respondent contributed materially to the error giving rise to the application: and the second respondent supported the first respondent. In those circumstances, we consider it appropriate that the parties should bear their own costs of the hearing before Heenan J. Although the appellants succeeded on appeal, they did so on issues which emerged only a few days before the hearing. The appellants were unsuccessful in the majority of the issues argued on the appeal and in respect of their application to make substantial amendments to their grounds of appeal. In those circumstances, we consider that the appellants should be awarded one half of their costs, taxed on the scale, but allowing for Senior Counsel and for the attendance of an instructing solicitor. We do not consider that the first respondent should escape from the liability to contribute to the costs of the appeal, even though it adopted a neutral stance at the hearing. The fact that it had contributed materially to the error giving rise to the original application is still a matter to be taken into account: see the decision of the Divisional Court in R v Liverpool Justices, ex parte Roberts [1960] 1 WLR 585. In these circumstances we consider that the appellants' taxed costs should be paid as to one half by the first respondent, and as to the balance, by the second respondents severally. We will allow the appellants to amend their grounds of appeal so as to accord more precisely with our decision on the substantive application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: TEMPLEMAN J

I accept that even in these circumstances, the Court has a discretion whether to grant writs of certiorari. However, as the Full Court held in Re Smith and the West Australian Development Corporation; Ex parte Rundle & Ors (1992) 5 WAR 295 great weight should be given to strict compliance with the requirements of the law. Malcolm CJ (at 320) cited with approval a passage from Wade (op cit), in relation to the Court's discretion:"Such a discretionary power may make inroads upon the rule of law and must therefore be exercised with the greatest care. In any normal case the remedy accompanies the right. But the fact that a person aggrieved is entitled to certiorari ex debito justitiae does not alter the fact that the court has power to exercise its discretion against him …Nevertheless distinctions may have to be drawn according to the nature of the remedy sought, and according to the differences between public and private law remedies. Certiorari and prohibition have as their primary purpose the preservation of order in the legal system by preventing excess and abuse of power, rather than the final determination of private rights …" In the present case, I am not persuaded that the delay on the part of the appellants, or that any prejudice suffered by the respondents would justify the Court denying relief to the appellants. The delay point arises only in relation to the attack on the first approval, given on 13 February 2001. The proceedings for an order nisi were commenced on 23 April 2002. The delay is explicable on the basis that the City itself considered the first approval to be invalid. On 31 October 2001, the Lord Mayor wrote to Mr Lord saying:"… the Development Application is in fact invalid and the applicant will be advised accordingly." I therefore agree with E M Heenan J, where he said:"At this stage of the proceedings I consider it sufficient to say that the course of correspondence between the solicitors for the applicants and the City of Perth from February 2001 to November 2001 appears to have proceeded on the footing that the question as to the efficacy of the first approval remained an open subject, and I consider that there are grounds upon which the applicants could reasonably expect that their protests against the validity of that first decision were receiving serious attention.Consequently, I do not consider that the delay which has occurred is indicative of any abandonment of rights by the applicants, nor of any disregard of the need to pursue proper compliance with the town planning scheme, nor any signification that the decision would pass without challenge. Accordingly, if it were necessary to extend time, I would be disposed to grant an extension of time. Similarly, if no extension of time were necessary I would be disposed to accept that the delay which has occurred has been satisfactorily explained." I consider that the conclusion reached by E M Heenan J is equally valid in relation to the substantive application. I am of the view also that the six‑month period prescribed by O 56 r 11 applies only to applications for writs of certiorari which are brought against inferior courts and tribunals in the categories to which the rule refers. The time limit is not applicable in this case. It is not necessary, therefore, for the appellants to seek an extension of time.