JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE FULL COURT (WA)
CITATION: RE CITY OF PERTH; EX PARTE LORD & ORS [2002] WASCA 254
CORAM: PARKER J
TEMPLEMAN J
HASLUCK J
HEARD: 9 AUGUST 2002
DELIVERED : 12 SEPTEMBER 2002
FILE NO/S: FUL 91 of 2002
FUL 92 of 2002
MATTER :Application for a Writ of Certiorari against the City of Perth
EX PARTE
KELVIN ERNEST LORD
KAMINA HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 009 178 474)
KELDEN SECRETARIAL SERVICES PTY LTD (ACN 009 089 454)
ROBERT JEFFREY BAKER
VERONICA ANN BAKER
Appellants (Applicants)AND
CITY OF PERTH
First Respondent (First Respondent)KERRYN BOHN
ANTHONY BURTON
LYNNE SYLVESTER BURTON
CHRISTOPHER JAMES UPSTONE
PAULA NEILAN
MICHAEL PETER LOTYCZUCK
PAUL MATTHEW WILSON
DARON NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 009 199 526)
REAGENT PTY LTD
CHAD BENJAMIN HENVILLE
DON COLASANTE
ROBERT COLASANTE
AMANDA LEE
SUNIL VARMA
PAUL JAMES BROWN
CARRI SOREL BROWN
Second Respondents (Second Respondents)
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Appeal from refusal of orders nisi
Administrative law - Prerogative writs of certiorari - Town planning - Local council approval - Whether Council approval was beyond its power - Whether there is jurisdictional error - Whether there are errors on the face of the record - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Appeal allowed
Orders nisi for writs of certiorari made absolute
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellants (Applicants) : Mr C B Edmonds SC
First Respondent (First Respondent) : Mr A Roberts
Second Respondents (Second Respondents) : Mr R L Le Miere QC
Solicitors:
Appellants (Applicants) : Kott Gunning
First Respondent (First Respondent) : Minter Ellison
Second Respondents (Second Respondents) : Phillips Fox
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Ex parte Helena Valley/Boya Association Inc & Ors; State Planning Commission and Beggs (1989) 2 WAR 422
Re Smith and the West Australian Development Corporation; Ex parte Rundle & Ors (1992) 5 WAR 295
Savage v Teck Explorations Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 7285; 16 September 1988
Settlers Holdings Pty Ltd v Coles Myer Property Developments Pty Ltd & Anor [2000] WASCA 147
Case(s) also cited:
Ackroyd v Whitehouse (Director of National Parks and Wildlife Service) (1985) 2 NSWLR 239
ACI Operations Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council & Ors [1998] NSWSC 784
Attorney-General for Western Australia v Cockram & Anor (1990) 2 WAR 477
Australian Electoral Electronics Foundry & Engineering Union Western Australia Branch & Ors v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1997) 19 WAR 145
Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297
Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110
Burns v Grigg [1967] VR 871
Caswell & Anor v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales (1990) 2 AC 738
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission & Anor (2000) 199 CLR 135
Excell v Harris & Ors (1983) 51 ALR 137
Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council (1999) 110 LGERA 235
Gavranich & Anor v…
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- Case
- [2002] WASCA 254
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the City of Perth's approval for the development application was beyond its power and whether there was a jurisdictional error in the decision. The court also had to determine if there were any errors on the face of the record that would warrant the issuance of the prerogative writs of certiorari. The case hinged on the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the approval process and the compliance with the town planning scheme.
The court found that the City of Perth's approval for the development application was indeed beyond its power and constituted a jurisdictional error. The court held that strict compliance with the requirements of the law should be given great weight, and the discretionary power of the court to grant writs of certiorari should be exercised with caution. The court concluded that the delay on the part of the appellants and any prejudice suffered by the respondents did not justify denying relief to the appellants. The court also found that the six-month period prescribed by the relevant rule did not apply in this case, and therefore, the appellants were not required to seek an extension of time.
The court ordered that the appellants be awarded 50 per cent of their taxed costs of the appeals, including reserved costs, to be paid as half by the first respondent and the other half by the second respondents severally. Each party was to bear its own costs in respect of the hearing before Heenan J. The appellants were also allowed to amend their grounds of appeal to accord more precisely with the court's decision on the substantive application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: TEMPLEMAN J
I accept that even in these circumstances, the Court has a discretion whether to grant writs of certiorari. However, as the Full Court held in Re Smith and the West Australian Development Corporation; Ex parte Rundle & Ors (1992) 5 WAR 295 great weight should be given to strict compliance with the requirements of the law. Malcolm CJ (at 320) cited with approval a passage from Wade (op cit), in relation to the Court's discretion:"Such a discretionary power may make inroads upon the rule of law and must therefore be exercised with the greatest care. In any normal case the remedy accompanies the right. But the fact that a person aggrieved is entitled to certiorari ex debito justitiae does not alter the fact that the court has power to exercise its discretion against him …Nevertheless distinctions may have to be drawn according to the nature of the remedy sought, and according to the differences between public and private law remedies. Certiorari and prohibition have as their primary purpose the preservation of order in the legal system by preventing excess and abuse of power, rather than the final determination of private rights …" In the present case, I am not persuaded that the delay on the part of the appellants, or that any prejudice suffered by the respondents would justify the Court denying relief to the appellants. The delay point arises only in relation to the attack on the first approval, given on 13 February 2001. The proceedings for an order nisi were commenced on 23 April 2002. The delay is explicable on the basis that the City itself considered the first approval to be invalid. On 31 October 2001, the Lord Mayor wrote to Mr Lord saying:"… the Development Application is in fact invalid and the applicant will be advised accordingly." I therefore agree with E M Heenan J, where he said:"At this stage of the proceedings I consider it sufficient to say that the course of correspondence between the solicitors for the applicants and the City of Perth from February 2001 to November 2001 appears to have proceeded on the footing that the question as to the efficacy of the first approval remained an open subject, and I consider that there are grounds upon which the applicants could reasonably expect that their protests against the validity of that first decision were receiving serious attention.Consequently, I do not consider that the delay which has occurred is indicative of any abandonment of rights by the applicants, nor of any disregard of the need to pursue proper compliance with the town planning scheme, nor any signification that the decision would pass without challenge. Accordingly, if it were necessary to extend time, I would be disposed to grant an extension of time. Similarly, if no extension of time were necessary I would be disposed to accept that the delay which has occurred has been satisfactorily explained." I consider that the conclusion reached by E M Heenan J is equally valid in relation to the substantive application. I am of the view also that the six‑month period prescribed by O 56 r 11 applies only to applications for writs of certiorari which are brought against inferior courts and tribunals in the categories to which the rule refers. The time limit is not applicable in this case. It is not necessary, therefore, for the appellants to seek an extension of time.