Ray v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal - [2004] FCA 1120

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ray v Superannuation Complaints Tribunal [2004] FCA 1120
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – superannuation – claim for disability benefit – application for review – decision that Superannuation Complaints Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear complaint – time limit on making complaint to Tribunal – whether a ‘decision’ was in fact made by Trustee – proper decision‑maker – delegation of authority – presumption of regularity.
WORDS AND PHRASES – “determination” within meaning of s 46 of Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), s 101
Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth), ss 14, 19, 37
Superannuation (State Public Sector) Act 1990 (Qld), s 6F
Superannuation (State Public Sector) Deed 1990 (Qld), ss 4, 32, 46, 49, 59
The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13, followed
BTR plc v Westinghouse Brake and Signal Company (Australia) Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 246, referred to
TXU Electricity Ltd v Office of the Regulator‑General (2001) 3 VR 93, referred to
Geographical Indications Committee v O’Connor (2000) 64 ALD 325, referred to
Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154, followed
Morris v Kanssen [1946] AC 459, followed
DALE PATRICK RAY v SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL, FIONA POWER and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE STATE PUBLIC SECTOR SUPERANNUATION SCHEME
V 73 of 2003
GOLDBERG J
30 AUGUST 2004
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 73 of 2003

BETWEEN:

DALE PATRICK RAY
Applicant

AND:

SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
First Respondent

FIONA POWER
Second Respondent

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE STATE PUBLIC SECTOR SUPERANNUATION SCHEME
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

GOLDBERG J

DATE:

30 AUGUST 2004

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION

The applicant, Mr Dale Patrick Ray, seeks to review and appeal from a decision of the first respondent, the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) or the second respondent on behalf of the Tribunal, that it had no jurisdiction to deal with Mr Ray’s complaint concerning the conduct of the third respondent, the Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (“the Board”). Mr Ray’s complaint arose from what is said to be a decision by the Board that Mr Ray was entitled to a permanent and partial disablement benefit under s 49 of the Superannuation (State Public Sector) Deed 1990 (Qld) (“the Deed”). Mr Ray disputed the decision contending that he had a total and permanent disability. The Board affirmed its decision and a complaint to the Tribunal was met with the Tribunal’s decision that it had no jurisdiction as the complaint had been lodged outside the prescribed time limit.
BACKGROUND
Mr Ray lodged a form dated 5 February 2001 and headed “Claim for Permanent Disablement Benefits” with the Board, in which he set out a description of a medical condition, an injury to his lower back, which he claimed prevented him from performing all the duties of his employment. The…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2004] FCA 1120
Decision Date: 30 AUGUST 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Dale Patrick Ray, sought to review and appeal a decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal, which found it had no jurisdiction to hear Mr Ray’s complaint concerning the conduct of the Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme. Mr Ray had lodged a complaint that the Board had incorrectly decided that he was entitled to a permanent and partial disablement benefit, rather than a total and permanent disablement benefit, under the Superannuation (State Public Sector) Deed 1990 (Qld). The Tribunal rejected the complaint on the basis that it was lodged outside the prescribed time limit.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear Mr Ray’s complaint and whether the Tribunal’s decision was in error. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the Board's decision and whether the Board's decision was correctly made. Another issue was whether Mr Ray's complaint was lodged within the prescribed time limit, as required by the relevant legislation.

The court examined the statutory provisions governing the Tribunal's jurisdiction and the time limits for lodging complaints. It determined that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear Mr Ray's complaint, despite the time limit, as the Board had failed to provide Mr Ray with adequate information regarding his right to appeal. The court found that the Board's decision to grant a permanent and partial disablement benefit was correct and that Mr Ray's complaint was, therefore, without merit. The court also noted that the Board had not provided Mr Ray with the signed and dated decision, which could have led to confusion about the appeal process.

The court dismissed Mr Ray's application, finding that the Tribunal's decision was not in error. The court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the complaint and that the complaint was, in fact, lodged within the prescribed time limit. However, the court found that the Board's decision was correctly made and that Mr Ray's complaint was without merit. The court did not grant Mr Ray leave to appeal the decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, Mr Dale Patrick Ray, seeks to review and appeal from a decision of the first respondent, the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) or the second respondent on behalf of the Tribunal, that it had no jurisdiction to deal with Mr Ray’s complaint concerning the conduct of the third respondent, the Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (“the Board”). Mr Ray’s complaint arose from what is said to be a decision by the Board that Mr Ray was entitled to a permanent and partial disablement benefit under s 49 of the Superannuation (State Public Sector) Deed 1990 (Qld) (“the Deed”). Mr Ray disputed the decision contending that he had a total and permanent disability. The Board affirmed its decision and a complaint to the Tribunal was met with the Tribunal’s decision that it had no jurisdiction as the complaint had been lodged outside the prescribed time limit.BACKGROUND Mr Ray lodged a form dated 5 February 2001 and headed “Claim for Permanent Disablement Benefits” with the Board, in which he set out a description of a medical condition, an injury to his lower back, which he claimed prevented him from performing all the duties of his employment. The claim form was received by the Board on or about 16 February 2001. By letter dated 13 September 2001 a senior case manager employed by the Board, Ms Marina Denysiv, informed Mr Ray’s solicitors that the Board had delegated its authority to determine whether or not a disability benefit was payable to Mr Ray to “the Manager, Disability Claims Management Group,” pursuant to s 6F of the Superannuation (State Public Sector) Act 1990 (Qld) (“the State Public Sector Act”). In the letter, the senior case manager said:“QSuper has assessed the medical evidence available. Under the terms of the QSuper trust deed, Mr Ray is considered permanently and partially disabled. A statement of reasons is attached, along with copies of medical evidence considered.” The letter also stated:“If Mr Ray is not satisfied with the decision he may appeal to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal after appealing to QSuper for review…The Tribunal can only hear Mr Ray’s case after he has made use of Q Super’s review process. Mr Ray should also be aware that the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal imposes time limits, within which complaints must be lodged. He may wish to seek advice from the Tribunal now with regard to the Tribunal’s time limits.” (emphasis in original) There were two attachments to the letter, one consisting of copies of medical evidence that had been considered and the other being a document entitled: “STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE DECISION OF THEMANAGER, DISABILITY CLAIMS MANAGEMENT GROUP,THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED BY THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THESTATE PUBLIC SECTOR SUPERANNUATION FUNDIN THE CASE OF DALE PATRICK RAY”(“the statement of reasons”). The statement then set out text under a number of headings. The statement of reasons concluded:“DECISION & REASONS FOR DECISION:It is the determination of the Manager, Disability Claims Management Group, the authority delegated by the Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Fund, that the medical evidence establishes that Mr Ray suffers with a disability of a degree which is such as to render him permanently unfit to discharge or incapable of discharging the duties of his office efficiently but the medical evidence does not establish that the disability is such as to render him unlikely ever to be able to work again in a job for which he is reasonably qualified by education, training or experience. It is recommended on the medical evidence available, Mr Ray be considered Permanently and Partially Disabled. It is also recommended that the medical evidence used in this submission be released to the member.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GOLDBERG J

There were two attachments to the letter, one consisting of copies of medical evidence that had been considered and the other being a document entitled: “STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE DECISION OF THEMANAGER, DISABILITY CLAIMS MANAGEMENT GROUP,THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED BY THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THESTATE PUBLIC SECTOR SUPERANNUATION FUNDIN THE CASE OF DALE PATRICK RAY”(“the statement of reasons”). The statement then set out text under a number of headings. The statement of reasons concluded:“DECISION & REASONS FOR DECISION:It is the determination of the Manager, Disability Claims Management Group, the authority delegated by the Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Fund, that the medical evidence establishes that Mr Ray suffers with a disability of a degree which is such as to render him permanently unfit to discharge or incapable of discharging the duties of his office efficiently but the medical evidence does not establish that the disability is such as to render him unlikely ever to be able to work again in a job for which he is reasonably qualified by education, training or experience. It is recommended on the medical evidence available, Mr Ray be considered Permanently and Partially Disabled. It is also recommended that the medical evidence used in this submission be released to the member.” The statement of reasons which Mr Ray received through his solicitors was undated and unsigned. There was evidence before the Court of another document which the Board submitted was the original decision of the delegate of the Trustee dated 13 September 2001 in relation to Mr Ray’s claim. This document was never sent to, or received by, Mr Ray or his solicitors. It was given to the Tribunal by the Board under cover of a letter dated 4 November 2002.The letter stated, inter alia:“I refer to your letter dated 29 October 2002 regarding the complaint by the above named.Please find enclosed the following documents as requested:·A copy of Mr Ray’s claim for permanent disablement benefits.·A copy of the Trustee delegate’s original decision dated 13 September 2001 in which it was determined Mr Ray is entitled to a Permanent and Partial Disablement benefit (and not a Total and Permanent Disablement benefit).Mr Ray’s claim for a permanent disablement benefit was dated 5 February 2001 and received by QSuper on 6 February 2001.” The document was headed:SUBMISSION TO:THE BOARD’S DELEGATEQSUPER DEFINED BENEFIT ACCOUNTSUBJECT : DETERMINATION AS TO DEGREE OF DISABILITYThe document then set out a number of headings which contained text in identical terms to the statement of reasons save for the last section. The identical headings were “Background”, “Legislative Provisions”, “Issue to be Resolved”, “Evidence” and “Summary of Evidence”. The last section, however, was in the following form:“RECOMMENDATION:Submitted for approval that the medical evidence establishes that Mr Ray suffers with a disability of a degree which is such as to render him permanently unfit to discharge or incapable of discharging the duties of his office efficiently but the medical evidence does not establish that the disability is such as to render him unlikely ever to be able to work again in a job for which he is reasonably qualified by education, training or experience. It is recommended on the medical evidence available, Mr Ray be considered Permanently and Partially Disabled. It is also recommended that the medical evidence used in this submission be released to the member.”SUBMISSION INITIATED(Signature) 11/9/01Signature DateDECISION: approved (initials) 13/9/01”On the last line, opposite “DECISION:”, the word “approved”, the initials and “13/9/01” appeared in handwriting.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GOLDBERG J

Full text does not contain this section.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	V 73 of 2003

JUDGE:	GOLDBERG J
DATE:	30 AUGUST 2004
PLACE:	MELBOURNE