CATCHWORDS:
Tort - Negligence - Procedure - denial of procedural fairness - right to a proper hearing - comments of trial judge did not indicate the conclusion of an issue.
Tort - Negligence - Procedure - discretion - arbitrary exercise of discretion.
Tort - Negligence - Procedure - District Court Practice - delay in commencing proceedings - Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) - resulting in prejudice towards the defendant.
Tort - Negligence - Procedure - factual error as to evidence - where factual error did not impact upon reasoning.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 60C

DECISION:
Appeal Dismissed With Costs

JUDGMENT:

THE SUPREME COURT

OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

No. 040207 / 1999
MEAGHER JA
HANDLEY JA
GILES JA
16 March 2001

RAMADAN v LEDA HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED

FACTS

The appellant alleged that she had slipped and fallen on steps at the respondent’s premises in Hunter Street, Sydney. The Statement of Claim in respect of this accident was filed out of time. The trial judge found that the plaintiff had not adequately explained her delay in the filing of the Statement of Claim, and that the defendant would be prejudiced by an extension of time, and dismissed the proceedings.

ON APPEAL

HELD per Giles JA (Handley JA agreeing):

(i) The appellant submitted that she was denied a proper hearing as to delay. The trial judge’s early observation that he believed the appellant’s onus had been discharged with respect to delay, when properly considered in light of the evidence as it was fully exposed and the submissions of the parties, did not indicate that the matter of delay was no longer in issue.; (Meagher JA agreeing)

(ii) There is no indication that the trial judge exercised his discretion in an arbitrary fashion. Although his reference to past appellate reversals was inappropriate, it is impossible to see in these remarks abandonment of the exercise of a judicial discretion or proper regard to authority.

Per Meagher JA:

There was no exercise by the trial judge of any discretion which was in any way capricious.

(iii) No miscarriage of justice occurred on the basis of a failure by the trial judge to address a particular of negligence. The particular of negligence in question was an unhelpful generality which did not materially add to the preceding particulars, and as such the trial judge did not fail to address such.

Per Meagher JA:

The trial judge did address all particulars of negligence, but of greater importance, was not…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ramadam v Leda Holdings

Details

AGLC: Ramadam v Leda Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41
Case: [2001] NSWCA 41
Decision Date: 16 March 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Ramadam v Leda Holdings* concerned an appeal from a decision of the District Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Ms Ramadam, brought a claim in negligence against the respondent, Leda Holdings. The central dispute revolved around whether the trial judge had erred in dismissing the appellant's claim, particularly in relation to issues of procedural fairness and the assessment of prejudice arising from delays in the proceedings.

The primary legal issues before the appellate court were whether the trial judge had denied the appellant procedural fairness by failing to adequately address a specific aspect of her case, and whether the judge had made a factual error regarding the timing of the appellant's medical consultations that tainted his reasoning on the issue of prejudice. The court also considered whether the judge's discretion in managing the proceedings had been exercised arbitrarily.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's comments, while discussing the potential for prejudice to the defendant due to the plaintiff's delay in commencing proceedings and the timing of medical examinations, did not indicate a concluded view on the matter that precluded further argument. The court noted that the judge had acknowledged the general principle of prejudice arising from delayed medical examinations but then considered the specific circumstances of the case, including multiple prior accidents and a subsequent accident, which complicated the assessment of prejudice. While there was a factual inaccuracy in the judge's statement that the appellant had not seen any medical practitioners between June 1995 and March 1998, the court determined that this error did not fundamentally impact the judge's overall reasoning regarding prejudice, as the judge ultimately considered the available medical evidence in light of the multiple incidents. The court concluded that the judge had not arbitrarily exercised his discretion and that the appellant had not been denied procedural fairness.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal Dismissed With Costs

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I do not accept that there was a separate case within particular (d) which his Honour failed to address. This ground of appeal also fails.Ground 4.1: Error as to evidence The appellant submitted that Christie DCJ was in error in saying in his reasons that the appellant had not seen any medical practitioners between 7 June 1995 and a subsequent accident at Franklins on 26 March 1998, and that this error “infected and tainted” his view as to prejudice to the respondent. His Honour’s reasons included a passage to the effect that it was often said that a defendant suffered natural prejudice because the defendant did not have a timely medical examination of the plaintiff, or timely reference to the plaintiff’s medical records (described as “seeing medical records between the time of an alleged incident and the time that they actually learn that they are about to be sued”). His Honour then said -“But the defendant points out that the doctors seen by the plaintiff were seen by her after a subsequent accident that occurred at Franklins. Apparently she had a fall of some description at Franklins in March 1998. In addition it is pointed out that as it turns out from various histories and so on and from cross-examination of the plaintiff here, she was also involved in two earlier accidents pre-dating the alleged incident on 7 June 1995. So that in this particular instance it is said that this is the third of four incidents involving the plaintiff and it is pointed out on the information available, that the injuries allegedly sustained at Franklins in March 1998 appear to relate to identical parts of the body as might be alleged were injured in this particular incident in June 1995. So that any perceived prejudice or presumed prejudice in regard to medical records and the ascertainment of symptoms and so on at particular times, appears to carry some little more weight in a case in which two earlier incidents have been finalised and in which some of the injuries relate to the same parts of the body as here. A subsequent matter involving Franklins is apparently in the stages of litigation or about to become so, and that [sic] all of the medical evidence so far made available by the plaintiff to the defendant relates to consultations with doctors obviously after the incident of 7 June 1995 but also after the incident that is said to have taken place at Franklins in March 1998. I regard that matter of prejudice as being somewhat in common with what I would describe as presumed prejudice in relation to any delay in this type of matter of any other.” (emphasis added) It is necessary to distinguish between the appellant consulting doctors and the appellant (in reality her solicitors) providing reports of consultations with doctors. The appellant had given evidence that she started seeing Dr Amin and Dr Giurgis after her fall at Franklins on 26 March 1998. It did not follow that the appellant had not consulted doctors after 7 June 1995 and before the fall at Franklins, and the respondent conceded that the appellant had in fact consulted doctors after 7 June 1995 and before the fall at Franklins. Consistently with that, however, the appellant might have provided to the respondent reports only of consultations with doctors after the fall at Franklins.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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Citations

AGLC Citation

Ramadam v Leda Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41

Most Recent Citation

Pegg v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner [2025] TASSC 51

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Pegg v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner
[2025] TASSC 51

…te of lodging the complaint is to be explained, not just the period extending from the expiration of the 12-month date ( Ramadan v Legal Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41) and there must be a satisfactory explanation for the delay ( Buderim Ginger Limited v Booth [2002] QCA 177). • Whether the delay was attributable to the…
HUBERT & STROUD
[2019] FCCA 2538 Para 1

…not merely look at the time which has elapsed since the expiration of the limitation period. [95] As Meagher JA observed in Ramadam v Leda Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41 at [6] (Ramadam) "it is the prejudice to the defendant as at the date of the filing of the statement of claim which must be examined, no matter what wa…
MULLIS & QUIMBY
[2019] FCCA 1516 Para 2

…not merely look at the time which has elapsed since the expiration of the limitation period. [95] As Meagher JA observed in Ramadam v Leda Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41 at [6] (Ramadam) "it is the prejudice to the defendant as at the date of the filing of the statement of claim which must be examined, no matter what wa…
OBANDA & PAGANO
[2018] FCCA 877 Para 15

…ion must be had as to whether “ to grant leave would prejudice or impose hardship on the respondent… ”. c)Meagher JA in Ramadam v Leda Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41 at [6] in respect to the timing of the prejudice states “ it is prejudice to the defendant as at the date of the filing…which must be examined… ” d)Giles J…
WEMPLE & DAUTRY
[2017] FCCA 408 Para 3

…lodged and whether those proceedings are attributable to default on the part of the applicant. (our emphasis)’ In Ramadam v Leda Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41 at paragraph 6 Meagher JA observed:- ‘It is the prejudice to the defendant as at the date of the filing of the statement of claim which must be examined, no matt…
Chancellor and McCoy
[2013] FCCA 740 Para 1

…tion must be had as to whether “ to grant leave would prejudice or impose hardship on the respondent… ” c)Meagher JA in Ramadam v Leda Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41 at [6] in respect to the timing of the prejudice states “ it is prejudice to the defendant as at the date of the filing….which must be examined… ” d)Giles…
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[2002] NSWDC 1 Para 2

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Whitlam v Dempsey (No.3)
[2002] NSWDC 25 Para 7

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Holt v Wynter
[2000] NSWCA 143 Para 5

…uth Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, and, as subsequent events (particularly the decision of this Court in Holt v Winter [2000] 49 NSWLR 128) make clear, on the judgment of McHugh J in that case.…
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor
[1996] HCA 25 Para 5

…ing the case, his Honour placed great reliance, as is proper, on the judgments of the High Court in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, and, as subsequent events (particularly the decision of this Court in Holt v Winter [2000] 49 NSWLR 128) make clear, on the judgment of McHugh J in…
Jones v Royal Hospital for Women
[1998] NSWCA 384 Para 20

…not a discretion to refuse an extension of time ( Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; Sydney City Council v Zegarac (1998) 43 NSWLR 195; Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128). As to delay, he was “of the view very marginally that the plaintiff has not … discharged an onus of explaining w…

Legislation cited in this decision · 1

Limitation Act 1969 (NSW)
60C 2 mentions (from Para 1)