OBANDA & PAGANO
[2018] FCCA 877
•17 April 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| OBANDA & PAGANO | [2018] FCCA 877 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Property – application to proceed out of time – Held application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975, s.44 |
| Cases cited: Sharp & Sharp [2011] FamCAFC 150 |
| Applicant: | MS OBANDA |
| Respondent: | MR PAGANO |
| File Number: | BRC 12536 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge L. Turner |
| Hearing date: | 27 March 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 27 March 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 17 April 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Glenday |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Alexander Law |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Trewavas |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Wellners Lawyers |
FINAL ORDERS
That the applicant de facto wife’s application pursuant to section 90SM Family Law Act 1975 to proceed out of time and apply after the end of the standard application period pursuant to s44(6) Family Law Act 1975 is unsuccessful and is hereby dismissed.
That otherwise all outstanding applications are hereby dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Obanda & Pagano is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRC 12536 of 2017
| MS OBANDA |
Applicant
And
| MR PAGANO |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The parties were in a de facto relationship that commenced in 2007 and ended in December 2014.
Subsequently, the applicant de facto wife (wife) filed financial proceedings in November 2017; nearly three years later.
Proposals
The wife is now seeking leave to proceed out of time.
The respondent de facto husband (husband) objects to the leave being granted and is seeking for the wife’s application to be dismissed.
Issue
The issue then requiring determination is whether the court should grant leave for the wife’s application to proceed out of time.
Evidence
In considering this issue regard has been had to:-
a)The material as marked on the court file.
b)The written submissions of the parties.
c)The exhibits.
d)Section 44 Family Law Act 1975 and other relevant sections.
e)Relevant authorities.
Both parties are legally represented.
Cross examination did not occur.
Findings of fact are made on the balance of probabilities having regard to the evidence and in what follows statements of fact constitute findings of fact.
Relevant history
Before considering the law it is necessary to capture the relevant history:-
a)The wife is aged 37 and moved from (country omitted) to Australia in 2002 and works in (employment omitted).
b)The husband is aged 47 and is a (occupation omitted).
c)In 2007 the parties commenced cohabitation.
d)At the time of cohabitation the wife had a child ([A] aged 14) from a previous relationship who lived with her.
e)Initially the parties lived in a property at Suburb A in a rental property.
f)On the wife’s estimate the husband brought about $100,000 worth of assets into the relationship consisting of a Motor Vehicle 1, a Motor Vehicle 2, some superannuation and $2000 cash.
g)The husband argues that it may have been more and said his super was worth some $48,000.
h)On the wife’s estimate the wife brought in some $77,000 worth of assets consisting mainly of household goods (estimated worth $65,000) bank savings of $6,000 and superannuation of $6,000.
i)The husband disputes the value of the household goods and cannot recall the wife brining in any cash.
j)The wife states that she was earning $120,000 from her own business and the husband was earning $180,000 for (occupation omitted) work at Town A.
k)The husband states that he had no idea of the wife’s income and that he was earning $132,000 per annum.
l)In 2008 the wife’s business had failed leaving the wife bankrupt (disputed by the wife) and the parties moved to live in a property owned by the husband’s mother.
m)In 2009 their son [X] was born.
n)In or around late 2009 the husband became redundant and received over $50,000 by way of redundancy payout.
o)In 2009 the husband commenced new (occupation omitted) employment for $140,000 per annum.
p)In 2010 the husband and his mother jointly purchased a house property at Property A (the Property A property) for $570,000 with around a $10,000 deposit paid by the husband and a $70,000 deposit paid by his mother and a mortgage in excess of $500,000 to cover the balance.
q)Renovations were done on the property which the wife claims was at her expense of approximately $60,000 (although figures not supported by any evidence in her affidavit suggests it was closer to $44,000).
r)The husband disputes the amount of monies paid by the wife and states it was his money that paid for it.
s)His mother says that she also financially contributed to the renovations.
t)In 2012 the husband was earning $100,000 per annum.
u)In 2013 the Property A property was refinanced for $470,000.
v)In December 2014 the parties separated but remained living under the one roof at the Property A property.
w)At the time of separation the parties had the following assets and liabilities:-
i)Property at Property A which was heavily mortgaged.
ii)Furniture and chattels.
iii)Husband’s motor vehicle.
iv)Wife’s motor vehicle that was encumbered by debt.
v)Husband’s motorbike.
vi)Husband and wife’s superannuation.
vii)Husband’s tools.
viii)Credit card debt.
ix)A debt owing on a laptop.
x)At the time of separation the wife was working as a (occupation omitted).
y)In a letter written by the wife’s legal representative to the husband in March 2015 it was estimated on the wife’s figures that there was equity of some $170,000 available for distribution.
z)In early 2015 the wife states that the parties entered into negotiations for a property division, although the husband disagrees that any agreement was reached.
aa)In July 2015 the wife left the Property A property with [X].
bb)In August 2015 with the assistance of family friends and some monies from the husband, the wife purchased, subject to a mortgage, a house property at Property B.
cc)In January/February 2016 the wife refinanced the car loan over her motor vehicle, obtaining more than what was owing on the car.
dd)In 2016 the wife changed employment and commenced working in Brisbane but by April 2016 was unemployed.
ee)In 2016 the mother was operating a small business and was not eligible for government handouts due to being a (country omitted) citizen.
ff)In 2016 the wife commenced a relationship with her current boyfriend, Mr P (Mr P), who provided the wife with financial assistance and helped with renovations on her Property B property.
gg)In 2016 the husband was made redundant and received a redundancy package of $42,000.
hh)In 2017 with the financial assistance of Mr P, the wife engaged lawyers in respect to obtaining a property division from the husband.
ii)In July/August 2017 the wife’s legal representative attempted to negotiate a settlement with the husband.
jj)In November 2017 the wife commenced property proceedings.
As at the date of the hearing to proceed out of time:-
a)The wife is running her own business and is earning approximately $8,000 per annum.
b)The wife retained from the property pool some of the household furniture and chattels and her motor vehicle and superannuation.
c)The husband retained the Property A property (and has serviced the mortgage over the property since July 2015) as well as some of the household furniture and chattels, his motor vehicle, motorbike and superannuation.
As at the date of the hearing to proceed out of time the property pool consists of:-
a)The Property A property in the name of the husband and his mother worth $520,000 to $550,000 subject to a mortgage of some $462,000 with a half share owned by the husband.
b)Furniture and chattels.
c)Husband’s Motor Vehicle 2 worth $10,000.
d)Wife’s Motor Vehicle 3 worth $5,000.
e)Husband’s superannuations worth together around $209,000.
f)Wife’s superannuation of $10,000.
As to property acquired post separation the wife has about $50,000 equity in the Property B property.
Comment on the material filed
Before considering the law, comment must be made as to the wife’s affidavit.
It is clear from reading the affidavit that this was not a document prepared by the lawyer but by the client and has been filed unfettered and unstructured.
I find that this is an unwise and somewhat dangerous practice as it was difficult to follow, full of gaping holes and did not properly address the issues before the court.
Further, an attempt to rectify the gaping deficiencies by way of written submissions by counsel simply does not “cut it” and renders much of the written submissions useless as it does not reflect what is in the mother’s material.
So in determining this issue I can only follow the wife’s material and nothing more.
The law
I now turn to the law.
Section 44(5) Family Law Act 1975 provides that a party can only make an application for a division of a property arising out of a de facto relationship provided the application is made within two years from the date the de facto relationship has ended.
This period is referred to as the “standard application period”.
Pursuant to 44(6) the court may grant a party leave to apply after the end of a “standard application period” if “hardship” would be caused to the applying party if leave was refused.
Leave to proceed out of time pursuant to section 44 has been the subject of extensive case law.
The Full Court in Sharp & Sharp [2011] FamCACF 150, after an analysis of the many leading authorities spanning over years of legislative changes in this area, provides clear guidance as to process the court must follow in exercising its discretion in determining whether leave is to be granted to proceed out of time.
In summary the court must take into account the following:-
a)There are reasons as to why time limitations exist and careful consideration must be given to an application for leave to proceed out of time.
b)The Court must be satisfied that hardship would be caused to the applicant if leave to proceed out of time is not granted.
c)Once hardship has been established, the court must be persuaded that discretion should be exercised to grant the leave to proceed.
d)The court in considering whether to exercise the discretion must be satisfied that the respondent will not be prejudiced.
e)Where the court is satisfied that hardship to the applicant will be caused if the leave is not granted, and that granting of leave will not prejudice the respondent, consideration must be had to the circumstances of the matter before leave is granted.
As to the imposition of time limitations on actions and the principles to be adhered to in considering whether leave is to be granted to proceed out of time, the views expressed in the following authorities are noteworthy:-
a)McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at [551] states:-
“The discretion to extend time must be exercised in the context of the rationales for the existence of limitation periods… The enactment of time limitations has been driven by the general perception that…where there is a delay the whole quality of justice deteriorates.”
b)In Whitford & Whitford (1979) FLC 90-612 the Full Court notes at 78,146 that although section 44 confers the power to grant leave for an extension of time in order to avoid hardship that the:-
“power should be exercised liberally in order to avoid hardship, but nevertheless in a manner, which would not render nugatory the requirement that proceedings should be instituted with a year from the decree nisi.”
As to what is meant by the term “hardship” and how hardship is to be assessed is the subject of numerous authorities:-
a)The term “hardship” is not defined in the legislation.
b)In Whitford & Whitford the Full Court observes:-
“In our view the meaning of “hardship” in subsec 44(4) is akin to such concepts as hardness, severity, privation, that which is hard to bear or a substantial detriment.”
c)In Hall & Hall (1979) FLC 90-679 the Full Court states that the authorities:-
“have considered what is meant by the term ‘hardship’… and the term ‘substantial detriment’ seems to be the generally accepted interpretation of that word.”
d)In Whitford & Whitford at 78,145:-
“Hardship may be caused to an applicant if leave were not granted to institute proceedings, although the applicant is not in necessitous circumstances. Whatever the financial situation of an applicant may be …loss of a prospective entitlement to property including money or …ability to have the financial and property relations of the parties adjusted or resolved, may constitute hardship. In some cases where a resolution of the property or financial relationships of the parties is desired, it might be, that the applicant would receive no more or even less, than he or she owns at law or in equity. Nevertheless hardship might be caused to the applicant if leave were not granted so as to facilitate such resolution…”
e)This position is supported by Sharp & Sharp at [131]:-
“…it is apparent that an assessment of hardship requires the court to consider whether the applicant would suffer a substantial detriment as a consequence of the loss of the right to institute the proceedings, although that detriment, in the circumstances of the particular matter, may not be entirely related to financial considerations.”
In Hall & Hall at 78,627 “Fundamental to a [finding of hardship] is the determination of the quality and character of the potential claim”.
In Althaus & Althaus (1982) FLC 91-233 the Full Court observes at 77,267:-
“The exercise is to determine whether there is a reasonable claim to be heard. That is the essence of the inquiry into whether hardship will be suffered by denying the applicant the right to litigate the claim.”
In Hedley & Hedley [2009] Fam CAFC 179 Cronin J cites the Full Court in Richardson & Richardson [2008] FamCAFC 107 at [215] “it is not a decision about whether the claim will succeed but whether there is a reasonable claim to be heard.”
In McDonald & McDonald (1977) FLC 90-317 Evatt C J at 76,688 states that a mere loss of the right to a court action:-
“is not in itself hardship…must be a right which in all circumstances is substantial…the applicant must establish …a prima facie case…that to deny the right to litigate would case hardship…”
a)In Whitford & Whitford at 78,144 and 78, 145:-
“…it must be made to appear to the Court that the applicant would probably succeed if the substantive application were heard on the merits. If there is no real probability of success, then the Court cannot be satisfied that hardship would be caused if leave were not granted… the inability of an applicant to pursue a claim which in the circumstances of the applicant… … is trifling, generally will not cause hardship. Similarly where the costs which the applicant will have to bear…are about as much or more than what the applicant is likely to be warded on a property claim, ordinarily hardship would not result… …otherwise we find no warrant …for saying that the right or entitlement lost must be a substantial one.”
b)In Sharp & Sharp at [17] and [18]:-
“Hardship…is more than the loss of a right to commence proceedings. It is the consequences attending the loss of the right to commence proceedings that constitutes hardship…the well established test is that the applicant must have a prima facie claim worth pursuing or a ‘real probability of success’… …However whether or not hardship exists is not to be assessed only by reason of monetary value of the probably order to be made if leave granted” and at [135] “…what is required by the court is an assessment of the asserted hardship, and in view of that hardship, a determination of whether the applicant has established that there is a reasonable claim to be heard and has demonstrated that he or she would suffer hardship in the form of a substantial detriment as a consequence of the loss of the right to instigate proceedings…then the court may then consider whether in all the circumstances leave should be granted…”
c)In considering whether the applicant has a prima facie or arguable case the following limitation is acknowledged in Sharp & Sharp at [68]:-
“We accept that any such assessment may be somewhat circumscribed because of the limited nature of the evidence presented on an interlocutory application.”
As to the exercise of the court’s discretion the following authorities provide guidance as to the factors to be considered:-
a)In Whitford & Whitford at 78,415 and 78,416 some of the factors to be considered in exercising discretion were identified, including:-
“the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay…the strength on the merits of the applicant’s case…These matters are not necessarily the only ones.”
b)McHugh J in Gallo v Dawson [1990] 93 ALR 479 refers to the need to consider the history of proceedings, the conduct of the parties and the nature of the litigation.
c)On the issue of delay Evatt C J in Althaus & Althaus at 77,267 to 77,268 states:-
“…an explanation of the delay in bringing proceedings …requires a consideration of the whole period from the date of the decree nisi to the lodging of the application. It requires the court to consider whether the wife took all reasonable steps to pursue her claim or whether, on the other hand, she acted at any time as if she had no intention of proceedings or pursuing her claim at all… It requires the court to consider whether it can reach conclusions as to why the proceedings were started beyond the time lodges and whether those proceedings are attributable to default on the part of the applicant.”
As to prejudice to the respondent the following must be considered:-
a)As discussed in McDonald & McDonald and Whitford & Whitford consideration must be had to the prejudice occasioned to the respondent by reason of the delay.
b)In Tamaniego & Tamaniego [2010] FamCAFC 254 at [162] consideration must be had as to whether “to grant leave would prejudice or impose hardship on the respondent…”.
c)Meagher JA in Ramadam v Leda Holdings [2001] NSWCA 41 at [6] in respect to the timing of the prejudice states “it is prejudice to the defendant as at the date of the filing…which must be examined…”
d)Giles JA in McLean v Sydney Water Corporation [2001] NSWCA 122 at [22] states that:-
“…Prejudice engendered by delay and unlikelihood of a fair trial will be highly material, and if there is prejudice and unlikelihood of a fair trial, that will tell strongly, often conclusively, against the grant of an extension of time.”
e)Nygh J in Frost & Nicholson (1981) FLC 91-051 at 76,425 defines prejudice:-
“Prejudice here means that a party faced with an action which he or she had no reason to expect or had been led to believe would not be brought.”
f)In Hedley & Hedley [2009] FamCAFC 179 Cronin J comments at [221]:-
“If a respondent claims to have been prejudiced by the applicant’s delay, in many cases, that can be ameliorated by the court in the substantive property proceedings making assessments and giving weight to contributions and the various factors under s 75(2)….Any prejudice to the respondent can be factored into the ultimate deliberation.”
As to whether the circumstances justify granting of leave, where hardship has been established, and where the respondent will not be prejudiced, is discussed in the following authorities:-
a)Evatt C J in Althaus & Althaus at 77,268 warns:-
“Where hardship to the applicant is established and there is no question of prejudice to the respondent, the Court should not seek to raise artificial barriers if the applicant has behaved in a reasonably diligent manner in prosecuting her claim.”
b)O’Ryan J in Tamaniego & Tamaniego at [162] states when exercising discretion “…the fundamental issue in any application for extension of time is whether this will enable the court to do justice between the parties….”
c)At [97] in Sharp & Sharp the Full Court comments:-
“Even if the Court came to the view that there are no significant prejudice to the respondent, the Court may consider whether in all the circumstances of the case, it is just an reasonable to grant the extension sought.”
Sharp & Sharp at [143] places the onus of proving any injustice on the applicant:-
“Generally, an applicant seeking an extension of time must demonstrate that strict adherence to the relevant provision or rule will result in an injustice.”
Should leave be given to the wife to proceed out of time?
I will now apply the law to the facts and evidence before the court.
The parties separated late December 2014, the date nominated by the wife and agreed to by the husband and the date which appears in the wife’s initiating application.
Although lawyers were engaged by the wife in May 2017 court proceedings were not filed until November 2017, nearly 3 years after separation.
The wife is clearly out of time in bringing her application.
In considering whether leave should be given to proceed out of time it is necessary pursuant to section 44(6) to consider whether hardship will be experienced by the mother if leave is not granted.
Determining hardship in this matter is not easy and requires sifting through an ill-conceived and badly drafted affidavit by the wife.
But this is what I am able to gather:-
a)At the time of separation the major asset was the Property A property, a property financially acquired by the husband and his mother and where the claim by the wife to having contributed to this house is questionable given the lack of evidence as to the amount of contributions made by the wife to its renovations and who the conflicting evidence as to who paid for those renovations and no evidence as to whether the renovations contributed either positively or negatively to the value of the Property A property.
b)In any event the equity in the property, according to the March 2015 letter from the wife’s legal representative to the husband, was some $45,000.
c)The equity in the property has not increased as of today’s date with it being worth roughly the same.
d)The only other assets were household chattels, motor vehicles (one of which was subject to a debt), superannuation (the majority of which was held by the husband) and some tools.
e)In addition there was miscellaneous debts.
f)In essence the wife knew the pool was small.
g)The wife then reportedly negotiated a settlement of $60,000 from husband (a negotiations which is denied by the husband) which is not referred to in the legal correspondence sent by the wife to the husband in March 2015 and appears to be at odds with the text messages which passed between the parties from October 2015 to October 2017, which make no reference to any agreement having being reached earlier in 2015.
h)The wife then made a series of decisions which has added to what she now describes as her hardship; the main decision being the purchase of the Property B property in August 2015; a property that could only be acquired through the generosity of a loan from a family friend and $4,000 paid by the husband to the wife towards stamp duty.
i)According to the wife it has been a financial struggle since then to keep and live in the house although the wife has been able to do so with the ongoing financial assistance of Mr P.
j)The wife now has equity in the Property B property; almost equal to the equity the husband has in the Property A property,
k)As to the issue of refinancing the Motor Vehicle 3 car loan, the logic of such a move did not make sense and nor was it explained why the wife would need to take out a $25,000 loan when according to the legal correspondence sent in March 2015 the loan owing on the car was for $16,000.
l)As to the wife and her employment, again her affidavit is unclear as to her true history of employment.
m)At this point according to her financial statement the wife is working for (employer omitted) (near her place of residence) and earning gross $600 per week and is receiving $400 per week from her company and that these monies are covering her expenses.
n)As to other aspects of hardship, the wife refers to her medical condition which gives rise to migraines, although it is unclear how that impacts on her capacity to hold down employment as there is no evidence before the court.
o)The wife also appears to be on antidepressants but again in the absence of any medical reports, it is unclear how that relates to her inability to work or function.
p)Another aspect of hardship appears to be her inability to engage a lawyer due to the costs.
q)Certainly when still under the one roof the wife engaged the services of a firm who wrote the letter in March 2015 to the husband which sets out the proposal of the wife to receive 60% of the pool; a payment of $98,920 with a suggestion that the husband obtain legal advice and respond within fourteen days.
r)It appears that that was the extent of that particular lawyer’s involvement in the matter.
s)The wife then states that she could not afford any legal representation until May 2017, when Mr P paid for her current lawyers involved.
t)This however contradicts the text messages sent by the wife to the husband, where:-
i)On 22 October 2015 the wife said “I’m looking for a lawyer and you will get the letters in the post”.
ii)8 November 2015 “I’ll be changing CSA tomorrow and calling my lawyers”.
iii)28 January 2016 “I saw my lawyer on Monday I have found out about the settlement”.
iv)28 January 2016 “I’ll see you in court and I’ll take the full 107k and the lawyer I have just gotten has informed me that you are being difficult they will make you pay my court costs as well as your own so good lunch you will get a letter once ive sorted it out”.
v)16 February 2016 “So any news on this other option you were talking about. My solicitor would like to know whats happening so he knows whether or not to start proceedings”.
vi)16 February 2016 “And if you had seen a lawyer they would have explained that the settlement has nothing to do with the house… either way I still get paid before the end of the year”.
As to determining hardship:-
a)In Sharp the questions asked was “is the wife is going to suffer a substantial detriment if she loses her right to institute proceedings?”.
b)In Hall the question asked is “what is the quality and character of the potential claim?”
c)In Althaus the question asked is “is there a reasonable claim?”.
I have asked those questions of this matter and in reality I find as follows:-
a)This is a short relationship just shy of 8 years.
b)The husband brought in assets of greater value than the wife at the commencement of the relationship.
c)The husband earned substantially higher income than the wife during the relationship.
d)The main asset, namely the Property A property, was acquired due to the major financial contribution by the husband’s mother of the deposit.
e)There is a dispute as to the extent of financial contributions made by the wife to work performed on the property and the impact, if any, those renovations have had on the property, including negative contributions.
f)The husband has been solely responsible for maintaining and preserving the Property A property since separation in December 2014.
g)The value of the Property A property has decreased since its acquisition and the husband’s equity in his half share is less than the equity which existed at the date of separation.
h)Given the husband’s financial position a sale of the property would result in even less equity.
i)The only other major asset is the husband’s superannuation.
j)At the time the relationship commenced the husband states that he had $48,000 in superannuation. At the time of separation the wife estimates it was worth $88,000.
k)It has significantly increased since separation.
l)If the matter was to proceed to a determination the husband may successfully argue a two pool approach with superannuation treated separately.
m)The wife has received her car, albeit subject to a loan, household goods and $4,000.
n)The wife has acquired the Property B property since separation.
So does the wife have a reasonable claim? Will that claim be worth proceeding?
I find that any claim is going to be small and that legal costs will exhaust any successful claim by the wife against the husband.
So is there hardship?
Is there substantial detriment?
I find that there is not.
But the hardship factor is not the only issue before the court.
Even if a finding was made that hardship has been established there are other hoops that the wife must jump through before leave to proceed could be granted.
The main hoop is whether the husband would have been prejudiced if leave is granted.
I find that the husband would suffer prejudice.
I make this finding based on the following:-
a)The wife has not adequately explained away the delay in commencing proceedings.
b)Whist stating that she could not afford the services of a lawyer, this is not the picture portrayed to the husband during text messages in 2015/2016.
c)Further, those text messages indicate that the wife knew what she was talking about, including the instigation of proceedings.
d)The wife could have commenced proceedings herself as a self-represented litigant.
e)The wife could have used the additional loan monies when refinancing the car to pay for the lawyer in 2015.
f)The wife could have obtained financial assistance in 2016 from Mr P to pay for a lawyer.
g)Even when Mr P offered to pay for her lawyer in January 2017, only a month outside of the two year period, it took the wife until May 2017 to obtain lawyers and then almost another six months for her lawyer to commence proceedings in November 2017, with no real explanation for the delay in commencing proceedings.
h)The evidence suggests that the wife was not engaging the husband in any attempted negotiations from February 2016 until sometime in the second half of 2017.
i)If leave was granted this would require the husband, who is in no better financial position than the wife, except for a higher income, to incur costs in engaging in court proceedings and may require the sale of the house at Property A as there are no “cash assets” which would leave the husband significantly financially disadvantaged.
In conclusion I find the following:-
a)Hardship has not been established by the wife (which distinguishes this case from the Full Court decision of Slocomb & Hedgewood [2015] FamCAFC 219).
b)Even if hardship had been established the wife had not explained the delay in commencing proceedings.
c)Given the size of the pool and the particular circumstances in this matter it would prejudice the husband for such proceedings to be commenced.
I therefore dismiss the wife’s application to proceed out of time.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge L. Turner
Date: 17 April 2018
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Civil Procedure
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Administrative Law
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Jurisdiction
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Procedural Fairness
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Natural Justice
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Standing
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