Rahme v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DEANE J

ANTOINE MAROUN RAHME AND ANOR v. COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA

(1993) 117 ALR 618

16 November 1993

Orders


Application for a stay of the judgment for possession refused.

Decision


DEANE J This is an application for interlocutory relief pending the hearing of an application for special leave to appeal to this Court from an order of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Mahoney, Sheller and Powell JJA) dismissing an appeal by the present applicants from a judgment for possession of certain land owned by the applicants on which a block of units is erected.

2. The judgment for possession was made by Studdert J in the Supreme Court and was in favour of the present respondent, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The interlocutory order which the applicants now seek is an order staying that judgment for possession either until the hearing of the application for special leave to appeal to this Court or until some time after the Court of Appeal, which has not as yet published its reasons for dismissing the appeal to it, publishes those reasons.

3. The basis upon which the respondent Bank claimed to be entitled to possession was as mortgagee under a mortgage given by the applicants as supporting security for a guarantee of any indebtedness of two companies, David Securities Pty. Limited and A. and T. Rahme and Sons Pty. Limited.

4. I find it unnecessary, for the purposes of dealing with this interlocutory application, to set out the complicated background facts or to trace the lengthy history of the present litigation which goes back to February 1988. It suffices that I identify the reasons which lead me to the conclusion to which I have come.

5. If it be assumed that the guarantee and the supporting mortgage remain enforceable against the applicants, it seems to me to be quite clear that, in all the circumstances, the application for a stay should be refused. On that assumption, there is dispute between the applicants and the Bank about the precise amount which will eventually be secured by the guarantee and the mortgage. That uncertainty results from the fact that the question whether any, and if so what, financial adjustments flow from the decision of this Court in David Securities Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia ((1) (1992) 175 CLR 353) awaits determination by the Federal Court. It is, however, apparent that, on the worst scenario from the Bank's point of view, the consequence of all the litigation to date is that the amount secured by the guarantee and mortgage (if still enforceable) is well in excess of $2.5 million.

6. The material before me discloses that the applicants have made no tender or offer of payment of that amount or of any part of it, nor have they, in the proceedings before me, indicated any willingness to submit to a requirement of such payment as a condition of the grant of a stay of the judgment…
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Details
Case
[1993] HCA 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Rahme and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia were the parties in this matter before the High Court of Australia. The dispute concerned the validity of a mortgage over certain land, which the plaintiff, Rahme, sought to have declared void. The plaintiff alleged that the mortgage was procured by undue influence and unconscionable conduct.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the mortgage was voidable on the grounds of undue influence or unconscionable conduct. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Bank had taken unfair advantage of the plaintiff's special disadvantage, or if the plaintiff had been subjected to undue influence in entering into the mortgage agreement.

Deane J, in his judgment, considered the principles of undue influence and unconscionable dealing. His Honour noted that for undue influence to be established, it must be shown that the plaintiff was under a special disability in dealing with the other party, and that the other party knew or ought to have known of this disability and took unfair advantage of it. His Honour also referred to the equitable doctrine of unconscionable conduct, which requires a party to show that they were under a disability which affected their ability to make a judgment in their own best interests, and that the other party unconscionably took advantage of that disability. The application of these principles to the facts of the case led to the conclusion that the mortgage was not voidable on these grounds.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of the mortgage.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established