Ragnelli v David Jones (Adelaide) Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 82 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

RAGNELLI v DAVID JONES (ADELAIDE) PTY LTD & ANOR

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Duggan and The Honourable Justice Gray)

2 December 2004

TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - ESSENTIALS OF  ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE - DUTY OF CARE - SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND DUTIES - OCCUPIERS

Appeal against decision of Judge of the District Court dismissing a claim for damages - appellant suffered injury as a result of falling down a flight of stairs at the first respondent's department store - oily substance present on marble stairs leading down to a food hall - trial Judge found that first respondent owed the appellant a duty of care but that duty had not been breached - both respondents held not liable in negligence for damages - appeal on grounds that trial Judge erred in finding no breach of duty -  consideration of cleaning contract between first and second respondents - consideration of occupier liability under statute and common law - consideration of standard of care owed by owner of a department store to members of the public  - consideration of adequate cleaning and inspection systems - consideration of principles of breach of duty - consideration of principles of causation.

Held:-  duty of care owed by first respondent to all entrants - standard of care heightened by commercial activities conducted on the premises and the nature and extent of the risk of danger - system of cleaning and inspection in place inadequate - failure to remove oily subtsance from stairs - breach of duty of care by first respondent - injury reasonably forseeable - causation established - first respondent liable in negligence for damages -  appeal allowed - appellant entitled to judgment against the first respondent in the amount of $224,818.95 -  plaintiff's claim against second respondent and claims for contribution between the respondents remitted to trial Judge for determination.

Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) Part 1 B; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 20, referred to.
Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241; Kocis v S. E. Dickens Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 408; Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232; Van de Heurval v Tucker (2003) 85 SASR 512; Kelly v Lend Lease Retail Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 21; Franklins Ltd v Hunter [1998] NSWSC 239; Allcorp Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Fairweather [1998] NSWSC 291; Dulhunty v J B Young Ltd (1975) 50 ALJR 150; Hackshaw v Shaw (1984) 155 CLR 614; Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479; Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; Drakos v Woolworths (SA) Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 431; Griffin v Coles Myer Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 478; Drotem Pty Ltd v Mannig [2000] NSWSC 320;

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ragnelli v David Jones (Adelaide) Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] SASC 393
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the appeal of Ragnelli v David Jones (Adelaide) Pty Ltd, the dispute centred on whether David Jones was negligent in failing to maintain safe premises, leading to Mrs. Ragnelli’s fall and injury. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia. Mrs. Ragnelli alleged that she slipped and fell on an oily substance on the stairs of David Jones's store, which the store was negligent in not cleaning up. David Jones contested the claim, arguing that there was no evidence of an oily substance that could have caused the fall. The primary legal issue before the court was whether David Jones was negligent in maintaining a safe environment for its customers, and if such negligence directly caused Mrs. Ragnelli's fall.

The court examined the evidence presented by both parties. Mr. Ragnelli provided testimony that he found an oily substance on the stairs shortly after the incident, which he believed caused his wife to slip. In contrast, Ms. Donato, a David Jones employee, testified that there was no oily substance present and that the area was safe. The trial judge accepted Mr. Ragnelli’s evidence over Ms. Donato’s, despite the latter's immediate presence and actions following the fall. The court concluded that Mr. Ragnelli’s evidence was not improbable and was supported by the circumstances. The court also rejected the argument that failure to cross-examine Ms. Donato about her inaction regarding the alleged oil precluded acceptance of Mr. Ragnelli’s evidence. The court found that the presence of an oily substance, though not definitively proven, was more probable than not, leading to Mrs. Ragnelli's fall. The court further reasoned that the absence of a reasonable system for inspecting and cleaning the premises, considering the expected hazards, made it probable that the fall would have been avoided if such a system had been in place.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders proposed by Gray J were adopted. The court held that David Jones was liable for Mrs. Ragnelli’s injuries due to its failure to maintain a safe environment. The reasoning followed the established legal principles that if no reasonable inspection and cleaning system was in place, and the evidence suggested that such a system would likely have prevented the accident, then causation could be inferred. The frequency of inspections was considered a crucial factor, with the court determining that in a place where spillages are common, more frequent inspections might be necessary. The final orders reflected the court's decision that David Jones was liable for the injuries sustained by Mrs. Ragnelli.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

My reasons for allowing the appeal differ in some respects from those of Gray J. Accordingly, it is necessary for me to explain why I would make those orders.Facts In making the findings that are summarised by Gray J, the trial Judge accepted evidence from Mr Ragnelli that when he inspected the steps and landing, not long after Mrs Ragnelli fell, he found a small patch of a clear oily liquid and a few drops of the same liquid on the landing between the two flights of stairs. Although the Judge did not make an explicit finding, it is clear that he found that Mrs Ragnelli slipped when she put her foot on this liquid while descending the stairs. Mr McNamara QC, counsel for David Jones, challenged this finding. He submitted that the Judge erred in not accepting evidence from Ms Donato, an employee of David Jones. She was a first aid officer. She came to the place of the fall within a few minutes, and tried to comfort Mrs Ragnelli. Her evidence conflicted sharply with that of Mr Ragnelli, and if accepted pointed to a conclusion that there was nothing oily or slippery on the stairway that could have caused Mrs Ragnelli to fall. Both Mr Ragnelli and Ms Donato gave quite detailed evidence about their observations after the fall, and about things they said to each other. It is common ground that together they inspected the place where Mrs Ragnelli fell, not long after she fell, and discussed the circumstances of the fall. The Judge considered their evidence with care. As is common in such cases, there are matters that tend to support the evidence of each of them. There are obstacles to the acceptance of all of the evidence of each of them. Mr McNamara did not identify anything in the nature of an incontrovertible fact that presented an obstacle to the acceptance of Mr Ragnelli’s evidence. Nor did he point to anything that provided incontrovertible support for Ms Donato’s evidence. He identified a number of difficulties in the way of accepting Mr Ragnelli’s evidence. But they were not difficulties of a kind that precluded acceptance of his evidence. His evidence was not improbable. There were matters that arguably supported the acceptance of Ms Donato’s evidence, but they were no more than that. Mr McNamara submitted that counsel for Mrs Ragnelli at trial failed to cross-examine Ms Donato to the effect that, having been told by Mr Ragnelli that he had found the oily substance, if Mr Ragnelli was to be believed she had then done nothing about the presence of that oily substance, despite, on the plaintiff’s case, it having shortly before led to Mrs Ragnelli falling. Mr Ragnelli had given evidence that when he found the oily substance on the landing, he pointed it out to Ms Donato. Mr McNamara argued that the failure to put to Ms Donato that, if Mr Ragnelli’s evidence was to be accepted, she had failed to take any steps to deal with the source of danger, precluded acceptance of evidence from Mr Ragnelli that involved that conclusion. I do not agree that it was essential to put this to Ms Donato. It was an obvious result of the acceptance of Mr Ragnelli’s evidence. In any event, failure to cross-examine Ms Donato to this effect is not something that, as a matter of fairness to her, precludes acceptance of Mr Ragnelli’s evidence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ DUGGAN J
It suffices that this finding is made on the balance of probabilities. It does not matter that the Court cannot exclude the possibility that the oily substance was deposited only moments before Mrs Ragnelli descended the stairs. For what it is worth, my impression is that in this respect the trial Judge’s finding was in favour of Mrs Ragnelli. My impression is that he found against her only because he considered that the oily substance was difficult to see.Conclusion For those reasons I agree with the orders proposed by Gray J. In my view the appeal should be allowed and I concur in the making of the orders proposed by Gray J. I agree with the reasons for decision prepared by Doyle CJ. I add the following comments on the question of causation. Whilst accepting that there is no unique test for determining causation in “slipping cases”: Kocis v S E Dickens Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 408 at 433, I think the approach to resolving the issue of causation in the present case was appropriately summarised by Higgins J in Kelly v Lend Lease Retail Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 21 when he said at 28:“If it appears that no reasonable system for inspection and cleaning of the floor was in place having regard to expected hazards, it may be inferred that it is probable that if such a system had been in place then the fall would have been avoided.” Presumably the word “may” in this passage does not suggest that a finding in favour of causation must be made automatically; the finding is to be made only if it is appropriate in the circumstances: Franklins Ltd v Hunter [1998] NSWSC 239. This analysis by Higgins J was adopted by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Franklins Ltd v Hunter [1998] NSWSC 329 and Allcorp Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Fairweather [1998] NSWSC 291. It appears to be the same approach as that followed in Brady v GirvanBros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241 at 254 where McHugh JA identified the crucial issue as “whether on the probabilities the evidence of a proper system would have removed the spilt oil before the plaintiff’s fall”. In many of the cases, including the present, frequency of inspection will be a crucial factor in determining whether the defendant’s conduct was causative. As Hayne JA said in Kocis at 433:“Much may turn upon the content of the standard of care and what the evidence reveals about what was done. Thus, where, as here, the premises are of a kind where spillages are commonplace, how often should the occupier inspect the floor? If it is decided that inspections at the defendant’s premises should have been very frequent (as Priestly JA held in Brady’s case) it may be easier to conclude that it is more probable than not had such precautions been taken, the accident would not have occurred. If it is decided (as is implicit in Dulhunty’s[1] case) that frequent inspection of the defendant’s premises was not necessary, the proof of causation may well be more difficult.”[1] Dulhunty v J B Young Ltd (1975) 50 ALJR 150

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ, DUGGAN J

Full text does not contain this section.